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ABSTRACT 
Research indicates that the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure projects continues to fail 
to achieve most of their strategies and benefits, which causes tremendous loss in productivity and 
profitability, whilst impacting organisational performances and stakeholder morale. When it comes to 
implementing or taking a mega project policy into action, such as an economic or social mega infrastructure 
project, even though it may be clear and concise, it tends to go ‘out of control,’ changes or even becomes 
manipulated in varying degrees and intensity over varying periods of time. There is little information as to 
why these phenomena occur. It is estimated that the current spending on megaprojects is USD $6-9 trillion 
a year, roughly eight percent of global GDP, labelling it as the ‘biggest investment boom in human history,’ 
which can serve real needs, meeting the expected surge in the demand for food, water and energy. However, 
such effort is likely to be counterproductive and unsustainable, as a significant proportion of megaprojects 
have substantial cost and time overruns, which impacts productivity, profitability, organisational 
performances and stakeholder morale. This represents a rather disastrous situation for policy-makers, as 
public deficits are increasing, whilst institutional and non-institutional investors are reluctant to invest in 
such projects. 
 
This research aims to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. This also includes the exploration 
of an effective governance mechanism to optimise its success. Particularly with a focus on a muddled and 
strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, intricate, plural and emergent properties of organisational strategic 
decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor (inter)actions. 
This research adopts an interpretivist worldview with an ontological stance, and focuses on case study as a 
methodological approach. The case selected is the AUD $14.7 billion Building the Education Revolution 
(BER) program (around 24,000 infrastructure projects for about 9,500 schools). The research then employs 
a grounded theory methodology to facilitate the generation of new theory. 
 
Four Australian state government agencies and five non-government agencies were selected for this 
research. In-depth interviews were conducted with 17 participants from executives to project managers, 
and six subject-matter experts provided validation on the research propositions that emerged from the 
findings via a modified Delphi technique. 
 
These results lead to a conceptual model for the successful implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. A key finding is that strategically shaping institutional project reality 
aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative is essential 
Abstract 
xii 
in achieving program strategies and benefits. In particular, significantly increasing megaproject 
performances.  
 
This finding has implications for project management theory and practice. In particular, the importance of 
collective institutional leadership, informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project work, project 
reality, and entering a state as a rational agent for the successful implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. The outcome of this research will improve our understanding of how 
megaprojects, taken from a public policy perspective, and subsequent mandated or prosecuted action 
interacts: strategy development and its interpretation into action. Being in such a position, agencies 
including policy-makers will be able to identify the best courses of action and optimise choices in achieving 
project and program strategies and benefits.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
Chapter One Prologue 
What this chapter does: 
The introduction provides the context of the research, problem statement, research rationale and 
significance, relevant literature, research questions and proposition, research design and approach, thesis 
structure and research limitations.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Two will provide a critical review and analysis of the relevant literature related to the 
research topic. 
• Chapter Three will expand the literature review and critically review and analyse the relevant 
literature related to the research topic. This will lead to a conceptual framework and proposition.  
• Chapter Four will discuss the research context, paradigm, methodology, and the case study 
approach in conducting the research. 
• Chapter Five will discuss and describe the case study and the organisations selected as case 
studies. 
• Chapter Six will provide the data analysis and interpretation of the case study.  
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
The strategy research process is like a river. Many researchers take a sample of water from a river, 
or a number of samples, in order to get a statistically valid result. These samples describe something 
about the river – water quality, clarity, temperature, etc. However, they say little about its dynamic 
quality, the flow of the river ‘where it has been and where it is destined’; how the surrounding terrain 
affects, and is affected by, the river; the impact of exogenous factors like rainfall or drought. 
(Chakravarthy and White 2002, p. 200) 
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This river metaphor helps to understand the dynamics and larger process of strategy research, or the 
research stream, which cannot be explored nor explained by static samples. This is like case study research. 
According to Verschuren (2003, p. 137) case study research is: 
A research strategy that can be qualified as holistic in nature, following an iterative-parallel way of 
preceding, looking at only a few strategically selected cases, observed in their natural context in an 
open-ended way, explicitly avoiding (all variants of) tunnel vision, making use of analytical 
comparison of cases or sub-cases, and aimed at description and explanation of complex and 
entangled group attributes, patters, structures or processes.  
This is especially suitable for studying highly complex phenomena, such as the implementation of 
government policy (see Tight 2010). This suggests that it is more appropriate to ‘see’ case study as a 
research process (Tight 2010, Verschuren 2003), like the river metaphor – a holistic, dynamic and complex 
process requiring detailed examination of phenomena in its context i.e., the flow of the river.  
 
The main streams of themes dealt with in the thesis relate to strategy development and its interpretation 
into action (or practice) in the means-end relationship on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure projects. Decisions related to megaprojects, such as economic and social infrastructure 
projects, are generally guided by government policy rather than the market (see Brookes and Locatelli 2015, 
Sanderson and Winch in press, Yescombe 2011) involving a significant plurality of influential stakeholders 
(Peters and Zittoun 2016). Although the research focuses on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects, it is noted that the words ‘project’ and ‘program’- implying mega public 
sector program of projects – will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis unless specified otherwise. 
Furthermore, for this research implementation means: the process of putting a decision or plan into effect 
(Oxford Dictionaries 2016). From a public policy or program policy perspective, implementation means 
‘what happens between policy expectations and (perceived) policy results’ or the means to achieve a desired 
end (Hill and Hupe 2002b, p. 2). Although researchers are ‘mixed’ on the policy/implementation nexus 
(see Hupe and Hill 2016), this research takes a hybrid policy/implementation approach incorporating 
control, institutional and comparative dimensions (Hupe and Hill 2016), thus seeing the relationship 
between policy formation and implementation as one holistic process. Such a view is typical of Federalism 
(May 1995, Ward 2010). From a project perspective, although there are numerous definitions of a project 
(see Turner and Müller 2003), project is defined for this research as ‘a temporary organisation to which 
resources are assigned to do work to deliver beneficial change’ (Turner et al. 2010, p. 14). This includes 
the fundamental concepts of time (it is finite), task (focuses on action; a task must be accomplished, it is 
finite), team (interdependent and legitimate sets of people working together: collective agents), and context 
(inextricably embedded organisationally and socially: its institutional ‘thickness’ or embeddedness) 
(Bakker 2010). Whereas, programs are defined as: 
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Frameworks (of various configurations) to coordinate, communicate, align, manage, and control 
(primarily ‘project’) activities to achieve a desired synergy, benefits, outcome, or vision. A (goal-
oriented) program’s vision and hence its success criteria are usually more strategic, and so program 
outcomes are less tangible then might be found in or desired of projects. Compared to projects, 
programs are emergent in terms of their content, scope, and final outcome, have a far less definite 
time horizon, and are far more embedded within the political, cultural, and governance norms of the 
organisation or community they seek to serve. They draw upon the contribution and participation of 
diverse stakeholders. Program (managers) operate in ‘grey’ environments and deal with powerful 
political forces and greater pluralism (Pellegrinelli et al. 2012, p. 259).  
Furthermore, the term program of projects is defined as ‘a temporary organisation in which a group of 
projects are managed together to deliver higher order strategic objectives not delivered by any of the 
projects on their own’ (Turner and Müller 2003, p. 7). But, to whom? According to political theorists (see 
Klosko 2013, p. 46), quoting Machiavelli, ‘The good ruler must learn to be bad – though while hiding this 
from his credulous subjects. In large part, the evil aura surrounding Machiavelli’s name stems from his 
merciless assault on what people like to believe – and what their rulers like them to believe.’ For the 
unravelling of just ‘thoughts’ will be revealed in this thesis. This raises an interesting paradox of ‘who 
benefits’ relating to the beneficiaries of project outcomes as well as the impact of project delivery processes 
employed. We may consider this aspect from an ethics and a power perspective. A utilitarian outcome view 
– consequentialism – assumes that the end justifies the means taken from a Machiavellian perspective but 
on the other hand we could take a process perspective – deontological ethics – where just, open and 
transparent processes are of central importance to the way that a project is delivered (Helgadóttir 2008).  
 
Davis in his paper ‘That’s Interesting!’ (Davis 1971) argues that an interesting thesis or paper will focus 
upon a paradox and explore and investigate it in a way that illuminates theory gaps and contexts that explain 
how the paradox may arise and how it may be resolved or coped with. Much of this thesis deals with the 
paradox of the means-end paradox of project success and the paradox of who may be considered the rightful 
beneficiary of a successful project outcome.  
1.2 Research Problem 
Research indicates that the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure project policies continue to 
fail to achieve most of their strategies and benefits, which causes tremendous loss in productivity and 
profitability, whilst impacting organisational performances and stakeholder morale (Flyvbjerg 2012, 2014, 
Forthcoming, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Patanakul et al. 2016, Patanakul et al. 2012, Williams 2005). When it 
comes to implementing or taking a government project policy into action, even though it may be clear and 
concise, it tends to go ‘out of control,’ changes or even becomes manipulated in varying degrees and 
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intensity over varying periods of time: a stream of pollutant quality (Flyvbjerg 2005, 2007, 2009b, 2014, 
Flyvbjerg et al. 2009, Flyvbjerg and Molloy 2011). For example, hidden and open agendas, actors within 
and outside of government controlling or shaping government project policies with illusions, deception, 
manipulation and brute external force. Scholars are baffled with the unexpected moves within policy 
processes and unanticipated outcomes (Edelenbos et al. 2009, Van Buuren and Edelenbos 2006, Van 
Buuren et al. 2009). Such phenomena can be seen from a Machiavelli’s lens during the Roman Empire: 
‘although some policies seemed to have good results (successi) at first, the end [il fine] was unexpected and 
the cause of much evil [in-aspettato e cagione di assai male]’ (Benner 2009, p. 326). There is little 
information as to why these phenomena occur. 
1.3 Rationale and Significance for the Research 
The ideas leading to this research study, or underlying rationale, is partly built from the author’s background 
as a steering committee member on an Australian state government mega infrastructure project taskforce, 
which was urgent and unexpected, fulfilling objectives of an overarching crisis program. The overarching 
program was the Australian Government’s AUD $14.7 billion Building the Education Revolution (BER) 
program. The taskforce oversaw the implementation of a mega infrastructure project to the value of about 
AUD $1 billion in the period of 2010 to 2012. The in-action and on-action experience in the taskforce 
aroused the author’s attention about how outcomes of the mega infrastructure project of intangible 
complexity and high political importance may be affected by stakeholder (inter)actions and the balance of 
tribal powers1.  
 
Despite the fact, the particulars of the project taskforce cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons, 
I can reveal that the taskforce involved highly experienced, knowledgeable and powerful individuals i.e., 
hand-picked project team members, including ministers, executives, senior government project managers, 
senior external project managers from a large international consultancy firm, and a dedicated team of 
solicitors. It can also be revealed that the project was an apparent constituent project of the BER program. 
Some similarities with the project taskforce and the BER program are: urgent and unexpected (a ‘crisis’), 
megaproject requiring rapid implementation, and operated in a highly complex institutional environment 
at the edge of chaos. The project taskforce had clear strategic objectives and outcomes directed by state 
government, but subsequently failed to achieve most of its strategies and benefits. This led to significant 
cost and time overruns, impacted organisational performances and stakeholder morale, and eventually led 
to the demise of the ruling government. This failure may be attributed to many complicated and complex 
                                                 
1 The concept of tribal powers within this research project is seen as factional interests and power structures (Smith 
and Winter 2010), which can also be seen as Machiavellianism (Adams 1997, Bass and Bass 2008), within a public 
sector organisational project context. 
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intertwined issues emanating from the stakeholder environment. For example, although the strategies of 
the project where clear and concise, apparently different individuals and groups had different images, or 
interpretations, on the implementation of the project with tribalistic traits, which was eventually seen as 
‘Machiavellianism.’ Basically, Machiavellianism stands for power, deceit, coercion and using any means 
to achieve desired ends (Adams 1997, Bass and Bass 2008).  
 
This led me to question the reasoning behind mega infrastructure project policy failure based on my 
observations on the (inter)actions amongst and between individuals and institutions during project 
implementation, particularly at the front-end. For example: Why do individuals and groups form powers of 
coalition to implement project’s their way? Why do individuals overpower projects with self-serving or 
group interests? Who ‘really’ makes project decisions? What are the main factors that influence, or 
perhaps shape, strategic decision-making on mega infrastructure project policies? Who has the most 
influential power on projects? How do individuals exercise power? What is the best way to manage or cope 
with tribalism and Machiavellianism to implement a successful project policy? All these questions led to a 
major research theme: Is there any empirical support that a mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects can be successfully implemented from a muddled and strategic context, intertwined in often 
unforeseen ways between different agency and actor (inter)actions? The establishment of this research 
theme became the starting point of this PhD study. 
 
Although there is abundant literature on project policy implementation and its effect on project success2, 
such as significant cost escalations and time overruns (see Flyvbjerg 2012, 2014, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, 
Legac et al. 2014, Love et al. 2012, Williams 2005); however, few have touched into the context of how 
these effects came to realisation. What is more, leading scholars clearly indicate that research on policy 
implementation is in deficit (see Peters and Zittoun 2016, Saetren 2014).  
 
The significance of this research instigates from the ancient Egyptian monuments to contemporary 
infrastructure projects. Examples of implementing iconic project policies can be seen from the distant past, 
for example by the Egyptians with the pyramids (Morris 1994), the Greeks with the construction of the 
Temple Zeus Basileus in the fourth century BC (Pitt 2014), the Roman Empire (Walker and Dart 2011) and 
in ancient China (Pheng 2007). Contemporary mega infrastructure project policy implementation examples 
have ‘enjoyed a symbolic, often even religious, connotation’ (Morris 1994, p. 4) are also evident (Flyvbjerg 
Forthcoming). A key feature of these projects was that: the end always justified the means for the 
                                                 
2 Success from a policy perspective is seen from a realism position, and basically means, ‘a policy is successful insofar 
as it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve. From a project policy perspective, this is the achievement 
of project policy objectives and outcomes. However, only those supportive of the original goals are liable to perceive, 
with satisfaction, a policy success. Opponents are likely to perceive failure, regardless of the outcomes, because they 
did not support the original goals’ (McConnell 2010, p. 225).  
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‘emperors,’ who were seen as gods or goddesses (Wasson 2014). According to Walker and Dart (2011, p. 
8) an ‘emperor’ would attach ‘one’s name to an important piece of public infrastructure to enhance personal 
prestige.’ Other common characteristics are: public-private partnerships, ‘slave’ labour3, an ‘emperor’ 
exercised control (i.e., hierarchical decision-making), legal and other formal frameworks, political ethics 
behind the means-end relationship, and minimal knowledge transfer (see Bredillet 2014, Pheng 2007, 
Walker and Dart 2011). Little has changed from the means-end perspective where the end always justifies 
the means for ‘emperors,’ or with the implementation of contemporary project policies for elite politicians.  
 
Upon implementation, project policies experience the adverse effects of the ‘iron law of megaprojects’ 
through a Machiavellianism 4  lens, which not only causes tremendous cost and time overruns, but 
demoralises the project environment where government portfolios and industry sectors struggle to survive. 
Cries for help continue to perpetuate the project management and government policy sectors with some 
calling it a fiasco (Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016) resulting in neither policy delivery or positive political 
reputation or absolute ‘insanity’ (Morris 2008). Which perhaps could not be further from the truth, as Albert 
Einstein supposedly once said, ‘the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and 
expecting a different result’ (Gingrich and Varroney 2010, Morris 2008, quoting Albert Einstein). This 
implies that such insane fiascos for project policy implementation are the rule rather than the exception, 
where a solution must be hastily found. Both in the scholarly community and professional project 
management practice, the future of project policy implementation looks rather oblique and treading on 
traditional contagious grounds – or on a project policy minefield. In addition, the scholarly and practitioner 
community clearly indicate that we are seeing the implementation of project policy ex ante or even prima 
facie – in other words we are in a perpetual state of fighting the last project war, but instead we should be 
asking: ‘In what ways can we prospectively imagine how to better fight the next war?’ (Corley and Gioia 
2011, p. 25, emphasis in original). This is the significance of this PhD research thesis: to implement a better 
way to fight the next project policy war. As Bovens and ‘t Hart (2016, p. 662) state ‘big policy failures can 
be, but all too seldom are, a trigger for big policy learning that reduces the likelihood of their reoccurrence.’ 
The World Economic Forum also augments this view (Alexander 2015).  
 
To understand this requires depth and breadth in the research process, an understanding of how project 
policy ‘emperors’ and ‘troops’ fight project wars, the tools needed to succeed, which may in Bovens and ‘t 
Hart (2016, p. 663) words: ‘generate terrible unintended consequences.’ Preventing such insane project 
                                                 
3 In ancient times, slave labour was common, and such commonality where contractors are ‘slaves’ to an ‘emperor’ 
with limited ‘degrees of freedom’ can be seen in modern project environments (Lingard et al. 2012).  
4 Machiavellianism is associated with the ‘doctrine of moral expediency and deviousness in political action; the 
divorce of politics from private morality; and the justification of all political means, even the most unscrupulous when 
the interests of the state are at stake’ (Ramsay 2012, p. 3). Almost 500 years after Machiavelli, man is still searching 
for inner meaning, balance, and an equal position in governance – interpretations of our reality – a position similar to 
where Machiavelli was in his world (Easley and Swain 2006).  
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policy fiascos – implementation failures – requires research into two fundamental phenomena to improve 
our understanding of how megaprojects, taken from a public policy perspective, and subsequent mandated 
or prosecuted action interacts: strategy development and its interpretation into action.  
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
Given that the implementation of mega infrastructure projects continues to fail to achieve most of their 
strategies and benefits, where decisions are generally guided by government policy rather than the market, 
the aim of the research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. This also includes the 
exploration of an effective governance mechanism to optimise its success. Particularly with a focus on a 
muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, intricate, plural and emergent properties of 
organisational strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency 
and actor (inter)actions. The main thrust of this argument, and its limitations thereof, is based on that fact 
that there are no identifiable and influential decision points in the organisational project policy process, 
thus avoiding Wilsonianism i.e., clear distinction between politics and administration, which can often 
produce ambiguous results (Hupe and Hill 2016). This truly signifies the process in understanding the 
means-end relationship on project policy implementation. The principal objectives of the research are: 
i. To examine and evaluate the literature on project strategy and the front-end, decision-making 
theory, external and internal environmental factors that influence organisational strategic decision-
making, governance and policy implementation.  
ii. To develop a plausible and working proposition, and a conceptual framework for the design and 
conduct of the research. 
iii. To identify and evaluate principal factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making 
on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. 
iv. To develop a conceptual framework to that can be used in research and practice to optimise the 
successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects.  
v. To suggest ways of improving project sponsors (policy-makers) and project manager’s decisions 
towards the successful implementation of mega infrastructure projects.  
In summary, research objectives (i)-(ii) aim to provide literature on the concepts that influence the 
successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects; and objectives (iii-v) 
are designed to validate the proposition and conceptual framework aimed at optimising the successful 
implementation of mega infrastructure projects. 
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1.5 Relevant Literature 
A critical review and analysis of the relevant literature (i.e., leading concepts, theories, data and patterns) 
to the research problem is discussed in Chapter Two and Three. However, to assist readers, table 1-1 was 
created to highlight the emergent themes and rationale for the relevant literature. This enabled me to deeply 
understand factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega 
public sector infrastructure program of projects.  
Table 1-1: Summary of Relevant Literature by Themes and Rationale 
Literature Themes Relevant Literature Rationale 
Project strategy and the 
front-end 
Artto et al. (2008b), Carter et al. 
(2015), Chakravarthy and White 
(2002), Hosking (2007), Kay et al. 
(2006), Lawrence et al. (2009), 
Macmillian and Tampoe (2000), 
Snowden and Boone (2007), Uhl-
Bien (2006), Uhl-Bien and Marion 
(2011), Walker et al. (2008b), 
Watkins (2009), Wensley (2003). 
The implementation of project strategies 
tends to be seen as a linear or rational 
function, cascading from organisational 
strategies. Considering it often fails to 
achieve its strategies and benefits, a better 
understanding is needed of how project 
strategies are implemented, particularly the 
front-end and strategic intent behind project 
policy implementation. 
Decision-making 
theory 
Buijs et al. (2009), Child et al. 
(2010), Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992), Langley et al. (1995), 
Mintzberg and Westley (2010), 
Morris et al. (2010), Müller et al. 
(2008), Nutt and Wilson (2010), 
Parkin (1996), Pentland and 
Feldman (2005), Pettigrew (2003), 
Rainey et al. (2010).  
Decision-making on the implementation of 
project policies is seen as a rational and 
easy process. But completely on the 
contrary. It is strategic, complex, dynamic 
and characterised by plurality within agency 
actor (inter)actions. To understand these 
phenomena, strategy development and its 
interpretation into action, requires an 
understanding of how organisational actors 
‘make’ strategic decisions for the 
implementation of project policies. This 
also requires an understanding of the ethics 
behind decision-making, and the internal 
and external factors that influence 
organisational strategic decision-making. 
Ethics Bredillet (2014), Clarke and Fuller 
(2010), Clegg et al. (2007), Elm 
Ethical decision-making on the 
implementation of policies is highly 
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Literature Themes Relevant Literature Rationale 
and Radin (2012), Helgadóttir 
(2008), Müller et al. (2013), 
Rossouw and Van Vuuren (2003), 
Selsky and Parker (2010), 
Sendjaya et al. (2016), Van 
Prooijen and Ellemers (2015), 
Vurro et al. (2010), Walker et al. 
(2008a). 
complex and contains areas of grey, which 
tends to be seen from a consequentialism 
lens. To make better ethical decisions, 
particularly from a social perspective, 
requires an understanding of the complex 
network of relationships including the 
process of institutional sensemaking, 
strategic collaboration, and deontological 
ethics. 
External environmental 
factors that influence 
organisational strategic 
decision-making on 
project policy 
implementation 
Allison (1971), Artto et al. 
(2008a), Bourne and Walker 
(2005), Child et al. (2010), Clegg 
et al. (2006), Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2009), Mintzberg (1983), Pierre 
(2006), Sallinen et al. (2013), 
Vuori et al. (2013), Wilson (2003).  
Organisational strategic decision-making 
tends to be influenced, or shaped, by the 
external project policy environment – for 
the better or worse. Internal organisational 
actors tend to surrender a significant 
proportion of their ‘power’ to external 
powers which influences project policy 
outcomes. This can lead to the demise of 
decision makers and government agencies. 
Consequently, this requires an 
understanding of the external powers of 
influence on project policy implementation.  
Internal environmental 
factors that influence 
organisational strategic 
decision-making on 
project policy 
implementation 
Allen (2003), Andersen et al. 
(2009), Clegg et al. (2006), 
Eisenhardt and Iii (1988), 
Flyvbjerg (1998), Gohler (2009), 
Haugaard and Clegg (2009), 
Jarzabkowski (2008), Mintzberg 
(1983), Pfeffer (1992a), 
Shrivastava and Grant (1985), 
Williams and Samset (2010), 
Wilson (2003). 
Similar to the external project policy 
environment, organisational strategic 
decision-making tends to be influenced, or 
shaped, by the internal project policy 
environment. Organisational actors tend to 
form powerful relations to influence project 
policy outcomes. Consequently, this 
requires an understanding of the internal 
powers of influence on project policy 
implementation.  
Governance and policy 
implementation 
Ahola et al. (2014), Bijlsma-
Frankema and Woolthuis (2005), 
Caers et al. (2006), Chiles and 
McMackin (1996), Das and Teng 
Governance tends to focus on the 
interactions between government 
organisations, and the dependency thereof 
on, the wider societal organisations for 
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Literature Themes Relevant Literature Rationale 
(2001), Dietz et al. (2010), 
Edelenbos et al. (2010b), Fast et al. 
(2012), Fiss (2008), Flyvbjerg 
(2009a, 2009b), Foss and Stea 
(2014), Meyerson et al. (1996), 
Müller (2012), Puranam and 
Vanneste (2009), Teisman et al. 
(2009a), Van Ees et al. (2009), 
Vickerman (2007), Walker and 
Jacobsson (2014). 
project policy implementation. Here 
government tends to be the controlling 
entity with high levels of cognitive biases in 
rationalising decisions, which significantly 
impacts, rather negatively, project policy 
implementation. To understand this 
‘demoralising’ phenomenon and optimise 
project policy success requires an effective 
governance mechanism for project policy 
implementation.  
1.6 Research Questions and Proposition 
The literature review shows significant gaps in the knowledge about factors that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects, 
particularly, from a muddled and strategic context, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different 
agency and actor (inter)actions. The literature shows that the concept of strategy, decision-making, and 
power in and around organisations has been studied in-depth and in different contexts. What is missing are 
research studies showing clear guidance and insight for understanding influential factors on organisational 
strategic decision-making, and an effective governance mechanism for mega public sector infrastructure 
program of projects implementation. Consequently, this research study will seek to answer the following 
questions, which were derived from the literature review: 
RQ1  To what extent and how do the external factors of economic environment, social environment, 
political, and expert knowledge influence organisational strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects? 
RQ2 To what extent and how do the internal factors of power and politics, information and 
knowledge, culture, and governance influence organisational strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects? 
The first research question focuses on the external, and the second on the internal, factors that influence 
organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure 
program of projects. The relative ‘openness’ of these research questions allows for flexibility and an 
interactive approach to the interviews with the aim to generate interviewees’ accounts of their own 
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perspectives, perceptions, experiences, (inter)actions, etc. This will enable me to obtain a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon under question and develop a conceptual framework. 
 
Based on the analysis of the literature review, the following plausible and working proposition was 
developed and articulated which guided the research process: 
Proposition: Project management, seen as an instrumental technocratic process, is in fact an 
institutional emergent process which leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. 
1.7 Research Design and Approach 
To understand factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of projects, I needed to delve deeply into the organisational 
strategic decision-making process. This directs to a study about the (inter)actions of agencies and actors. 
The political and project environment, and how these (inter)actions, their means and patterns thereof to 
achieve desired ends, influenced project policy outcomes – their temporary institutionalised project reality. 
This research adopted an interpretivist worldview with an ontological stance. Interpretivism enables the 
researcher to understand (Verstehen) the world of human experience (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006, emphasis 
added). Ontology is the philosophical study of the reality or nature of being. One of the reasons for 
conducting case study research with an ontological stance is the conviction that such cases reflect the reality 
of a situation or process (Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010, p. 630). Taken together, ontology 
(i.e., subjectivist) and epistemology (i.e., interpretivist) are related in commonsense actions and 
interactions, and from a research methods perspective, semi-structured interviews, case studies or grounded 
theory are used to explore different meanings, perceptions, and interpretations of organisational actors 
(Cunliffe 2011, Scotland 2012), which is particularly dominate in project management research (see 
Biedenbach and Müller 2011). 
 
A case study is a commonly used method to study organisational behaviour, seen from either a qualitative 
or quantitative stance, or even combinations of them (Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010), which 
enables a researcher to explore real-life, contemporary bound system (a case) over time, through detailed, 
in-depth data collection from multiple sources (Creswell 2013, Yin 2014). The selection of the case study 
was strategically based on the research goal, type of causal effect, and level of analysis, basically, a focus 
on the cross-case characteristics, sufficiency and necessity of a case: how the case fits into the theoretically 
specified population (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The AUD $14.7 Building the Education Revolution 
(BER) program meet such strategic characteristics, and subsequently, was selected as the case study. 
Additionally, the program was unique in terms of how the Australian government had to respond to the 
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global financial crisis with rapid implementation of the program to stimulate the Australian economy, which 
required co-operation among federal, state and territory governments and the non-government education 
sector. The program’s aims were to provide rapid construction of school-based infrastructure, and build 
integrated learning environments. Furthermore, to understand organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of the program, I deeply analysed the creation and evolution of influential 
environmental factors in their context. I traced the origin and effects of these influential factors on 
organisational strategic decision-making through semi-structured interviews and document analyses. I also 
made a conscious effort not to define the boundary of the case study too narrowly prior to the study.  
1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis contains nine chapters including a literature review. The literature leads to a conceptual (or 
literature mind map) framework for the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure 
program of projects, which evolved throughout the research process. Thereafter, the thesis explains the 
research methodology which includes a case study approach. The final chapter includes the conclusions 
and recommendations. The outline of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter Two Literature Review (Part I) 
This chapter provides a critical review and analysis of the relevant literature related to the research topic 
including project strategy and the front-end, and decision-making theory (‘the emergent themes’). This will 
be an evolving chapter throughout the research and will ask questions such as: How are project strategies 
implemented? How are strategic decisions made in public and private organisations?  
Chapter Three Literature Review (Part II) 
Chapter Three expands on the second chapter of the literature review and critical reviews and analyses the 
relevant literature on external and internal factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making, 
governance and policy implementation (‘the emergent themes’). Chapter two and three are evolving 
chapters throughout the research and will ask questions such as: What external and internal environmental 
factors influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects? How can we implement a governing mechanism for project policy 
success? The literature review ends with a conceptual framework providing a detailed relationship analysis 
of the core mechanisms or concepts and their associated activities based on the assumptions from the 
literature review and a plausible proposition. The conceptual framework and proposition will also be 
revised and refined throughout the research process.
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
1 
 
Chapter Four Methodology and Research Design 
Chapter Four will discuss the research context, paradigm, methodology and method (case study approach 
supported by qualitative methods of semi-structured interviews, modified Delphi technique, reflections, 
and documentation), case organisations, research instruments, and the triangulation of the case study data.  
Chapter Five Case Study Data 
In this chapter, I discuss and describe the case study and the organisations that were selected as case studies. 
This also includes a general background of each organisation including their relationships, and project 
policy implementation plan. A key objective is to achieve depth of data (triangulation and thick description) 
to generate substantive evidence and rich understandings about the case study – thus increasing its 
credibility and applicability. This information forms the platform for data analysis and interpretation.  
Chapter Six Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Chapter Six consists of preparing and organising the case study data; describing, classifying and 
interpreting the data into codes, categories and themes; and interpreting and presenting the data. NVivo 
was used to code and categorise the data. The intended analytical strategy was to follow the theoretical 
proposition initially proposed in the research study, and the intended analytical tactic was to use pattern 
matching which will assist to strengthen the internal validity of the research study. 
Chapter Seven Validation of Findings 
Chapter Seven provides the validation of the case study research which is achieved as follows. Construct 
validity with the collection of multiple sources of information, review of transcripts by participants, clear 
chain of evidence, explanation of data collection and data analysis, and a modified Delphi technique; 
internal validity through theory triangulation; external validity through explaining the rationale for the case 
study selection and details of case study context; and reliability through case study protocol and the case 
study database.  
Chapter Eight Research Reflections 
In this chapter, I intend to provide reflections of the research process. Evidence of reflection are provided 
by a journal (or research diary), including the exploration of ideas and concepts, linking theory to practice, 
and documenting my development as a researcher. This also added to the validation of the research process. 
Chapter Nine Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Nine provides the findings, insights and recommendations for practice and future research. One of 
the main objectives is to offer a protocol of how the subject project could be improved in the future.  
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1.9 Research Limitations 
This research investigates factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. There are a few limitations 
associated with this research, particularly the rather small sample size of participants.  
 
The case study used in this research to investigate organisational strategic decision-making is limited to the 
Australian public sector infrastructure project and program context. Although the case study is very specific 
i.e., a temporary crisis program of projects, and only limitedly generalizable to other contexts, the approach 
and methodology can be extended to other industry sectors, such as the pharmaceutical or the financial 
sector; developing countries, such as Africa and Latin America; other temporary organising, such as the 
interplay of structure and agency over a period of time in defence, national security taskforces or in the 
formation of temporary alliances; and, to the fast paced and unpredictability of technological advances 
which tend to have low spatial organisational proximity. In addition, the scope conditions are constrained 
to megaprojects; federal and state government agencies, and for-profit organisations.  
 
Although document analysis provides a valuable source of data from other agencies participating in the 
case study, the data could have been more information-rich if other agencies and agency actors participated 
in the research. However, this was predominately constrained by the research timeframe and allocation of 
funding to conduct the research.  
 
Considering the case study was retrospective, this constrained the data gathering process particularly from 
a ‘situated’ sensemaking perspective. I relied on participants’ memory to recall real-world accounts. Having 
the ability to capture real-world data in context i.e., direct participant observations, would have potentially 
provided more information-rich data. It would have enabled me to describe human interaction and 
behaviour through firsthand accounts – allowing me to ‘live’ and ‘breath’ everyday realities of the social 
worlds, as described by Yin (2014). However, a major drawback with such a process is gaining access to 
participants in real-world events, particularly within a government context. Additionally, covert participant 
observations are rare because of ethical considerations including deception surrounding its nature. Having 
pointed out these limitations, I must stress that I was able to gain access to significant documentary evidence 
as indicated in section 4.8 Research Instruments and referred to throughout the thesis Chapters Five to 
Eight. In particular, Chapter Seven addresses research validity constraints, limitations and strategies 
deployed in this research.  
 
Another constraint is the tedious time it takes to obtain case study documents, particularly under the 
freedom of information legislation. As the case study was a mega public sector infrastructure program of 
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projects, some documents took over one year to obtain, which was only possible with the intervention of 
the Australian Information Commissioner. Such a process is significantly constraining on the research 
process.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW (PART I) 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
The research context was situated in understanding and explaining factors that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects. This includes the exploration of governance mechanisms to optimise its success considering 
the high rate of project policy failures.  
What this chapter does: 
The first chapter of the literature review provides a critical review and analysis of the relevant literature 
related to the research topic, being, project strategy and the front-end, and decision-making theory.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Three will expand the literature review and critically review and analyse external and 
internal factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making, governance and policy 
implementation. This will lead to a conceptual framework and proposition. 
• Chapter Four will discuss the research context, paradigm, methodology, and the case study 
approach in conducting the research. 
• Chapter Five will discuss and describe the case study and the organisations selected as case 
studies. 
• Chapter Six will provide the data analysis and interpretation of the case study.  
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
Men are in general ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, but as long as you succeed, they are 
yours entirely. (Graham 1996, p. 67, quoting Machiavelli) 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
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the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. I believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable policy-makers and 
project managers to implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to 
eradicate potential ‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process. To carry out this study, it was necessary to 
complete a critical review of the salient literature, which was ongoing throughout the data collection and 
analysis process, and summary phases of the study.  
 
This critical review explores the complex, dynamic, intricate, plural and emergent properties of 
organisational strategic decision-making for project policy implementation. Particularly, it focuses on two 
major areas of literature: (1) project strategy and the front-end; and (2) decision-making theory. A review 
of the literature on project strategy and the front-end provides an understanding of the how project strategy 
is implemented for, and its impact on, project policies within an organisational context. This includes a 
discussion on the concepts of strategic intent, collective leadership, leadership within complex contexts, 
institutionalism and institutional work, and the concept of project strategy. Decision-making theory is then 
reviewed to provide a context for understanding how organisational actors make strategic decisions. This 
includes a discussion on the concepts of decision-making, strategic decision-making, organisational and 
political strategic decision-making, and strategic decision-making in professional and public organisations. 
2.2 Project Strategy and the Front-End 
The Oxford Dictionaries (2013) defines strategy as ‘a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or 
overall aim.’ Britannica (2013) defines it as the ‘art of employing plans toward a goal.’ This resonates with 
the definition of policy, which is seen as a course of action or a web of decisions which take place over a 
long period of time to achieve goals (Hill 2009). This strongly suggests that policies are complex, dynamic 
and change over time. Cummings and Wilson (2003) describe strategy as a movement toward the future, 
which enables organisational actors to think and act strategically. Thinking strategically involves the use 
of images and strategic frameworks to perceive or visualise a preferred end state, whereas acting 
strategically involves getting people behind a decision so as to take a course of action to get to that state 
(Cummings and Wilson 2003). Although originally derived from and linked to the art of war (see Wensley 
2003), it was first introduced into management by Chandler (1962) to mean the achievement of goals or 
objectives as well as the courses of action: a formal planning process. It is predominantly seen as a linear, 
bureaucratic and rational process, setting goals and objectives as well as courses of action (Faulkner and 
Campbell 2006, Kay et al. 2006, Steensen 2014, Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). This is analogous to nineteenth-
century Newtonian thinking in which the universe is said to operate in a precise and linear manner – as with 
contemporary policy problems, implementation and decision-making (Givel 2015). This linear, formal or 
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rational strategic process has significant cognitive limitations, for example, too much reliance on executives 
for making and implementing strategic decisions (Chakravarthy and White 2002), which results in 
bureaucratisation of the planning and governing process (Gluck et al. 1982, Mintzberg 1994, Uhl-Bien et 
al. 2007). Although conventionally, strategy is seen ‘as a purposeful, future-oriented activity represented 
by plans and objectives’ (Legge 2003), it also emphasises leadership, vision and mission (Kay et al. 2006). 
Such a view is important for strategy implementation and change (Kantabutra and Avery 2010), as leaders 
who use vision and mission statements are able to pursue new directions, mobilise people to action and 
maintain high levels of sustainable success (Berson et al. 2001).  
 
The perceived end state needs also to be appreciated within its situational context. Snowden has developed 
the Cynefin framework which is a useful tool for making sense of situations that the project faces as well 
as being relevant in the way the domains of order and unorder are perceived (Kurtz and Snowden 2003). 
Ordered domains comprise simple/known and complicated situations that are the domain for most projects 
where traditional project management and strategy development approaches apply. Unordered domain 
situations comprise complex or chaotic contents where ‘best’ or ‘better’ practice is no longer useful 
requiring a different approach to both strategy development as well as strategy implementation and 
leadership style (Snowden and Boone 2007). The influence of complexity is discussed later as it has a 
profound impact on how decisions are made and best carried out. Thus, this requires a deeper understanding 
of strategy development and its interpretation into action, which is the essence of strategic intent. 
 Strategic Intent 
At the core of strategy and its purposeful action orientated towards the future is strategic intent (Wensley 
2003). The Dictionary of Business and Management (2009) defines strategic intent as a clearly understood 
statement, such as a vision or mission statement, for what an organisation will become. It is, however, more 
than a vision or mission statement as it also outlines a clear strategy for achieving that vision, a means 
towards the end including capturing the essence of winning, embedding stability, group identity, setting 
targets that deserve personal effort and commitment, making the right decisions within the right structure 
and right culture, sensemaking and sensegiving, and adopting the necessary leadership style (Delisle 2007, 
Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Hamel and Prahalad 1989, 2005, Haslam and Reicher 2007, Levin 2000, Smith 
1994, Thoms and Kerwin 2007, Watkins 2009, Wensley 2003). The concept of strategic intent was 
introduced by Hamel and Prahalad (1989) to envision a desired leadership position. It goes beyond the 
traditional, and rather still dominate, concept of strategy such as: ‘strategic fit,’ ‘generic strategies,’ and 
‘strategy hierarchies’ (Hamel and Prahalad 1989, Kay et al. 2006, Wensley 2003) and being seen as an 
rationalist paradigm (Chakravarthy and White 2002, Kay et al. 2006). It enables collective and co-ordinated 
action and agency (Goldman 2012, Mantere 2013, Mantere and Sillince 2007, O'Shannassy 2016, Wensley 
2003), and formulating a ‘criterion of we-intent’ (Mantere and Sillince 2007, p. 419) through powerful 
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discourse (Mantere 2013). This is further professed by Campbell and Yeung (1991), Chakravarthy and 
White (2002), and Collins and Porras (2005) who argue that a mission is about organisational culture, a 
way of behaving, and strategy: the present state. This includes its values, beliefs and morals that ‘glue’ an 
organisational culture as a collective unit: constituting a high performance team (Katzenbach and Smith 
1994). Vision is about the concept of leadership: the future state of an organisation. It is a descriptive story 
of the desired future in action (Levin 2000). They further argue that although strategic intent envisions a 
desired leadership position, which draws from both vision and mission statements, it does along with vision, 
have some limitations. Vision and strategic intent begin to lose their power once it is achieved and it can 
leave organisations powerless and directionless (Campbell and Yeung 1991), and in an uncertain world 
their pre-emption might become illusory (Wensley 2003). Cyert and March (1963) and Simon (1964) argue 
that it is difficult for organisations to have strategic intent. The rationale behind their argument is that 
organisations consist of individuals who form temporary powers of coalition, and therefore, only 
individuals can have strategic intent. Although they have some limitations, which are minor in that, majority 
of scholars profoundly profess that strategic intent along with vision and mission statements are powerful 
strategic tools and a necessity for strategy implementation (Chakravarthy and White 2002, Kay et al. 2006, 
Macmillian and Tampoe 2000, Pearce II and Robinson 2011, Verma 2009, Wensley 2003), especially in a 
project environment with the achievement of successful outcomes (Christenson and Walker 2008, Walker 
et al. 2008b). This should be the starting point for a project policy: a compelling vision that ‘captures the 
core purpose, preferred future state and essence of the project objectives, its raison d’etre’ (Walker and 
Rowlinson 2008, p. 55). Here project selection and outcomes must align with the strategic intent, including 
group identity, to achieve project success, especially with mega infrastructure projects where decisions 
have political and social consequences (Norrie and Walker 2004, Walker et al. 2008a). 
 
Furthermore, the literature implies that capturing the ‘power’ of key and influential stakeholders is 
absolutely essential for an inspirational and sustainable strategic intent (Macmillian and Tampoe 2000). If 
‘powerful’ stakeholder views and not taken into account in developing strategic intent, it can derail or divert 
an organisation from its strategic direction and impact its survival (Macmillian and Tampoe 2000). As 
Denis et al. (2012, p. 254) argue ‘actors are present in leadership – creating it, maintaining it, and disrupting 
it – but they are not containers of leadership.’ Leadership is therefore seen as a group characteristic (Denis 
et al. 2012, Katzenbach and Smith 1994), an emergent approach, culturally embedded (i.e., values, 
behaviours, ideologies) which is institutionalised (Crevani et al. 2007, Hosking 2011, Uhl-Bien 2006, Uhl-
Bien and Marion 2011). This strongly suggests that leadership is a relational effect imbedded within social 
(inter)actions. This also resonates with Smith and Winter (2010, p. 53) saying that ‘projects are formed in 
the social world.’ Furthermore, it is ‘at the same time an outcome of actors’ interactions and a contextual 
element that shapes the interactions that follow’ (Denis et al. 2012, p. 261). Consequently, this relies on 
examining the context of strategic intent including leadership and actor relations or interactions. 
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 Collective Leadership 
The literature on strategic intent implies the essence of collectivism and leadership, which is well worth 
exploring. However, prior to exploring these concepts it is important to remember a quote from 
Machiavelli: 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to 
handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by 
the old order, and only lukewarm defenders who would profit by the new order. (Bass and Bass 2008, 
p. 161) 
What Machiavelli implies is that strategic change requires strong collective leadership and understanding 
the relational behaviour of actors to achieve desired outcomes – the means-end relationship (Drescher et 
al. 2014, Macmillian and Tampoe 2000), which is critical in forming strategic intent (Macmillian and 
Tampoe 2000, Pearce II and Robinson 2011). Collective leadership is seen as a ‘shared, relational, strategic, 
and complex social dynamic’ (Avolio et al. 2009, p. 423), requiring the identification of the most influential 
stakeholders or at least the most powerful stakeholders values and expectations (Eden and Ackermann 
2004, Macmillian and Tampoe 2000, Uhl-Bien 2006) to form a shared sense of identity (Haslam and 
Reicher 2007). This is especially relevant to the front-end of project policy implementation, as according 
to Bass and Bass (2008, p. 112) to ‘emerge as a leader, one needs to participate early.’ This implies that 
timing is an essential criterion for the emergence of collective leadership. Over the past decade there has 
been a shift in the leadership paradigm with a focus on leadership as an emergent, fluid, relational, and 
collectively enacted phenomenon constructed in interactions (Carter et al. 2015, Contractor et al. 2012, 
Denis et al. 2012), which can be either formal or informal (Carter et al. 2015, Friedrich et al. 2009). 
Friedrich et al. (2009) conducted an extensive literature review with 55 propositions and proposed an 
integrated framework to understand the collective leadership process (see figure 2-1). They concluded that 
collective leadership can have significant benefits for team and organisational processes. Although the 
propositions and framework do have limitations, for example, lacking in empirical evidence and 
understanding of social networks, it does profess that collective leadership is an emergent process and the 
importance of structuring (i.e., sensemaking), mission, communication (i.e., feedback loops), team 
performance parameters (i.e., information sharing), team affective climate, team network, team exchange 
(i.e., sensegiving), and leader network to the collective leadership phenomenon.  
 
From a social network perspective, Carter et al. (2015) provide a number of relational conceptions of 
leadership to understand leadership emergence and effectiveness. This study also includes informal 
leadership constructs of coevolution and communication. Although the study also has limitations, for 
example, lacking in empirical evidence, it does significantly advance organisational leadership towards  
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Figure 2-1: Integrated Framework for Understanding Collective Leadership. Figure by Friedrich et al. 
(2009, p. 937). 
informal influence, which is relevant today, especially given the increasing prevalence of flatter and team-
based organisational structures within a rapidly changing world. This is also reinforced by Gittell (2012, p. 
402) who states that ‘relational coordination is a mutually reinforcing process (i.e., shared goals, shared 
knowledge, and mutual respect) of interaction between communication and relationships carried out for the 
purpose of task integration, which is the basis for co-ordinated collection action.’ However, their review 
along with Lichtenstein et al. (2006), Uhl-Bien (2006) also argues for a paradigm shift in leadership, from 
an emphasis which sees leadership as static with formal and individualistic actions of behaviour (usually 
seen as a two-way influence process), toward a leadership networks paradigm that emphasises ‘the complex 
and patterned relational processes that interact with embedding social context to jointly constitute 
leadership emergence and effectiveness’ (Carter et al. 2015, p. 613). This is further professed by Uhl-Bien 
(2006, p. 661) who argues that the relational perspective of leadership has multiple realities that: 
Do not adopt traditional organisational and management of ‘structures’ and ‘entities’; instead they 
view organisations as elaborate relational networks of changing persons, moving forward together 
through space and time, in a complex interplay of effects between individual organisational members 
and the system into which they enter. In this way, organisations change as a result of the ‘co-
ordination’ of people’s language and actions in relation to each other at all levels and to the ever-
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changing larger socioeconomic environment. Moreover, power is not a commodity, concentrated 
within certain individuals, but is distributed throughout the social field. [emphasis in original] 
Applied to leadership, a relational perspective focuses on the collective dynamic, for example, the 
combinations of interacting relations and contexts (Uhl-Bien 2006), with multiple realities of the self and 
others co-evolving (Hosking 2007, Mitleton-Kelly 2015), which are inherently communicative (a relational 
dialogue or multilogue) in forming a shared sense of reality (Haslam and Reicher 2007). Although there is 
no clearly adopted definition of relational leadership, Uhl-Bien (2006, p. 268) provides a general definition 
which she defines as a ‘social influence process through which emergent coordination (i.e., evolving social 
order) and change (i.e., new values, attitudes, approaches, behaviours, ideologies, etc.) are constructed and 
produced.’ Here the whole is greater than the sum of its parts situated in the behaviour of social interactions 
(Mitleton-Kelly 2015, Webb 2015). Uhl-Bien and Marion (2011), Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) add to this by 
emphasising that leadership is a complex interactive dynamic – ‘living systems’ – through which adaptive 
outcomes (e.g., learning, innovation, flexibility and adaptability) emerge. This collective leadership 
phenomenon for adapting to existing and emergent environments is also stressed by Chen and Lee (2008), 
Dimovski et al. (2012) with the thinking and practice of Sun Tzu, a Chinese general and military strategist 
in the time of Confucius. Here a leader must follow and adapt to the emergent situation, like when ‘water 
changes its course in accordance with the contours of the terrain so do the commanders change their tactics 
in accordance to the situation’ (Chen and Lee 2008, p. 164).  
 
From these perspectives, leadership lies in the ‘interconnected actions of individuals acting out of personal 
values or vision and engaging with one another through dialogue’ (Uhl-Bien and Marion 2011, p. 469) in 
the emergent situation. This requires consideration of the mechanisms (e.g., formal and informal) and 
contexts (e.g., structure) by which change occurs. These definitions view leadership as an organising 
phenomenon constituted within complex networks where organisational actors interact to co-evolve a 
jointly constructed reality. However, and moving on from this framework of leadership, some ‘bigger’ 
questions are needed, such as: How can we keep people moving and working together to achieve team or 
organisational congruence and goals? How can we form strong relational bonds that contribute to the 
generation and emergence of social order? In answering this, Murrell (1997) suggests, which is also 
professed by Uhl-Bien (2006), laying out a structure which becomes a product of leadership relations that 
constitutes the social structure (see also Weick 2009). This structure requires a context that generates richly 
networked interactions (Uhl-Bien and Marion 2011), which according to Lawrence (2008), Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) can be seen as ‘institutional work,’ the actions of creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutional relations (i.e., the ‘emergent’ Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) to form a relatively stable state e.g., 
semistructures or adaptive organisations on the edge of chaos (Uhl-Bien and Marion 2011) relational 
interactions). Such systems appear to be best able to co-ordinate complex, flexible behaviour and respond 
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to changes in their environments (Kauffman 1993, Mitleton-Kelly 2015). This will be further advanced in 
the section 2.2.4 on Institutionalism and Institutional Work. It should also be noted that the concept of 
governance (section 3.4) and the concept of power, which are essential for strategic intent and 
understanding the dynamic and co-evolving nature of collective leadership, will be discussed in section 3.3. 
However, prior to discussing these concepts, it is well-worth exploring the concept of leadership within 
complex contexts, which is considered the norm in today’s and (co-)evolving nature of organisations 
(Ashkenas et al. 2013). 
 Leadership within Complex Contexts 
Leadership within complex contexts focuses on the ‘patterns of behaviour, or complexity mechanisms, that 
define and emerge from interactive dynamics’ (Marion 2013, p. 185). Such a view of leadership is 
particularly relevant to projects which are seen as complex social entities (Ashkenas et al. 2013, Cicmil et 
al. 2006). Although there is no clear nor universally accepted definition of project complexity, Bakhshi et 
al. (2016, p. 1203) define project complexity as: ‘an intricate arrangement of the varied interrelated parts 
in which the elements can change and evolve constantly with an effect on the project objectives.’ They base 
their definition on the most reputed definitions of project complexity in the literature over the last 25 years. 
The authors also provide three of the most dominate characteristics of complex projects:  
• The PMI perspective: focuses on structural complexity, uncertainty and socio-political elements. 
Other key elements include multiple stakeholders and project ambiguity (Project Management 
Institute 2013).  
• The System of Systems (SoS) perspective: focuses on the integration of large scale systems that 
are heterogeneous and operate independently in a networked system towards a common goal. Other 
common characteristics are connectivity, diversity, and emergent behaviour. Such a framework is 
the Cynefin model (Snowden and Boone 2007) which recognises casual differences between 
system types. This includes simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic which call for different 
managerial responses.  
• The complexity theories perspective: views projects through the lenses of various theories. This 
includes, for example, complexity theory, organisational theory, network theory, nonlinearity and 
chaos theory (see Curlee and Gordon (2011) for a deeper understanding of complexity theory and 
project management).  
Although each perspective has many characteristics to consider in the context of project management, 
Bakhshi et al. (2016) propose seven dominant elements integrating the three perspectives: context, 
autonomy, belonging, connectivity, diversity, emergence, and size. Although project complexity has 
different meanings for different people and comes in different degrees, such as human behaviour and 
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‘systemicity’ of a project (Cooke-Davies 2011a), if an organisation thinks its work is complex then how it 
anticipates, comprehends and navigates complexity determines its success and failures (Project 
Management Institute 2013). This requires organisations and individual practitioners to positively respond 
to project complexity (Cooke-Davies 2011a). Such mechanisms include developing transformational 
leadership traits, collective creativity and knowledge diffusion, and processes that are adapted and adaptive 
in a project environment.  
 
From another perspective, Remington and Pollack (2011) recommend the application of tools for complex 
projects. This involves the classification of complexity as either structural complexity, technical 
complexity, directional complexity, or temporal complexity. Structural complexity is based on the structure 
of information pathways, such as complicated organisational and approval pathways. Technical complexity 
derives from technical or design challenges. Directional complexity is when goals or goal-paths are unclear 
or unshared, which is especially prevalent at the front-end of projects. Temporal complexity is based on the 
sensitivity of a project due to volatile and unpredictable changes over time, which tends to increase with 
project duration. Remington and Pollack (2011) further state that such a tool that identifies the nature of 
complexity can also enable project managers and stakeholders to apply the best approach to address the 
complexity. Tools for managing complexity from a whole of project perspective include: 
• Mapping the complexity: this involves identifying through collective dialogue when a project is 
more than just complicated. Based on this knowledge, project stakeholders can make more rational 
decisions including the application of the most appropriate tools and approaches to manage 
complexity. 
• System anatomy: this involves integrating project implementation through a one-page ‘anatomy’ 
diagram in a project environment with diverse cultures that are geographically distributed with 
often isolated teams with different work practices.  
• Time-linked semi-structures: this approach ‘supports maintenance of a dynamic balance between 
a more formal structure at tone extreme and the more chaotic environment needed to optimise 
creativity’ (2011, p. 35). This is especially applicable to projects that hover near ‘the edge of chaos,’ 
where creativity and learning is the greatest.  
Tools for managing specific aspects of complexity include: 
• Earned value: this is applicable to projects that exhibit high structural complexity such as mega 
infrastructure or defence procurement projects. Alliances or partnerships are seen as the most 
effective procurement options, which also depends on other factors such as trust, transparency and 
communication to be effective.  
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• Problem structuring and soft systems thinking tools: seen as directional complexity, this is 
applicable when there is unclear or unshared goals or goal paths in a project environment. This is 
especially contagious at the front-end of projects, which can result in a loss of trust and cooperation.  
Such tools can also work in combination at different times and in different dimensions of complexity. The 
authors further state that such tools are practically useless without the appropriate level of capability. This 
includes a governance team to identify the nature of complexity, the necessary tools and approaches, skills 
and competences, and ensuring the right people are engaged to deliver the project. Similarly, Kermanshachi 
et al. (2016) empirical study into identifying project complexity and management strategies identified the 
establishment of a governance team as the best complexity management strategy to optimise the overall 
success of a project. What the research on project complexity implies is that it is human driven i.e., the 
right individuals with the right skills and competencies that ‘gel’ together as a team to deliver a project. 
Additionally, capturing the right people with the right behaviour particularly at the front-end of projects is 
absolutely essential for its success. This is profoundly professed by Cooke-Davies (2011b), Edkins et al. 
(2013), Morris (2011), Morris and Edkins (2014), and Samset and Volden (2016) who see human behaviour 
as a significant source of complexity in projects. Perhaps this can explain the use of agency in project 
environments, where agent behaviour is controlled through contracts and incentives which can lead to moral 
hazard risks (Joslin and Müller 2016), rather than understanding project teams and the strength of their 
relations. As stressed previously, this brings a question to mind: Considering project complexity is human 
driven, how can individuals and groups work together to create and maintain robust relations? This requires 
an understanding of institutionalism and institution work.  
 Institutionalism and Institutional Work 
There are many diverse meanings and usage of the concept institution and institutional analysis (Hill 2009, 
Scott 2008, Wooten and Hoffman 2008). From seeing it constituted within the theories of economics, 
political science, and sociology (Scott 2008, Washington et al. 2008) to seeing it infused within the themes 
of ‘institutional strategy’ (Lawrence 1999), ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2005), ‘sensemaking’ (Ashforth et al. 2011, Fuglsang and Jagd 2015, Weick et al. 2005, 2010), and 
‘institutional work’ (Lawrence et al. 2009) to describe the behaviour of individual and organisational actors 
attempting to change the institutional environment. Although diverse in meanings and adaptations, common 
themes emerging amongst the literature suggests that an institute is ‘a natural product of social needs and 
pressures – a responsive, adaptive organism’ (Washington et al. 2008, p. 728). It is ‘inhabited by people 
comprising of rules, norms, and meaning in interactions which is resistant to change’ (Scott 2008, p. 48). 
Scott (2008) discusses this within the three pillars of institutions being regulative (i.e., rules, laws, 
government policies), normative (i.e., values, norms, morals) and cultural-cognitive (i.e., shared 
understanding, taken-for-grantedness). He further states that the mechanisms and basis of order for these 
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three pillars are: coercive and regulative rules for the regulative pillar, normative and binding expectations 
for the normative pillar, and mimetic and constitutive schema for the cultural-cognitive pillar. This suggests 
that the rules, norms and meanings of an institute can be deeply embedded within the relational interactions 
of actors; rather constitutive in the way decisions are made. The value in the normative and cognitive frames 
is demonstrated by Surel (2000, p. 500) who states that: 
One of the principal ‘functions’ of a cognitive and normative frame shared by a certain number of 
actors is effectively to develop a ‘collective consciousness’ in them; in other words, a subjective 
sense of belonging, producing a specific identity. Cognitive and normative frames allow actors to 
make sense of their worlds, and to locate themselves and develop in a given community, by defining 
the field for exchange, by allowing meaning to be conferred on social dynamics, and by determining 
the possibilities for action. They thereby contribute to the construction of individuals or groups as 
social actors in a particular field. 
Organisations are seen as ‘a rational instrument engineered to do a job’ (Washington et al. 2008, p. 728). 
Although organisations are not institutions, they can carry or generate institutions (Kadefors 1995), also 
seen as institutional logics i.e., the way a particular social world works (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Such 
institutions are infused with identity and identification (Ashforth et al. 2008), where a collective identity 
can emerge (Ashforth et al. 2011). This requires an intrasubjective understanding (‘I think’) which 
facilitates the emergence of intersubjective understanding (‘we think’) through interactions, which over 
time transcends to generic understanding (‘it is’) to form a collective sense of or institutionalised reality. 
However, an ‘adaptive organism’ needs legitimacy within an institutional environment, or its framework, 
to survive and thrive. According to Scott (2008, p. 59) legitimacy is ‘an assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system, or institutional framework, 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ For example, an infrastructure unit or division of a government 
agency may have differing views of norms, rules and values (its identity) compared to other infrastructure 
units or divisions of government agencies (their identity) – all seen as legitimate in their own ‘unique’ 
ways, which can transcend from an individual to a divisional level, and then to an organisational level and 
then back again to form an institutional reality (Ashforth et al. 2011). The same principle can be applied 
on construction projects with architects, engineers, surveyors, and builders having different professional 
norms and values (Bresnen and Marshall 2012). However, individual and organisational actions can also 
be seen as illegitimate, which usually reflects non-conformity to social constructed systems of rules, norms, 
values and beliefs (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). For example, legitimacy or legitimate actions can 
involve the forming of strong strategic alliances (Cohen and Dean 2005), or illegitimate institutionalisation 
or action such as organised crime or political corruption (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Jepperson 1991). 
This can also be seen as an anomie, which is a ‘cultural malintegration where normative rules and 
procedures governing the attainment of culturally approved goals have lost their savor and force … [or] … 
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a lack of coordination between ‘means-and-goals phases of social structure’ (Johnson and Duberley 2011, 
p. 570). A primary source of anomie is ‘the institutionalisation of self-interest in the guise of utilitarianism 
(Johnson and Duberley 2011, p. 572), which is seen as Machiavellianism (O'Connor 1999). This type of 
institutional work can also be seen as ‘boundary work,’ or politicisation, relocation and institutionalisation 
of boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Here organisational actors tend to disrupt institutional relations 
through manipulating social (i.e., economic, physical and political) and symbolic (i.e., moral, 
socioeconomic, cultural) boundaries, which is a powerful medium through which people acquire status and 
monopolise resources (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Such disruption to the relational actor space tends to be 
seen with large-scale changes, such as revolutionary change, war and imminent economic failure (Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006). For example, currently [at the time of writing] would be the Public Transport of 
Victoria (PTV), a relatively new statutory authority, responsible for state government public transport 
infrastructure projects, where certain actors are being investigated for serious corruption around at least 
AUD $25 million for the procurement of projects (IBAC 2015b). However, PTV has undertaken a number 
of procurement reforms as recommended by the Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission 
(IBAC) predominately focusing on formal and hierarchical control mechanisms i.e., strict policing and 
auditing, ICT systems, CEO approval, and minimal focus on informal control mechanisms such as change 
in values, norms, and cultural beliefs. These reforms are seen as a traditional form of bureaucratic 
paradigms and leadership which are therefore questionable to the contemporary work environment where 
the focus is on understanding leadership as a complex interactive dynamic from which adaptive outcomes 
emerge e.g., learning, innovation and adaptability (Lichtenstein et al. 2006, Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). This 
begs the question: Considering the dominance of formal leadership and governance mechanisms, will this 
public-sector reform lead to further dynamics of institutional corruption? The IBAC is also investigating 
alleged serious corruption by senior government executives which had significant delegative power 
(responsible for approximately AUD $4 billion of AUD $11 billion of annual budgets) of the Department 
of Education and Training in Victoria for the procurement of projects (IBAC 2015a). These actions can be 
seen as illegitimate but institutionalised (i.e., illegitimate institutionalisation), culturally, by certain agency 
actors to achieve illegitimate means to an end i.e., self-serving ends. Despite its usages, according to 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008, p. 60): 
Legitimacy is fundamentally non-rival: it is rarely a zero-sum game within any given population; 
indeed positive feedback loops and a ‘logic of confidence’ tend to produce win-win ceremonies of 
mutual affirmation among legitimate actors. Further, precisely because legitimacy is non-rival and 
homogenizing, it paints with a broad brush and tends to attach to all entities that share a given form. 
Although firms, structures and even individuals can achieve legitimacy on their own, the more 
common pattern is for each instance to be legitimated by conformity with a collective legitimated 
template. 
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This requires an understanding of the relational spaces where collective understandings of actors emerge – 
embedded within the structuring or restructuring process of organisational dynamics (Scott 2008, Wooten 
and Hoffman 2008), from the micro-agent interaction to macro-structures (Mitleton-Kelly 2015), and thus 
‘institutional work’ (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, Lawrence et al. 2009). Institutional work is concerned 
with ‘how institutions maintain their status and legitimacy in the face of their own institutionalised 
environment’ (Washington et al. 2008, p. 725), which requires institutional leadership and an understanding 
of the purposive action of individual and organisational actors who create, maintain and disrupt institutional 
relations (Jepperson 1991, Lawrence et al. 2009, Washington et al. 2008). This suggests that actors can 
purposively behave either to maintain or change institutions, which again emphasises the importance of 
understanding the relational spaces of these actors and their (inter)actions. 
 
Washington et al. (2008) argue that to maintain legitimacy and institutional survival, institutional leaders 
need to do three things: manage internal consistency of the organisation, develop external support 
mechanisms to maintain survival and obtain legitimacy of their organisation, and engage in actions to 
overcome external enemies. Internal consistency involves maintaining commitment to the organisational 
vision, mission and values through powerful narratives. The development of external support mechanisms, 
to gain external legitimacy for their institution, requires maintaining a balance of stability and flexibility 
through normative, regulative and culturally-cognitively mechanisms. Institutional leaders also have to 
defend against external enemies as they are under constant threat from competing institutions who have 
different sources of interest and identities. Washington et al. (2008, p. 732) also argues that the distinction 
between institutional leaders and organisational leaders is the use of a vision statement: ‘for an institutional 
leader, the vision is a chance to embed values and mission of the organisation into the everyday reality. For 
the organisational leader, the vision is a chance to look forward to future challenges and developments.’ 
He or she is seen as a ‘statesman’ (i.e., executive really making a transition to statesmanship and not a 
mirage), entrepreneurs of identity (Haslam and Reicher 2007), a person of integrity, intertwined within 
organisational politics who is able to make critical and character-defining decisions (Kraatz 2009) needed 
to initiate and sustain an identity-embedding structure (Haslam and Reicher 2007). 
 
What the literature on institutional leadership implies is that it requires significant ‘effort’ – mental or 
physical exertion to achieve a result. This is also strongly professed by Lawrence et al. (2009) who argue 
that institutional work can be understood as the mental or physical work needed to achieve an effect on an 
institution or institutions. Additionally, institutional leaders can be seen as key agents of institutional work 
(Haslam and Reicher 2007, Kraatz 2009), and thus able to strategically shape the relational actor space. 
With institutional work, the focus is on understanding the interactions of actors and institutions – creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al. 2009). As opposed to organisational theories on 
rationalisation, institutional theory argues that broader social and cultural processes shape organisational 
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action (Battilana and D'Aunno 2009, Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003) with actor legitimacy playing a 
central role in this theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Creating institutional work involves ‘advocacy, 
defining rule systems and vesting them with the ability to confer property rights, constructing normative 
networks of actors possessing defined identities in relation to the new rule systems, and developing support 
for those rule systems through advocacy, theorising, and educating’ (Zietsma and Pedersen 2009, p. 148). 
This also involves collaborative co-creation and competitive convergence mechanisms which has a strong 
emphasis on collective action (Zietsma and Pedersen 2009). Furthermore, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, 
p. 228) state that the key to creating institutions is ‘the ability to establish rules and construct rewards and 
sanctions that enforce those rules.’ They profess that work that focuses on rule systems (i.e., vesting, 
defining and advocacy) is more associated with the construction of new institutions, while work that focuses 
on changing norms or belief systems including cultural, which is embedded in communities of practice, is 
more associated with practices that parallel or complement existing institutions. This type of work is also 
the most co-operative. With maintaining institutions, the focus is on adhering to rule systems (i.e., enabling, 
policing and deterring) and reproducing norms and beliefs (i.e., valorising/demonising, mythologising, 
embedding and routinising), some of which are rather too conflictual i.e., enforcing compliance – the social 
mechanisms. With disrupting institutions, the focus is on attacking or undermining the mechanisms that 
lead members to comply with institutions. This involves mechanisms such as disconnecting sanctions, 
disassociating moral foundations, undermining assumptions and beliefs. A common theme with disrupting 
institutions is the focus on relationships between an institution and the social controls (Lawrence 2008). 
Considering that most of the institutional work is language-centred, discourse analysis (i.e., narrative, 
rhetoric and dialogue) and semiotics are important mechanisms to consider when analysing institutional 
work (Lawrence 2008). Such narratives, or guiding principles, are also essential with decision-making in 
fast pace or high velocity environments (Oliver and Roos 2005). 
 
Although creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions takes significant effort, how is an institution or 
institutional leader supposed to manage contradictions that are inherent in organisational fields? Hargrave 
and Van De Ven (2009, p. 127) suggest that institutional actors adopt a both/and approach which 
‘acknowledges both poles of contradiction, frames these poles as complementary, and uses the 
contradiction as a source of innovation.’ This is particularly prevalent within the normative and cognitive 
frames for changes in public policies (Surel 2000). This is also especially valuable in pluralistic settings 
where multiple individual and organisational actors have legitimate rights to pursue their interests. As 
opposed to moderation, and either/or approaches which tries to satisfy a single criterion. For example, 
ensuring compliance through policing would be an either/or approach, which enables institutes or 
institutional actors to obtain relative stability in their interactions (Hargrave and Van De Ven 2009).  
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If institutes are, by definition, seen as ‘a responsive, adaptive organism’ (Washington et al. 2008, p. 728), 
rooted in taken-for-granted rules and norms which are resistant to change (Scott 2008), thus, suggesting 
‘strength, endurance and stability’ (Smith and Graetz 2011, p. 74), then how can institutions change? This 
is succinctly phrased by Holm (1995, p. 398): ‘How can actors change institutions if their actions, 
intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?’ Is change 
instigated from exogenous or endogenous force? More succinctly, how can organisations survive through 
the successful implementation of megaproject policies? Which not only impacts millions of people and 
costs billions of dollars (or euros, pounds etc.), but more importantly, impacts the advancement and survival 
of nation states.  
 
Many researchers have attempted to address this theoretical dilemma (see Smith and Graetz 2011), 
including project management (Bresnen and Marshall 2012). Most scholars still echo Lewin (1951) rational 
three stage model of change: unfreeze-change-refreeze (Purser and Petranker 2005). However, such a 
rational and linear (or managerial agency) process of change is unrealistic – not a ‘true’ representation of 
the change management process (Purser and Petranker 2005, Sonenshein 2010, Wilson 2009). Additionally, 
it tends to echo Machiavellianism (Smith and Graetz 2011, Wilson 2009). All in all, although change is a 
theoretically complex process (i.e., life-cycle, teleological, dialectical, evolutionary theories etc.), it is also 
temporal in nature which research has neglected to adequately conceptualise (Purser and Petranker 2005, 
Wilson 2009). This implies that a greater understanding is needed of the situated and continual nature of 
change – the emergent phenomenon. This is reinforced by Purser and Petranker (2005, p. 186) who state 
that ‘change is emergent, it is the realisation of a new pattern of organising in the absence of explicit a 
priori intentions.’ This is similarly echoed by Smith and Graetz (2011) with a duality perspective on change; 
where such a view of change identifies the tensions of change, as well as their power. This requires a new 
mindset, which can be achieved through the collaboration of five duality characteristics: 
1. Simultaneity: Simultaneous presence of contradictory forces. 
2. Relational: Bi- rather than uni-directional relationships between opposite poles. 
3. Minimal threshold: Ensuring that enabling rather than constraining forces emerge. 
4. Dynamism: Focus on the interactive nature of dualities relationships. 
5. Improvisation: Mediating action which dynamically shapes decision-making.  
Such characteristics ‘encourage building ‘both/and’ constructs that accommodate contradictory elements 
of management as simultaneously operating truths’ (Smith and Graetz 2011, p. 197). Although such a shift 
in mindset is critical to change management, how does such change, or the management of continuity and 
change, come to fruition? What the literature on institutional change, and organisational change in general 
(see Luecke 2003), implies is that it requires an agent of change i.e., change agent. Such an agent of change 
can be seen as an institutional entrepreneur (Marti and Mair 2009, Smith and Graetz 2011, Thornton and 
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Ocasio 2008). An institutional entrepreneur capable of merging institutional logics to create a new institute 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Tracey et al. 2011). Achieving such a state of constitutive institutional logics, 
including emergent structures, can be achieved through four communicative functions: coordinating, 
sensegiving, translating, and theorising (Ocasio et al. 2015), which is held on the convention that 
communication i.e., oral and written statements and speech acts (Cooren 2001), shapes institutional logics 
at increasing levels of abstraction. With the coordinating communicative function, the focus is on linking 
categories i.e., category conventions, with practices, which can either reinforce or change existing logics. 
Such a process that enables change in logics can also be seen as sensebreaking, which is defined as ‘the 
destruction or breaking down of meaning’ (Pratt 2000, p. 364). According to Maitlis and Christianson 
(2014, p. 69) sensebreaking ‘can motivate people to re-consider the sense that they have already made, to 
question their underlying assumptions, and to re-examine their course of action.’ The sensegiving 
communicative function focuses on establishing category conventions i.e., generic language which capture 
patterns and regularities, as social facts. With the translating function, the focus is on translating category 
conventions i.e., across contexts, into institutional narratives. While theorising focuses on abstract aspects 
of categories. Furthermore, the four communicative functions need to combine i.e., vocabulary dimensions, 
to change institutional logics. For example, coordinating an initial project meeting on delivery frameworks 
i.e., PPP or other joint ventures for a transport project, where a change in logic i.e., partnership based on 
greater embodiment of trust and cooperation between program partners – ‘sink-or-swim’ or esprit de corps 
mindset – Program Partners. Communicating the Program Partners category expresses generic meaning 
(cognitive sensegiving) that anchors it in the specific instance – thus legitimising it into practice. This leads 
individuals and organisations to form the presumption that the practice of Program Partners with its 
characteristics is a social fact – a representation of social reality. Once the Program Partners category is 
established in the specific instance, it can be used to communicate at a meta level, beyond the instance 
through translating and theorising. It can be translated across contexts, say transport projects across 
countries, through communicative events which gives Program Partners structure. Theorising can also 
reinforce the Program Partners category through abstract communicative events, such as journals and media 
to generalise beyond the specific instance. However, it can also generate larger meanings, with its level of 
abstraction and interconnectedness with other categories (Ocasio et al. 2015). For example, the Program 
Partners category, or dimension, is interconnected with more specific categories such as contracts, 
procedures, and agendas, which are the principles of institutional logics.  
 
What the literature implies is that strategy development i.e., setting a vision, mission, objectives and courses 
of action is easy but implementation is difficult. This is also stressed by Kay et al. (2006). It is much more 
than a vision or mission statement, but embedded within the complex fabrication of human behaviour. As 
Legge (2003, p. 74) states that ‘people’s behaviour can be inconsistent as well as consistent, unpredictable 
as well as predictable, uncertain as well as certain.’ This is especially relevant from a political perspective, 
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which according to Lindblom (1959), later extensively developed by Cyert and March (1963), and stressed 
by Kay et al. (2006), political constraints tend to significantly hinder the successful application of a 
rationalist approach to strategy. This also suggests that the implementation of strategy cannot be prescribed 
but is rather masterminded or shaped by organisational or agency actors – strongly emphasising the concept 
of Machiavellianism and tribalism. Where different identities can emerge within the relational actor space 
(Ashforth et al. 2008) and thus influence organisational strategies (Ashforth and Mael 1996). It is 
institutionalised by agency actors to achieve a means to a desired end. However, this raises some interesting 
questions that requires further investigation, such as: What are these political constraints? What factors 
influence organisational strategic decisions on the implementation of project policies? How do 
organisational actors craft or shape organisational and project strategies? The understanding of the factors 
that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of project policies will be 
discussed in the next chapter. However, prior to delving into these concepts, it is essential to understand 
the concept of project strategy, which will be discussed next. 
 Concept of Project Strategy 
The concept of project strategy is ambiguous in existing project literature (Artto et al. 2008a). Artto et al. 
(2008a, p. 8) conducted an extensive literature review and analysis on the concept of project strategy and 
concluded that project strategy is ‘a direction in a project that contributes to success of the project in its 
environment.’ In the definition, direction can be interpreted as goals, plans, means, methods, tools, or other 
controlling devices, success as achieving the project goals including the ability to survive in a competing 
and hostile environment, and environment as external factors that may influence project delivery (Artto et 
al. 2008a). This suggests that project strategy is not necessary an image of its parent organisational strategy 
but is dynamic. This is further professed by Aaltonen et al. (2015), Artto et al. (2008b) who suggest that 
the implementation of a project strategy depends on a project’s autonomy in its environment and the 
complexity of a project’s stakeholder environment. Most project strategies tend to align with and obey a 
parent’s organisational strategy, characterised by low complexity and low level decision-making autonomy. 
However, the reality is that most projects are characterised by a highly complex stakeholder environment 
with a low level of autonomy, such as with the implementation of project policies (Artto et al. 2008b). 
Although their study does contribute to existing knowledge on the concept of project strategy, further 
research is needed to verify their framework. Similarly, Anderson and Merna (2003) conducted a study on 
strategy formulation at the front-end of projects. Their study highlights limitation in the literature, 
particularly the understanding of effective strategies for developing and deploying projects – the plurality 
of project strategies.  
 
In general, the literature provides a generic definition of the concept of project strategy characterised by a 
project’s parent organisation independence and number of project stakeholder organisations. Furthermore, 
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it is noted that scholars often assume project strategy as a linear or rational function that relates to a set of 
static objectives, plans, and mechanisms, and apparently has its own independent strategy from a parent’s 
organisation business strategy: like an obedient servant (Artto et al. 2008a). Nevertheless, the literature 
does not consider factors or processes for project strategy implementation – and understanding of the means 
to the desired end – particularly factors that may influence project strategy implementation and the decision-
making process. Young et al. (2012, p. 889) also agree with the findings reported by Artto et al. (2008a) 
and argue that ‘there is little guidance about how strategy gets translated into projects.’ In this connection, 
they suggest that further empirical research is needed which focuses on the dynamic implementation of 
project strategies and how they change during a project lifecycle, especially in other business sectors and 
countries, and pluralistic organisations. Surprisingly, and rather disturbing, Young and Grant (2015) 
replicated and extended Young et al. (2012) study in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) to 
determine whether projects contributed to the realisation of business strategies. Young et al. (2012) study 
provided evidence that although the Victorian government project management and investment frameworks 
were seen to be comparable with and sometimes better than ‘best practices’ there were some deficiencies. 
For example, there was little evidence of how projects or programs should be governed, no 
acknowledgement of strategic intent, showed evidence of a static or rational relationship between project 
strategy development and implementation, and a lack of focus on the realisation of strategic goals. Another 
surprising find is that considering the pluralism of government agencies, there was significant duplication 
of project effort. In addition, most of the Victorian project management tools and frameworks are 
influenced by the UK Office of Government Commerce (OCG) methodologies for the management of 
successful projects and programs. However, their NSW study suggests that projects are twice as effective 
in contributing to strategic goals when there are stable strategic priorities and centralised project insight. 
This is similar to the UK Bates Review (for example see Miller and Hobbs 2005) findings that revealed 
from a project institutional perspective, that centralised oversight and the reduction in the number of 
institutional players led to significant increases in project success rates. They also concluded that with the 
right environment, projects do appear to make some contribution to strategy. This also includes managing 
the long, complex and critical front-end; embedding projects to institutional frameworks; creating and 
maintaining coalitions within network of relations; understanding high uncertainties and risks, for example, 
slowly materialising projects; understanding factors that shape project strategies, for example, leaders that 
give project legitimacy and protect it from challenges; strong project sponsors; and ensuring adequate 
scrutiny. Most of these points are also professed by Haji-Kazemi et al. (2013) with the identification of 
early warning signs in front-end stage of projects with the case study on the Norwegian High Speed Railway 
project. Section 2.2.3 on leadership and complexity also stresses the need to understand complexity from 
the Cynefin framework (Snowden and Boone 2007), in particular a need for a probe, sense, and respond 
response. This implies that decisions may be re-interpreted to suit the context and this may explain why 
decisions may morph from one expected way to deliver them than initially expected.  
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The disturbing part of the state government studies, which is also evidenced globally on mega infrastructure 
projects (for example see Flyvbjerg 2012, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Patanakul et al. 2012, Productivity 
Commission 2014, Williams 2005) is that fewer than half of strategies were found to be improving, thus 
contributing to financial losses in the billions and undeliverable outcomes. Evidently, Flyvbjerg (2014) 
found that nine out of ten mega projects have cost overruns with up to 50 percent in real terms. For example, 
the cost overrun for the Channel Tunnel was 80 percent in real terms, the Denver International Airport was 
200 percent, for the Sydney Opera House it was 1,400 percent, ICT projects experience average overruns 
of 200 percent in real terms (Flyvbjerg 2014), and the Brazilian Itaipu Dam project was 240 percent in real 
terms which impaired the economy for three decades (Ansar et al. Forthcoming). Another example is the 
Croatian Motorway, where the Croatian government approved HRK kn11.23 billion (or AUD $2.21 
billion), but after the start of implementation the cost increased to HRK kn14.69 billion (or AUD $2.89 
billion) or 30 percent (Legac et al. 2014, Vlada Republike Hrvatske 2013). This is further evidenced by 
Andersen et al. (2016) who found that on average cost overruns on large investment projects was 84 
percent, with extremes of up to 500 percent. This also, as aforementioned, significantly impacts 
organisational performances and stakeholder morale. This fundamentally begs the question: Why should 
financial resources funded by taxpayers or private institutions partner with government agencies, for 
example with PPPs, when project failure i.e. tremendous loss in productivity and profitability, is so 
prevalent? It also begs the question raised by the work of Flyvbjerg cited above about how reasonable initial 
expectations and estimates of cost/benefits are. 
 
The research limitations identified by the previous scholars clearly indicate that the implementation of 
project strategies tends to be aligned with organisational strategies in a rather linear or rational approach. 
This is especially evident with policy implementation (see Barrett 2006, Birkland 2005, Jenkins-Smith et 
al. 2014). It also timely reminds us that there is still a lack of studies in investigating how project strategy 
is implemented by organisations, and understanding of the complex and dynamic (inter)actions that project 
strategies have with the internal and external project environment.  
 
In this aspect, some project management researchers described project strategy as an image of its parent 
organisation’s business strategy (Anderson and Merna 2003, Artto et al. 2008b, Kezner 2003, Loch and 
Kavadias 2012, Milosevic and Srivannaboon 2006, Morris and Jamieson 2005, Shenhar et al. 2005, 
Shrivastava and Grant 1985, Walker et al. 2008b). Considering this weakness that is a contagion in the 
project management literature, Walker and Rowlinson (2008) summarise three strategic management 
approaches within a project management perspective, being prescriptive strategic schools, descriptive 
strategic schools, and configuration strategic schools that enriches the gap between a given strategic 
approach and a given project type. The prescriptive strategic schools approach focuses on how strategy 
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should take place within a relatively stable, mechanical and formal (i.e. follow the dots) environment, which 
is rather contrary to the ‘real’ project environment of complexity, uncertainty and contagious with risks. 
The descriptive strategic schools approach focuses on how strategy does take place including the use of a 
vision, innovation, strategic intent, rapid change with little time to perfect strategies, laced with uncertainty, 
seeing strategy as an emergent and collective process, institutionalised within an organisation, embodied 
within power and politics, and tends to suffer from delusions, biases in decision-making, and evidence-
based policy making which is argumentative and shaped towards desired ends. Although still seen as a 
rational process it is useful in trying to understand organisational interactions and how actors see strategy. 
The configuration strategic school sees strategy as a process of configuration and transformation where 
organisations evolve and respond to challenges even though they may be in a relatively stable state of 
configuration. In their summary, Walker et al. (2008b, p. 159) conclude that ‘the key to strategic 
management, therefore, is to sustain stability most of the time when that maintains competitive advantage 
and to be able to shift gear to being transformational to cope with disruptive change to position the 
organisation to be ready for the next fairly stable period.’ This shifting gear resonates with the 
recommendation of Snowden and Boone (2007) relating to a probe-sense-respond approach to exercising 
agency in decision implementation and interpreting strategic intent.  
 
Advancing Artto et al. (2008b) critical analysis on prior project management literature addressing different 
context-specific strategies of single projects, it was revealed that projects can be either autonomous of a 
parent organisation i.e., pursue their own strategies, or a subordinate of a parent organisation i.e., aligning 
and obeying the strategy of a parent organisation. Based on their analysis, they concluded that the concept 
of project strategy should not only be limited to serving a single parent organisation only, but instead should 
acknowledge a project’s autonomy as well as its unique position as part of its complex context (Artto et al. 
2008a). Similarly, Milosevic and Srivannaboon (2006) conducted a study on strategic management 
literature on alignment of project management and business strategy that revealed project strategies are 
derived from, and aligned to, an organisation’s business strategy. Kezner (2003) argues that strategies tend 
to derive from a formulated business strategy through executives. Thus, reinforcing the rationalist strategy 
approach: project strategies aligned with organisational strategies. However, Milosevic and Srivannaboon 
(2006, p. 107) suggest that to align project management elements and business strategy, organisations 
should ‘interpret their business strategy in the context of project management by initiating and selecting 
projects to fulfil business needs.’ The empirical literature tends to focus on the degree of project autonomy 
from its parent organisation, and mechanisms that organisations use to align project strategy with business 
strategy. Artto et al. (2008b) paper also suggests that future project strategy research should focus on 
connections between a parent organisation’s project and stakeholder strategies. This strongly suggests that 
future empirical studies should consider the potential impact and influence of stakeholder performance, 
conflicting or aligned with the implementation of project strategies.  
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 Gaps and Areas for Project Management Advancement 
The body of the literature indicates that in previous studies on the concept of project strategy and the front-
end may not have duly focused on the elements that may influence organisational strategic decision-making 
in project environments, especially the relational space of organisation actor (inter)actions. The literature 
typically assumes that a project’s strategy is derived from a parent organisation’s business strategy, 
cascaded down from organisational executives, with static and rational objectives, plans, and mechanisms 
(Artto et al. 2008a). Although Walker et al. (2008b) does provide a number of different lenses to see project 
strategy, especially the descriptive strategic school which is laced with mechanisms on how strategy does 
take place in project environments, it still lacks sufficient empirical evidence. Moreover, the literature tends 
to show gaps for the concepts of strategic intent, collective leadership, institutionalism and institutional 
work dealing with complex or chaotic domain situations, and project strategy for the implementation of 
project policies. With strategic intent, there needs to be more empirical evidence on the strategy for 
achieving vision and mission statements, the desired leadership position, the necessary collective and co-
ordinated mechanisms needed for project policy implementation and capturing powerful stakeholder views. 
Collective leadership for project policy implementation needs to focus on the emergent, fluid, co-evolving, 
relational and collective (inter)actions of organisational actors towards high performing teams, which will 
enable a deeper understanding of the relational actor space. There also needs to be an understanding of the 
mechanisms for creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project relations – the cultural norms, 
values, and regulations, particularly through the process of sensemaking and sensebreaking that govern the 
project policy implementation (change) process. Finally, effective strategies for developing and deploying 
project policies to achieve desired ends. 
 
The literature also strongly suggests that the implementation of project strategy tends to be heavily 
politicised, but there is a considerable lack of understanding of factors, especially at the front-end of 
projects, that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of project policies. 
However, the strengths of the literature lie in its stakeholder focus, which contributes to the knowledge of 
organisational strategic decision-making in project environments. The literature views the autonomy of a 
project based on the complexity of a project’s stakeholder environment, depicted in figure 2-2. Artto et al. 
(2008b) suggest that projects should consider the complexity of its stakeholder environment including 
stakeholders’ different strategies and stakeholder alliance formation in its selection of project strategy and 
implementation. In other words, project strategies can be shaped by diverse stakeholders who may have 
diverse interests in the projects. The concept of institutionalisation explained by Scott (2014) also identifies 
agency as being a vital shaping mechanism of how strategy is perceived, shaped, re-interpreted within 
dynamic situations.  
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Figure 2-2: Project Positions in their Context. Figure by Artto et al. (2008b, p. 53). 
However, it is worth noting that a typical project may involve a number of stakeholders who may not 
necessarily share common views and interests, and tend to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, 
stakeholders may not necessarily share equal rights and responsibilities over a project lifecycle. In this 
study, the above dynamics among stakeholders’ help reinforce the fact that project strategies are influenced, 
to a degree, by organisational principals and actors within the project environment. Mullay (2015) also 
emphases that very few projects are actually aligned with organisational strategy.  
 
This literature review has identified that there are existing knowledge gaps on the concept of project strategy 
and the front-end and its interpretation into action. Salient gaps include strategic intent, collective 
leadership, institutionalism and institutional work, and the concept of project strategy for the 
implementation of project policies. For example, an understanding of individual and organisational 
interactions; internal and external factors (including the level of complexity or chaos) that may influence 
project strategy implementation; translation of strategy in projects; and the influential impact of stakeholder 
performance, conflicting or aligned, with project strategy. Additionally, empirical studies need to expand 
investigations into other business sectors or areas (e.g., infrastructure, aerospace, defence, health, public, 
private, ICT system implementation or organisational change), pluralistic organisations (e.g. universities, 
hospitals, state or federal government departments), and other countries especially with the emergence of 
virtual environments. Such empirical studies would then significantly deepen our understanding of: what 
kind of elements may influence the implementation of project strategy; the extent of project independence 
from a parent organisation; and how strategy gets implemented into projects in the public sector and private 
sectors. See table 2-1 for the concepts, salient characteristics, gaps and areas for project management 
advancement. This research will address these gaps in the literature. 
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Table 2-1: Summary of Salient Theoretical Literature on Project Strategy and the Front-End 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Strategic intent • Vision and mission statement 
• Strategy for achieving that 
vision 
• Desired leadership position 
with collective and co-
ordinated action 
• Powerful stakeholder views 
Strategic intent including the strategy for 
achieving vision and mission statements; the 
desired leadership position; the necessary 
collective and co-ordinated mechanisms for 
project policy implementation including capturing 
powerful stakeholder views. 
Collective 
leadership 
• Emergent, fluid, co-evolving, 
relational and collectively 
enacted phenomenon 
constructed in actor 
interactions 
• Formal and informal 
• Understanding the relational 
behaviour of actors 
Collective leadership mechanisms needed for 
project policy implementation, especially 
understanding the relational behaviour of actors. 
Institutionalism 
and institutional 
work 
• Responsive and adaptive 
organism 
• Comprising rules, norms and 
meaning in interactions 
• Needs legitimacy but may be 
illegitimate 
• Understanding of relational 
spaces including institutional 
logics 
• Institutional leadership with 
significant effort 
• Understanding actor 
(inter)actions i.e., creating, 
maintaining and disrupting 
institutional relations 
Institutional responsiveness and adaptation to 
internal and external stimuli; actor (inter)actions 
i.e., mechanisms for creating, maintaining and 
disrupting institutional project relations with 
legitimate and illegitimate disruptions especially 
for the implementation of project policies; and 
institutional logics in changing institutions.  
 
Project strategy • Ambiguous in existing 
literature 
Effective strategies for developing and deploying 
project policies; the dynamic and pluralistic nature 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
• Limited understanding of the 
plurality of project strategies 
or how it gets translated into 
projects 
• Often assumed and seen as a 
linear or rational function: 
obedient servant or image of 
its partner organisation’s 
business strategy, but is seen 
as dynamic 
• Significant agency 
duplications 
of project strategy implementation to achieve 
desired ends. 
Contextual factor 
influence 
• The dynamic nature of 
interpreting the project 
• Uncertainty and ambiguity 
emergence influence factors 
due to technology or 
stakeholder pressures 
Understanding how people make sense of the 
situation they face and how they respond to re-
interpreting the ‘given’ strategy and ‘vision’ into a 
workable approach. Understanding how 
technology may trigger complexity and the 
emergence of unanticipated consequences.  
2.3 Decision-Making Theory 
 Decision-Making 
Decision-making, which is strongly related to strategy, tends to be seen as a rational and easy process: a 
commitment to action that follows a pattern (Langley et al. 1995, Mintzberg and Westley 2010, Parkin 
1996). First, we define the problem, then diagnose its causes, next design possible solutions, and finally 
decide which solution is best for implementation (Mintzberg and Westley 2010). However, this rational 
process turns out to be uncommon, especially in organisations. This is due to the fact that decision-making 
is a cognitive phenomenon with assessments of consequences and uncertainties (Brindle 1999, Brunsson 
1982, Eisenhardt and Iii 1988, Müller et al. 2008). In addition, action is ‘not a combination of ‘acts’: ‘acts’ 
are constituted only by a discursive moment of attention to the duree of lived-through experience. Nor can 
‘action’ be discussed in separation from the body, its mediations with the surrounding world and the 
coherence of an acting self’ (Giddens 1984, p. 3). A number of theorists have used the following metaphors 
to describe organisational decision-making: ‘constellations or galaxies of individual decisions,’ ‘rope’ of 
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‘intertwined issues,’ ‘a flowing stream, filled with debris, meandering through the terrain of managers and 
their organisations’ (Langley et al. 1995, p. 269). But is the confusion in the decision-making process or 
the way people observe decisions? To understand this more deeply, Mintzberg and Westley (2010) discuss 
three major approaches to decision-making: ‘thinking first,’ ‘seeing first,’ and ‘doing first.’ They 
characterise the quality features of ‘thinking first’ by science, planning, verbal, and facts. ‘Seeing first’ by 
art, visioning, imagining, visual, and ideas. Finally, ‘doing first’ by craft, venturing, visceral, and 
experiences. They also conducted a number of workshops on the three approaches, which revealed the 
following: 
‘Thinking first’ encouraged linear, rational and categorical arguments, where the group focused on 
problems. The group that were encouraged to ‘seeing first’ reached consensus that required 
collaboration and a deeper integration of ideas. There was laughter and a higher energy level. They 
focused on solutions. ‘Doing first’ generated more spontaneity with participants responding to one 
another intuitively and viscerally. Turf battles became evident with the surface of humour, power, 
fear and anger. 
Moreover, Mintzberg and Westley (2010) also emphasis that each approach has its strengths and 
weaknesses. ‘Thinking first’ works best when an issue is clear, data reliable, the context is structured, 
thoughts can be pinned down, and discipline can be applied. ‘Seeing first’ is preferred when many elements 
have to be combined to form creative solutions, commitment to those solutions is key, and communication 
across boundaries is essential. ‘Doing first’ works best when the situation is novel and confusing, 
complicated specifications would get in the way, and a few simple relationships rules can help people move 
forward. In the previous discussion on the Cynefin framework we see these different types of thinking 
associated with the simple, complicated, complex or chaotic domains (Snowden and Boone 2007). The 
concept and benefits of ‘seeing first’ is also emphasised by Winter and Szczepanek (2009) in their book of 
Images of Projects. They state that to do a project, one must have an image of that project, which can be 
seen from multiple perspectives. By image they mean a project that is purposeful and action orientated in 
that they involve different people and organisations with aims and objectives, linked to differing interests 
and agenda, continually interacting together and doing things in an unfolding flux of events through time. 
With multiple perspectives, they focus on seven core images for engaging with complex realities of projects, 
being, social, political, intervention, value creation, development, organisational, and change. However, 
they emphasise that these are not the only images that can be used in practice. This concept is also reinforced 
by Andersen (2008) who states that projects can be seen from different angles or perspectives, a perception 
of reality, where there is more than one way to see the world. It appears from the literature that decision-
making from the ‘seeing first’ perspective is more suited to project environments, especially for the 
implementation of project policies, which is bound by complexity, dynamics and uncertainty. This will be 
discussed next. 
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 Strategic Decision-Making 
Decision-making is also seen as strategic, especially in an organisational context where it is seen as complex 
and dynamic, in often unforeseen ways, and characterised by plurality (Buijs et al. 2009, Jean-Louis et al. 
2007, Klijn and Snellen 2009, Kriger and Barnes 1992, Little 2015, Pettigrew 2003). According to Buijs et 
al. (2009, p. 37) complex systems are ‘dynamic and open, exhibit emergent properties and have the potential 
for qualitative transformations.’ This is also reinforced by Little (2015) on the complicated interaction of 
political actors on decision-making which will always generate emergent dimensions. Nutt and Wilson 
(2010, p. 3) define the term strategic decision-making as ‘important key decisions made in organisations 
of all types, and the term organisation to include any ‘collective social, economic or political activity 
involving a plurality of human effort.’ This implies that organisational strategic decision-making is an 
effortful social phenomenon carried out among and between organisational actors, which is also seen as 
‘large, expensive, and precedent setting producing ambiguity about how to find a solution and uncertainty 
in the solution’s outcomes’ (Nutt and Wilson 2010, p. 4). This is also reinforced by Fligstein (1997) who 
sees strategic action as the ‘attempt of social actors to create and maintain stable social worlds (i.e., 
organisational fields).’ A strategic decision is also often difficult to reverse once implemented with 
commitment to human and financial resources (Aaltonen and Kujala 2010, Nutt and Wilson 2010). 
Furthermore, some of the characteristics of strategic decisions are: 
• They are elusive problems that are difficult to define precisely 
• They require an understanding of the problem to find a viable solution 
• They rarely have one best solution, be often a series of possible solutions 
• Solution benefits are difficult to assess as to their effectiveness, in part because they lack a clear 
final end point against which effectiveness can be judged 
• High levels of ambiguity and uncertainty are associated with solutions 
• Realising hoped for benefits has considerable risk 
• Strategic decisions have competing interests that prompt key players to use political pressure to 
ensure that a choice aligns with their preferences (Nutt and Wilson 2010, p. 4) 
Amason (2011), Mintzberg (1987) present five definitions of strategy, which raises interesting questions 
about the nature and definition of strategic decision-making. Strategic decisions can be viewed as a plan: a 
course of action where leaders try to establish a direction for an organisation. Alternatively, it can be seen 
as a ploy: a specific set of manoeuvres employed to gain advantage. For example, a government decision 
to implement a policy to deliver a community infrastructure project may not be the overt strategy, but is 
more concerned with a political party’s motive to win another term in government. Thirdly, strategic 
decisions can be seen as a pattern: a stream of actions with consistent behaviour. These strategies may also 
be seen as deliberate with pre-existing intentions or emergent where patterns are developed in the absence 
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of intentions. Strategic decision-making can also be seen as achieving a position: a means of locating a 
strategy between an organisation and its external environment. Finally, strategic decision-making can be 
seen as a perspective: the way strategists in an organisation perceive the world and their organisation. This 
suggests that organisational decisions tend to result in plans or ploys, but the strategic element of them 
becomes apparent when decisions are examined together and the patterns and themes are uncovered (Nutt 
and Wilson 2010).  
 Organisational and Political Strategic Decision-Making 
Organisational strategic decisions are also likely to stimulate political actions, observable, but often covert 
action, because they are complex, significant and subject to uncertainty (Child et al. 2010, Eisenhardt and 
Iii 1988). Strategic decisions shape the course of an organisation, which is crucial for its survival. There is 
also more at stake especially for those who stand to lose or gain from their decisions. Strategic decisions 
are made among people by people for people muddled by action, interaction and counteraction (Child et al. 
2010). As implied previously, organisations comprise of distinct groups of people within different units 
with different motivations for getting involved in decisions. They compete for scarce resources which can 
cause considerable conflict (Eisenhardt and Iii 1988). Interest groups implement ‘political tactics to 
influence decisions which affect their positions and interests in an organisation’ (Child et al. 2010, p. 107). 
In addition to the use of power, decision makers can use other tactics including forming powers of coalition, 
agenda control, tactics of timing affecting communications and meetings, the use of outside expert 
consultants, negotiation or bargaining, and the manipulation and control of crucial information (Child et al. 
2010, Cyert and March 1963, Eisenhardt and Iii 1988, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992, Elbanna 2006, 
Pettigrew 2001). The use of other tactics and how they influence organisational strategic decision-making 
will be discussed in section 3.3.4 of this thesis. 
 
The literature provides a good understanding on the concept of organisational strategic decision-making, 
particularly the (inter)actions between and amongst people within organisations. Some political actions also 
arise primarily from the exercise of formal authority by those in hierarchical positions (Child et al. 2010). 
Langley et al. (1995) suggest that decisional behaviour may be either vertically intertwined (decision-
making is undertaken by one actor) or horizontally intertwined (decision-making is undertaken by a number 
of actors). They argue that horizontal decisional behaviour, as seen in rich cultures with a deep net of 
interactions, encourages innovation in interactive ways, often referred to project organisations, and vertical 
decisional behaviour is seen in organisations with formal hierarchical systems of authorisation. Similarly, 
this view is reinforced by Eisenhardt and Iii (1988) study on politics of organisational strategic decision-
making in high velocity environments. They suggest that a centralised organisation is an impetus for 
politics, where CEOs preserve their power through the use of politics, and with decentralised organisations, 
members of a team are empowered and see little need to engage in politics. Moreover, they found that 
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politics is organised around stable coalitions whose membership is based on demographic characteristics, 
and the use of politics is related to diminished firm performance, which exhibits slow growth and low 
profitability. Similarly, Pfeffer (1981) came to the conclusion that power centralisation is expected to 
reduce the scope for political behaviour but it illuminates decision-making illusions, which therefore, 
affects organisational adaptability and survival. Here decentralisation of decision-making, vision and 
organisational culture, and power and influence are imperative for strategy implementation and it success 
(Pfeffer 1992b). However, there is one negative consequence with horizontal decision-making. Empirical 
research shows that horizontal networks which lack a clear command structure and where decisions are 
made on the basis of consensus, are not capable of making fast and painful decisions (Klijn and Teisman 
1991). 
 
Advancing the previous points, others amount to politicking between organisational units oriented towards 
strategic decisions. According to Child et al. (2010, p. 113) the ‘political tactics that the members of 
organisational units employ to generate or exercise power over major decisions respectively concern the 
use of information and knowledge, and the manipulation of reputation and credibility.’ Organisational 
actors tend to form powers of coalition behind the scenes, offline lobbying, withholding information, and 
controlling agendas to enhance their power and influence strategic decisions (Eisenhardt and Iii 1988). 
Strategic decisions can also be influenced upward. While top management may continue to set strategic 
directions of an organisation, they also rely on proposals, briefs and detailed knowledge provided by 
managers in lower levels (Child et al. 2010). Which from a public administrative perspective, is often seen 
as street-level bureaucrats, which often have significant power to shape organisational decisions and 
policies as they directly interact with citizens in the course of their tasks (Lipsky 2010). Top management 
rely on this information to make organisational strategic decisions. This implies that managers (including 
project managers and other agency actors) in lower levels have significant power to influence organisational 
strategic decisions and project outcomes. For example, they can withhold information or use consultants 
with persuasive information to influence top management in making decisions that serve their agendas. 
Mowday (1978) conducted a study on the effectiveness of five methods of upward influence that revealed 
manipulation followed by persuasion as the most subtle methods of exercising upward influence. According 
to Child et al. (2010, p. 114) an ‘advantage of covert methods of influence such as manipulation lies in the 
fact that organisational actors seeking to exert influence over a decision retain a greater degree of credibility 
and flexibility insofar as their intentions are not known and they are not perceived to be self-serving.’ Senior 
management decisions can also become volatile when they are advised by specialist actors i.e., advisors 
with exclusive competencies or expertise, and senior management cannot readily substitute for them (Child 
et al. 2010). This further reinforces that fact that lower level management, or intra-organisational actors, 
can exert significant influence on top management strategic decisions, and thus affect organisational and 
policy survival.  
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Organisational strategic decisions can also be influenced by inter-organisational actors. This suggests that 
organisations can collude and form alliances within an intertwined web of relationships with other 
organisations, agencies and actors to influence strategic decisions. This is reinforced by Tushman (1977) 
who states that inter-organisational actors can either implement competitive strategies, such as seeking 
power or prestige, or collusive strategies, such as co-opting and forming coalitions. Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
suggest organisations that possess greater resources are more likely to be politically active. Child et al. 
(2010, p. 116) emphasises that ‘situations that involve competition for resources and their allocation, both 
within and between organisations, generate conflict and encourage political behaviour.’ This implies that 
governments can influence business outcomes, as they have significant financial resources funded by 
taxpayers, by altering market conditions. For example, governments can introduce policies that increase 
the amount of infrastructure projects. On the other hand, multinational corporations can influence 
government strategic decisions with their ability to relocate to other states or countries, which can have a 
significant impact on the level of employment and state survival. Other government agencies can also block 
or significantly delay strategic decisions, which can be achieved through legal, regulatory, public pressure, 
and when prevailing norms and rules conflict with interests (Child et al. 2010), which is particularly 
prevalent with the implementation of major project and program policies (McConnell 2010). This was 
evident in the State of Victoria when the Labor Government made a strategic decision to stop the proposed 
AUD $10.7 billion East West Link PPP transport megaproject proceeding, which was initiated by the 
previous government, and ‘paid-out’ the project’s consortium AUD $339 million through political tactics, 
legal and public pressure for the ‘dud’ megaproject (Premier of Victoria 2015a). Inter-organisational 
politicking, misrepresentation of costs and benefits were seen as the main contributors to this ‘dud’ 
megaproject (ANAO 2015). 
 
Child et al. (2010) discuss some of the consequences of political behaviour in strategic decision-making. 
Firstly, political tactics that are successful in exerting influence over strategic decision-making lead to a 
selective and biased disclosure of relevant information. This can lead to managers making decisions on 
incomplete information, which may affect outcomes. Secondly, political decision processes are divisive. 
This can dilute organisational resources, which could have been directed towards achieving organisational 
objectives. Thirdly, political behaviour may lead to incomplete understanding of the environmental 
constraints, resulting in the undermining of strategic decisions. Similarly, Nutt (2010a) reviewed more than 
400 decisions by executive level managers of major firms. The review showed that premature commitments 
and wasted resources were responsible for failed decisions. With premature commitments, decision makers 
felt pressured to act quickly, which stemmed from a desire to appear decisive, from fear and personal 
interests. This was evidenced on the ‘failed’ East West Link PPP megaproject where the then state 
government political party quickly executed a side letter with the project consortium prior to elections to 
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enforce the project contract (Premier of Victoria 2015b), which eventually led to the demise of that 
government, the megaproject, and compensation in the hundreds of millions. With misused resources, 
decision makers conserve resources, which leads to failure-prone practices. To overcome and avoid these 
traps Nutt and Wilson (2010) suggest that decision makers focus on technical, personal and organisational 
perspectives from different angles. Technical perspectives focus on facts and economic realities, the 
organisational perspective focuses on decisions through the eyes of the organisation, and the personal 
perspective focuses on decisions through the eyes of affected stakeholders. Nutt and Wilson (2010) also 
suggests that decision makers should select the area of action, deal with interests and interest groups, search 
broadly and encourage innovation, use evaluation wisely, confront ethical questions, and promote a culture 
of learning. This will enable decision makers to stay ‘issue centred using an exploratory mindset to cope 
with pressure to take action’ (Nutt 2010a, p. 191). Similarly, Child et al. (2010, p. 123) state that ‘while 
traditionally political behaviour has been defined by reference to serving sectional interests, it can also 
widen and enrich a debate over the best strategic paths to follow in the interest of the organisation as a 
whole. This implies that although politics in strategic decision-making tends to be seen as commonplace, 
and much of the research is focused on the negative aspects of political behaviour, it can take two paths: 
either constructive or destructive to an organisation. 
 Strategic Decision-Making in Professional and Public Organisations 
While much as been discussed in relation to how decisions are made and the political aspects of strategic 
decision-making, it is also important to examine decision-making in professional and public organisations. 
Morris et al. (2010) examined decision making within professional services firms, especially the managerial 
challenges and organisational tensions faced by firms. The examination revealed that professional service 
firms are characterised by the nature of their work, external context within which their work is performed, 
and the organisational framework structures and systems. The nature of their work is characterised by the 
knowledge based features of task inputs and outputs including environmental autonomy, discretion and the 
exercise of personal judgement, ability to control and co-ordinate complex environments, being highly 
mobile, and intangible applications of complex knowledge. External context is characterised by 
organisational and commercial dimensions including cultural and environmental ideologies, deeply 
embedded professional norms and behaviour, changing market environment and increased competitive 
pressures, and client relationships. These have posed a number of managerial challenges, for example 
developing and maintaining a firm’s reputation, and the traditional means of addressing these challenges 
has been through collegial forms of governance in the form of professional partnerships (Morris et al. 
2010). Despite the extensive research into professional organisational arrangements, there is limited 
understanding of how decisions are made and executed by professional service firms. In order to further 
understand this issue, Morris et al. (2010), conducted an exploratory study of large practice firms by 
interviewing managing partners and lead partners. However, prior to examining the study, it is worthwhile 
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stating the main difference between strategic decisions taken by professional compared to non-professional 
service organisations: 
Non-professional service organisations relate less to capital investment decisions, which are 
relatively light in these firms, and more to investments in human capital. Strategic decisions in 
professional firms are much more focused upon policies to attract, retain, and create incentives for 
its human capital. These are crucial in order to nurture competence, creativity, and commitment 
amongst the firm’s most crucial assets, who are the foundations of professional service firms’ profits, 
reputation, and strategic expansion into new markets. Indeed, the growth imperative is driven as 
much by the need to manage the aspirations of professional staff as by external, market-based 
(especially client) considerations (Morris et al. 2010, p. 289). 
The Morris et al. (2010) study revealed that professional service firms are engaged in strategic/non-strategic 
and easy/hard decisions. Strategic/easy decisions affect the firm and its major practices, for example, 
growth of service sector or client relationship strategies. Non-strategic/easy and non-strategic/hard 
decisions are routine and functional, for example, non-partner recruitment or organisational identity. 
Strategic/hard decisions or ‘people decisions’ are complex, difficult and of strategic importance, and 
involve significant resources and/or the direction of the firm. These decisions require the support and 
commitment of staff, especially building consensus among partners, to implement strategic decisions. 
However, as Morris et al. (2010, p. 297) state ‘these decisions are very difficult because partners are self-
interested individual owners who expect a high degree of autonomy in the management of their work life 
and of their client engagements … which has a major influence upon the future performance and reputation 
of the entire firm.’ Morris et al. (2010) also noted that there is a noticeable difference in the decision-
making approach of partner and publicly owned professional services firms.  
 
Traditional partnerships pose a share of the firm’s equity and rights to question, debate, or contest strategic 
decisions, which can slow the decision-making process. However, in publicly owned professional service 
firms there is a separation of management from ownership, which results in ‘faster decision-making and 
less dissent in implementation, and a decision-making style which emphasises rationality, efficiency, and 
defined organisational goals over emotion and consensus via politicking’ (Morris et al. 2010, p. 299). This 
suggests that publicly owned professional service firms, compared with partnerships, operate in an 
environment with less challenges and influence over strategic decision-making and implementation. 
However, Morris et al. (2010) also notes that there is much to learn from professional service firms, as they 
have a diverse set of professionals embedded in a complex organisational environment which requires 
consensus amongst key and influential stakeholders, especially who controls vital resources for the 
organisation to survive and thrive. The Morris et al. (2010) notion of faster decision-making of private 
organisations is reinforced by Butler et al. (1991) study into strategic investment decision-making. Their 
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research described and investigated the process of capital investment projects of a strategic nature in three 
UK companies. Focusing on semi-structured interviews with managers that have the ability to influence 
strategic decision-making, and a questionnaire involving 32 questions on the investment process and its 
outcome. The findings of the intensive case study revealed that organisations which achieved a high 
consensus between managers, and high levels of communication, improved the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process, especially the speed of decisions. Decisions with the lowest perceived 
effectiveness lost support from those involved in the decision-making process and took a long time to 
implement. However, all three organisations perceived the effect upon product quality and productivity, fit 
with business strategy and competitive position of the organisation as being the most important factors to 
consider when evaluating decisions. Although the study does provide a good understanding of strategic 
investment decision-making and the influences thereof, it does pose a number of limitations including the 
involvement of managers’ own rating of their decision effectiveness, factors the influence the strategic 
decision-making process, and a focus on private organisations.  
 
Compared to private organisations, decisions in public organisations can, and usually do, have broader 
implications. Rainey et al. (2010) undertook an extensive review and analysis of decision-making in public 
organisations. They assert that public decision-making processes differ little from private organisations, 
particularly that public organisations engage in ‘rational’ decision processes, and that government and 
private organisations often do the same things. For example, they engage similar stakeholders (contractors 
and consultants), governments frequently contract-out some of their services, such as PPPs for projects, 
and frequently face similar decisions. However, the major differences between public and private 
organisations are that public organisations operate under the authority of government and receive 
authorisation and funding (through taxes and budgetary allocations) for their activities from government, 
and private organisations must sell products and services to customers to receive most of their financial 
resources. This implies that public organisations are subject to more control and direction that is politically 
constrained, while private organisations are subject to less authority but constrained to find innovative ways 
to use their autonomy to sell their products and services to customers. Rainey et al. (2010) also argue that 
these general differences in control and direction establish the context for organisational decision-making. 
They state that public decision makers have to consider implications for broad populations and 
constituencies, and thus become subject to more public scrutiny, such as media and interest groups, while 
private organisations ownership is vested in private owners and shareholders. These differences influence 
organisations decision-making, processes and structures. Rainey et al. (2010, p. 354) state that: 
The authority of leaders in public organisations tends to be more limited, by external political 
interventions and controls and shifts in the election results, and through structures of constraints such 
as constitutional limitations, and system-wide personnel and purchasing rules that limit 
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administrative authority. These administrative constraints lead to differences in incentive structures 
and processes within public organisations.  
Rainey et al. (2010) also provide a number of assertions and evidence about decision-making in public 
organisations. They state that public organisations tend to engage in routine and rational decision-making 
processes, which tends to apply to simple and operational contexts. With rational decision-making actors 
enter decision situations with known objectives, gather appropriate information, develop a set of 
alternatives, assess the possible consequences, and the select the optimal alternative (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki 1992, Lindblom 1959, 1979, Pfeffer 1981, 1992a, 1992b). However, major decisions in public 
organisations tend to be intertwined within a web of complexity and dynamism. When decision makers 
engage in major and complex decisions, the ‘deluge of information and uncertainty overloads decision 
makers’ cognitive capacity to process it, which causes them to decide under conditions of ‘bounded 
rationality,’ and do not maximise in accordance with rationality assumptions; they ‘satisfice’’(Rainey et al. 
2010, p. 356). With satisficing, decision makers search for alternatives and solutions in relation to problems 
rather than in a systematic way, which tends to result in satisficing outcomes (Harrison and Pelletier 1995, 
Little 2012, 2015). They also rely on technical knowledge to assist them to solve problems and accomplish 
tasks. This tends to be the common approach to decision-making in public organisations (Rainey et al. 
2010). However, when decision makers have ‘no clear consensus on goals and little clarity as to the 
technical means of achieving them, they engage in ‘satisficing’ behaviours, such as bargaining and political 
manoeuvring and more intuitive, judgmental decision-making, which occur more often in public as 
compared to the private sector’ (Rainey et al. 2010, p. 357).  
 
Advancing the rationality of decision-making, Dietrich and List (2013) suggest an alternative theory to 
rational choice with reason-based theory. Here the focus is on preference formation, particularly, reason-
based explanations (motivating) and reason-based justifications (normative). A proposition attains 
motivational relevance for an agent’s preferences when an agent: (a) conceptualises it abstractly; (b) 
qualitatively, and not merely abstractly, understands it; and (c) draws on the concept of attentional salience. 
Although the motivating reasons explain why agents make a choice, they also must be justified on whether 
the agent has made them for the right reasons. According to Dietrich and List (2013, p. 117) ‘while reason-
based explanations must refer to motivating reasons, reason-based justifications require a reference to 
normative reasons.’ Normative reasons focus on what an agent ‘ought’ to have as a reason, for example, 
whether the reason is a rational or moral one. Such a theory based on reason i.e., reason-based model of 
choice, also focuses on rationality as valid inference, rather than rationality as optimal choice, as it is ‘the 
procedure that makes one rational or irrational’ (Viskovatoff 2001, p. 328, emphasis in original). This begs 
a question: considering that individuals have mixed motives i.e., different values which may diverge from 
common interest, and make a choice ‘irrational,’ can motives align? And if so, how? This is a typical 
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question situated in government portfolios with the prima facie challenges on the implementation of 
megaproject or program policies, which entail numerous strategic, political, social and economic 
interactions. According to Almendares and Landa (2016) such a phenomenon can be seen as collective 
action problems with a solution based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning. This ‘links the 
characterisation of joint intention (similarly seen as joint motivation) in terms of individual intentions – an 
equilibrium view – with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games,’ such as 
counterfactual conditions to achieve equilibrium strategies of jointness (Almendares and Landa 2016, p. 
733). This implies that strategic equilibrium-based reasoning is based on two minds of rationality: 
conscious and unconscious. Evans (2014) moving on from ‘traditional thinking’ comprising of Type 1 
(described as fast, automatic and high capacity) and Type 2 (described as slow, controlled and low capacity) 
processes, conceptualises two minds rationality: an old mind rationality (succeeded in or adaption to the 
past) i.e., implicit knowledge, instincts and learned behaviour, and new mind rationality (reasoning about 
the future) i.e., explicit knowledge, engaged in mental simulations of hypothetical possibilities and 
consequential decision-making, that co-exist in complex interactions. However, a significant limitation of 
the old mind is to ‘make decisions by reasoning about future consequences’ (Evans 2014, p. 138). This is 
where epistemic rationality, classically described as truth seeking, and sometimes referred to as theoretical 
rationality or evidential rationality (see Stanovich 2011), seen as the ‘propensity of learning systems to 
form accurate representations of the world around us,’ an occupation of the new mind, ‘compensates’ for 
the old mind (Evans 2014, p. 135). However, the ‘formation of habits in the old mind is by its general 
learning mechanism as a major cause of two minds conflicts and cognitive biases’ (Evans 2014, p. 142). 
For example, when a project manager decides out of habit, s/he may fail to notice innovative solutions to a 
challenge which would require new mind resources for the solution. 
 
Besides rational and bounded rationality decision-making, Rainey et al. (2010) also discuss additional 
alternatives to decision-making in public organisations, being Prospect Theory and Poliheuristic Theory. 
Prospect Theory assumes that decision makers have cognitive limitations and frame a problem around a 
reference point of losses and gains, such as possible losses of budget, credibility, program or human 
resources. Poliheuristic Theory explains decision-making as more rational and focuses on the development 
of alternatives and choice with decision makers performing five sequential processes. This consists of 
employing a non-holistic approach rather than a full comparison of alternatives, then discarding alternatives 
that fail to meet their minimal requirements, followed by assessing alternatives on an irrelevant 
dimension(s), then adopting a satisfying behaviour, and finally employing an ‘order-sensitive search’ of 
the alternatives (Dacey and Carlson 2004, Mintz 1993, Rainey et al. 2010). However, the general consensus 
by researchers on decision-making processes in public organisations is that strategic decisions tend to 
follow an incremental process with limited changes from existing conditions (Lindblom 1959, Rainey et 
al. 2010). Lindblom (1959, 1979) states that government actors tend to avoid major departures from 
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existing policies and instead concentrate on relatively limited incremental steps. He also suggests if 
government actors deviate too far from existing policies it may evoke strong opposition, but if they 
implement incremental processes there is a good chance a policy will achieve its objectives with minimal 
opposition from interest groups. Rainey et al. (2010) also suggest that strategic decision-making processes 
in public organisations tends to follow a ‘garbage-can’ process. This is a process in which problems, 
solutions and choices are uncoupled from one another in highly complex and dynamic environments (Jean-
Louis et al. 2007, Langley et al. 1995). Moreover, it lacks a clear beginning and end point in the decision-
making process, and decision makers tend to wander in and out of decisions (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992, 
Langley et al. 1995). According to Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992, p. 29) decisions ‘are not the result of 
analysis by bounded rationality or the power of a coalition, but rather are a random confluence of events.’ 
This type of decision-making process tends to occur frequently in public organisations (Rainey et al. 2010).  
 
In addition, most of the research on decision-making focuses on pre-decision information gathering and 
processing patterns. However and from another perspective, Svenson (1996) presents the Differentiation 
and Consolidation Theory of human decision-making, a process approach to pre- and post-decision 
processes. This theory distinguishes four different types of decision-making processes. The first level 
includes many quick, automatic and unconscious decisions. This suggests that decisions are made from 
previous experience, for example, familiar situations, habit or knowledge-based behaviour. Decisions based 
on a number of attributes favouring a chosen candidate belong to level two decisions. This is where a 
solution is obvious and decisions are based on emotional reactions, which may not involve conflicts. The 
third level of decision-making refers to choices between alternatives with goal conflicts. This is where 
different attributes favour different alternatives. Most of the existing literature on decision-making treats 
decisions at this level. The fourth level of the decision-making process alternatives are not fixed nor is a set 
of attributes used to characterise alternatives. Problem solving is an essential sub-process that constitutes 
this level. This implies that there is not a one-size-fits-all process to decision-making nor is it a linear 
process.  
 
Moreover, decision-making can be either a fairly simple process based on familiar situations and habits, or 
a highly complex process based on problem solving with a number of alternatives with goal conflicts. 
Similar to Svenson (1996) decision-making theory, Snowden and Boone (2007) discuss the Cynefin 
framework which enables organisational actors to make better decisions based on five contexts defined by 
the nature of the relationship between cause and effect: simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and 
disorder. Simple contexts are characterised by stability and clear cause and effect relationships, repeating 
patterns and consistent events within the realm of ‘known knowns,’ fact-based, and decisions are assessed 
on sense, categorize, and respond process. Complicated contexts may contain multiple answers, but not 
everyone can see the relationship between cause and effect. Expert diagnosis is required within this realm 
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of ‘known unknowns,’ which is fact-based and decisions are assessed on a sense, analyse, and respond 
process as it may contain several options. It also enables leaders and experts to approach decision-making 
more creatively. Complex contexts are characterised by flux and unpredictability and there are no right 
answers. There are many competing ideas, there is a need for creative and innovative approaches within 
this realm of ‘unknown unknowns’ where decisions are assessed on the need to probe first, then sense, and 
then respond. Decision-making in most contemporary businesses and organisations have shifted into this 
context. In chaotic contexts, there is no clear cause-and-effect relationship, and thus no point in looking for 
the right answers. This is the realm of unknowables where there are many decisions to make, but no time 
to think. Actors need to look for what works instead of seeking the right answer. For example, the events 
of the Fukushima nuclear accident fall into this category (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission 2012). The literature on decision-making implies that it is essential to understand 
human decision-making behaviour and the environmental contexts of decision-making to maximise or 
optimise strategic decision-making in project environments – thus the relational actor space. The literature 
also suggests that organising decisions can be, and usually are, a complex and dynamic process with a 
number of alternative solutions or competing ideas that require a collective approach to a course of action. 
Müller et al. (2009, p. 77) argue as emphasised by Davis (1992) that ‘social factors can play a role in a 
variety of personal decisions, but it is the collective, co-ordinated action by a group of individuals that 
generates a choice, judgement, and opinion.’ This is especially prevalent in decision-making styles in 
project teams composed of team members from different nationalities (Müller et al. 2009).  
 
A central theme in organisational strategic decision-making is focused on the attempt to understand 
individual, group and organisational decision-making processes: the emergent behaviour of organisational 
actors. For example, as advanced previously, executive groups within government agencies make important 
decisions with far-reaching consequences that affect businesses, economy, environment, and projects that 
are funded by the public. Because of this, most of the literature on decision-making deals with the quality 
of decision-making and how to improve it. Along with that, Parkin (1996) conducted a critical analysis on 
organisational decision-making and the project manager, and theorised that humans undertake the decision-
making process in five stages, consisting of: (1) problem definition; (2) thought; (3) judgement; (4) 
decision; and (5) action. 
 
Parkin (1996) highlights that the decision-making process is influenced by external elements being 
behavioural, beliefs, personal values, social and occupational norms, personality, and environmental 
constraints. Parkin also argues that a project management team may have a relatively small influence on 
decisions when compared to the larger, and thus, highly influential organisational networks of influential 
actors. Does this imply that a project that is independent of an organisation, thus organisational network of 
actors, has more control over the decision-making process, and thus a greater chance of success? Similarly, 
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Bourgault et al. (2008) conducted an empirical study using a quantitative approach on decision-making 
within distributed project teams. The results support the benefits of a quality decision-making process 
within distributed teams, autonomy is an important characteristic for successful dispersed teams, and 
formalisation does add value to teamwork especially as the distributedness of the team increases. Their 
study suggests that team effectiveness increases when actors take an influential role in team decisions, feel 
a sense of authority, responsibility and accountability, which has a direct influence of the value of outcomes. 
Despite the value of the results for quality of decision-making and team work, especially shedding some 
light on rationality of decisions, it does have a number of limitations. This includes a focus on private firms 
and respondents in North America, limited understanding of the decision-making process especially the 
strategic context, and factors that influence team decision-making processes. Aaltonen and Kujala (2010) 
also conducted an empirical study on understanding of the potential of secondary stakeholders to influence 
the project management’s decision-making during the different phases of the project lifecycle. Their 
findings reveal that secondary stakeholders are most salient in the investment phase of projects, and hence, 
have the best chance to influence the project management decision-making. Other findings include that 
secondary stakeholders are unlikely to influence project outcomes during the early phase of the project 
lifecycle. Despite the value of the results for secondary stakeholder influence on project management 
decision-making, it does pose some limitations. This includes a focus on a private construction firm and 
respondents in South America, and a simple example of the use of influence strategies by secondary 
stakeholders within a project environment. 
 
As mentioned previously, organisational decision-making can also be influenced by and imbedded in 
routines, habits and emotions. Organisational routines are continuously emerging systems with internal 
structures and dynamics (Becker 2005, Pentland and Feldman 2005). Pentland and Feldman (2005) state 
that organisational routines can either exhibit continuity thus demonstrating traits of inertia and stability, 
or exhibit continuous change thus demonstrating traits of flexibility and change. Becker (2005) argues that 
although further research is needed to understand the concept of ‘organisational routine,’ it is usually an 
abstract pattern of relationships (or rules) and a path of action. Cohen (2007) explores the study of routine 
by reflecting on American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey theory of human learning. He argues that 
organisational routine tends to be rigid (routine patterns of action), mundane (lack of importance) and 
mindless (not tightly integrated with deliberation, reflection, or feelings). This implies that organisational 
routines tend to be encoded or formalised in organisational policies and procedures. However, 
organisational routines can be shaped or changed based on Dewey’s theory on the dynamic interplay of 
habit, thought and emotion (Cohen 2007). He also goes on to state that this suffuses perception and 
reflection, conveys emotion, constitutes character and embodies morality. In order to better understand 
organisational routines, Pentland and Feldman (2005) propose three different units of analysis: routines as 
‘black boxes,’ in isolation (e.g. routines as patterns of action), and relationship between these parts and 
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processes. The study reveals that the ‘black box’ routine is simple and general but it can lead to a narrow 
understanding of organisational routines. When considered in isolation, there are three possibilities to 
consider: the performances, the ostensive aspect, or the related artifacts. Exploring the relations between 
ostensive and performative aspects, ostensive routines and artifacts; performances and artifacts provides a 
better understanding of stability, rigidity, innovation, flexibility and change in organisational routines. By 
artifacts they mean organisational rules, policies, procedures, program guidelines, and general physical 
settings. Implicitly, the study indicates that organisational routines are powerful mechanisms that can shape 
organisational actors and influence the decision-making process. Managers are able to exercise power by 
‘motivating people to change their performances in a routine or to change their understandings of what the 
routine is supposed to do or how it is supposed to be enacted’ (Pentland and Feldman 2005, p. 809). This 
implies that organisational actors can form powers of coalition to either dominate or resist organisational 
routines or the performance of routines, and thus the decision-making process, but it is still an effortful and 
time consuming process (Pfeffer 1992b). This is especially evident in bureaucratic and hierarchical 
organisational frameworks.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on organisational routines, habits and emotions suggests that they can either 
enable or constrain organisational strategic decision-making processes. Senior management can influence 
actors by exploring the internal dynamics of organisational routines to ‘favour’ their course of action. 
Organisations can also take different approaches to routines activities by employing some of Cohen (2007) 
suggestions, which provides some insightful ways of thinking about the concept of routine activities within 
an organisational environment. However, the literature is limited in significant ways including thorough 
reviews and research studies, especially external influences on organisational routines. The literature 
review shows gaps of influential factors that shape organisational routines or means, and the effects of 
changes of routines or means on organisational strategies in different contexts. This study will address the 
existing gaps in the literature. However, it does provide an opportunity for detailed research to gain a deeper 
undertaking of the theory of organisational routine or means and strategic decision-making in project 
environments.  
 
The importance of quality decision-making in project environments has also been emphasised in many 
government reports. The Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2012a) investigated the delivery of major 
infrastructure projects by Major Projects Victoria (MPV). The report concluded that MPV is unable to 
demonstrate that it operates and manages infrastructure projects effectively, efficiently or economically. 
Impartiality in the decision-making process was a factor that contributed to MPV poor portfolio 
performance. Since the audit report, MPV has dissolved as a governing project entity and merged with 
another government agency for the delivery of major projects. Similarly, the Parliament of Victoria (2012) 
conducted an inquiry into effective decision-making for the successful delivery of significant infrastructure 
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projects. The report revealed that the Victorian government should strengthen the quality of its decision-
making competencies in major infrastructure projects, which should, in turn, achieve higher performance 
infrastructure projects and generate higher community benefits. Similar conclusions were drawn from the 
Australian Government Productivity Commission (2014) inquiry report into public infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (2012) conducted 
an investigation into the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. The report concluded that the accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant ‘cannot be regarded as a natural disaster, but a manmade disaster 
due to the faulty rationales for decisions and actions’ (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission 2012, p. 9). Moreover, the essentiality of quality decision-making is also 
reported by Nutt (1999b) and Miller et al. (2008) who state that at least half the decisions made in 
organisations fail. The reports timely remind us of the significant importance of quality decision-making in 
major projects that have significant financial, social, morale, and environmental consequences.  
 Gaps and Areas for Project Management Advancement 
Past research trying to understand decision-making in project environments have focused on the front-end, 
and the quality and influence of stakeholders on the decision-making process. While the researcher 
recognises the value of existing decision-making literature, and the literature on project decision-making, 
the researcher finds that significant attention is still required at the project level, especially empirical studies 
in the context of strategic decision-making. This can include understanding the way people observe 
decisions, and the influence of inter- and intra-organisational actors on the decision-making process in 
project policy environments. The context and organisational norms can also significantly influence project 
decision-making. For example, Parkin (1996) does not discuss how other internal and external factors may 
influence the decision-making process. Although Parkin’s model mentions incremental decision-making, 
it does not discuss decision-making timeframes. Additionally, the literature implies that project decisions 
are made from senior management or hierarchical powers of influence cascaded down to the project team 
to deliver the organisations strategies, but does not discuss an independent project decision-making process, 
only that a project manager must demonstrate a high level of leadership and control over the project when 
reporting to senior management. Thus, the literature tends to show knowledge gaps in the concepts of 
decision-making, strategic decision-making, organisational and political strategic decision-making, and 
strategic decision-making in professional and public organisations for the implementation of project 
policies. With decision-making, there needs an understanding of the cognitive phenomenon of decision-
making, especially the ‘seeing’ of decision-making by organisational actors. There also needs to be a deeper 
understanding of the complexity, dynamism, plurality, and the emergent properties of strategic decision-
making and its affects project policy implementation. The political, inter- and intra-organisational 
(inter)actions of strategic decision-making, and the forms of ‘power’ that organisational actors use to shape 
or influence project policy implementation also needs deeper understanding. Finally, the way professional 
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and public organisations ‘make’ and the consequences of strategic decision-making on the implementation 
of project policies. See table 2-2 for the concepts, salient characteristics, gaps and areas for project 
management advancement. This research study will address these gaps in the literature.  
Table 2-2: Summary of Salient Theoretical Literature on Decision-Making Theory on the 
Implementation of Project Policies 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project 
Management Advancement 
Decision-making • Tends to be seen as a rational and easy 
process 
• Cognitive phenomenon with assessments 
of consequences and uncertainties 
• Three approaches: thinking first, seeing 
first, and doing first 
Cognitive phenomenon of decision-
making on the implementation of 
project policies, the ‘seeing’ of 
decision-making by organisational 
actors within a project policy context. 
Strategic decision-
making 
• Organisational context seen as effortful, 
complex and dynamic with emergent 
properties 
• Has competing interests the prompt key 
players to use political pressure to ensure 
that a choice aligns with their 
preferences 
• Seen as either a plan, ploy, pattern, 
achieving a position, or a perspective 
• Organisational decisions tend to result in 
plans or ploys, but the strategic element 
becomes apparent when decisions are 
examined together and patterns emerge 
Complexity, dynamism, plurality, and 
emergent properties of strategic 
decision-making and its effects on 
project policy implementation. 
Organisational and 
political strategic 
decision-making 
• Likely to stimulate political action, and 
often covert as they are complex, 
significant and subject to uncertainty 
• Crucial for organisational survival 
• Muddled by action, interaction and 
counteraction 
• Actors tend to use power, form powers 
of coalition, agenda control, etc. to 
Political, inter- and intra-
organisational (inter)actions of 
strategic decision-making for project 
policy implementation; and forms of 
‘power’ that organisational actors use 
to shape or influence organisational 
strategic decisions on the 
implementation of project policies. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project 
Management Advancement 
influence decisions and their positions 
and interests in an organisation 
• Can be either vertically or horizontally 
intertwined, and centralised or 
decentralised, but requires a clear 
command structure 
• Strategic decisions can be influenced 
upward, by inter-organisational actors 
• Organisations that possess greater 
resources are more likely to be politically 
active 
• Political tactics leads to selective and 
biased disclosure of information, 
political decision processes are divisive, 
political behaviour may result in 
undermining of strategic decisions 
• Can be either constructive or destructive 
to an organisation 
Strategic decision-
making in 
professional and 
public 
organisations 
• Decisions in public organisations have 
broader implications (i.e., subject to 
more public scrutiny), but differ little 
from private organisations 
• Public organisations operate under the 
authority of government and receive 
authorisation and funding for their 
activities from government, and are 
subject to more control and direction that 
is politically constrained 
• Private organisations must sell products 
and services to customers, and are 
subject to less authority but constrained 
to find innovative ways 
• Public organisations tend to engage in 
routine and rational decision-making 
Professional and public organisations 
‘make’ and the consequences of 
strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of project policies. 
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
45 
 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project 
Management Advancement 
processes seen as a ‘garbage-can’ 
process, also major decisions tend to be 
intertwined within a web of complexity 
and dynamism, cognitive capacity is 
limited (i.e., bounded rationality), which 
tends to result in satisficing decisions 
and outcomes 
• Government actors tend to avoid major 
departures from existing decision-
making policies, which if they did, may 
evoke strong opposition 
• Can follow pre- or post-decision 
processes, or be a fairly simple or 
complex process (i.e., cause and effect 
relationship), or be influenced by 
external and internal environmental 
elements in different phases and degrees 
of an organisation and project 
2.4 Summary 
The first chapter of the literature review and analysis investigated factors that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. 
Particularly, with a focus on the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent 
properties of organisational strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between 
different agency and actor (inter)actions. The literature review focused on two major areas, being: project 
strategy and the front-end, and decision-making theory. From these major areas of investigation, it can be 
argued that when considering the implementation of public sector project policies the following can be 
concluded: 
• The implementation of project policies is difficult, complex, dynamic, and embedded within the 
complex fabrication of human behaviour (Artto et al. 2008a, Kay et al. 2006, Legge 2003). Here 
the implementation of project strategies is masterminded or crafted by organisational actors to 
achieve desired ends. To understand this ‘craftsmanship’ or Machiavellianism to project policy 
implementation, requires collective institutional leadership including an inspirational, sustainable 
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and clearly articulated strategic intent: vision and mission statement, a strategy for achieving that 
vision (i.e., capturing the ‘power’ of key and influential stakeholders, making the right decisions 
within the right structure and culture, understanding the relational behaviour of actors to achieve 
desired outcomes, etc.). This generates richly networked interactions – a deep understanding of the 
relational actor space (inter)actions – which is seen as ‘institutional work,’ the effortful actions of 
individuals and organisations in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional relations – the 
emergent – to form a relatively stable state (i.e., adaptive ‘organism’ or institution) of interacting 
relations. Such a phenomenon to capture this complexity is sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson 
2014, Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015), and once legitimised, it enables systems to co-ordinate 
complex, flexible behaviour and respond to changes in their environments. This leads to the 
decision-making environment.  
• Decision-making is strategic, complex, dynamic and characterised by plurality (Buijs et al. 2009, 
Jean-Louis et al. 2007, Klijn and Snellen 2009, Kriger and Barnes 1992, Pettigrew 2003). It is an 
emergent and effortful social phenomenon, embedded and embodied (i.e., covertly and overtly) 
within the (inter)actions of various organisational actors’ strategies, interacting in an unpredictable 
and unexpected manner (Byrne 1998), where the patterns of these strategies influence policy 
outcomes (Klijn and Snellen 2009) and organisational survival. Once implemented, it is often 
difficult to reverse (Aaltonen and Kujala 2010, Nutt and Wilson 2010). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW (PART II) 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
The first chapter of the literature review provided a critical review and analysis of the relevant literature 
related to the research topic – this being, project strategy and the front-end, and decision-making theory. 
What this chapter does: 
Expands on the first chapter of the literature review and provides a critical review and analysis of the 
relevant literature on external and internal factors that influence organisational strategic decision-
making, governance and policy implementation. This leads to a conceptual framework and proposition. 
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Four will discuss the research context, paradigm, methodology, and the case study 
approach in conducting the research. 
• Chapter Five will discuss and describe the case study and the organisations selected as case 
studies. 
• Chapter Six will provide the data analysis and interpretation of the case study.  
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This critical review expands on the previous chapter on exploring the complex, dynamic, intricate, plural 
and emergent properties of organisational strategic decision-making for project policy implementation. 
Particularly, it focuses on two major areas of literature: (1) external and internal environmental factors that 
influence organisational strategic decision-making; and (2) governance and policy implementation. A 
review of the literature provides an understanding of the extent and how external and internal environmental 
factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of project policies. 
This includes the economy or economic environment, social environment, ethics, politics, expert 
knowledge, power and politics, information and knowledge, and culture. Governance theory is then 
reviewed to provide a context for understanding effective mechanisms for project policy implementation. 
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This includes a discussion on the concepts of governance, institutions and governance, agency theory, 
transaction cost economics, stewardship theory, trust and control, and project governance on policy 
implementation. 
3.2 External Environmental Factors of Influence 
This section of the literature review will discuss external environment factors that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. 
In particular, the economy or economic environment, social environment, politics, and expert knowledge.  
 Economy or Economic Environment 
An influential factor that influences organisation decision-making is the state of the economy or economic 
environment (Hill 2009, Jabnoun et al. 2003, Johnson et al. 2003, Peters 2006, Pettigrew 2003), especially 
for the implementation and changes in policies (Hill 2009, Peters and Pierre 2006) including transport and 
infrastructure which stimulates economic growth and productivity (Bingham 2006, Button 2006, Cole 
2005). Such a change in the economic environment is also a trigger for organisational sensemaking, for 
example, an organisational response to crises and unexpected events (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). 
Rumelt et al. (1991) conducted an extensive review of the relationship between strategy and strategic 
management and found that the changing nature of the economy is a major influential factor that shapes 
organisational strategy. Moreover, Elbanna (2006) argues that intuition plays a significant role in shaping 
project strategy in an unstable economy, but negatively in a stable one. Influential variables include the 
macro-environment, competition, market demand and uncertainty, and technology (Bingham 2006, Button 
2006, Jabnoun et al. 2003). This is further stressed by Miller and Hobbs (2005) who state that high risks 
imposed on the governance regimes for large complex projects include macro-economic events such as the 
Asian economic crisis. This is significantly prevalent to the Australian resources sector, particularly, 
thermal coal projects. According to Saunders (2015) since 2011, the prices for thermal coal have 
significantly declined which has resulted in the closure and delay of projects. The main motivating factor 
was a change in policy measures to combat air pollution, particularly in China, Australia’s largest thermal 
coal importer. Another example is external market volatility (i.e., global or regional financial crises, abrupt 
changes in the stance of monetary policy in advanced economics) risk to investors for PPPs (Schwartz et 
al. 2014). However, they state that a way to mitigate these risks is by improving the overall investment 
climate e.g., political stability, rule of law and judicial access, government regulations, taxes, and 
government transparency and accountability. In general, the literature provides a narrow view on the level 
of influence the economy or the economic environment has on organisational strategic decisions where 
most of the literature is focused on the macro environment. This strongly suggests that a shift in strategy is 
needed towards a micro perspective to understand the complexities of organisational (inter)actions (i.e., 
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tacit, cultural) that influence strategic outcomes (Johnson et al. 2003, Valerie-Ines de la and Eléonore 2005). 
This point is stressed by Pierre (2006) who summaries on the topic of decision-making and policy 
implementation, that there is much to understand how the economy, or economic theory, contributes to 
policy implementation especially at the micro level – as most of the theory tends to focus on the macro 
level. Although the literature tends to neglect empirical studies on project strategy, the economy, 
implementation of project policies, and the decision-making process, (Koch et al. 2015) examined 
strategising in project-based organisations with a focus on middle-managers’ interaction and strategy 
praxis. Their study showed that middle managers played an essential role in mediating and translating 
intention, which provided an understanding of the micro activations of operations strategy development 
and implementation within project-based organisations. However, due to this narrow and neglect of studies 
in the existing literature, there needs to be an understanding of the significance the economy, especially the 
micro-economic environment, plays in influencing project strategies.  
 Social Environment 
The social environment is also an element that influences organisational strategies. Influencer forces come 
from a variety of groups including partners, contractors, unions, professional societies, agencies, special 
interest groups, regulators, governments, family and friends seeking to control the externalities of an 
organisation (Bourne and Walker 2005, Delmas and Toffel 2004, Mintzberg 1983, Pressman 1984, 
Shrivastava and Grant 1985, Winter 2006). These stakeholders impose normative and coercive pressures 
on organisations that influence organisational structures and practices (Delmas and Toffel 2004), and 
project policy implementation (Delmon 2011). For example, when firms adapt to environmental practices 
enforced (coercive power) by government agencies through legislation and regulations. Artto et al. (2008b) 
conducted an extensive literature review on the complexity of the stakeholder environment that recognised 
there are multiple stakeholders with strong and conflicting interests that influence project strategies. 
Similarly, Vuori et al. (2013) conducted a study on the formation of project strategy in response to the 
project’s environment and concluded that a project organisation needs to create a strategy to fit with the 
influence of its external stakeholder environment. Thus, project strategy fitness with its external (and 
internal) environment is an essential deciding factor if a project survives. This suggests that external 
organisational stakeholders are strong influencers of project strategy survival. Moreover, it implies that 
organisations should align, or fit, their project strategy with their external (and internal) environment. 
External influencers have the power to shape organisational behaviour by social norms, formal constraints, 
pressure campaigns, direct control, and membership on boards of directors, which can take many forms 
including regular or episodic, general or focussed, detached or personal, initiative or obstructive, formal or 
informal (Mintzberg 1983). He goes on further to state that external stakeholders can shape project strategy 
to their own advantage by employing an act of influence – the more acts, or shaper elements employed, the 
greater the power of influence over organisational strategy. Thus, a view can prevail that external 
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stakeholders have significant power to influence, and thus shape, project strategy including its survival. 
However, the empirical literature tends to focus on the degree of project autonomy from its parent 
organisation within a limited stakeholder environment. Empirical research should focus on identifying the 
effects of using different external social influencers in a project environment, especially incrementally over 
a project lifecycle, and consider a project’s stakeholder complexities e.g. (inter)actions.  
 Politics 
Politics, or political power, has a significant influence in shaping organisational and project strategy 
(Buchanan and Badham 2008, Delmas and Toffel 2004, Eisenhardt and Iii 1988, Elbanna 2006, Mintzberg 
1983, Pfeffer 1992a, Sallinen et al. 2013, Wilson 2003). Mintzberg (1983) is credited as being a pioneer in 
power in and around organisations, especially powers of coalition and powers of configuration that 
influence strategies. This is reinforced by Pfeffer (1992a, p. 101) assertion that ‘one of the most important 
resources that any member of an organisation can have is allies or supporters.’ Mintzberg (1983, p. 172) 
defines politics as ‘individual or group behaviour that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, 
and above all, illegitimate – sanctioned neither by formal authority, accepted ideology, nor certified 
expertise.’ This is reinforced by Mitleton-Kelly (2015) that an institutionalised authoritative mindset and 
illegitimate behaviour within a government agency tends to be a sign of survival than legitimate change. 
Similarly, Buchanan and Badham (2008, p. 11) define politics as ‘power in action, using a range of 
techniques and tactics.’ The concept of power and its influence on organisational strategies and decision-
making will be further advanced in section 3.3.1 Power and Politics. Sallinen et al. (2013) conducted a 
study on a governmental stakeholder’s influence on large projects and concluded that a governmental 
stakeholder can simultaneously restrain and enable projects. For example, a government stakeholder can 
inform the public about projects and make requirements easier to apply (enabling influence), and can 
enforce requirements, interfere and halt project work (restraining influence) (Sallinen et al. 2013). The 
literature suggests that politics, especially when individual or groups form powers of coalition can influence 
project strategies. More surprisingly, is the fact that political influence can be enabling and restraining. 
Moreover, Eisenhardt and Iii (1988) argue that as a means of influence organisational actors tend to form 
external alliances with the aim to influence and shape organisational decisions. This is also reinforced by 
Freeman and Reed (1983) argument that external stakeholders have the ability to influence organisational 
strategy due to the use of political process, namely, stakeholders forming groups of coalitions that demand 
organisational change. Wilson et al. (2010) conducted a study on extreme events, organisations and the 
politics of strategic decision-making. The study revealed that there are pre-existing dominant powers of 
coalition that centralise control by ensuring that only a few functional interests participate in the decision-
making process. However, further research is need to understand the influence of politics, and different 
forms of politics, on project strategy in government and non-government environments. Moreover, the 
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literature does not consider the influence of political power in different project contexts. Such empirical 
studies would deepen our understanding of the power of politics in shaping project strategy.  
 Expert Knowledge 
Expert knowledge is essential to the decision-making process (Child et al. 2010, Clegg et al. 2006, Dean 
and Sharfman 1993, Pfeffer 1981, 1992a), which has the ability to significantly influence project strategy 
and decision-making (Eweje et al. 2012). De Bruijn and Leijten (2008) argue that the substance and 
generation of information is crucial to the decision-making process. Pfeffer (1992a) asserts that the use of 
external experts is a powerful mechanism used by internal organisational actors to selectively construct the 
appearance of legitimate and sensible decision-making. Eweje et al. (2012) conducted a study on the 
influence of information feed on decision-making by a project manager and concluded that externally-
focused information types have the strongest influence on project strategy. Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) 
conducted a critical analysis on the delusion and deception in a large infrastructure project that revealed 
external expert actors can influence project strategy by presenting favourable and often deceptive 
information. Projects survive because the analysis of information may be biased or inadequate (Flyvbjerg 
2009b, Williams et al. 2009), and external actors form powers of coalition with internal actors (Shrivastava 
and Grant 1985). In this view, external actors with expert knowledge can present or withhold information 
that can influence the decision-making process within an organisation – colluding with internal 
organisational actors to shape project strategies and decision-making processes. Consultants tend to provide 
information that looks favourably on paper with the objective for an organisation to obtain funding for a 
project (Flyvbjerg 2009b). Moreover, Flyvbjerg (2012) argues that projects tend to secure approval and 
funds by external actors providing information that underestimates costs and overestimates benefits. 
Similarly, Williams and Samset (2010) suggest that actors have the ability to interpret and use information 
differently to influence, and thus shape, the project decision-making process. The outcome of this is 
strategic misrepresentation of project costs and benefits (Flyvbjerg 2012). This provides the delusion of 
making projects feasible, but may have adverse consequences in the long-run. This is also reinforced by 
Klakegg’s (2009) study on identifying effective strategies to improve governance of public projects, which 
revealed that when pursing sustainability of public projects, a critical element leading to a lack of 
sustainability is planning optimism or overestimation (deliberately or not) of project benefits which 
misleads decision makers. A report on the management of the Eurofighter Typhoon project by the National 
Audit Office (2011b) in the United Kingdom concluded that key investment decisions were made on the 
basis on over-optimistic cost estimates. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not predict the project budget 
and costs accurately due to poor corporate decisions, and as a consequence, the project costs had risen 
substantially in the billions of dollars. This strategic misrepresentation of project costs and benefits is also 
evidently evolving with the United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability program which is 
primary focused on the acquisition of a fleet of four new Vanguard-class submarines (National Audit Office 
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2008). Initially, the UK’s MoD predicated the procurement cost of the submarines and associated 
equipment and infrastructure would be region of 15 to 20 billion pounds at 2006/07 prices (National Audit 
Office 2008, Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
2006). However, in 2015, Her Majesty's Government (2015) announced the latest estimate is likely to cost 
a total of 31 billion pounds with an additional 10-billion-pound contingency fund – an increase of up to 16 
billion pounds or 52 percent. Her Majesty's Government (2015) states that the revised cost reflects their 
greater understanding of the detailed design and manufacture of the submarines. In addition, the National 
Audit Office (2008) strongly implies that there are significant challenges of delivering complex defence 
projects, principally the MoD’s relationship with various industrial partners, including BAE Systems and 
Rolls-Royce. In general, the literature provides a narrow view of expert knowledge as an influencer on 
organisational strategic decision-making. The literature tends to focus on the power of experts to present 
or withhold salient information to influence strategies and the decision-making process. Further empirical 
studies are needed to understand different forms of influence deployed by experts to shape project strategies 
and the decision-making process, especially in diverse project environments i.e., complex and complicated 
contexts. 
 Gaps and Areas for Project Management Advancement 
Understanding the external network of influential organisational elements, or shapers, can significantly 
shape project strategies and the decision-making process. By using any or all the external means of 
influence, an actor or group of actors can influence organisational project strategies and decision-making 
processes. Influencers can take many forms, restraining and enabling projects, presenting favourable and 
deceptive information. Basically, an internal organisation surrenders a significant proportion of its power 
as the external coalition of relational frameworks strengthens their power of influence (Mintzberg 1983). 
However, the literature review has identified that there are existing knowledge gaps in the concepts of 
economy or economic environment, social environment, politics, and expert knowledge for project policy 
implementation. There needs a deeper understanding of the macro– and micro-economic environment 
including the complexities of organisational (inter)actions that influence organisational strategic decision-
making for project policy implementation. The normative and regulative influence of the social 
environment including the complexity of (inter)actions of organisational actors that influence project 
strategies and decision-making processes. Politics tends to be seen as corrosive on the implementation of 
project policies, which therefore, requires a deeper understanding of the informal and illegitimate 
behaviour, and the power of action of organisational actors on decision-making processes. Information 
from experts which is seen as a powerful mechanism to influence project strategies, tends to be strategically 
misrepresented by organisational actors who are also plagued with cognitive biases when making project 
decisions. See table 3-1 for the concepts, salient characteristics, gaps and areas for project management 
advancement. 
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Empirical studies to fill the gaps in the literature would deepen our understanding of key external factors 
that influence organisational strategies and the decision-making process on the implementation of project 
policies. This research study will address these gaps.  
Table 3-1: Summary of Salient Theoretical Literature on External Factors that Influence 
Organisational Strategic Decision-Making on Project Policy Implementation 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Economy or 
economic 
environment 
• Intuition plays a significant role in 
shaping project strategy in an 
unstable environment, but 
negatively in a stable one 
• Macro- and micro-economic 
environment influences strategy 
and organisational strategic 
decision-making 
• Micro perspective involves 
complexities of organisational 
interactions that influence strategic 
outcomes 
• Middle-managers in project-based 
organisations play an essential role  
Macro- and micro-economic environment 
including the triggers of organisational 
sensemaking and the complexities of 
(inter)actions that influence organisational 
strategies on the implementation of project 
policies. 
Social 
environment 
• Stakeholders impose normative, 
regulative and coercive pressures to 
influence organisational practices 
and policy implementation 
• The more acts of influence by 
external stakeholders the greater 
the power of influence 
• Organisations need to create a 
strategy that fits with the influence 
of external stakeholder 
environments 
Normative (or informal) and regulative (or 
formal) influence including the complexity of 
(inter)actions of stakeholders on organisational 
strategies for project policy implementation.  
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Politics • Individual or group behaviour that 
is informal, divisive and 
illegitimate – sanctioned by either 
formal authority or accepted 
ideologies 
• Power in action 
• Stakeholders can simultaneously 
employ restraining and enabling 
influence on project policies 
• Organisational actors tend to form 
external alliances to influence 
organisational strategies and 
decisions 
Informal and illegitimate behaviour, enabling 
and constraining influences, and power in 
action of stakeholders influencing the 
implementation of project policies. 
Expert 
knowledge 
• Information is crucial to the 
decision-making process 
• Powerful mechanism used by 
organisational actors to selectively 
influence decision-making 
• External actors tend to present 
favourable and deceptive 
information 
• Projects survive because the 
analysis of information may be 
biased or inadequate, and external 
actors form powers of coalition 
with internal actors 
• Consultants tend to provide 
favourable information to obtain 
project funding 
• Organisational actors tend to 
interpret and use information 
differently to shape the project 
decision-making process – strategic 
misrepresentation 
Powerful mechanisms, and governance, 
including the use of information used by 
stakeholders to influence organisational 
strategies and the decision-making process 
including cognitive biases on the 
implementation of project policies. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
• Plagued with cognitive biases 
3.3 Internal Environmental Factors of Influence 
Similarly to the pervious section, this section of the literature review will discuss internal environment 
factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. In particular, power and politics, information and knowledge, and 
culture. 
 Power and Politics 
Prior to exploring how power and politics influences internal organisational strategies and decision-making 
processes it is well worth exploring the concept of power. According to Allen (2003, p. 2) power is ‘not 
some ‘thing’ that moves and it does not traverse and transect places or communities, but it is a relational 
effect of social interaction.’ This concept of power is strongly advocated by a number of leading scholars 
(for example see Clegg 1989a, Clegg et al. 2006, Dahl 1957, Haugaard and Clegg 2009). Although there 
is plethora accounts of power (i.e., legitimate, illegitimate, manipulative, coercion, authoritative, collective, 
individual), the distinction of power to and power over has featured predominantly in the literature in the 
last few decades (Gohler 2009). These distinctions are explained by Gohler (2009, p. 28) as follows: 
Power over means power over other people, enforcement of one’s own intentions over those of 
others, and is thus only conceivable in a social relation. Power to, on the other hand, is not related to 
other people. It is an ability to do or achieve something independent of others. It is not a social 
relation. This distinction corresponds to a different normative judgement of power. Exercising power 
over within a social relation always produces a negative result for those subjected to it, because it 
narrows their field of action. Power to is generally considered favourably. The reason for this is that 
power to is not directed at others, but at the individual or the group of actions themselves. [emphasis 
in original]  
According to Gohler (2009) propositions of power, ‘power over’ is conceived as a vertical relationship (i.e., 
bureaucratic and rather formal in nature) by virtue of the structure of relations that is held over others, 
which strongly implies a relationship of domination and subordination where the capacities to act are not 
distributed symmetrically to all parties in a relationship (Allen 2003). Allen further states that because of 
the unequal distribution of power, the benefits tend to be skewed, which could be either a loss or gain. With 
the other proposition of power, ‘power to’ it is seen as transformative, or enabling, a collective and 
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integrative action, a ‘fluid’ medium, and more of a means to achieve outcomes (Allen 2003). Thus, this 
emphasis on understanding the relational space of power. With the concept of medium, Allen (2003) 
professes that it is about identifying power through the mobilisation and deployment of resources (i.e., 
economic, political, capital, people, ideological, informational, cultural, normative) to achieve outcomes. 
Resources can be either allocative, for example technology or access to finance, or authoritative, for 
example control over social life. Here resources are not possessed by individuals or organisations but are 
seen as a medium through which power is exercised and diffused, which takes place through networks of 
extensive and intensive social interactions. Furthermore, Allen (2003, p. 50) states that: 
The most effective institutions in terms of power are those which encompass all four forms of 
organisational reach. An understanding that powerful institutions may enhance their means through 
extensive and intensive networks, combining both authoritative and diffused techniques of 
organisation to achieve far-flung goals. 
This suggests, as implied by Jenkins (2009), that institutions can be seen as ‘power containers’ – able to 
draw on available resources as and when it is needed to achieve a means to an end. However, power still 
needs to be legitimately institutionalised to survive (see Arendt 1958, Giddens 1979, Mann 2012) especially 
from a cultural perspective (Engelstad 2009). Governance can also be seen as this, a medium to steer 
outcomes, which will be discussed in section 3.4 Governance and Policy Implementation.  
 
Thus, the literature on power suggests that internal systems or networks of power have a strong influence 
on strategic decision-making (Allen 2003, Clegg et al. 2006, Eisenhardt and Iii 1988, Jarzabkowski 2008, 
Mintzberg 1983, Wilson 2003). Internal influencers with power include the chief executive officer, middle 
line managers, operators, analysts, and support staff (Mintzberg 1983). Organisational actors can also 
enhance their interests and obtain the most power by formal authority, control of formal decision processes 
and structures, control of scare resources, control of boundaries, control of technology, interpersonal 
alliances and networks, charisma and the ability to cope with uncertainty, symbolism, language and the 
management of meaning (Wilson 2003). This is especially highlighted in Clegg (2008) and deeply 
demonstrated by Flyvbjerg (1998) on the study of rationality and power. Furthermore, internal actors can 
manage the decision-making process so that their interests are protected and maximised (Eisenhardt and Iii 
1988). Moreover, Mintzberg (1983, p. 111) states that internal influencers differ from external influencers 
in a number of significant ways:  
They tend to have a serious commitment to the organisation by virtue of their dependence on its well-
being; they come to know the organisation intimately, by virtue of the amount of time they spend 
there; and they are the ones who make the decisions and take the actions; the initiative rests with 
them; the external influencers must influence their behaviour.  
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It is clear that internal actors, vertical and horizontal, have significant power to influence organisational 
strategies and decision-making. Jarzabkowski (2008) conducted a seven-year study of top managers in three 
universities that revealed organisational strategy is shaped by three types of behaviour: interactive, 
procedural, and integrative strategising. Interactive strategising shapes strategy by influencing the 
meanings, power, and norms of a specific action; procedural strategising shapes strategy by administrative 
processes; and integrative shapes strategy by ongoing behaviour by interacting with actors about the 
meanings, power, and norms instantiated in administrative processes (Jarzabkowski 2008). This implies 
that organisations are political due to the diverse influence stakeholders have on shaping organisational 
strategy, which can be for the better or worse. Winter and Szczepanek (2009) argue that projects are 
political processes due to a number of aspects, namely, interests and agendas including hidden agendas, 
power and influence, political tactics, and attitudes to politics. Moreover, organisational actors tend to form 
powers of coalition to influence strategy when they lack power (Nutt 1999a, Tilly 2009). Brindle (1999) 
conducted an extensive literature review on the micro-processes of decision-making in organisational 
environments, or the most pervasive ‘games decision makers play.’ The review revealed that framing, 
criteria setting, misuse of analogy, misuse of rationality, and commitment building were the most common 
‘games’ decision makers play to shape strategic decisions. This is also demonstrated by Flyvbjerg (1998) 
on the topics of rationality and power. Here he investigates an infrastructure project and the abuses of 
power, and the complex interplay between political power and technical rationality. Also, the paper argues 
that we cannot control the human nature behind decision-making, but we can learn and understand, and 
thus influence, common decision-making processes. This implies that organisational actors have significant 
power over the decision-making process, but awareness and understanding of decision-making processes 
raises our consciousness of the decision-making process, and thus ability to influence and make better 
decisions, which is also highly applicable to the implementation of public and project policies (Hill 2009). 
It appears that whether power is used for good or evil, organisations require power, they require it to survive 
– it is oxygen to an organisation, imbedded within crucibles of organisational politics, but it can also achieve 
great things (Clegg et al. 2006).    
 
The empirical literature focuses, limitedly, on power and politics to influence organisational strategic 
decision-making in pluralistic organisations. However, further research is need to understand the influence 
of power and politics on organisational strategic decision-making in socially dynamic project environments. 
Moreover, studies should consider the use of power by individual actors, especially in a hierarchical and 
horizontal structures and in different project environments. Such empirical studies would deepen our 
understanding of the influence power and politics plays in influencing organisational strategic decision-
making in project environments beyond a typical organisational context or environment.  
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 Information and Knowledge 
A further feature that influences organisational strategies and the decision-making process is information 
and knowledge. This is a powerful feature, especially for actors with expert and professional knowledge as 
they have the ability to draw power away from organisations (Clegg et al. 2006, Mintzberg 1983). This is 
reinforced by Pfeffer (1992a, p. 248) assertion that ‘organisational actors ability to manipulate and present 
facts, and analysis is a critical element to exercise strategic power effectively.’ Shrivastava and Grant 
(1985) conducted an empirical study on the strategic decision-making processes and organisational learning 
of 32 business organisations facing complex environments that revealed knowledge sharing within 
organisations is influenced by a number of systems, namely, single person, informal personal networks of 
selected groups, shared values and culture norms, network of organisational working groups, divisional and 
departmental systems and procedures, and elaborate system of operating procedures and regulations. Lin 
and Huang (2010) came to similar conclusions on their quantitative study on factors that influence people 
withholding knowledge from their colleagues on project teams. Their study indicates that knowledge 
withholding is influenced by trust, distributive justice as well as team-related and personal outcome 
expectations. In addition, it has been found that organisational boundaries act effectively as ‘information 
envelopes, and the more valuable the information, the more likely organisational boundaries are used to 
limit its diffusion’ (Zuker et al. 1996, p. 91). This implies that trustworthiness has a significant influence 
on an organisational actor’s willingness to share knowledge with their fellow colleagues. This is especially 
important to the process of action, as agents mainly act on the basis of their tacit knowledge (Sydow 2006). 
This strongly suggests that organisational actors can influence the strategic decision-making process with 
their knowledge sharing systems, particularly, the ability to create, share and use strategic information with 
their environments. Similarly, Williams and Samset (2010) conducted a critical analysis on the importance 
of the front-end decision-making phase of projects that revealed organisational actors have the ability to 
influence the strategic decision-making process by restricting or omitting essential project information. 
Similarly, Nutt (1999a) conducted a study on 317 strategic decisions in the public, private, and third-sector 
organisations that indicated decision makers used subjective tactics, namely, omitting persuasive and 
compelling information to support a strategic choice. He also finds that some decision makers implemented 
judgmental tactics by using their powers of intuition, prior experience or knowledge, without supporting 
information to make strategic decisions. Sims (1993) argues that projects frequently fail due to 
misinformation. The paper suggests that the main categories of reasons of why people say they give 
misinformation are: lack of effort, timing factors, social niceties, self-defence, incompetence, and 
politicking. This implies that project teams are not taking misinformation seriously. The seriousness of 
misinformation in project environments is emphasised by the Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2011) 
report on the management of major road projects. The report findings include that state government 
agencies where misinformed on project costs, risks and benefits, thus giving decision makers false 
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confidence about the capacity to deliver road projects. Similarly, the National Audit Office (2011a) of the 
United Kingdom conducted a report on the lessons from the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and other 
projects. The report reveals that public-sector bodies have limited in-house skills to make critical decisions 
on complex projects, and that inadequate data was responsible for making poor procurement decisions. The 
report also identifies that the Ministry of Defence made a poor procurement decision (appropriate degree 
of openness and transparency on the transfer of information and significant risk) to a contractor on the 
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft PFI contract. This adversely affected value for money for many years into 
the future. In general, the literature views information and knowledge as a powerful factor to influence the 
strategic decision-making process. However, further empirical studies are needed to understand the salient 
features of information and knowledge that influence organisational strategic decision-making on project 
policies. Research is also needed on the influence of information and knowledge in different project 
contexts i.e., project alliances and partnerships that may influence project strategies and decision-making. 
 Culture 
The culture of an organisation embodies the underlying assumptions of the strategic decision-making 
process (Wilson 2003). Johnson (1992) argues organisational strategies are configured within a cultural 
web of behaviours, rituals, stories, language and expressions, and symbols that bond organisational life. 
Such symbols can strengthen or corrode organisational relationships (Ashkanasy et al. 2014, Danielsson 
and Bodin 2009, Dutton and Heaphy 2003, Pratt and Rafaeli 2001). Moreover, Wilson (2003, p. 400) states 
that ‘strong cultures can be a potent source of competitive advantage since they allow decisions to be made 
that would be more difficult in other organisations with less cultural coherence.’ Andersen et al. (2009, p. 
479) state that ‘projects are organisations within an organisation.’ Pfeffer (1992a, p. 279) asserts that: 
People are persuaded by reason, but moved by emotion. We exercise power and influence, when we 
do it successfully, through the subtle use of language, symbols, ceremonies, and settings that make 
people feel good about what they are doing. 
This is particularly emphasised by Dutton and Heaphy (2003) who states that high-quality connections 
between organisational actors allows for strong and resilient interactions, while low-quality connections 
are corrosive and depletes the relationship strength. Such high-quality connections enrich organisational 
cultures and enable organisational actors to routinely influence and relate to one another (Pratt and Rafaeli 
2001). The literature implies that organisational culture has a strong influence on the strategic decision-
making process. Further, Andersen et al. (2009) conducted a study on the organisational culture and project 
management, and concluded that the behaviour of an individual is affected by the organisational culture 
including thinking, values, ideas, rules, standards, and procedures that govern decision-making. Hardy 
(1996) argues that strong cultural norms, traditions, and values have a strong influence on organisational 
strategy. This suggests that organisational ideologies have a significant influence on shaping the decision-
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making process, especially for policy implementation where ideologies tend to be deeply ingrained within 
agency actor behaviours. Mintzberg (1983) argues that ideologies are developed through three stages: the 
rooting of an ideology in a sense of mission, the development of the ideology through traditions and sagas; 
and the reinforcement of the ideology through identifications. Furthermore, Brunsson (1982, p. 39) 
conducted a critical analysis on decisions, ideologies and organisational actions and suggests that 
‘ideologies can be formed with the direct purpose of avoiding rational decision-making.’ Müller et al. 
(2009) conducted a research on cultural differences in decision-making styles in project teams composed 
of team members from different nationalities. The study revealed that there are differences in the decision-
making style of cultural teams that can be grouped into three categories: 
• General cultural differences (team orientation, flatter organisational hierarchies, informal work 
attitudes) 
• Decision-making style differences (faster decision-making, clearer responsibilities, willingness to 
accept change) 
• Decision-making process differences (transparency, formality, expertise) 
They suggest that individual personalities, work processes and attitudes towards work were the main 
influential factors on decision-making style and speed. Implicitly, the report suggests that cultural 
differences on project teams can influence the decision-making process in different ways. Some project 
teams can be team driven and derive decisions based on collective action, and others on formalism where 
decisions are based on formal authority (Müller et al. 2009). It is also essential to point out that the decision-
making style adopted and adapted by a project team will yield different speeds in the decision-making 
process. This implies that a project’s culture has a significant effect on the decision-making process. 
Sometimes organisational cultures can contribute to astronomical project disasters. For example, the report 
into the Fukushima nuclear accident (FNAIIC 2012) revealed that the regulators of the power plant had a 
negative attitude towards the importation of new advances in knowledge and technology from overseas, 
and were aware of the risks of a tsunami, but had not prepared any measures to lessen or eliminate the risks. 
The report also states that the operator and regulators either intentionally postponed safety measures, or 
made decisions based on their organisation’s self-interest and other cultural behaviours, and not in the 
interest of public safety. It is evident that organisational culture can embody and influence project strategies 
and the decision-making process. However, the literature is silent on the influence of different cultures, or 
sub-cultures, ideologies on project strategic decision-making. For example, the influence of group cultures 
on influencing project policy strategic decision-making – are individual or group ideologies more 
influential in shaping project policy strategic decision-making? 
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 Gaps and Areas for Project Management Advancement 
Understanding the internal network of influential organisational elements, or shapers, also can significantly 
influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of project policies. By using 
power and politics to influence internal actors, restricting or omitting information, providing expert 
knowledge, embarrassing cultural ideologies, and working within a robust governance structure, 
organisational actors or a group of actors, can influence organisational project strategies and decision-
making processes. However, the literature review has identified that there are existing knowledge gaps on 
the internal factors and drivers that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of project policies. These include the concepts of power and politics, information and 
knowledge, and culture. With power and politics there needs to be a deeper understanding of the relational 
effect of power including ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ on social (inter)actions and the political processes 
on organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of project policies. Sharing of 
information and knowledge including the concept of trust and tactics used by organisational actors to 
influence organisational strategic decision-making. Finally, an understanding of the cultural web of 
organisational behaviours and its effects on organisational strategic decision-making for project policy 
implementation. See table 3-2 for the salient concepts, characteristics, gaps and areas for project 
management advancement. This research study will address these gaps in the literature.  
Table 3-2: Summary of Salient Theoretical Literature on Internal Factors that Influence Organisational 
Strategic Decision-Making on Project Policy Implementation 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Power and 
politics 
• Power is not some ‘thing’ but a 
relational effect on social interaction 
• Predominantly seen as ‘power to’ and 
‘power over,’ and oxygen to 
organisational survival 
• Institutions can be seen as ‘power 
containers’ to achieve means to an end 
but still needs to be legitimately 
institutionalised to survive 
• Vertical and horizontal actors have 
significant power to shape 
organisational strategies and the 
The relational effect of power including 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’ on social 
(inter)actions and the political processes of 
strategic decision-making on the 
implementation of project policies. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
decision-making process for the better 
or worse 
• Projects are political processes 
Information 
and 
knowledge 
• Actors with expert and professional 
knowledge have the ability to draw 
power away from organisations 
• Knowledge sharing is influenced by a 
number of mechanisms (i.e., formal 
and informal) 
• Trustworthiness has a significant 
influence on organisational actors to 
share information and knowledge 
• Decision makers tend to use 
subjective and judgmental tactics to 
support and make poor strategic 
decisions 
Sharing of information and knowledge 
including the concept of trust and tactics used 
by organisational actors to influence strategic 
decision-making for project policy 
implementation. 
Culture • Embodies the underlying assumptions 
of the strategic decision-making 
process 
• Configured within a web of 
behaviours 
• Behaviours of individuals and 
decision-making processes are 
affected by organisational cultures 
• Project teams composed of three 
different cultural decision-making 
styles 
Cultural web of organisational behaviours and 
its effects on organisational strategic decision-
making on the implementation of project 
policies. 
3.4 Governance and Policy Implementation 
 Governance 
The word governance is derived from the Latin word ‘gubernare’ which means ‘to steer’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2012). Governance originated from policy research in political science and today is used to 
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‘steer’ countries, corporations, operations, transactions, and projects (Müller 2012). It is a more inclusive 
term ‘concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action, as opposed to 
‘government,’ which refers to formal institutions of state and their monopoly of legitimate, coercive power’ 
(Milward and Provan 2000, p. 239). Here authorities tend to adopt a ‘command-and-control’ approach to 
governance (de Roo 2015). Furthermore, traditional literature on governance, or more so corporate 
governance, predominantly focuses on economic-value of organisations as a relationship of contracts, or a 
contractual approach to corporate governance (Fama and Jensen 1983, Fiss 2008, Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Although there are various definitions of the concept of governance (for example see Hill and Hupe 
2002b, Kooiman 1999), from a policy perspective: 
Governance … is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rules and collective action, 
often including agents in the private and nonprofits sectors, as well as within the public sector. The 
essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms – grants, contracts, agreements – that 
do not rest solely on the authority and sanctions of government (Milward and Provan 2000, p. 239). 
Although it is seen as a complex matter i.e., non-linearity of the interactions between parties and emergent 
outcomes (Hill and Hupe 2002a, 2002b, Teisman et al. 2009a), a basic principal stands: agreements are 
made beforehand between parties on the nature of the transaction and its governance (ways of legitimately 
doing things) which tends to comply with each party’s individual corporate governance policy (Müller 
2012). This strongly implies, as emphasised previously, an understanding of the relational actor space, or 
more specifically governing the relational actor space for the implementation of project policies. 
Furthermore, Müller (2012, p. 298) states that ‘corporate governance sets the boundaries for project 
governance, most simply in companies’ internal projects, more complex and potentially further restrained 
in projects with external parties. The boundaries for project governance are thereby set at the level of 
corporate governance.’ Among the large number of definitions of corporate governance, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2008, p. 103) one is often referenced and defined as: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.  
This suggests that corporate governance tends to set the boundaries for project governance – a rather linear 
relationship. From a theoretical perspective this is questionable, as governance systems are complex and 
dynamic i.e., linear and non-linear, stable and non-stable (Milward and Provan 2000, Teisman et al. 2009a, 
Van Ees and Van Der Laan 2012) with elements of strategy and innovation (Clarke and Branson 2012). 
Furthermore, according to Fiss (2008), Teisman et al. (2009a) the basic elements of governance systems 
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are agents or actors i.e., individuals, formal or informal groups and organisations, which is considered to 
be an institutional system. Such a school of thought is also advanced by Bekker (2015). Teisman et al. 
(2009a, p. 6) also state that ‘human actors in social systems are reflexive: they respond, anticipate, plan, 
think, forecast, etc.’ This suggests that there is a strong element of, and control thereof on human behaviour, 
as actors have the capacity, or power, to implement and change the relational actor space – for the better or 
worse.  
 
Governance systems may be seen as an institutional system embedded with elements of complexity, 
dynamism and change (or coevolution) over time (Fiss 2008, Teisman et al. 2009a). This requires a deeper 
understanding of governance systems from a number of perspectives which are especially relevant to the 
study of project governance and policy implementation, namely: agency theory, transaction cost economics, 
stewardship theory, and trust and control (Biesenthal and Wilden 2014, Davis et al. 1997, Fanny and 
Albéric 2011, Müller 2009, 2012, Pryke 2005, 2012, Toivonen and Toivonen 2014). Other scholars who 
have investigated the governance theme of stakeholder, or stakeholder theory, and argue that it is embedded 
with normative foundations. These include, for example, stakeholder relationships established and 
maintained on trust, cooperation, morality and ethical behaviour, but they also profess that it lacks sufficient 
theoretical content and it continues to be debated amongst academic scholars on its characterisation 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995, Hasnas 2013, Jones and Wicks 1999).  
 
Governance from an ethical behaviour perspective requires a pattern of behaviour that links an appropriate 
response (action) to either external direction (governance systems imposed by an organisation in response 
to societal norms) or internal norms (governed by personal cultural and cognitive interpretation of what 
seems to be the right thing to do under a given set of circumstances). Ethics and ethical dilemma resolution 
provides the basis of linking governance, trust and action within a framework where individuals interpret 
and act upon decisions (Müller et al. 2013). To better understand this dimension of ethically governed 
action it is necessary to briefly discuss how ethics and governance may be seen to be logically linked. 
 Ethics and Governance 
Duignan (2011, p. ix) state that ‘ethics is the philosophical study of morality. For most of its history, it has 
been occupied with two main tasks: to discover what moral qualities such as right and wrong, good and bad 
consist of – what it means to say that an action is right, that a thing or event is bad, and so on – and to 
investigate certain broader questions regarding the nature and scope of morality and moral judgements.’ 
The author further states that this can be seen from a number of perspectives:  
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• Normative ethics: is concerned with the moral evaluation of human actions, institutions, and the 
ways of life. The central task is to ‘determine how basic moral standards, or norms, are justified 
and what basic norms there may be’ (2011, p. 1). 
• Theoretical ethics (or ‘metaethics’): is concerned with determining the nature of moral concepts 
and judgements.  
• Applied ethics: focuses on the application of normative ethical theories to practical problems such 
as environmental ethics, and the morality and legality of war.  
However, an important question to answer, as stated by Walker et al. (2008a, p. 103), is: ‘Why should we 
consider ethics at all in business?’ Essentially, every organisational actor will be engaged in ethical 
decision-making which can have profound relational, social, economic and environmental effects (Hartman 
et al. 2014). Thus, harnessing of what is a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decision is absolutely essential for humanity, 
particularly within a project policy context which tends to have profound impacts on societies and the 
natural environment. Additionally, not every decision is covered by policies and rules, thus, more often 
than not, individuals must rely on personal values and principles when making decisions (Hartman et al. 
2014). This brings another fundamental question to mind: How are personal values and principles ingrained 
in decision-making? The answer is in the conduct of human behaviour or normative ethics, both 
individually and collectively (Hartman et al. 2014), which ultimately influences the means-end relationship 
(Lawrence 1999). This suggests that normative ethics are socially constructed within the interactions of 
individuals, organisations and moral communities, or a legitimate institutionalised system of moral 
behaviours (Shadnam and Lawrence 2011). Such morality within an institutionalised system ‘originates 
from and is situated in everyday discourse’ (Shadnam and Lawrence 2011, p. 384). Such a process can be 
seen as institutional work, the process of sensemaking and sensegiving where organisational actors moral 
meanings materialise (Clegg et al. 2007, Shadnam and Lawrence 2011). Additionally, Shadnam and 
Lawrence (2011) state that moral collapse is more likely to occur with ideological and regulative 
breakdowns.  
 
Such institutional work is also highly prevalent with the implementation of public policies where ethical 
decision-making is highly complex (Sullivan and Segers 2007). Government officials need to consider 
multiple factors and interests when making decisions, such as duty to professional norms, to conscience, to 
constituents, to the public interest, and humanity (Sullivan and Segers 2007). Such decisions are mostly 
seen from a consequentialist (or teleological) approach which focuses on securing the right outcome. With 
consequentialism, or the moral philosophy of consequentialism, the view is that ‘moral quality of an action 
– for example, the rightness of the action – is completely determined by the action’s consequences, relative 
to the consequences of alternative actions open to the agent’ (Driver 2012, p. 5, emphasis in original), which 
also be seen as utilitarian i.e., generate the greatest good for the greatest number (Bredillet 2014). However, 
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such decisions also contain elements of deontological and virtue ethics (Sullivan and Segers 2007). For 
example, with the implementation of a mega defence project e.g., a new submarine, which has profound 
consequences on society. Additionally, it acts as a deterrence of war but takes away billions from other 
government portfolios such as education and health (consequentialism), where politicians would report 
business cases honestly i.e., public consultation on cost-benefit analysis (deontological ethics), but maintain 
confidentiality on highly sensitive matters i.e., innovative research (virtue ethics). Such decision-making 
within a project context is also discussed by Helgadóttir (2008) where the results reveal that discussing 
ethics and implementing codes of conduct can have profound effects on ethical decision-making. 
Considering that ethical decision-making by government officials is complex and contains shades of grey, 
where officials can justify means such as deception, manipulation and lying in pursuit of their ends, what 
is the best way to govern such behaviour? The answer to this may lie in understanding the complex network 
of relationships, or cross-sector social interactions (Seitanidi and Lindgreen 2010). Such cross-sector social 
interactions include cross-sector social partnerships with a focus on prospective sensemaking (Selsky and 
Parker 2010), institutional logics (Vurro et al. 2010), and collaborative strategic management (Clarke and 
Fuller 2010). A common theme in the articles is that the institutionalisation of partnerships has a profound 
effect on project values and outcomes (Seitanidi and Lindgreen 2010). Perhaps governments should adopt 
institutionalisation of ethical decision-making to eliminate deceptive and manipulative means to achieve 
their desired ends, and as a result, achieve better outcomes for society and the natural environment. 
Subsequently, this requires further exploration on the concepts of institutions and governance.  
 Institutions and Governance 
Similar to corporate governance, the institutional tradition of studying organisations focuses on the themes 
of control and coordination, particularly the implicit and explicit relationships between corporation and 
stakeholders (Bradley et al. 1999, Fiss 2008). Fiss (2008) provides a deep understanding of sociological 
institutionalism of corporate governance by examining the diffusion of governance practices, variation of 
governance practices, governance and resistance, variety of groups with varying identities and interests, 
and a comparative study of governance systems. He sees governance models as ‘articulated systems of 
meaning that embody the moral order as they explain and justify the proper allocation of power and 
resources’ (2008, p. 391). Fiss (2008) sees power as a relational force (for example, see Clegg 1989b). This 
suggests that corporate governance systems are embedded and embodied within relational norms rather 
than the more traditional contractual mechanisms, which has the power to steer institutions or institutional 
actors. He further argues that the speed of governance diffusion is a ‘function of the number, interest, and 
relative power of agents within a given environment’ (2008, p. 395), which is also professed by a number 
of other scholars (Fligstein 1985, Marquette 1981). Although governance systems will encounter resistance, 
especially from powerful actors that actively influence the corporate environment for self-serving needs 
(Fiss 2008), Barker (1993), Dyer and Singh (1998) show that the normative elements of governance systems 
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make for more effective control than traditional and authoritative governance systems. This suggests that 
the nature of relationships between organisational or institutional actors i.e., normative values, culture and 
trust is of central importance when creating and maintaining governance systems, or the relational actor 
space, which is especially important for the implementation of project and program policies in democratic 
institutions and societies (Edelenbos et al. 2010a, Edelenbos et al. 2010b, Flyvbjerg 1998, Van Buuren et 
al. 2012). The need for better institutional and governance arrangements is highly stressed by the Australian 
Government Productivity Commission (2014) inquiry report into public infrastructure. According to the 
report’s recommendations and findings, ‘institutional and governance arrangements for the provision of 
much of Australia’s public infrastructure are deficient and are a major contributor to unsatisfactory 
outcomes’ (Productivity Commission 2014, p. 39). Building a better governance and institutional 
framework is an unequivocal and urgent task for governments (Productivity Commission 2014). This brings 
us to the next topic of agency theory.  
 Agency Theory 
Agency theory focuses on the contractual relationship between the principal and agent, where the principal 
engages the agent to perform a service on his or her behalf (Eisenhardt 1989a, Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
which is strongly rooted in bureaucracy (see Moe 1984, Niskanen 1975). The principal-agent relationship 
is essentially a contract, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Caers et 
al. 2006), as the principal, especially in larger organisations, is bounded rationally and unable to engage in 
all activities or tasks in a timely and effective way (Barney and Hesterly 2006). Furthermore, both agents 
and principals seek to receive maximum utility from the relationship with the least possible expenditure 
(Davis et al. 1997) with the agent being motivated to pursue his or her own goals (Caers et al. 2006, 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). This implies that the principal must closely monitor the agent for potential 
opportunistic behaviour, which in essence is a problem. Consequently, according to Müller (2012, p. 299), 
and as emphasised by Barney and Hesterly (2006), the relationship between the principal and agent can 
become problematic because: 
• The interest of principal and agent will typically diverge if both are utility maximisers 
• The principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of the agent 
• The principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor and acquire the information available to or 
possessed by the agent 
This problem is also stressed by Jones et al. (2006) for the implementation of public policies. Here they 
raise the points that the principal cannot know a priori the exact qualifications of the agent. Thus the agent 
may mislead his or her competencies to attain a contract (adverse selection), and secondly, the principal 
lacks the necessary resources or ability to constantly monitor an agent (moral hazard), which therefore 
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requires the agent to induce compliance through incentives. Arrow (1985) equates moral hazard to hidden 
agendas and adverse selection to hidden information. So when the agent’s behaviour is not controlled or 
restrained, the goals of the principal are unlikely to be attained. Müller (2012) further emphasises the agency 
problem, as summarised by Moe (1995), as follows: 
• The adverse selection problem: has the principal chosen the right agent? 
• The moral hazard problem: will the agent always act in the best interest of the owner? 
Thus the problem lies in information asymmetries in the principal-agent relationship, which most often is 
costly to create and maintain, however, according to Barney and Hesterly (2006) the basic mechanisms to 
resolve these problems is through monitoring and bonding. Monitoring involves observing the behaviour 
or performance of the agent, and bonding refers to penalising or rewarding the principal, which is specified 
in the contract between the principal and agent. However, close monitoring of agent behaviour could be 
interpreted as an expression of distrust which violates a norm of reciprocity (Dickinson and Villeval 2008), 
and designing performance incentives is highly complicated and may signal mistrust, and designing ones 
that are both useful and strong is extremely difficult (Foss and Stea 2014, Pepper and Gore 2015, Roberts 
2010). Furthermore, according to Lavikka et al. (2015), Turner (2004) contracts, especially complex project 
contracts, are always incomplete because of humans’ bounded rationality, which therefore opens-up the 
door for agent opportunistic behaviour. Unsurprisingly, these problems can be seen as Machiavellianism 
(Heath 2009). 
 
As empirically shown by Harrison and Harrell (1993), when adverse selection exists, managers who 
initiated a project and are held responsible for it success or failure will tend to continue that project. This 
implies that adverse selection may influence a manager’s project strategic decision-making including the 
continuation of a detrimental project. The results also indicate that agents may be inclined to continue 
projects that maximise their self-interest at the expense of their principals. However, when the conditions 
associated with adverse selection are not present, people tend to make decisions that are in the best interests 
of their principal. Another governance mechanism to deal with agent opportunism associated with adverse 
selection is to provide principals with information to verify agents’ behaviour – this should discourage 
opportunism because the agents will realise that they cannot deceive the principals. The second way, as 
stated by Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 60), is to provide agents with outcome-based contracts that will ‘coalign 
with the preferences of the agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the 
same actions, and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest between principal and agent are reduced.’ 
Although the author’s study on agency theory makes contributions to organisational theory, she 
recommendations further studies should focus on the variables of information systems, outcome uncertainty 
and risk; expand into richer and more complex contexts, such as organisational behaviour that relates to 
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information asymmetry in partnerships, and different outcome contacts in a plural organisational 
environment. For example, executives usually are compensated differently from project managers.   
 
Scholars when considering the difficulties and high risks of the principal-agent relationship, especially in 
project environments, have suggested alternative or new versions of agency theory, such as ‘behavioural 
agency theory’ (Pepper and Gore 2013, 2015), which was first advanced by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998). Another version of agency theory is ‘theory of the agent’s mind’ or ToM (Foss and Stea 2014) 
which links up with Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) ‘behavioural agency theory.’ Behavioural agency 
theory assumes ‘bounded rationality and recognises the importance of agents’ human capital i.e., a function 
of ability and work motivation. This allows for departures from the rational choice model when it comes to 
loss, risk and uncertainty aversion, time discounting, inequity aversion, and the trade-off between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation’ (Pepper and Gore 2015, p. 1048). It focuses on the behaviours, interests, and 
actions of agents with links to leadership and strategy including mission statements. While theory of agent’s 
mind is more general and focuses on examining the implications for information policy and incentive design 
and management, for example, the ability to read the desires, intentions, knowledge and beliefs of other 
people to increase value in the relation (Foss and Stea 2014). In order to understand this theory, Foss and 
Stea (2014) conceptualise it with a map of various possibilities regarding the principal’s and the agent’s 
theory of the mind, see figure 3-1. 
Figure 3-1: ToM with Various Possibilities. Figure by Foss and Stea (2014, p. 109). 
Obviously, the best fit would be where both the principal and agent have a high ToM: joint value creation. 
Here the agent gets the best reward system in a way which reduces informational asymmetrics with the 
principal. However, some of the limitations of this theory are the organisational context, especially 
sensitivity to organisational sensemaking instruments such as vision and mission statements; the cost of a 
ToM i.e., cost for a principal to create a relation with a new agent; and, the variability of an environment 
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i.e., fast-moving versus slow-moving environments or national firms versus multinational corporations 
which have different characteristics.  
 Transaction Cost Economics 
Closely related to agency theory, transaction cost economics focus on the cost of check and balance 
mechanisms, such as internal and external auditing, information disclosure, and risk analysis (Tricker 
2012). Transaction cost economics, like agency theory assumes that agents act in their own best interests, 
but not necessarily in those of the principals. According to Biesenthal and Wilden (2014), Müller (2009), 
as outlined by Williamson (1979), the main drivers of transaction costs are: contingency factors (e.g., 
frequency and asset specificity), behavioural factors (e.g., bounded rationality and opportunism), and 
context (i.e., institutional context). It also focuses on governance structures and mechanisms, whereas 
agency theory focuses on contracts, which constitutes the governance structure of the relationship (Müller 
2012). This is perhaps because of the ‘complexity of the relationship of actors within and among 
organisations and the impossibility of developing and agreeing on contracts comprehensive enough to 
structure the relationship in an all-comprehensive manner’ (Müller 2012, p. 302). Basically, it focuses on 
how organisations choose governance structures with economising on transaction costs being the main 
purpose of economic institutions.  
 
This brings to mind a number of questions: What about the applicability of transaction cost economics in 
public and private sectors and the integration or coexistence of organisations for extended periods of time? 
Is there a difference? According to Dagdeviren and Robertson (2016) the public-private arm remains 
problematic based on their three pillar assessments, which focuses on Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost 
theory analysis in relation to the governance structures of public sector transactions. Firstly, transaction 
cost economics is limited as an instrument for prediction and decision-making due to its application, which 
results in ex post justification of governance forms. Secondly, there is no evidence that transaction costs 
are systematically higher or incentives systematically lower under public governance. Finally, transaction 
cost economics tends to ignore political interest. Their critical assessment is especially relevant from a 
project perspective, as it focuses on the public-private dilemma by examining water and sanitation services, 
which shows relevance for PPPs and other joint venture projects.  
 
From an integration or coexistence perspective, Chiles and McMackin (1996) argue that incorporating risk 
and trust into the transaction cost theory paradigm enhances the explanatory and predictive power of the 
theory with minimal loss of parsimony. This implies that governing the relational actor space based on 
informal mechanisms, such as norms and morality, constrains opportunistic behaviour, increases 
information disclosure, decreases transaction costs i.e., creating and maintaining contracts, and complexity. 
They further argue that ‘there are several different levels of asset specificity at which firms will change 
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their preferred governance structure from market to hierarch, depending on the joint effects of risk and 
trust’ (1996, p. 92). This implies that a strong governing relationship based on joint or alliancing attributes 
may improve governance performance. Chen et al. (2013) undertook a study examining the relationship 
between transaction attributes and transaction costs in 88 alliancing projects in Australia. Their focus on 
complex, long-duration and high-value construction transactions revealed that uncertainty, project value 
and asset specificity (i.e., physical and immaterial resources) increases set-up costs, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs in construction alliances. However, their study has significant limitations including the 
examination of trust and risk in project alliancing, which according to Chiles and McMackin (1996) can 
significantly decrease transaction costs and increase the alliancing partnership for the better. This is also 
reinforced by Winch (2001) who presented a conceptual framework for understanding the governance of 
construction project processes, drawing on transaction cost economics. He stresses that an important aspect 
of transaction governance choice is the level of trust between the principal and agent. He also suggests that 
trust is developed between repeat transactions, and that the prospect for further transaction will preclude 
opportunism. The theory of trust and control will be discussed in section 3.4.7 Trust and Control. 
 Stewardship Theory 
With stewardship theory individuals in organisations are seen as stewards where their decisions act in the 
organisation’s best interest and which is based on trust, and they do not inevitably act in a way that 
maximises their own personal interests (Caers et al. 2006, Davis et al. 1997, Tricker 2012). It is a 
collaborative, collective and non-economic approach, where stewards behave in ways that are consistent 
with organisational objectives, making their behaviour completely rational (Encyclopedia of Management 
Theory 2013). Here there is a high level of principal-steward relationship, which is mutually supportive, in 
contrast, to the principal-agent relationship(s), which is mutually distrusting (Müller 2012). Davis et al. 
(1997) conducted an extensive review on the differences between agency theory(ies) and stewardship 
theory of management. They reviewed factors such as psychological (i.e., motivation, identification, use of 
power) and situational (i.e., management philosophy, culture, power distance) which revealed that a 
stewardship relationship is a better governance mechanism, especially for joint utility. Stewardship also 
enables actors to define and accept an organisation’s vision, mission and objectives. However, the 
implementation of this relationship depends on the risk and trust phenomena. Furthermore, formal 
governance mechanisms, such as cost-benefit analysis which is used extensively for mega project decision-
making (see Vickerman 2007, Vickerman 2008) tend to incorporate an agency relationship (i.e., 
individualistic, self-serving behaviour, extrinsic motivation, coercive power) (Davis et al. 1997). From a 
government department and agency perspective for the implementation of policy, Schillemans (2013) argue 
that stewardship can enrich principal-agency relationships with more potions of stewardship. This includes 
a focus on selection, preferences, procedures, incentives, and monitoring which is in line with stewardship 
principals. They also argue that elements from both perspectives could be combined to improve relations, 
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as could leadership that fosters productive working relationships. This is also reinforced by Mills and Keast 
(2009) who explored better ways to achieve stewardship of major infrastructure assets through 
configuration of governance arrangements utilising stewardship theory. They conclude that there is 
potential for principal-agent models to be developed that mix the emerging organisational and contractual 
forms of governance, which focuses on the complex and dynamic relationships between actors. Although 
relational contracts have been assessed for infrastructure projects (see Grimshaw et al. 2002, Keast et al. 
2005, Walker and Jacobsson 2014) they provide little evidence of project action-based organisations 
forming strong relational bonds and best project practices. Actually, some of the case studies show signs 
of Machiavellianism. However, Walker and Jacobsson (2014) study did provide evidence that it is possible 
to design alliance relations (e.g., principals of stewardship theory) within PPPs for mega and complex 
projects, but argue there needs to be clear and compelling reasons for its implementation. This suggests that 
significant investment needs to focus towards understanding the informal mechanisms (i.e., norms, trust, 
values, culture, power-to) for governing the relational actor space (i.e., complex interactions) for the 
implementation of project policies. Similarly, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) provide an integrative 
picture of agency and stewardship theories by focusing on the control and collaboration paradoxes of 
governance. They hypothesis and highlight that governance needs both control structures and collaborative 
structures. In particular, they suggest that organisations with a history of high performance and a strong 
emphasis on collaboration or control tend to foster strategic persistence, but when performance declines, 
these organisations tend to experience decline. When it comes to managing control and collaboration, they 
suggest that encouraging trust in others’ capabilities, distrust of human limitations, and cognitive (task 
related) conflict among governance actors helps manage control and collaboration. Within a context of 
diversity and shared understanding they suggest that diversity enriches decision-making, whilst shared 
understanding encourages mutual trust and enhanced interactions, which also helps manage control and 
collaboration. This brings us to the next topic of trust and control.  
 Trust and Control 
What the literature so far strongly implies is that trust and control, especially between the principal and 
agent, are essential governance mechanisms. Subsequently, this requires a deeper analysis of the relation 
between trust and control in governing relations. Trust is a ‘psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’ (Dietz et 
al. 2010, p. 10) that exists at multilevels (i.e., personal, team, organisational, institutional, 
interorganisational, international) (Das and Teng 2001, Fulmer and Gelfand 2012, Woolthuis et al. 2005) 
with different sources (i.e., competence-based, goodwill, cognition-based, and affect-based trust) 
(Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, Levin 2008). Perhaps a better and more ‘realistic’ view of trust is ‘the 
expectation that a partner will not engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face of opportunities and 
incentives for opportunism, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that party’ (Woolthuis et al. 
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2005, p. 816). This implies that trust relies on the ability of actors to engage in meaningful interactions in 
the first place, as emphasised by Mollering (2006). However, and it must be highly stressed that ‘actors, 
collective and corporate included, can always act otherwise, no matter how precise the rule or coercive the 
situation is. Even a well-established collectively held trust orientation towards the partner organisation may 
rapidly turn into a non-trusting or even a disrupting attitude and behaviour’ (Sydow 2006, p. 383). 
Furthermore, Mollering (2006) states, that being so, the social institutions that embody the rules for 
interaction (i.e., legislation, associations, standards) are the basis for trust and trustful relations. This is 
applicable to changes in the structure of societies, organisations and relationships (i.e., complexity and 
uncertainty of interactions) which has placed trust, as an alternative governance mechanism, and control 
on the organisational research agenda (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, Dietz et al. 2010, Teisman 
et al. 2009a). This is especially prevalent in strategic alliances which is recognised as grounds for 
opportunistic behaviour (see Chao 2011, Das and Bing-Sheng 1998, Das and Teng 2001).  
 
How do human actors gain trust, such as institutional-based trust, and prevent opportunistic behaviour? 
According to Ostrom (2003) this relies on the relationship between trust, reciprocity and reputation. Trust 
includes the expectations that individuals have about others’ behaviour, with reciprocity it depends on the 
norms that individuals learn from socialisation and life’s experiences, and reputation is about the identities 
that individuals create that project their intentions and norms. This is more succinctly described by 
Greenwood and Buren III (2010, p. 426): 
Trust is the reliance by one person, group, or firm, upon a voluntarily accepted duty on part of another 
person, group or firm, to act in a manner that is ethically justifiable; that is, undertake morally correct 
decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of analysis towards all others engaged in a joint 
endeavour or economic exchange. 
This implies that a trusting party is left vulnerable to and dependent upon the uncertain actions of the trusted 
party. That being so, as rather implied previously, repeated face-to-face communication, or as otherwise 
known as interaction-based trust (see Bachmann and Inkpen 2011), can have a major effect on trust i.e., 
increase or decrease its effectiveness, and strengthen organisational relationships (Stephens et al. 2012). 
Advancing this point, according to Fulmer and Gelfand (2012), face-to-face interactions increase 
interpersonal trust compared to online or phone communication. This is based on the assertions that humans 
are intrinsically social and have a need to belong, connections between individuals are dynamic and change 
(i.e., thinking, feeling and behaving), and performing work in organisations is through social processes 
(Stephens et al. 2012). Ostrom (2003, p. 51) further states that ‘with a chance to see and talk with others 
repeatedly, a participant can assess whether he or she trusts other sufficiently to try to reach a simple 
contingent agreement regarding the level of joint effort and its allocation.’ This is also professed by Law 
(1994, p. 182) who states that ‘in face-to-face interaction it is relatively difficult to put on a concealing 
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performance as the body gives off many signals. In complex and uncertain environments that require 
collective action to achieve beneficial outcomes (e.g., major infrastructure projects and programs), 
developing institutions and linking exogenous variables through endogenous processes to the core set of 
relationships is critical for successful mutually beneficial outcomes (Ostrom 2003). This implies that 
creating and maintaining relationships based on trust, reciprocity and reputation (or identity) is an effortful 
process. However, it does have some implications including groups sometimes tend to fail to achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes, monitoring and sanctioning of rules, ethical decision-making especially with 
cost-benefit analysis, and institutional arrangements including alliances, which tend to affect the behaviour 
of actors towards collective action. This makes it rather difficult to establish and deeply imbed the ‘rules 
of the game’ with divergent (i.e., inter- and intra-organisational) actors. Consequently, this requires a deeper 
understanding of the relationship of trust and control from an institutional context. This can also be seen as 
a level of abstractness where collective identities form (Ashforth et al. 2011).  
 
Trust within an institutional framework (i.e., societal and organisational structures) is essential as trust-
based relations are sustained by institutional mechanisms (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, 
Fuglsang and Jagd 2015, Mollering 2005). This is further professed by Bachmann and Inkpen (2011, p. 
285) who state that institutional-based trust, or more so institutions, helps establish a ‘world-in-common’ 
i.e., tacit and explicit knowledge diffusion, and in these circumstances: 
An individual or collective actor finds good reasons to trust another actor, individual or collective, 
because institutional arrangements are, like a personal third party guarantor, capable of reducing the 
risk that a trustee will behave untrustworthily, allowing the trustor to actually make a leap of faith 
and invest trust in a relationship. [emphasis in original] 
This implies that institutions can be seen as a pre-existing ‘third’ actor, acting between and governing the 
behaviour of individuals and organisational actors. This brings to mind a question: that being the case, how 
do institutional arrangements get embedded into individual and organisational decisions and interactions? 
According to Bachmann and Inkpen (2011, p. 288), this occurs through two principal ways:   
• Institutions may find access into potential trustors’ behaviour in that they lend meaning to the 
circumstances in which the actors are embedded before any relationship is built. This is to say that 
the actors’ behavioural antecedents can be influenced and thus lead to a (potential) trustor’s 
decision to invest in a relationship. 
• The antecedent behaviour as observed from a potential trustor’s point of view might not be the 
direct target of institutional influences. Rather, institutions influence the patters of how trustors and 
trustees interact when they start to actively establish a business relationship. 
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The authors further state that the two principals are not mutually exclusive, but work both ways to manage 
inherent risk in a relationship. This can be achieved through four mechanisms:  
1. Legal provision (i.e., legal rules which is seen as a relatively weak formal institutional mechanism 
from a common-law perspective but beneficial in shaping relationships) 
2. Corporate reputation (i.e., informal behavioural patterns of an individual or firm) 
3. Certification of exchange partners (i.e., program guidelines and norms of professional groups, and 
standardised industry procedures) 
4. Community norms, structures and procedures (i.e., legitimised behavioural norms between actors) 
Such mechanisms have different effects on building trust in inter-organisational relationships. Formal 
institutions i.e., law and certification, tend to be most important in the early stages of a relationship and for 
swift trust, reputation tends to favour low asset specificity, and community norms, structures and 
procedures tends to favour mature industries. In addition, Dowell et al. (2015) conducted a study on the 
changing importance of affective trust and cognitive trust across the relationship cycle. Their study revealed 
that in the early phase of a relationship lifecycle, integrity trust (i.e., adherence and conforming to rule 
systems including norms) was the main driver of relationship performance, and in the mature phase 
competency trust (i.e., a person’s ability to complete a task) has the largest effect on performance. Their 
study also stresses that emotions and affective trust alter over time, which includes the ability to reflect on 
past actions in relationships, maturity of individuals as well as external elements such as the economic 
environment. What these studies suggest is that an institutional framework is an imperative framework 
when dealing with complexity, especially through the mechanisms of trust and control (see Edelenbos and 
Eshuis 2009, Müller 2012). In addition, an institutional governance framework can be seen from a number 
of perspectives:  
• Formal (i.e., contracts, regulations, policies, procedures, etc.), and informal (i.e., trust, norms, 
values, morals, etc.) (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, 
Eisenhardt 1985) 
• Macro (i.e., norms and values embedded by groups) which is also seen as ‘thin’ trust, and a micro 
(i.e., empathy and identification developed in specific relations) which is referred as ‘thick’ trust 
(Fuglsang and Jagd 2015, Woolthuis et al. 2005) 
Formal control also tends to be based on specification and codification ex ante, while informal control is 
not (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005). Other dilemmas of formal control are that it is impossible to 
specify and codify everything, specifying and enforcing rules can be extremely costly and time consuming 
and sometimes impossible to enforce especially for international relationships, intangible resources are hard 
to codify and specify, and to effectively protect against and penalise opportunistic behaviour requires a 
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suitable juridical structure (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, Vlaar et al. 2006). This implies that 
trust seems to be a superior governance mechanism, especially in agency relationships, which according to 
Chen (2000), Eckel and Wilson (2003) can also be seen as more efficient and effective.   
 
Furthermore, because formal agreements are not followed word-by-word but ‘more to the goals and 
intentions, trust-based relationships provide more room for the openness, creativity and flexibility which is 
needed to make relationships successful’ (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, p. 5). This is especially 
critical for the implementation of project and program policies, i.e., PPPs (Verhoest et al. 2015), where 
projects have been and tend to be managed by competitive mentality (i.e., tighter contracts) rather than 
partnership mentality, which leads to mistrust between parties (Heino et al. 2015, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, according to Heino et al. (2015) assessment for successful PPPs, a partnership based on trust 
encourages sustainable relations and allows for innovation and flexibility. However, considering the 
changing nature of environments (i.e., lack of shared formal and informal institutions, different cultures 
and sub-cultures, large geographical distances, intangible resources, fast moving technology and 
economies, virtual relationships, etc.) trust is becoming more important and problematic (Alnsour 2014, 
Bergiel et al. 2008, Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005). This begs the question: How are actors 
supposed to create and maintain ‘robust’ relationships when formal control and trust are so fragile? How 
about in project environments? Can actors, as described by Eckel and Wilson (2003), rely on facial 
expressions, body language, and the tone of voice for trustworthy cues? The answer may lie in 
understanding the concept of swift trust and temporary groups (Meyerson et al. 1996), such as project-
based organisations, project-supported organisations, or project networks (Lundin et al. 2015).  
 
According to Meyerson et al. (1996, p. 191), swift trust in temporary groups requires ‘an artful approach, 
making do with a modest set of general cues from which inferences are drawn about how people might care 
for what we entrust to them.’ It requires a collective perception and strong relations that is capable of 
managing issues of vulnerability, risk and expectations (Meyerson et al. 1996). Although they conclude 
that swift trust is less about relating than doing, this is questionable, as it implies that team members just 
‘jump into trusting relations’ in non-routine situations, which rather undermines the ‘reality’ of most 
temporary teams i.e., repeated interactions between actors to achieve effective outcomes. Surely, repeated 
interactions, ex post trust, will increase the speed of swift trust, and vice versa. What about the theory on 
institutional-based trust? Surely, there would be constraints on achieving swift trust, especially for the 
implementation of PPPs where decisions tend to also be driven by politicians and public values (Flinders 
2005, McAdam et al. 2010, Willems and Van Dooren 2016). This is where an informal psychological 
contract or informal sensemaking, prior to commitment of a formal contract, has advantages as it ‘binds’ 
elements of a quasi-moral involvement amongst parties (Hoezen et al. 2012), which strongly aligns with 
institutional-based trust. However, some scholars also argue that swift trust is fragile and diminishes 
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quickly in temporary teams (Harrison et al. 1997, Jarvenpaa et al. 1998). Arguably, it appears that the front-
end phase of projects is crucial in terms of creating and sustaining trust in temporary teams, which according 
to Heino et al. (2015), Hodge et al. (2010) is crucial as outsourcing of government operations via 
partnership models will increase in the future. Contracts here can be seen as the start of relationships and 
as creating relationships, since it governs organisational actor interactions (Camen et al. 2011). Such 
situations are strongly aligned with institutional-based trust (see Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). Now this 
brings to light another vital question: How is trust related to control (i.e., formal governance mechanisms 
such as contracts, legislation, regulations, etc.)? Are they seen as substitutes or as complements, or both? 
Does a contract precede trust or does it follow it? And how does it effect relationships and performance? 
Also, how does a project manager choose an appropriate governance framework, especially considering 
the complexity of relations, risks, uncertainty and costs associated for the implementation of project and 
program policies?  
 
Although heavily debated in the literature (see Woolthuis et al. 2005), most scholars see trust and control 
as complements or coexisting (Bachmann 2001, Das and Bing-Sheng 1998, Das and Teng 2001, Edelenbos 
and Eshuis 2009, Luhmann 1979, Puranam and Vanneste 2009, Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003), especially 
in environments of complexity, uncertainty and volatility (Das and Bing-Sheng 1998, Das and Teng 2001, 
Puranam and Vanneste 2009), and with the implementation of infrastructure project policies (Camen et al. 
2011, Hoezen et al. 2012). Puranam and Vanneste (2009) undertook a thorough analysis of the relationship 
between trust and governance which revealed the following: governance mechanisms may crowd out trust 
because the reliance on governance (e.g., contracts with the use of coercion or the threat of sanctions) may 
be seen as a signal of distrust, and the signal of distrust may be stronger if it is common practice to not use 
any governance mechanism. For example, certain government agents rely on handshakes or memorandum 
of understandings rather than lengthy written agreements to close deals. Insisting on a formal governance 
mechanism in such instances can rapidly crowd out trust. Also, an indirect crowding out effect (i.e., where 
governance mechanisms reduce the build-up of trust into an exchange relationship) of trust could transpire 
when trust development is hampered because of the attribution of trustworthy behaviour to the contract. 
Trust also tends to complement governance mechanisms when it is impossible to specify all contingencies 
ex ante. Furthermore, trust complements agreements with nonenforceable clauses which are upheld in the 
relationship and thus enhance the exchange performance. This is especially crucial in project partnerships 
and alliances when the need for coordination between exchange partners’ is high.  Although Puranam and 
Vanneste (2009) analysis lacks empirical evidence and has limitations, it does encourage empirical progress 
to further untangle the complex web between trust and governance, and provide project managers a simple 
understanding of the complements and substitutes dilemma that obscures the implementation of governance 
mechanisms.  
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It appears from the literature, the reliance on a complementary, coevolution or hybrid form of a governance 
mechanism (i.e., formal and informal) is crucial for the implementation of project and program policies, 
such as PPPs and other alliances (see also Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, 2012, Inkpen and Currall 2004, 
Klijn et al. 2008, Klijn and Snellen 2009, Woolthuis et al. 2005), especially in institutional structures with 
multiple actors with competing interests. It is a ‘reciprocal influence that changes the behaviour of the 
interacting entities (which can be either individuals, groups, organisations, economies, society, and so on)’ 
(Mitleton-Kelly 2015, p. 114, emphasis in original). Here project managers must deal with the complex 
interplay between trust and control, including the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of actors, to achieve 
project policy outcomes. According to Edelenbos and Eshuis (2009, 2012) this requires a symbiotic 
coevolution (or mutual reinforcing relationship) approach which is an ongoing process of adjustments and 
reciprocal selection between trust and control. They also argue, as does Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 
(2005) in their empirical investigation, that partially written contracts (formal governance mechanism) 
facilitates the development of trust in institutional arrangements and personal relationships (i.e., positive 
ambience), as it limits opportunistic behaviour, enables actors to diffuse and share information in a more 
timely and accurate matter, signal problems earlier, and actors collectively solve problems. This is further 
evidenced in Walker and Lloyd-Walker (2014) empirical study on the ambience of project alliance in 
Australia, which concluded that ambience i.e., environment where trust and transparency values dominate, 
is valued in project alliances as it encourages collegiality, trust and commitment. However, when dealing 
with complexity, uncertainty and risk, especially for the implementation of project policies, project 
managers should place a contract in its social context and within the dynamics of relationship development 
(Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, Woolthuis et al. 2005) including ethical dilemmas (Müller et al. 2013), which 
is essential in the development of project governance frameworks (Klakegg et al. 2008). According to Vlaar 
et al. (2006) such formalisation of a contract has a curvilinear relationship and can be seen as a ‘double-
edged sword.’ It can assist with the establishment and maintenance of relationships offering a collaborative 
environment for joint action, or it can turn into formalism, cause rigidity, a loss of creativity and flexibility, 
and diminish trust.   
 
However, one of the major dilemmas of control is its illusion, or more specifically the illusion of control 
(Brown 2004, Vlaar et al. 2006), which has been linked to power (Fast and Chen 2009) and tends to occur 
from managers ‘believing that their assumptions concerning measurability, communication, and 
compliance are actually in use throughout an organisation’ (Dermer and Lucas 1986, p. 471). Also, from 
this perspective, ‘people’s judgments of control are influenced by subjective needs related with the 
maintenance and enhancement of their self-esteem’ (Yarritu et al. 2014, p. 38). This implies self-esteem or 
personal involvement is a main factor that may contribute to the illusion of control. To understand if 
personal involvement contributes to the illusion of control, Yarritu et al. (2014) conducted an empirical 
study on the personal involvement of participants in trying to obtain desired outcomes, which revealed that 
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people acting more often to obtain a desired outcome developed stronger illusions. They further argue that 
people’s self-esteem must be at risk for the illusion to occur (see also Thompson 1999, Thompson et al. 
1998). Other factors that contribute to the illusion of control to obtain outcomes is when people focus on 
successes (Thompson 1999). Here people focus on success, or success-focused tasks, rather than failures 
to achieve desired outcomes, which leads actors to overestimate the connection between their action and 
the successful outcome (Thompson 1999). According to Thompson (1999, p. 189) they do this because 
‘compared with tasks focusing on failure, success-oriented tasks produce more instances in which actors 
actions are followed by the desired outcome and because these types of tasks direct attention to success, 
and vice versa.’ This can also be seen as positive illusions (Matute and Blanco 2014) and overconfidence 
in decision-making especially among the powerful (Fast and Chen 2009, Fast et al. 2012). With 
overconfidence in decision-making, the Fast et al. (2012) study showed that power (i.e., powerful decision 
makers) increases overconfidence in decision-making, which is driven by a sense of power, and that power 
can harm performance on tasks that require careful deliberation and accuracy.  
 
Considering high level cognitive biases (e.g., delusions, illusions, deceptions, optimism, strategic 
misrepresentation, overconfidence) in decision-making is common for the implementation of major project 
policies, which may be seen as the desired outcome (for example see Flyvbjerg 2008a, 2009a, Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2009, National Audit Office 2011b), how are project managers supposed to reduce the illusion of control, 
or alleviate cognitive biases, and achieve better project policy outcomes? According to Matute and Blanco 
(2014) and Blanco and Matute (2015) it can be achieved in a number of ways. With illusions of control, 
one strategy consists of warning people that desired outcomes might have alternative causes, other than 
participants’ actions (Matute and Blanco 2014). The other strategy focuses on to prevent an undesired 
outcome before it occurs. Here, Blanco and Matute (2015) conclude that the illusion of control appeared in 
preventive scenarios when the probability of the to-be-prevented outcome was low. This implies that an 
illusion will be weaker when the probability of the cause is low. Another mechanism to reduce illusions 
which is strongly advocated by Matute et al. (2015) is to teach people how to make better use of educational 
strategies or scientific thinking i.e., illusion of the cause and effect relationship with a desired outcome. For 
example, do success-orientated tasks lead to successful outcomes? By developing an educational strategy 
and questioning the cause-effect relationship with the desired outcome, people will be able to reduce 
illusions and produce better outcomes (Matute et al. 2015). However, a major drawback with this 
mechanism is that people can see cognitive biases in other people but are terrible at recognising their own 
biases (Matute et al. 2015), which tends to create an illusion of validity (Kahneman 2011). However, 
Kahneman (2011, p. 217) suggests that ‘illusions of validity are supported by powerful professional 
cultures.’ Overconfidence in decision-making by powerful individuals, can be contributed to motivational 
and non-motivational factors (Merkle and Weber 2011). With motivational factors, positive illusions 
contribute to mental health and well-being, which foster self-esteem and enhance the motivation to act, and 
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non-motivational factors can be contributed to selective recruitment of information, focalism, and 
egocentrism (Merkle and Weber 2011). Mechanisms to combat overconfidence in decision-making 
includes mitigating the effects of power through decentralising decisions, minimising the likelihood of high 
power individuals experiencing feelings of competitiveness with advisors, and creating organisational 
cultures that encourage the sharing of information where leaders are also rewarded for seeking and 
integrating the perspectives of others (Tost et al. 2012). What the literature suggests is that changing 
organisational culture, and actors’ perception of organisational or project reality, may alleviate cognitive 
biases and increase the achievement of project policy strategies and benefits.  
 Project Governance 
There is evidence that the principles of agency theory for the implementation of project policies, especially 
PPPs, dates back to the fourth century BC (Productivity Commission 2014). Here a consortia of city-states 
in Lebadeia, Greece, partnered with private contractors to build the Temple of Zeus Basileus in 338 BC, 
which remains unfinished (Hayward 2015). The project management literature tends to view project 
governance as either external to any specific project or internal to a specific project (Ahola et al. 2014). 
According to Ahola et al. (2014), with project governance as external to any specific project, projects are 
subjected to governance mechanisms by their private or government owners which emphasises a project-
parent relationship (i.e., principle-agent relationship, risk of opportunistic behaviour, implementation of 
standard policies, procedures, practices, and monitoring mechanisms). With project governance, as internal 
to a specific project, which majority of the project governance literature tends to focus on, project 
governance is subjected to governance mechanisms to meet the goals and expectations of various 
stakeholders with a focus on projects-in-context (i.e., project is a powerful actor, shared goals and control 
mechanisms, joint governance structure with parent and external contingencies), see figure 3-2. However, 
Ahola et al. (2014) investigation also revealed, as did Biesenthal and Wilden (2014), Müller (2012), that 
majority of project governance mechanisms tend to focus on transaction cost economics theory, especially 
in construction projects.  
 
Furthermore, the Ahola et al. (2014) investigation does pose some limitations on the study of project 
governance, including a further understanding of agency theory within a project context, the role of 
governments as powerful stakeholders for the implementation of major infrastructure projects such as PPPs, 
and the governance of multi-actor projects with diverse stakeholders and the complexity of interactions. 
Similarly, Bekker (2015) states that although the categorisation of project governance in three ‘schools of 
thoughts’ i.e., single firm, multi-firm, and large capital has advanced the sector, more discussions and 
practical research is needed in understand this phenomenon, particularly, from a stakeholder and ethical 
consideration.  
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Figure 3-2: Two Streams of Project Governance Research.Figure by Ahola et al. (2014, p. 1328). 
From the literature, project governance tends to be seen as a multi-level phenomenon where different levels 
(i.e., project, links parent organisation to project, and parent organisation) require different governance 
structures and mechanisms (Biesenthal and Wilden 2014). According to Biesenthal and Wilden (2014) 
investigation of the trends and opportunities for multi-level project governance, at the individual project 
level, governance mechanisms are imposed by higher project-based organisational levels with a high focus 
on transaction cost economics and other agency theory to minimise opportunistic behaviour. At the level 
that links a parent organisation to a project (e.g., PMOs), project governance links to corporate governance 
and is concerned with defining projects, programs and portfolios, and project management capabilities to 
deliver projects. At the level of project organisation (or corporate governance), project governance is 
described as corporate governance for project-based organisation, which is concerned with collecting 
timely, relevant and reliable reports for senior management to support decision-making. Furthermore, 
stakeholder theory and stewardship theory tend to characterise this level (Biesenthal and Wilden 2014). 
Although Biesenthal and Wilden (2014) undertook a thorough investigation of the project governance 
phenomenon, it still tends to be seen as a rather linear and rational process i.e., project governance 
mechanisms implemented to align with corporate governance mechanisms. According to Miller and Hobbs 
(2005) governance mechanisms must adapt to the particular project and its context, dealing with emergent 
and co-evolving complexity and dynamic interactions of organisational actors. This is further stressed by 
Camen et al. (2011, p. 378) who state that the ‘development of a relationship can be described as an 
evolution, or as a process whereby the parties, in the interim, reduce the distance between themselves and 
develop trust in their partners.’ 
 Gaps and Areas for Project Management Advancement 
Research is needed to understand the way project governance influences organisational strategic decision-
making on the implementation of project policies. Further understanding is needed on the mechanisms (i.e., 
formal and informal) used by actors to influence project governance and its strategic outcomes. Thus, the 
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literature tends to show gaps in the concepts of governance, ethics and governance, institutions and 
governance, agency theory, transaction cost economics, stewardship theory, trust and control, and project 
governance for the implementation of project policies. With governance in general, there needs to be an 
understanding of the ‘steering’ and boundaries of governance including ethics, especially within an 
institutional system and its effects on project policy implementation. Relational norms and its 
embeddedness and embodiment within institutional governance structures also needs deeper understanding. 
From an agency theory perspective, the contractual relationships including information asymmetries and 
other similar agency theories needs further investigation. Although transaction cost economics is rather 
embodied within the relational actor space based on trust and norms, it can also be expanded to the 
collaborative, collective and non-economic approach of stewardship theory to understand its influence on 
project policy implementation. Also, the co-existence and co-evolution of trust, swift trust, intra- and inter-
team based trust, and control while alleviating cognitive biases in rationalising decisions for project policy 
implementation also requires deeper investigation. See table 3-3 for the concepts, salient characteristics, 
gaps and areas for project management advancement. This research study will address these gaps in the 
literature. 
Table 3-3: Summary of Salient Theoretical Literature on Governance and Policy Implementation 
Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Governance • Governance means ‘to steer’ 
• Seen as a complex matter i.e., non-
linearity of actor interactions and 
emergent outcomes 
• Corporate governance tends to set the 
boundaries for project governance – 
highly questionable 
• Governance systems are considered to 
be an institutional system 
• Control of human behaviour which 
can change for the better or worse 
The ‘steering’ and boundaries of governance 
especially within an institutional system and 
its influence on project policy 
implementation. 
Ethics and 
Governance 
• Ethical decision-making is highly 
complex and contains shade of grey 
• Ethics is usually seen from a 
consequentialist, deontological and 
virtue perspective 
Better ethical decisions, particularly from a 
partnership and social perspective, including 
institutional sensemaking and strategic 
collaboration. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Institutions 
and 
governance 
• Focuses on the implicit and explicit 
relationships between corporation and 
stakeholders 
• Embedded and embodied within 
relational norms rather than traditional 
contractual mechanisms 
• Will encounter resistance, but 
normative elements make for effective 
control than traditional and 
authoritative governance systems 
Relational norms are embedded and 
embodied within institutional governance 
structures for the implementation of project 
policies.  
Agency 
theory 
• Contractual relationship between 
principal and agent rooted in 
bureaucracy 
• Delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent as principals are 
bounded rationally 
• Both agents and principals seek to 
receive maximum utility from the 
relationship with the least possible 
expenditure 
• Requires close monitoring and 
bonding to limit opportunistic 
behaviour 
• Problem lies in information 
asymmetries 
• Complex project contracts are 
incomplete because of human 
bounded rationality: Machiavellianism 
• Plagued with difficulties and high 
risks 
• Behavioural agency theory and theory 
of the agent’s mind suggested as 
alternative versions of agency theory 
Contractual relationship including 
information asymmetries, and behavioural 
agency theory and theory of the agent’s mind 
for the implementation of project policies.  
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
• Focuses on how organisations choose 
governance structures with 
economising on transaction costs 
• Assumes that agents act in their own 
best interests 
• Main drivers are contingency factors, 
behavioural factors, and context 
• Limited instrumentally and 
systematically 
• Governing the relational space based 
on norms, constrains opportunistic 
behaviour and decreases transaction 
costs 
• Important aspect of transaction 
governance choice is the level of trust 
between the principal and agent 
Governing the relational space based on trust 
and norms, and the main drivers of 
transaction cost economics for the 
implementation of project policies. 
Stewardship 
theory 
• Individuals in organisations are seen 
as stewards – decisions act in 
organisation’s best interest and based 
on trust 
• Collaborative, collective and non-
economic approach, behaviour 
completely rational 
• High level of principal-steward 
relationship which is mutually 
supportive 
• Good governance mechanism for joint 
utility 
• Enables actors to define and accept an 
organisation’s vision, mission and 
objectives, and foster productive 
working relationships 
Collaborative, collective and non-economic 
approach, and rational behaviour including 
informal mechanism for the implementation 
of project policies. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
• Relationship depends on the risk and 
trust phenomena, control structures 
and collaborative structures 
• Significant investment needs focus 
towards understanding the informal 
mechanisms for project policies 
Trust and 
control 
• Essential governance mechanisms. 
• Exists at multilevels with different 
sources 
• Expectation partner will not engage in 
opportunistic behaviour 
• Especially prevalent in strategic 
alliances 
• Gain trust: relationship between trust, 
reciprocity and reputation, and 
requires effort 
• Trust relations are sustained by 
institutional mechanisms (i.e., formal 
and informal), which is imperative in 
complex project environments but 
does have limitations 
• Superior governance mechanism 
especially in agency relationships and 
institutional structures with multiple 
actors with competing interests 
• Swift trust requires a collective 
perception and strong relations 
• Front-end phase of projects crucial in 
terms of creating and sustaining trust 
• Most scholars see trust and control as 
complements or coexisting 
• Crucial in project partnerships and 
alliances when the need for 
Co-existence and coevolution of trust, and 
swift trust, and control within a multi-level 
governing institutional context; and in 
alleviating cognitive biases in rationalising 
decisions for project policy implementation. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
collaboration between exchange 
partners’ high 
• Requires a symbiotic coevolution (or 
mutual reinforcing relationship) 
approach with ongoing adjustments 
• Partially written contracts facilitate 
the development of trust in 
institutional arrangements and 
personal relationships 
• Limits opportunistic behaviour, 
enables actors to diffuse and share 
information, signals problems earlier, 
and enables collective problem 
solving 
• Project manager should place a 
contract in its social context and 
within the dynamics of relationship 
development 
• Major dilemmas of control are its 
illusion or cognitive biases in 
rationalising decisions but can be 
reduced or alleviated 
Project 
governance 
• Seen as either external to any specific 
project or internal to a specific project 
• Majority of project governance 
mechanisms tend to focus on 
transaction cost economics theory 
• Tends to be seen as a multi-level 
phenomenon with different structures 
and mechanisms, and as a rather linear 
and rational process 
• Must adapt to the particular project 
and its context, dealing with emergent 
and co-evolving complexity and 
Multi-level phenomenon of project 
governance and its adaption to a particular 
project and its context, including its emergent 
and co-evolving complexity and dynamic 
interactions for the implementation of project 
policies. 
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Concepts Salient Characteristics Gaps and Areas for Project Management 
Advancement 
dynamic interactions of organisational 
actors 
3.5 Conceptual Framework and Proposition 
The review and critique of the literature has contributed to the development of a conceptual framework and 
proposition for the design and conduct of this research study. According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2008), 
Jabareen (2009), Miles and Huberman (1994) a conceptual framework explains either graphically or in 
narrative form the main conceptual categories to be studied and the relationships among them. Here each 
category relates to each research question which forms the backbone of the study. As such, Bloomberg and 
Volpe (2008, p. 61) state that a conceptual framework ‘provides an organising structure both for reporting 
the study’s findings as well as the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of the findings – essentially it 
becomes a working tool.’ In a broad sense, the aim is to describe and explain, in narrative form, a pattern 
of relationships with a set of conceptual categories: a simplification of reality (Encyclopedia of Case Study 
Research 2010). To achieve this, I adopted Jabareen (2009) process, while also considering Rocco and 
Plakhotnik (2009) salient considerations for developing a conceptual framework which includes the 
following phases: 
1. Mapping selected data sources. This includes extensively reviewing and holistically mapping the 
multidisciplinary literature regarding the phenomenon in question i.e., existing empirical data and 
practices, interviews with practitioners and scholars whose work focuses on the phenomenon.  
2. Extensively reading and categorising the selected data. This includes reading and categorising the 
selected data by discipline, importance, and representative power within each discipline.  
3. Identifying and naming concepts. This includes the process of ‘discovering’ core concepts (Glaser 
2001) which emerged from the literature, and naming them.  
4. Deconstructing and categorising concepts. This includes the process of deconstructing each 
concept, identifying its main attributes and characteristics, and then organising and categorising 
the concepts.   
5. Integrating concepts. This includes integrating and grouping the concepts together, the casual 
relationships, in narrative form i.e., differentiation between cause and effect, for example, direct 
effect, mediating effect, or moderating effect.  
6. Synthesis, resynthesis, and making it all make sense. This includes the process of synthesising 
concepts into a theoretical framework i.e., repetitive synthesis and resynthesis until a general 
theoretical framework emerges which makes sense. 
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7. Validating the conceptual framework. The basic aim here is to validate the conceptual framework, 
i.e., presentation to a group of experts, conferences. 
8. Rethinking the conceptual framework. Here the researcher undertakes a process of potentially 
revising the theoretical framework based on new insights, comments from a group of experts, 
literature, and so on. All in all, the theory ‘should make sense for those disciplines and enlarge their 
theoretical perspective on the specific phenomenon in question’ (2009, p. 55).  
In addition, the grounded theory approach was adopted that aimed to ‘generate, identify, and trace the 
phenomenon’s major concepts, which together constitute its theoretical framework’ (Jabareen 2009, p. 53); 
as was Rohlfing’s (2012) integrative framework on causal inferences including mechanisms, entities and 
activities. Although debated in the literature (see Gerring 2010, Rohlfing 2012) this research adopts the 
word ‘mechanisms’ with its associated ‘properties,’ rather than ‘categories,’ as it more accurately ‘explains 
how a phenomenon comes about or how some significant process works’ (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 2). 
Moreover, it is commonly used to describe good propositions and theory making (Davis and Marquis 2005, 
Gerring 2005, Shepherd and Suddaby 2017). This view has been embraced and professed by leading 
scholars with near total absence of opposition (Gerring 2010, Rohlfing and Schneider 2016, Weller and 
Barnes 2016). In this light, the following plausible and working proposition was developed and articulated 
from the literature which guided the remainder of the research process: 
Project management, seen as an instrumental technocratic process, is in fact an institutional emergent 
process which leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program 
of projects. 
Figure 3-3 conceptualises the proposition in a conceptual framework, which is directly derived from the 
study’s research questions, as outlined in Chapter One. The first research question seeks to determine the 
extent of, and how, do external factors of economic environment, social environment, political and expert 
knowledge influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. While the second research question focuses on the internal factors of 
power and politics, information and knowledge, culture, and governance within the same context. These 
questions are holistically embedded into the framework with ‘constant re-evaluation and re-negotiation of 
concepts (or mechanisms) and its boundaries, its key contributions and its place in the wider literature i.e., 
fluid and emergent rather than linear’ (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012, p. 821), which will be explained next. 
 
According to Machamer et al. (2000, p. 3) the ‘organisation of the entities and activities (i.e., types of 
causes or interactions) determines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon.’ For example, the 
theorised phenomenon project institutionalisation leads to the successful implementation of mega public 
sector infrastructure program of projects, which is donated by the dashed arrow, is determined by the 
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theorised mechanisms (entities or actors) project institute, institutional-based governance, project reality, 
and rational agent, which is donated by the solid arrows. These mechanisms or entities engage in activities 
or behaviours to ‘explain why the former has an effect on the latter’ (Rohlfing 2012, p. 35). For example, 
the entity project institute engages in project action-based activities of front-end institutional project work, 
which effects institutional-based governance and the coevolution of power, trust and control, and so on. 
Such a process can be referred to as a multi-mechanism explanation, which serves to deliver observations 
that support the proposition (Rohlfing 2012). A further explanation of the phenomenon including how the 
entities engage in project action-based activities, including the salient gaps identified in the literature, to 
ensure productive continuity will be discussed next. 
Figure 3-3: Conceptual Framework of Proposition 
As organisations carry or generate institutions (Kadefors 1995) or institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008), and the strength of institutionalisation is dependent on the relational embeddedness i.e., regulative, 
normative and cognitive frames, and institutional work between and among individuals and their 
institutions (Battilana and D'Aunno 2009, Lawrence et al. 2009, Scott 2014, Thornton et al. 2012), 
including ethical thinking (Helgadóttir 2008) within a project environment; the logical mechanism to 
capture this would be project institutionalisation. Such a context also requires actors to make sense of and 
construct an interpretation of reality – the emergent phenomenon (Maitlis and Christianson 2014, Sandberg 
and Tsoukas 2015, Weick et al. 2010) aligned with temporary organising as a process and form (Bakker et 
al. 2016). For example, project institutions identified primarily with bureaucratic, regulative and cognitive 
power relations and consequentialist reasonings is considered to lead to the unsuccessful implementation 
of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Such a phenomenon is also seen in project 
management as an instrumental technocratic process (Morris 2013, Morris 2012, Walker and Lloyd-Walker 
2016), or the ‘iron cage’ of project management, where ‘institutionalised norms, practices and logics which 
structure organisational fields exert isomorphic pressures, forming an ‘iron cage’ which constrains 
organisational actions’ (Zietsma and Pedersen 2009, p. 143) in temporary organising aligned with the task 
‘uniqueness’ (Burke and Morley 2016), or action-based entrepreneurialism (Lundin and Söderholm 1995), 
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i.e., temporary organising as process and form (Bakker et al. 2016) aligned with the organisational change 
initiative. ‘Escaping the iron cage’ is absolutely essential in times of uncertainty and ‘complex’ change, 
that is, when there are discrepancies between expectations and reality, such as, megaprojects (Van 
Marrewijk et al. 2016), temporary organisations (Lundin et al. 2015), strategic change (Balogun and 
Johnson 2005), and teams managing crises and unexpected events, which ‘triggers’ the need for 
sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Whereas, project institutions identified primarily with 
collective, normative and cognitive power relations and deontological reasonings is considered to lead to 
the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. This phenomenon 
is further explained by the mechanisms of project institute, institutional-based governance, project reality, 
and rational agent with their associated project action-based activities.  
 
Since sensemaking is a social phenomenon where actors create intersubjective meaning arising out of 
human interaction for collective action (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, Weick 1995), the mechanism to 
capture such action meaning cycles of sensemaking is a project institute through the project action-based 
activities of front-end institutional project work where organisational actors create, maintain and disrupt 
institutional project relations aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness, or action-based 
entrepreneurialism, of the organisational change initiative that ‘triggers’ the need for sensemaking i.e., 
comprehend the world and act collectively in a more taken-for-granted reality. This also includes the project 
action-based activities of embedding a strategic intent, such as, vision and mission statements through 
powerful narratives and a strategy for achieving that vision within the project environment; enacting 
collective institutional leadership that fosters a ‘sink-or-swim’ or esprit de corps mindset towards a 
responsive and highly adaptive performing ‘action team’; embracing an institutional leader, seen as a 
‘statesman,’ making critical and character-defining decisions, and a change agent, truly transforming the 
relational actor space towards an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality aligned at 
the front-end with the organisational change initiative. However, such institutional work is dependent on 
‘steering,’ or influencing and shaping, actors (inter)actions to achieve project strategies and benefits, hence, 
the appropriate mechanism is institutional-based governance through the coevolution of power, trust and 
control project action-based activities. This includes the project action-based activities of ‘power-to’ people 
and identifying the right medium through which power is exercised and diffused; situating normative ethics 
in everyday discourse; making decisions based on deontological and virtue ethics; embedding trust in 
relations, such as institutional-based trust; using contracts to facilitate trust; which taken together, coevolve 
through the ongoing processes of adjustments and reciprocity to create and maintain strong relational bonds. 
Although such an institutional state of governance, if it is ever reached, is temporal at best (Gerrits et al. 
2009), through such project action-based activities actors truly form an unique temporary organising 
institutionalised project reality aligned at the front-end with the organisational change initiative, which can 
transcend the isomorphic (i.e., ‘iron cage’) of organisational institutes from the intrasubjective to an 
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intersubjective and then form an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality – a taken-for-
granted reality aligned with the project change – hence the mechanism project reality. Being in such a state 
of embedded agency (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Thornton et al. 2012), actors’ diffusion of information 
and knowledge based on the project action-based activities of strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, 
including reason-based explanations (motivating) and reason-based justifications (normative), can either 
increase or decrease the risk of cognitive biases in rationalising decisions, hence, the appropriate 
mechanism is rational agent. Such a linchpin is the ‘success’ in ‘successful implementation,’ more 
elaborately, a rational agent strategically shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with 
the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative in achieving project strategies and benefits. 
Such an inference that project institutionalisation leads to the successful implementation of mega public 
sector infrastructure program of projects occurs in the relational actor space of (inter)actions, thus, the 
appropriate theoretical concept to capture this would be the relational actor space (inter)actions.  
 
The relationships between each mechanism is demonstrated by the arrows in the conceptual framework. 
Although sensemaking is ‘not Aristotelian – that is, linear, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive’ but 
interconnected through feedback loops (Kessler 2013, p. 496), to understand such a phenomenon and guide 
the remainder of the research process, it will be represented as Aristotelian. The dotted line signifies the 
cause-effect relationship, while the solid lines signify the means-end relationship. This will be advance in 
the next chapter.  
3.6 Summary 
This literature review and analysis investigated factors that influence organisational strategic decision-
making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects, including the 
exploration of effective governance mechanisms to optimise its success. Particularly, with a focus on the 
muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. The literature review focused on two major areas, being: external and internal environmental 
factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making, governance and policy implementation. 
From these major areas of investigation, it can be argued that when considering the implementation of 
public sector project policies, the following can be concluded: 
• Enabling better rationalising of decisions for the implementation of project policies requires an 
understanding of actor and agency (inter)actions including external and internal environmental 
factors that influence their strategic decision-making (i.e., economic environment, political, social, 
expert knowledge, power and politics, culture, information and knowledge), and how they 
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influence others. This also includes decentralisation of decision-making, collective approach to a 
course of action through mechanisms of power, diffusion of information and knowledge, and a 
clear ‘command structure’ for people to make fast and sometimes painful decisions (Klijn and 
Teisman 1991). Basically, decision-making on the implementation of project polices requires an 
understanding of the strategic relational actor space that affect and shape individual and agency 
(inter)actions. Furthermore, many of these elements of theories can be traced back to governance 
(Klijn and Snellen 2009).  
• Governance, a ‘steering’ mechanism, is bound within the complexity of individual and agency 
(inter)actions and their emergent outcomes (Teisman et al. 2009a). This is especially prevalent with 
project governance, where boundaries are set by corporate governance systems (Müller 2012), in a 
rather linear relationship. From a theoretical perspective, this is questionable, as governance 
systems are complex and dynamic i.e., linear and non-linear, stable and non-stable (Teisman et al. 
2009a, Van Ees and Van Der Laan 2012) with elements of strategy and innovation (Clarke and 
Branson 2012). Within this context, governance systems are considered to be an institutional 
system embedded within the complexity of human behaviour (Fiss 2008). Here the elements of 
power, trust and control are of central importance when creating and maintaining governance 
systems, especially for the implementation of project and program policies in democratic 
institutions and societies (Edelenbos et al. 2010a, Edelenbos et al. 2010b, Flyvbjerg 1998, Van 
Buuren et al. 2012). This is also imperative in public administration, where decision-making is 
linked to power (Fast and Chen 2009) and desired outcomes (Yarritu et al. 2014) are ‘plagued’ 
with cognitive biases, such as delusions, illusions, deceptions, optimism, overconfidence and 
strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg 2008a, 2009a, Flyvbjerg et al. 2009, National Audit Office 
2011b, Productivity Commission 2014). Basically, governance for the implementation of project 
policies requires an understanding of governing the relational actor space of project (inter)actions 
through formal and informal governance mechanisms which are institutionalised by agency actor 
(inter)actions.  
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METHODOLOGY AND 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
The literature review critically reviewed and analysed factors that influence organisational strategic 
decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects, 
including an exploration of governance mechanisms to optimise its success. It also identified salient 
characteristics, gaps and areas for project management advancement.  
What this chapter does: 
The methodology and research design discusses the research context, paradigm, methodology, and the 
case study approach in conducting this research. This includes the PhD as a vehicle for research, my 
experience and role, the worldview, the case study as a methodology and method, collection of evidence 
and research instruments, and the triangulation of data.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Five will discuss and describe the case study and the organisations selected as case 
studies. 
• Chapter Six will provide the data analysis and interpretation of the case study.  
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. I believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable project managers to 
implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to eradicate potential 
‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process. In seeking to understand this phenomenon, the study addressed 
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two research questions: (1) to what extent and how do the external factors of economy, social, political and 
expert knowledge influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public 
sector infrastructure program of projects? (2) To what extent and how do the internal factors of power and 
politics, information and knowledge, culture and governance influence organisational strategic decision-
making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects?  
 
This chapter describes the research methodology and research design including discussions on: context 
being the PhD as a vehicle for research; experience and role of the researcher; research paradigm i.e., 
worldview of the researcher and stance; research methodology being a case study approach; the research 
strategy and methods of data collection and analysis as research method; collection of evidence; case 
organisations; research instruments used as case study evidence; and triangulation of data. The chapter 
culminates with a brief concluding summary.  
4.2 Context 
 The PhD as a Vehicle for Research 
According to RMIT University (2016) a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) program allows individuals to pursue 
their own theories and ideas and contribute to research in their field, which complies with the Australian 
Qualifications Framework: Level 10. Here the purpose of a doctoral degree (typically referred to as a PhD) 
is to ‘qualify individuals who apply substantial body of knowledge to research, investigate and develop 
new knowledge, in one or more fields of investigation, scholarship or professional practice’ (Australian 
Qualifications Framework 2013, p. 63). This suggests that research is the defining characteristic of doctoral 
degrees with ‘substantial body of knowledge’ as a key element. According to Petre and Rugg (2010) 
substantial body of knowledge, or significant contribution, means providing evidence to substantiate a 
conclusion that is worth making, which usually involves three key steps: What’s the question? What 
evidence will answer the question? Choose a technique that will produce the required evidence. To achieve 
this requires motivation, critical thinking and analysis, good academic English, balance between 
independence and guidance and family (Petre and Rugg 2010). This is also emphasised and further 
advanced by Murray (2011, p. 145) who states that a PhD is a piece of independent research which aims to 
contribute to knowledge with a focus on a core question (i.e., problems in the world, gaps in the literature, 
etc.), and is generically structured as follows: 
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• Introduction/Background/Review of the Literature 
Summarise and evaluation books, articles, theses, etc. 
Define the gap in the literature 
Define and justify your project 
• Theory/Approach/Method 
Define method, theoretical approach, instrument 
Method of inquiry 
Show links between your method and others 
Justify your method 
• Analysis/Results 
Report what you did, list steps followed 
Document the analysis, showing how you carried it out 
Report what you found 
Prioritise sections for your thesis or for an appendix 
• Interpretation/Discussion 
Interpret what you found 
Justify your interpretation 
Synthesise results in illustrations, tables, graphs, etc. 
• Conclusions/Implications/Recommendations 
For future research 
For future practice 
Report issues which were beyond the scope of this study 
 
The above framed my research approach for this thesis. Petre and Rugg (2010) state that the capacity for 
independent research means having knowledge, skills, critical thinking and intuitive to design and conduct 
rigorous research. Overall, a PhD is a ‘vehicle’ for research as it involves significant collective effort i.e., 
independent research within a supervisory relationship, drive to find answers to questions that provides 
significant contribution to knowledge, undertaken in a rather interactive and recursive, and sometimes 
unpredictable ways. One of the important contextual features of this PhD journey was that it was 
substantially informed by the experience and background of the researcher, me. This vital element needs 
some explanation because it reveals the strengths of the research having valuable and unique insights into 
the process being studied, but also shapes potential biases that I was cautiously aware of and endeavoured 
to not allow this to cloud my critical evaluation of evidence gathered and analysed to help me draw 
conclusions from the work. 
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 Experience and Role 
I have about five years’ experience as a senior program officer in leading and managing infrastructure 
projects and programs for state government agencies. Prior to this I was in the property sector, valuing 
high-rise commercial, major retail hubs, industrial and residential properties for about three years. Most the 
projects and programs were in the educational infrastructure and finance space. This included projects to 
the value of about AUD $1 billion and program of projects to the value of about AUD $500 million such 
as planning, land acquisition and disposal, leases and licences, capital works (construction), information 
and communication technology, and asset revaluations. These projects and programs where seen as 
strategic, complex, dynamic and characterised by plurality. Some of the daily operational tasks included: 
• Contributing to the full life-cycle of projects and programs to meet departmental and other 
government strategies and benefits. For example, undertaking research and analysis for the 
implementation of projects and programs; managing projects and sub-projects and being 
responsible for their successful delivery within deadlines, resourcing and budgetary constraints. 
Other tasks included monitoring and evaluating project performances. 
• Providing authoritative, high-level strategic, financial, risk management and commercial advice to 
cabinet, ministers, executives and other senior managers, and external stakeholders on complex 
project management matters. For example, ministerial briefs, cabinet and agency submissions, and 
memos on complex and highly sensitive project matters.  
• Working with intra- and inter-governmental agencies (state and federal) to implement and deliver 
major infrastructure projects while ensuring appropriate risk and stakeholder management 
principles and practices where in place. 
• Creating and maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with key and influential stakeholders to 
facilitate a strong partnership approach to project implementation and delivery. 
• Undertaking intensive negotiations with powerful stakeholders, including developing negotiation 
strategies, and reviewing and amending major project agreements. 
• Representing the department on steering committees and other working groups. 
• Providing leadership to staff from diverse backgrounds. 
• Maintaining accurate and complete records of project work activities in line with legislative, 
regulative and policy requirements. 
This experience involved substantial time and effort and was a consuming process where most of the 
projects and programs failed to achieve their strategies and benefits. Upon personal reflection, this major 
drawback appeared to be principally due to a muddled strategic context, intertwined between different 
agency and actor (inter)actions and their deceptions of reality. However, paradoxically, despite this 
apparent complex and at times chaotic environment, the projects that achieved their strategies and benefits 
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had a strong sense of collectiveness, confident decision-making, innovative thinking, high level of 
stakeholder commitment and governing mechanisms. My main reflection was that I was operating in a 
contagious Machiavellianism environment. This is imperative for this research project because this paradox 
piqued my interest to undertake this PhD.  
4.3 Research Paradigm 
The philosophical position or worldview of the researcher is important to consider and define for the readers 
so they can understand the research approach adapted by the researcher. Researchers always bring certain 
beliefs and philosophical assumptions to research (Creswell 2013, 2014), which shapes the problem and 
research questions and the way to answer the research questions (Creswell 2013). This is also reinforced 
by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 22) statement that a paradigm is a ‘basic set of beliefs that guides action.’ 
Consequently, this research uses Creswell and Clark (2011) conceptualisation to position philosophy within 
a qualitative study, as depicted in figure 4-1.  
Figure 4-1: Qualitative Study Conceptualisation Position. Figure by Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 39). 
Creswell and Clark (2011) state that there are four elements to designing a study. At the broadest level is 
the philosophical assumptions, such as ontology behind the study. These philosophical assumptions or 
worldviews inform the use of a theoretical stance that the researcher might use. This stance then informs 
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the methodological approach or research design. Then finally, the methodological approach includes the 
methods or procedures to collect, analyse, and interpret the data.  
 
Creswell and Clark (2011) discuss four paradigms that are common in literature, being postpositivism, 
constructivism, participatory, and pragmatism. Postpositivism assumptions are grounded in a scientific 
method of research, a lens of objective reality, where probable causes determine effects or outcomes. Rather 
than starting with theory, constructivists (which is often combined with interpretivism) aim to make sense 
of reality, develop a theory or pattern of meaning, and develop subjective meanings of their experiences (a 
humanistic sense of the world). The participatory paradigm focuses on marginalised or disenfranchised 
groups, and is intertwined with politics and political change agendas confronting social oppression. 
Pragmatism focuses on the outcomes of a research rather than antecedent conditions, and uses multiple 
methods of data collection to answer a research question. The major elements of each paradigm are 
presented in table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Paradigms and their Major Elements 
Postpositivism Constructivism Participatory Pragmatism 
Determination 
Reductionism 
Empirical observation 
and measurement 
Theory verification 
Understanding 
Multiple participant 
meaning 
Social and historical 
construction 
Theory generation 
Political 
Empowerment and issue 
oriented 
Collaborative 
Change oriented 
Consequences of action 
Problem-centered 
Pluralistic 
Real-world practice 
oriented 
Source: Creswell (2014, p. 6). 
According to Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 41) all ‘four paradigms have common elements but take different 
stances on these elements, which take a different stance on the assumed nature of reality (ontology), how 
we gain knowledge of what we know (epistemology), the role values play in research (axiology), and the 
process of research (methodology),’ which influence how researchers undertake their research inquires. 
Examples of these paradigms and how they are translated into practice are presented in table 4-2. 
 
Among the main four paradigms of postpositivism, constructivism (or interpretivist), participatory and 
pragmatism as outlined by Creswell (2007), Creswell and Clark (2011), this research adopts an 
interpretivist worldview with an ontological stance, as highlighted in table 4-2. Fundamentally, the rationale 
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behind adopting such a view is that interpretivism enables the researcher to understand (Verstehen5) the 
world of human experience (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006, emphasis added). Such a worldview is succinctly 
argued by Hammersley (2013, p. 27) who states that ‘we cannot understand why people do what they do, 
or why particular institutions exist and operate in characteristic ways, without grasping how people interpret 
and make sense of their world and act on their interpretations.’ Such a view is pinnacle to interpretivism, 
that is, understanding the ‘meaning’ of social phenomena (Schwandt 1994), particularly, the Verstehen in 
the means-end relationship (Lane 1974) which underpins this research study. Furthermore, interpretivism 
is particularly dominate in project management research (see Biedenbach and Müller 2011). While 
interpretive approaches have their critics (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), the conception of organisational 
strategic decision-making pursued here usefully permits me to focus on the muddled and strategic context 
of such decision-making by means of understanding agency and actor (inter)actions. It also assists me to 
examine the means by which external and internal factors of influence may be exercised, created, 
maintained and enhanced with the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program 
of projects.  
Table 4-2: Common Elements of Paradigms and Implications for Practice 
Worldview 
Element 
Postpositivism Constructivism (or 
Interpretivist) 
Participatory Pragmatism 
Ontology (What 
is the nature of 
reality?) 
 
Singular reality (e.g., 
researchers reject or 
fail to reject 
hypothesis; reality as 
concrete structures 
and behavioural 
patterns, reality as 
process: interrelated 
actions) 
 
Multiple realities (e.g., 
researchers provide 
quotes to illustrate 
different perspectives; 
social reality relative to 
interactions between 
people in moments of 
time and space, socially 
constructed, emerging; 
context is human action 
and interpretation) 
Political reality 
(e.g., findings are 
negotiated with 
participants) 
Singular and 
multiple 
realities (e.g., 
researchers test 
hypotheses and 
provide 
multiple 
perspectives) 
Epistemology 
(What is the 
relationship 
between the 
Distance and 
impartiality (e.g., 
researchers 
Closeness (e.g., 
researchers visit 
participants at their sites 
to collect data) 
Collaboration 
(e.g., researchers 
actively involve 
Practicality 
(e.g., 
researchers 
collect data by 
                                                 
5 Verstehen, a German word for personal understanding, is commonly used in social science to explain human action 
i.e., a researcher ‘putting oneself in the other fellow’s shoes,’ and the validation of explanations (Bourgeois 1976, p. 
27).  
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Worldview 
Element 
Postpositivism Constructivism (or 
Interpretivist) 
Participatory Pragmatism 
researcher and 
that being 
researched?) 
objectively collect 
data on instruments) 
participants as 
collaborators) 
“what works” 
to address 
research 
questions) 
Methodology 
(What is the 
process of 
research?) 
 
Deductive (e.g., 
researchers test an a 
priori theory; 
surveys, observation, 
structured/coded 
interviews) 
Inductive (e.g., 
researchers start with 
participants’ views and 
build “up” patterns, 
theories, and 
generalisations; 
grounded theory, 
discourse analysis, 
content analysis) 
Participatory 
(e.g., researchers 
involve 
participants in all 
stages of the 
research and 
engage in cyclical 
reviews of 
results) 
Combining 
(e.g., 
researchers 
collect both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data 
and mix them) 
Axiology (What 
is the role of 
values?) 
Formal style (e.g., 
researchers use 
agreed-on definitions 
of variables) 
Informal style (e.g., 
researchers write in a 
literary, informal style) 
Advocacy and 
change (e.g., 
researchers use 
language that will 
help bring about 
change and 
advocate for 
participants) 
Formal or 
informal (e.g., 
researchers may 
employ both 
formal and 
informal styles 
of writing) 
Source: Creswell (2007, p. 17), partially adapted from Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 42), Cunliffe (2011). 
From an ontological perspective, the nature of reality is rather subjective and associated with ‘interpretive 
approaches to social constructionism, where multiple realities are experienced, constructed, and interpreted 
in many ways’ (Cunliffe 2011, p. 656). Such an approach enables researchers (i.e., subjectivist researchers) 
to embrace hermeneutic, constructivist, and phenomenological approaches to research, for example, 
focusing on ‘micro-interactions (e.g., executive strategy meetings, work interactions) or macro level 
organisational and societal discourses and their impact (e.g., on organisational identities)’ (Cunliffe 2011, 
p. 656). Taken together, ontology (i.e., subjectivist) and epistemology (i.e., interpretivist) are related in 
commonsense actions and interactions, and from a research methods perspective, semi-structured 
interviews, case studies or grounded theory are commonly used to explore different meanings, perceptions, 
and interpretations of organisational actors (Cunliffe 2011, Scotland 2012). For example, organisational 
strategic decision-making involving the interpretation of complex forms of human (inter)actions i.e., the 
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action means cycles of sensemaking in creating and maintaining institutional project relations, which can 
be analysed at the macro or micro level and broken down into sub-processes. With this worldview, research 
is more of a craft than a scientific endeavour (Cunliffe 2011), which is valuable in interpreting and 
‘reconstructing’ social, political and organisational life: hidden meanings, actions, practices and institutions 
(Allard-Poesi 2005, Hay 2011, Novicevic et al. 2016), where such phenomena underlines this research 
study. 
 
Although with the interpretive paradigm there is no independent reality and knowledge is pragmatic (i.e., 
commonsense), in contrast with postpositivits where reality is seen to exist independently from our 
interactions and knowledge is syntagmatic (i.e., structural) (Cunliffe 2011), it has shortcomings (without 
bowing the research as science i.e., postpositivism) towards procuring the truth. For example, reaching 
consensus can be problematic i.e., validation of findings, therefore, researchers engage in practices of 
prolonged engagement, persistent observation, thick and rich description, negative case study analysis to 
demonstrate trustworthiness (Angen 2000). Other dilemmas are: transferability of knowledge, ethical 
validation, and researchers imposing their own subjective interpretations. However, most of these are 
common misunderstandings (see Flyvbjerg 2006, Rohlfing 2012, Yin 2014), and the trustworthiness or 
legitimacy of a research study is usually taken up by the community of researchers (Mishler 1990).  
4.4 Research Methodology 
This research aims to understand factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making within a 
public sector mega program of projects policy context. This is achieved by interviewing participants, having 
them project their individual consciousness – their own worldview of the phenomenon, and then triangulate 
the findings to discover the closest truth possible or true reality. Additionally, Carroll and Johnson (1990, 
p. 31) state that: 
Decision makers frequently are unable to articulate their underlying decision processes, or are more 
interested in presenting a favourable impression. As a result, we need some ways to check on the 
accuracy and completeness of self-reports. Both self-reports and case study methods represent 
natural or implicit methods because they have every day, commonsensical origins and uses. They 
are typically qualitative, rather than quantitative, in the way data are collected and interpreted.  
Consequently, this research will focus on case study as a methodological approach. The rationale being that 
case study is a commonly used method to study organisational behaviour [such as Machiavellianism which 
underpins much of this research study], which is used to capture contextual richness and complexity (Dyer 
et al. 1991). Furthermore, it can be seen as qualitatively or quantitatively, or even in combinations 
(Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010). Creswell (2013, p. 97) defines case study research as a 
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‘qualitative approach in which the investigator explores real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) 
or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple 
sources of information, and reports a case description and case themes.’ Similarly, Rohlfing (2012, p. 27) 
defines case study as the ‘empirical analysis of a small sample of bounded phenomena that are instances of 
a population of similar phenomena.’ This is advanced by Yin (2014, p. 16) who provides a ‘twofold 
definition of case study. The first part begins with the scope of a case study: 
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world 
context, especially when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. 
The first part of the definition distinguishes case study research from other research methods. The second 
part focuses on the features of a case study: 
2. A case study inquiry 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis.  
A key element in these definitions is the word ‘case,’ which requires further explanation. According to 
Rohlfing (2012, p. 24) a ‘case’ is ‘a bounded empirical phenomenon that is an instance of a population of 
similar empirical phenomena.’ The author further elaborates on two attributes in the definition – ‘bounded 
empirical phenomenon’ and ‘instance of a population of similar phenomena.’ The latter attribute focuses 
on ‘causal homogeneity, which signifies that a cause-effect relationship is, on average, expected to hold 
true for the cases within the population’ (2012, p. 24). While the former attribute focuses on exhaustively 
delineating a certain number of boundaries of a case i.e., a temporal and a substantive bound. Rohfling’s 
analysis positions case studies on the ‘ontological premise that at least some empirical relationships are 
regular, that is invariant or at least systematic, and that one can learn something about these relationships 
via systematic small-n research’ (2012, p. 1). Subsequently, this research adopted Rohlfing (2012) 
integrative framework on case studies and casual inference, which focuses on four dimensions:  
1. Research purpose or goal of a case study focuses on the formulation, test or refinement of a 
hypothesis or proposition. 
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2. Level of analysis is of theoretical interest and focuses on the cross-case level i.e., ‘infer whether a 
given factor has a casual effect and, if it does, of what sort it is,’ and/or within-case level i.e., casual 
mechanisms and processes – or the means-end relationship. 
3. Nature of the casual effect focuses on the question if an effect of a cause on an outcome is 
correlational or set-relational.  
4. The frequentist and Bayesian modes of casual inference are for case studies that specifically test 
hypotheses or propositions, rather than modifying propositions (2012, p. 4).  
The integrative framework can be conceptualised as ‘the empirical analysis of a small sample of bounded 
empirical phenomena that are instances of a population of similar phenomena’ (2012, p. 2, emphasis in 
original). Using Rohlfing’s integrative framework, the aim of this case study is to investigate factors that 
influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects with testing the theorised proposition, which is based on 
problematization6, after empirical analysis (see Eisenhardt 1989b). The plausible and working proposition 
developed and articulated for this study, which guided the research process is: 
Project management, seen as an instrumental technocratic process, is in fact an institutional emergent 
process which leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program 
of projects. 
The level of analysis focuses on the cross-case level and the within-case level, see figure 4-2. As rather 
discussed in and expanding on the previous chapter, the casual effect on the cross-case level is theorised as 
project institutionalisation leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure 
program of projects, which is donated by the dashed arrow. While the mechanisms that produce the within-
case relationship are project institute, institutional-based governance, project reality, and rational agent 
which is donated by the solid arrows. These mechanisms can be seen as entities or actors that engage in 
activities or behaviour to ‘ensure productive continuity between the cause and the outcome and explain 
why the former has an effect on the latter’ (Rohlfing 2012, p. 35). For example, the entity project institute 
engages in project action-based activities of front-end institutional project work, which effects institutional-
based governance and the coevolution of power, trust and control, and so on. Such a process can be referred 
to as a multi-mechanism explanation, which serves to deliver observations that support the proposition 
(Rohlfing 2012). For example, analysis of documents on front-end institutional project work and interviews 
with government and non-government actors. In addition, the nature of the casual effect is set-relational as 
the case is based on an invariant cause-effect relationship, and the research focuses on how project  
                                                 
6 Problematization means to ‘challenge the value of a theory and to explore its weaknesses and problems in relation 
to the phenomena it is supposed to explicate’ (Alvesson and Karreman 2007, p. 1265), which enables the development 
of theory that is interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant, or absurd (Davis 1971).  
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Figure 4-2: Multiple-Mechanism Explanation. Figure partially adapted from Rohlfing (2012, p. 38). 
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institutionalisation, a condition (X) and independent variable, is related to the successful implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of projects, an outcome (Y) and dependant variable, thus, for 
this case study, the condition (or the variation of interest) is sufficient for the outcome (see Rohlfing 2012). 
From the means-end relationship, this can be seen as ‘X is a meansa to an enda Y,’ where ‘enda’ refers to 
actual activities or behaviours of actors, and ‘meansa’ refers to actual activities or behaviours of actors that 
are sufficient conditions for endaY, and X and Y are not intentional objects’ (Lane 1974, p. 26). For example, 
an unique temporary organising actor (X) uses instrumental technocratic processes, meansi, for the 
successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects (Y), but in fact, X uses 
institutional emergent processes, meansa, for Y, regardless of what the intentions of X may have been.  
 
As a chosen case is to stand for or represent a population of cases, another imperative consideration with 
case study research is case selection (Gerring 2007, Rohlfing 2012, Seawright and Gerring 2008). Which 
case(s) should be chosen? Although scholars, when choosing a case, tend to lean towards ‘pragmatic 
considerations such as time, money, expertise, and access, which if chosen must be justified; they do not 
provide a methodological justification for why case A might be preferred over case B’ (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008). According to Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 296), and similarly professed by Rohlfing 
(2012), when choosing a case, researchers should focus on the ‘cross-case characteristics of a case: how 
the case fits into the theoretically specified population.’ In addition, Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 297) 
provide the following seven case selection strategies to assist researchers in identifying useful cases for in-
depth research: 
1. Typical method selects cases (one or more) that exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship. Its 
use is confirmatory; to probe casual mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a given 
theory. The typical case is representative, given the specified relationship.   
2. Diverse method selects cases (two or more) that exemplify diverse values X, Y, or X/Y. Its use is 
exploratory or confirmatory; illuminates the full range of variation of X, Y, or X/Y. It is likely to be 
representative in the minimal sense of representing the full variation of the population. 
3. Extreme method selects cases (one or more) that exemplify extreme or unusual values of X or Y 
relative to some univariate distribution. Its use is exploratory; open-ended probe of X or Y; and 
representativeness is achievable only in comparison with a large sample of cases.  
4. Deviant method selects cases (one or more) that deviate from some cross-case relationship. Its use 
is exploratory or confirmatory; to probe new explanations for Y, to disconfirm a deterministic 
argument, or to confirm an existing explanation (rare). After the case study is conducted, it may be 
corroborated by a cross-case test, which includes a general hypothesis (a new variable) based on 
the case study research. If the case is now an on-lier, it may be considered representative of the 
new relationship. 
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5. Influential method selects cases (one or more) with influential configurations of the independent 
variables. Its use is confirmatory; to double-check cases that influence the results of a cross-case 
analysis. It is typically not representative.  
6. Most similar method selects cases (two or more) that are similar on specified variables other than 
X1 and/or Y. Its use is exploratory if the hypothesis is X- or Y-centered; confirmatory if X/Y-
centered. Most similar cases that are broadly representative of the population will provide the 
strongest basis for generalisation. 
7. Most different method selects cases (two or more) that are different on specified variables other 
than X1 and Y. Its use is exploratory or confirmatory; to (1) eliminate necessary causes (definitively) 
or (2) provide weak evidence of the existence of a causal relationship. Most different cases that are 
broadly representative of the population will provide the strongest basis for generalisation.  
Based on Seawright and Gerring (2008) strategy for case study selection, and considering the research aim, 
type of causal effect, and level of analysis, this research adopts the typical case method. The dimensions or 
variables and boundaries for the case study which represent the population of cases are: 
• ‘Project Institutionalisation’ seen as the strength of relational embeddedness i.e., regulative, 
normative and cognitive frames, and institutional work between and among individuals and their 
institutions (Battilana and D'Aunno 2009, Lawrence et al. 2009, Scott 2014, Thornton et al. 2012) 
aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative 
(Bakker et al. 2016, Burke and Morley 2016, Lundin et al. 2015), engaged in project action-based 
activities of sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson 2014, Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, Weick et 
al. 2010) and strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, including reason-based explanations 
(motivating) and reason-based justifications (normative). Project institutions identified primarily 
with bureaucratic, regulative and cognitive power relations and consequentialist reasonings is 
considered to lead to the unsuccessful implementation of project policies: traditional project 
management school of thought. Whereas, project institutions identified primarily with collective, 
normative and cognitive power relations and deontological reasonings is considered to lead to the 
successful implementation of project policies. This variable is also an institutional boundary 
dimension.  
• ‘Successful,’ successful in the sense of achieving project strategies and benefits, and unsuccessful 
in the sense of failing to achieve project strategies and benefits (Shao et al. 2012). This variable is 
also an element of the substantive boundary dimension.  
• ‘Implementation’ seen as the authorisation of a sponsor to commit resources to a project, which 
takes many years, from the front-end until its execution (Edkins et al. 2013). This variable is also 
a temporal boundary dimension.  
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• ‘Mega public sector infrastructure program of projects’ seen as ‘large-scale, complex infrastructure 
program of projects, or a megaproject, measured in the billions of dollars (or euros, pounds, etc.), 
are transformational, impact millions of people’ (Flyvbjerg 2014, p. 6). This variable is also an 
element of the substantive boundary dimension.  
Subsequently, the case selected for this research, within resource constraints, is the Building the Education 
Revolution (BER) program. The dimensions of the BER program, which will be advanced in the next 
chapter, met the dimensions or variables for a typical case which stands for the population of cases.  
 
As mentioned previously, case study research can be seen qualitatively, quantitatively, or even in 
combinations. From a qualitative approach, research focuses on the meanings and interpretation of social 
phenomena and social processes that cannot be experimentally examined or measured, for example, in 
terms of quantity or frequency (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Moreover, some of the key characteristics of 
qualitative research, as emphasised by Creswell (2013), are the study is conducted in a natural setting, the 
researcher is the key instrument, involves multiple methods of data, involves complex reasoning through 
inductive and deductive logic, focuses on participants meanings, involves an emergent design, is reflective 
and interpretive, and presents a holistic account. Similarly, Creswell (2013) asserts that qualitative research 
is conducted to explore a problem or issue. It is also conducted when a researcher needs a complex and 
detailed understanding of an issue that requires talking directly to people, to identify variables that cannot 
be easily measured, when a researcher wants to understand the contexts or settings of a phenomenon, and 
develop theories when existing theories do not capture the complexity of the problem being examined. In 
contrast, quantitative studies involves the collection of data in numerical form, and analysis of casual 
relationships between variables (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).  
 
Yin (2014) also states that ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are likely to favour a case study approach. This is 
also reinforced by Denzin and Lincoln (2005) statement that qualitative researchers tend to seek answers 
to ‘how’ questions, which creates and gives meaning to a social phenomenon. The qualitative nature of this 
research, being the aim to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making (social 
phenomenon), on the implementation of the BER program including constituent projects of the program 
(the ‘case’), combined with the ‘how’ questions makes it ideal for an explanatory qualitative case study 
research methodology to answer the research questions. According to the Encyclopedia of Case Study 
Research (2010, p. 371) explanatory case studies use both ‘qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
explanatory case studies not only explore and describe phenomena but can also be used to explain causal 
relationships and the develop theory,’ and focus on explaining a complex and single phenomenon. This is 
also professed by Gerring (2005), and reinforced by Yin (2014, p. 238) who states that ‘the purpose of an 
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explanatory case study is to explain how or why some condition came to be.’ Therefore, this case study 
research is seen from an explanatory lens. 
 
Although the case study approach is a distinctive form of research, there are a number of misunderstandings, 
or common concerns, about this research approach, including generalising from case studies, contains bias 
toward verification, and it is often difficult to summarise specific case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006, Rohlfing 
2012, Yin 2014). Generalisation, especially the use of theory to generalise from case studies, will be 
discussed later. The misconception that case study contains bias toward verification is false. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) asserts that it is falsification not verification that characterises case study research, even though bias 
toward verification is general. According to the Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (2010) it is 
impossible to substantiate the claim that theory is universally true, but it is possible to prove theory is false 
by identifying contrary data. Falsification in cases studies can also inform researchers how they may or 
may not use the theory in other situations. Moreover, subjectivism and bias toward verification applies to 
all research methods (Flyvbjerg 2006). The difficulty in summarising case studies are ‘more often due to 
the properties of the reality studies than the case study research method’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 241). More 
often than not, researchers also suggest that good case studies should be read as narratives – approaching 
the complexities and contradictions of real life (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
4.5 Research Method 
As outlined in the research paradigm, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews. Transcripts and 
other documents were then critically analysed using a grounded theory approach, and then a modified 
Delphi technique (like focus group interviews, see Encyclopedia of Research Design 2010, p. 344) for 
validation purposes. In relation to methodological rigour, the researcher adopted the ‘natural science model’ 
(see Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, Gibbert et al. 2008, Piekkari et al. 2009). 
This model includes four rigour dimensions of construct validity, internal validity, external validity (or 
generalizability), and reliability (see Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, Yin 2014). This is further advanced in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
This case study follows a single-case (holistic) design. Gerring (2007), Seawright and Gerring (2008) argue 
that this is appropriate under several circumstances, being, a typical case, a diverse case, an extreme case, 
a deviant case, and influential case. As mentioned previously, this case study is seen as typical i.e., 
representative of a broader set of cases on a cross-case level (Seawright and Gerring 2008), being project 
institutionalisation leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects. This can have significant consequences and benefits for the implementation of future project 
policies. As mentioned in the problem statement, research indicates that the implementation of mega public 
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sector infrastructure project policies continues to fail to achieve most of their strategies and benefits. As a 
result, this causes tremendous loss in productivity and profitability, whilst impacting organisational 
performances and stakeholder morale. In addition, this is particularly valuable to researchers where the 
puzzle of interest lies within a case i.e., within-case mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a 
given theory or theoretical proposition (Seawright and Gerring 2008), as was advanced previously.  
 
Furthermore, an essential element of case study research is the process of preparation to collect evidence. 
Yin (2014) discusses a list of basic set of attributes for case study research, being asking good questions, 
being a good listener, staying adaptive, having a firm grasp of the issues being studied, avoiding bias and 
conducting research ethically. These desired attributes were demanding during the research process. This 
is mainly due to the demands of case study research on intellect, ego and emotions. During interviews, I 
asked relevant and penetrating questions, and as an indicator became mentally and emotionally exhausted 
at the end of each day of doing fieldwork. Being a good listener was also demanding as this required the 
assurance that responses to questions where deep, detailed and contained clarity. I also had to guide 
conversations by asking follow-up questions, if and when required, that pursued the topic of the research. 
This required the ability to read between the lines during conversations and reading documentation. Staying 
adaptive was less demanding as rigour was maintained throughout the research process. Having a firm 
grasp of the issues being studied was more demanding, as the research required a high level of detective 
work. This required making inferences about what had actually transpired, which required a focus on 
convergent evidence from interviews, documentation and common sense. Avoiding bias was less 
demanding, as openness to contrary evidence was maintained throughout the research process. The highest 
level of ethics was obtained and maintained throughout the research process, which was less demanding 
than the other attributes. Obtaining RMIT University ethics approval prior to conducting interviews was a 
key success ingredient to this attribute. A copy of the ethics application and approval letter is presented in 
Appendix F.  
 Selection of Research Candidates 
An important process in developing deep and detailed data for the case study research was the selection of 
candidates that were involved, experienced and knowledgeable, in organisational strategic decision-making 
on the BER program or constituent projects of the program. Initially, a target of 33 candidates were 
approached with 17 candidates deciding to participate in the case study research (52 percent participation 
rate). I also selected key informants that were critical to the case study research. Yin (2014) defines such 
individuals as ‘Docs,’ which are persons who are considered more than an interviewee but as an ‘informant’ 
that can provide insights into a matter and give access to other potential participants who can provide 
corroboratory or contrary evidence. Which may also be referred to as purposive sampling (Patton 2002, 
Stake 2005). I advanced this with snowball sampling, via informants, to locate other research participants, 
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which began with interviewing an initial set of research participants. With the number of candidates, the 
aim is to achieve data saturation and enhance credibility during the data collection, analysis and reporting 
process. Saturation is the point in the data collection process where no new or relevant information emerges, 
which occurs during the construction of new theories (The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research 
Methods 2008).  
 
All candidates have sufficient experience and knowledge in organisational strategic decision-making with 
a BER project or a constituent project of the BER program, with an average of 13 year’s relevant 
professional experience within government on projects and programs. See Appendix D for a summary of 
the experience and knowledge of each participant. They all hold or held senior officer i.e., senior project 
officer or project manager or management positions in their relevant organisations. All the participants are 
known to the researcher. The primary reason that candidates did not participate in the case study research 
was a lack of time, which was conveyed by the candidates. This appears reasonable, as the research requires 
deep and detailed data from some participants of senior positions with limited time to commit to the 
research process. This is also reinforced by Carroll and Johnson (1990) assertion that research on decision-
making requires high level of cooperation and time from decision makers. They further assert that when 
senior management are faced with decision-making research, they tend to use time demands as a convenient 
excuse for not participating. As Carroll and Johnson (1990) assert, I encountered these situations. In these 
circumstances, I minimised participant’s time demands, and made it clear why their investment of time is 
worthwhile. Carroll and Johnson (1990) also assert that sometimes participants can feel threatened by 
decision-making research. The two major reasons (Carroll and Johnson 1990, p. 107) for this are: ‘decision 
makers who are insecure about their performance will be concerned that they are being evaluated and may 
be found wanting; and secondly, the decision rules that decision makers actually use may be very different 
from those that say they use.’ They suggest that evaluating and replacing decision makers, and making 
decision rules explicit as mechanisms to deal with decision makers who feel threatened by research on 
decision-making. With evaluating and replacing decision makers, decision makers should feel that a model 
has the ability to work in partnership with decision makers, and not as a replacement to their decision-
making process. A primary rationale for this is because decision-making processes are complex, dynamic 
and intrinsically uncertain. With making decision rules explicit, decision makers should feel that the criteria 
often used for making decisions, especially strategic decision-making, is controversial, which may not 
reflect the wider set of political constituents.  
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4.6 Collection of Evidence 
 Interview 
The experience and knowledge of each participant was gathered through a semi-structured face-to-face 
interview or telephone interviews. I individually interviewed each participant, or informant, asking eight 
questions about external and internal environmental factors that influence organisational strategic decision-
making to implement a nominated BER project. Interviews lasted between 30-74 minutes in duration with 
most running for about 45 minutes (see Appendix D). Interviews were also recorded when permission was 
granted and notes were taken. To establish interview depth and a strong trustful relationship with 
participants, I initially introduced myself and the topic including the purpose of the research. For example, 
I thanked the participant for agreeing to participate, and then discussed common project management 
experiences. This enabled the participant to feel more relaxed. Some interviewees were initially nervous 
but this subsided after about 10 minutes of interviewing, which enabled the interviewees to ‘open-up’ and 
talk more deeply with detailed data. I began with easy questions that are central to the research prior to 
asking the specific research questions to make interviewees comfortable. This also enabled the research to 
convey emotional understanding by empathising with the interviewees. I then went on to ask the ‘tough’ or 
specific research questions, which also included probing techniques to keep a discussion going, for 
example, clarification on a matter. Towards the end of the interviews, I thanked the participants for their 
time and the ideas that the interviewee shared. Additionally, I gave the participants an opportunity to 
continue the discussion, including adding any other insightful data, by sending the participants a copy of 
the transcribed interview. For example, I asked the following question: ‘Would you like me to send you a 
copy of the transcribed interview, so you can see if I got it straight or if there is anything you would like to 
add?’ The participants were also happy to have me continue the interview, if needed, at another convenient 
time. After finishing with a formal closing, the participant and I continued with more casual chatting – this 
also enabled the participant to add more information indirectly.  
 
Telephone interviews were also conducted with three participants. This was not the preferred way to 
conduct initial, deep and detailed interviews, but it made sense as some participants were located in different 
states. Additionally, the research lacked the necessary resources to travel long distances for face-to-face 
interviews. However, telephone interviews were useful for follow-up questions, and when a participant’s 
time was limited to achieve deep and detail information. In the situation where time was limited, I organised 
a convenient time to finalise the interview with the participant. A noticeable problem with telephone 
interviews is the difficulty to sense or see visual expressions of the participants, which could have 
potentially enabled deeper and more detailed information.  
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
112 
 Modified Delphi Technique 
Similar to focus group methodologies (Morgan 1996), the Delphi technique was developed by the Rand 
Corporation in the 1950s to improve the use of expert opinion for policymaking following the Second 
World War (Demi 2012, Linstone and Turoff 2002, Loo 2002). Investigators of the Rand Corporation found 
that results of a Delphi survey produced better predications than roundtable discussions (Demi 2012). 
Basically, it is a consensus method used to enhance effective decision-making through a series of structured 
questionnaires (Hasson et al. 2000). Although predominately used in the nursing and health related fields 
(see Hasson et al. 2000, Keeney et al. 2011), the Delphi is a flexible research approach with many possible 
modifications (Skulmoski et al. 2007, Vernon 2009), for example, validate research outcomes (Bloor et al. 
2015, Hartman and Baldwin 1995), organisational decision-making for program policy implementation 
(Loo 2002) and project management as a quantitative and qualitative technique (MacDonald et al. 2012). 
According to Loo (2002, p. 763), the Delphi technique has five major characteristics: 
1. The sample consists of a ‘panel’ of carefully selected experts representing a broad spectrum of 
opinion on the topic or issue being examined. 
2. Participants are usually anonymous. 
3. The ‘moderator’ (i.e., researcher) constructs a series of structured questionnaires and feedback 
reports for the panel over the course of the Delphi. 
4. It is an iterative process often involving three to four iteration or ‘rounds’ of questionnaires and 
feedback reports. 
5. There is an output typically in form of a research report with the Delphi results, the forecasts, policy 
and program options with their strengths and weaknesses, recommendations to senior management 
and, possibly, action plans for developing and implementing the policies and programs. 
Some of the advantages of the Delphi compared to other group decision-making methods is that it is 
individual based, anonymous, and independent thus panel members are not swayed by group pressures; 
interpersonal conflicts and communication problems are practically nonexistent; travel to a central location 
is not required thus avoiding travel costs and coordination problems; and, the use of successive rounds 
enables the moderator to build upon earlier rounds and maintain focus (Loo 2002). However, as with all 
applied research, particular attention must be paid to the application of the Delphi technique including 
establishing rigour (Hasson and Keeney 2011) and achieving consensus (Von der Gracht 2012). According 
to a number of scholars (Hasson and Keeney 2011, Hasson et al. 2000, Skulmoski et al. 2007), the main 
processes to be taken when using the Delphi are: (1) problem definition; (2) panel selection; (3) determining 
the panel size; and (4) conducting the Delphi rounds. 
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With the first process, the problem definition, the researcher determines the use of the Delphi, for example, 
to explore assumptions leading to differing judgements or to seek out information that may generate a 
consensus on the part of a respondent group. The main purpose of using the Delphi for this research project 
is to generate a consensus on the validity of the findings (i.e., validation purposes), in effect, it becomes a 
variant of ‘methodological triangulation’ (Bloor et al. 2015). Thus it can be seen as a modified Delphi 
technique, as it departs from the traditional Delphi (Maijala et al. 2015). With a modified Delphi, the aim 
varies according to the project design (e.g., predict future events, achieve consensus), which may employ 
fewer than three rounds (McKenna 1994). Other factors that may also vary include the provision of 
feedback, expertise selection, composition and size (Hasson and Keeney 2011). For this research, 
participants were invited to complete on online survey, subsequent the interviews and data analysis.  
 
With the panel selection process, this requires a group of subject-matter experts (SMEs), which can either 
involve random or purposive sampling. Purposive sampling i.e., participants handpicked by the researcher 
as opposed to random sampling was adopted for this research. This was appropriate due to the researcher’s 
knowledge about the population based on predetermined criteria i.e., knowledge and experience with the 
issue under investigation, capacity and willingness to participate, sufficient time to participate, effective 
communication skills (Adler and Ziglio 1996, Patton 2002), and policy influence (Baker et al. 2006). 
Although there are no prescribed rules on a sample size, Skulmoski et al. (2007) suggest that a number of 
factors should be considered. These include: taking into account if the sample is heterogeneous or 
homogeneous, decision quality/Delphi manageability tradeoff (i.e., reduction in group error or an increase 
in decision quality as the sample size increases), and the internal and external verification (i.e., the way the 
Delphi technique is used for verification purposes). Furthermore, a heterogeneous population for a Delphi 
study could be between 15-30 experts and as few as five to ten for a homogeneous population (Loo 2002). 
Although conducting the number of rounds is variable and dependent upon the purpose of the research 
(Skulmoski et al. 2007), in line with the technique’s fundamental rationale, achieving consensus 
measurement, including group stability and rigour, are key components of the Delphi technique (Von der 
Gracht 2012). These processes will be further explained i.e., aligned with the specifics of the research study, 
in Chapter Seven on the validation of the research findings. 
4.7 Case Organisations 
This research was based on face-to-face and telephone semi-structured interviews with 17 participants from 
four organisations that were involved with organisational strategic decision-making in a BER project or a 
constituent project of the BER program. As stated hereinbefore, this was followed by a modified Delphi 
technique, where six SMEs completed a questionnaire on seven propositions that emerged and were 
articulated from the research findings for validation purposes. Organisations are designed with an 
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alphabetical code (e.g., Infra-GA, Infra-GB, etc.) known to the participants and researcher to protect the 
identity of the organisation, and participants were identified by a number (e.g., Participant-1A, Participant-
2B, etc.) as described in Chapter Five. Participation by individuals was voluntary. Most individuals 
participated in the research and answered every question to provide valuable information on the 
phenomenon under investigation.  
4.8 Research Instruments 
Collecting case study evidence can come from many sources including documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin 2014). A critical aspect 
in conducting case study research is access to information, including the researcher’s network of friends 
and associates for gaining entry and conducting the research. This is reinforced by Carroll and Johnson 
(1990, p. 43) statement that with case study research, the ability to ‘obtain “insider” information depends 
on the quality of the relationship between the researcher and respondents.’ I was fortunate to have worked 
on the BER program and a constituent project of the BER program with state government agencies. This 
enabled me to develop strong relations with a network of friends, and thus, an easier path of entry to conduct 
the research. The research instruments used in this research included the following: 
Documentation 
This provided a valuable source of data for case study research, especially the detailed review, interpretation 
and analysis of written artifacts, for example, letters, memoranda, e-mails, agendas, briefs, formal reports, 
and my field notes or research journal. The documents examined are either public records, semi-public 
records, or private records. Public records included anything that is readily available to the public, for 
example, government reports. There are also documents that are not completely public, which required 
creativity, for example, available under the relevant freedom of information legislation. I also distinguished 
between primary and secondary documents. Primary documents tend to be those ‘created by individuals 
closest to the phenomenon under study, and secondary documents those created by those not directly 
involved and perhaps at a later date’ (Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010, p. 319).  
Archival records  
This is an invaluable source of information as it focuses on the past and impacts the present. When used 
systematically with other forms of case study evidence, it can assist researchers understand organisational 
decision-making behaviour and processes. Archival records included written documents and internet based 
materials that usually have been catalogued and preserved, which allows for exploratory work. However, 
governments and certain organisations generally do not grant public access to their documents, and often 
keep certain documents archived and hidden from public. A usual way to gain access to archival records, 
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which are not readily available to the public, is a request under the relevant freedom of information 
legislation. However, this still does not guarantee access will be granted to the researcher.  
Semi-structured interviews  
This is a strategy in which I asked participants, especially key informants, a series of predetermined open-
ended questions. I also develop a prewritten interview guide. This included carefully worded questions and 
a list of specific topics, where I moved back and forth based on the participant’s responses. The topics of 
the interview guide are ‘based on the research question and the tentative conceptual framework of the 
phenomenon that underlies the research’ (Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010, p. 810). Semi-
structured interviews are also useful where there is a good understanding of the theoretical concepts and 
relationships among them.  
Modified Delphi technique  
Similar to focus group methodologies, a modified Delphi technique was used to obtain the most reliable 
consensus of opinion from a group of subject-matter experts (SMEs) by a series of questionnaires. These 
were based on propositions that emerged from the research findings, including the provision for written 
feedback, interspersed with controlled feedback for validation purposes (i.e., corroborate certain research 
findings that may have already been established).  
Physical artifacts 
This methodology used physical or cultural artefacts that were collected or observed as part of a case study. 
For example, agreements, policies, procedures or similar discourses that were used as ‘artifacts’ during 
project implementation – a tangible document ‘in-practice’ that guided organisational strategic 
(sense)making. Yin (2014) summaries the strengths and weaknesses of the four sources of evidence as 
depicted in table 4-3. 
Table 4-3: Strengths and Weaknesses of Evidence Sources 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly 
Unobtrusive – not created as a result 
of the case study 
Specific – can contain exact names, 
references, and details of an event 
Broad – can cover a long span of 
time, many events 
Retrievability – can be difficult to find 
Biased selectivity 
Reporting bias 
Access – may be deliberately withheld 
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Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Archival records [Same as those for documentation] 
Precise and usually quantitative 
[Same as those for documentation] 
Accessibility due to privacy reasons 
Interviews Targeted – focuses directly on case 
study topics 
Insightful – provides explanations as 
well as personal views 
Bias due to poorly articulated questions 
Responses bias 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
Reflexivity – interviewee gives what 
interviewer wants to hear 
Direct or participant 
observations 
Immediacy – covers actions in real 
time 
Contextual – can cover the case’s 
context 
Insightful into interpersonal behaviour 
and motives 
Time-consuming 
Selectivity – broad coverage difficult 
without a team of observers 
Reflexivity – actions may proceed 
differently because they are being 
observed 
Cost – hours needed by human observers 
Bias due to participant-observer’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical artifacts Insightful into cultural features 
Insightful into technical operations 
Selectivity 
Availability 
Source: Yin (2014, p. 106). 
However, there are challenges with individual interviews with participants, or with self-reports. The main 
objective of researching organisational strategic decision-making is to produce useful information. This 
requires the information to be relevant, sufficiently detailed, reliable and valid. According to Carroll and 
Johnson (1990, p. 33) some threats to the usefulness of participant’s responses to the interview questions 
on decision-making are: 
• In the process of remembering what they did in any specific instance, they may have forgotten parts 
of the decision. 
• They may be reconstructing the decision process by using what they usually do or what they are 
supposed to do, rather than reporting what they actually did. 
• They may be rationalising by creating a logical story or saying what they think the audience wants 
to hear, instead of the truth.  
Carroll and Johnson (1990) discuss these challenges in more detail. With remembering, individuals often 
have difficulty retrieving memories, especially accurately, over time as it fades, and are unwilling to exert 
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the necessary effort to recall memories of the decision-making process. With reconstructing, individuals 
tend to reconstruct their memories from fragments, images and general knowledge, when they cannot recall 
accurate details of an event – thus they are reconstructing judgements and not reporting the actual decision-
making process. With rationalising, individuals do not always tell the truth, which is partly the result of an 
accurate recall of the problem rather than deliberate misrepresentation. Carroll and Johnson (1990) suggest 
that informal self-reports, such as case studies, are highly plausible methods to obtain accurate details of 
the decision-making process. They further suggest that for self-reports to be valid it should be as close to 
the phenomena as possible, the phenomena should establish a strong memory as being important, and for 
the questions to be asked in an order that facilitates accurate recall. This requires the interviewer to 
reconstruct the phenomena so as to aid recall from participants, as described in section 4.6.1 Interview, and 
use multiple sources of information (and detective work), such as the triangulation of data. 
4.9 Triangulation of Data 
Triangulation is an attempt to fix an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon (Stake 2005). Triangulation 
has generally been considered in the research literature as a process of using multiple perceptions to fix, 
position and confine a position of knowledge between two points, which is able to be verified by repeating 
an observation or interpretation (Stake 2005). However, in social research, triangulation is used in a less 
literal sense. Stake (2005, p. 454) assert that ‘by acknowledging no observations or interpretations are 
perfectly repeatable, triangulation serves also to clarify a meaning by identifying different ways the case is 
being seen.’ This implies that triangulation helps to identify different realities, and thus reduce bias and 
improve convergence. Yin (2014) distinguishes four types of triangulation that enables converging lines of 
inquiry:  
1. data triangulation, whereby data are collected from different sources 
2. investigator triangulation, whereby different researchers independently collect data and compare 
results 
3. theory triangulation, whereby different theories are used to interpret the same data set 
4. methodological triangulation, whereby multiple methods of data collection are used 
There are also various sub-types of triangulation that researchers may use, for example, various 
combinations of qualitative and quantitative research designs (Creswell 2014), such as a modified Delphi 
technique (Bloor et al. 2015). However, Yin (2014) pertains to data triangulation as a preferred approach 
to strengthen the construct validity of case study research as it encourages the collection of multiple sources 
of information aimed at corroboration of the findings. Despite such a position, Cox and Hassard (2005) 
argue that it is also important to recognise that the emphasis on stabilisation and capture derives from 
positivism, where knowledge is hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form. They further 
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assert that ‘convergent findings can allow greater research confidence in the reliability and/or validity of 
results, whereas divergence can lead to greater definition and theoretical elaboration as the researcher 
attempts to piece together many pieces of a complex puzzle into a coherent whole’ (Cox and Hassard 2005, 
p. 112). Although these positivist assumptions have been subject to continuous debate, especially in 
organisational studies, it is important to consider postpositivism assumptions, which assumes that ‘reality’ 
is only ‘imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable’ (Cox and Hassard 2005). These assumptions have 
important implications for triangulation. Under a positivist assumption, Cox and Hassard (2005) assert that 
research can converge on the ‘true’ state of affairs, and under postpositivism, emphasis is placed on 
falsifying rather than verifying, being that theory can never be logically proved to be an accurate or ‘true’ 
view of what it explains. Furthermore, Richardson and Pierre (2005, p. 963) argue that researchers have 
moved from plane geometry or triangulation to light theory and crystallisation: 
For postmodernist texts is not the triangle-a rigid, fixed, two-dimensional object. Rather, the central 
imaginary is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, 
substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approaches. Crystals grow, change 
and are altered, but they are not amorphous…. What we see depends on our angle of response. 
However, Cox and Hassard (2005) do not dismiss or reject triangulation to obtain a ‘true’ picture of 
phenomena, but present a different way to consider triangulation. The first of these strategies is to follow 
nomothetic lines and search for convergent patterns based on theoretical proposition(s). For example, based 
on testing a series of hypotheses, or proposition(s), developed from the literature review, qualitative data 
can then be analysed for recurrent patterns across different sources of information. The second strategy is 
to take an ideographic overview of content generated from research participants. For example, to stand back 
from the data and look for patterns and typifications not from nomothetic, but from a multidimensional 
scaling or using qualitative techniques from a content analysis of metaphors used by participants. Finally, 
the third strategy is to find an angle where the researcher not only enters the picture by chooses to adopt a 
partial view. They further argue that a shift is needed from the ‘triangulation of distance’ tradition to a more 
reflexive consideration of ‘researcher distance,’ where the focus is on the metaphorical space within the 
triangle and the micro-practices involved in making true, thus encouraging less dualistic thinking and 
innovative ways of thinking. As previously mentioned in section 4.3 Research Paradigm, this research will 
adopt an interpretivist worldview with an ontological stance, and rethink the lines and angles of enquiry, to 
adopt a more reflexive consideration of the researcher stance, as depicted in figure 4-3. By adopting this 
research stance, I can strengthen the construct validity of the case study. 
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Figure 4-3: The Sources of Evidence for this Research 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed description of this study’s methodology and research design. Firstly, it 
discussed the overall benefit of a PhD as a vehicle for research. One of the important contextual features 
was me as a researcher. Subsequently, this required some explanation of my experience and background 
which provided valuable and unique insights into the study. Following, the worldview of the researcher 
was established being interpretivist worldview with an ontological stance. As this research aims to 
understand the true reality i.e., factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making within a 
public sector mega program of projects context, and explores ‘how’ questions, the case study as a 
methodological approach was considered most appropriate. This is able to create and give meaning to a 
social phenomenon (Yin 2014), which is applicable to the phenomenon under investigation in this study. 
The research method was then discussed including the conduct of semi-structured interviews, analysis of 
transcripts and other documents using a grounded theory approach, and a modified Delphi technique for 
validation purposes. Methodological rigour was also discussed including the ‘natural science model’ as a 
validation approach. Following, the participant sample was made up of 17 purposefully selected 
individuals. The collection of evidence was then employed including interviews, documentation, archival 
records and physical artifacts. Finally, the triangulation of data was discussed as a process to fix an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon and strengthen the construct validity of the case study research.  
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THE CASE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
The methodology and research design discussed the research context, paradigm, methodology and the 
case study approach in conducting this research.  
What this chapter does: 
Discusses and describes the case study and organisations selected as case studies. This includes the 
background of the Building the Education Revolution (BER) program, agencies and actors, and their 
relationships in implementing the BER program.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Six will provide the data analysis and interpretation of the case study.  
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable project 
managers to implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to eradicate 
potential ‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process. It is therefore essential to have a good understanding 
of the public-sector project policy environment in which the organisations operate. Further as discussed in 
Chapter Three, the decision-making process is a critical factor within an organisational context. This 
chapter starts by describing the Building the Education Revolution (BER) program and a constituent project 
under the program. The rationale for choosing the BER program is because it met the dimensions or 
variables for a typical case which stands for the population of cases. Such as implementation complexity, 
particularly intangible complexity. Organisational stakeholders, from the Prime Minister, Premiers and 
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Chief Ministers to education authorities made a rapid decision to implement the program in a complex, and 
almost chaotic, environment. This included the consideration of internal and external factors on the 
decision-making process that was intertwined between different agency and actor (inter)actions. 
Governments had to work in a partnership, otherwise, Australia would have potentially fallen into a 
recession. Furthermore, the program is bound in controversy, including policy and legislative failure, 
factional interests, value for money outcomes, manipulation, bureaucracy, cost and time overruns with 
demoralising effects (Lewis et al. 2014). Such phenomena can be seen as Machiavellianism (Howard 2005, 
Jones 2010, McConnell 2010). The chapter then goes on to describe the organisations that were selected as 
organisational case studies. It provides a general background of each organisation including its program 
implementation plan (if applicable), roles and responsibilities. This information forms the platform for data 
analysis and interpretation in the next chapter.  
5.2 Building the Education Revolution (BER) Program 
The global financial crisis in 2008 led the Australian government to deploy a number of stimulus measures 
including the Building the Education Revolution (BER) – Primary Schools for the 21st Century program 
(around 24,000 infrastructure projects for about 9,500 schools). The global financial crisis caused severe 
loss of consumer and business confidence around the world. According to the Australian National Audit 
Office (2010, p. 36) the International Monetary Fund summarised the situation as follows: 
The world economy is entering a major downturn in the face of the most dangerous financial shock 
in mature financial markets since the 1930s. 
The Australian economy was widely expected to fall into recession. In response to the global financial 
crisis, many governments around the world used fiscal measures to support employment and economic 
recovery. The Australian Government used a number of fiscal stimulus measures to improve the adverse 
effects on the global financial crisis on the Australian economy including the Economic Security Strategy; 
Council of Australian Governments Funding Packages; Nation Building Package; Nation Building and Jobs 
Plan; Nation Building Infrastructure Measures; and Jobs, Training and Youth Transitions Package 
(Australian National Audit Office 2010). The packages were aimed at delivering a broad range of short, 
medium and long-term stimulatory measures, including investment in schools. The Nation Building and 
Jobs Plan, hereinafter called the plan, was the single largest stimulus package announced by the 
Government at AUD $42 billion. According to the Australian National Audit Office (2010, p. 36) in 
announcing the plan, the then Prime Minister outlined the importance of a rapid response to the global 
financial crisis to what he described as ‘an unfolding international and national economic emergency: 
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For nation building to work, it’s got to be translated into real projects on the ground and translated 
onto the ground quick smart. Therefore, what we’ve done today is agree on a timetable for 
implementation for what will be the single biggest school modernisation program of the 
Commonwealth in the nation’s history… In my original discussion with the Premiers and Chief 
Ministers at the beginning of the meeting today, I said that we were in uncharted, unprecedented 
times … It won’t be just business as usual for our bureaucracies. We are in a national economic 
emergency and we’re going to have to all roll our sleeves up and take a direct, personal, and rolling 
interest in the implementation of this … I want to see our schools right across the country become 
new centres of economic activity as we all deal with the challenge which the global economy has 
presented our nations with.’ 
The main aims of the plan were to stimulate the economy by supporting employment and growth, and foster 
a more resilient Australia with the BER program being the largest component of the plan (Council of 
Australian Governments 2009b). According to the Australian National Audit Office (2010, p. 39) the 
Commonwealth Government decided on school-based infrastructure spending because it had a number of 
elements that supported stimulus objectives, including: 
• It has the advantage of providing stimulus to almost every population area of the country, as the 
economic slowdown was expected to be geographically widespread. 
• School land is available immediately without the need for planning approval, hence no planning 
delays were envisaged. 
• School infrastructure projects have low import content, which raises domestic stimulatory effect.  
The Commonwealth Government committed funding of AUD $14.7 billion over about three years to 
provide new educational facilities and refurbishments in Australia to meet the needs of 21st century students 
and teachers through the program. According to the Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 2) 
program guidelines, the three elements of the program were: 
1. Primary schools for the 21st century – AUD $12.4 billion for all Australian primary schools, K-12 
schools (primary school component) and special schools to build new iconic facilities such as 
libraries, multipurpose halls or classrooms, or to upgrade existing facilities. 
2. Sciences and language centres for 21st century secondary schools – AUD $1 billion for the 
construction of new science laboratories or language learning centres. 
3. National school pride program – AUD $1.288 billion for all schools in Australia, government and 
non-government, for funding for minor capital works and maintenance projects. 
The Guidelines also state that the main objectives of the program were to: 
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1. Provide economic stimulus through the rapid construction and refurbishment of school 
infrastructure. 
2. Build learning environments to help children, families and communities participate in activities 
that will support achievement, develop learning potential and bring communities together.  
Furthermore, the purpose of the program guidelines was to assist states, territories and block grant 
authorities and schools (being non-government schools) to submit project proposals for funding under, and 
arrangements for the administration and delivery of, the program. The program was delivered through 
cooperation among federal, state and territory governments and the non-government education sector. The 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), hereinafter called the program 
owner (PO), a Commonwealth Government agency, was responsible for program implementation and dealt 
directly with 22 state and territory education authorities, hereinafter called the education authorities or 
program owner representative (POR), across Australia but not with individual schools. The education 
authorities were responsible for working with schools and school communities to develop and submit 
project proposals to the PO, manage and report on funded construction and refurbishment projects.  
 Funding 
According to the Building the Education Revolution (2009a) funding allocations to each state, territory and 
block grant authority was calculated on the basis of enrolment numbers as of February 2009 census data 
collected by the Commonwealth Government, as outlined in table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Indicative Project Funding Allocations Per School 
School Size (Full-Time Equivalents) Indicative Project Funding Caps 
0 to 50 $250,000 
51 to 150 $850,000 
151 to 300 $2,000,000 
301 to 400 $2,500,000 
401+ $3,000,000 
Source: Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 5). 
For funding eligibility, all Australian primary schools were eligible as prescribed under the Schools 
Assistance Act 2008 (the Act), non-government schools must be a block grant authority and be in receipt 
of General Recurrent Grant Funding as prescribed under the Act. In addition, each school must agree to the 
starting and completion dates for building as prescribed for each funding round of the Primary Schools for 
the 21st Century element of the program, further discussed below. School closures, amalgamations, new 
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
124 
schools, and schools with multiple campuses were also considered for funding allocations. Some of the 
conditions for funding included: 
• That schools with multiple campuses will be treated as a single school. 
• Each school must maintain its current and planned investment in capital for the next four years in 
addition to its program funding. 
• Design templates or configurations must be used by education authorities wherever possible. 
• New buildings and refurbishments should incorporate sustainable building principles wherever 
possible. 
• Schools must agree to provide access at no cost, or low cost, to the community its libraries and 
multipurpose halls. 
• Project costs may include the demolition of buildings.  
In addition, the Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 7) states that funding, on a priority basis, will 
be as follows: 
1. Construction of new libraries. 
2. Construction of new multipurpose halls or, in the case of smaller schools, covered outdoor learning 
areas. 
3. Construction of classrooms, replacement of demountables or other buildings to be approved by the 
Commonwealth. 
4. Refurbishment of existing facilities. 
If a school applies for funding that is not the first funding priority, then it must provide a reasonable 
explanation for why it is not seeking funding for that priority.  
 
The Commonwealth Government was also responsible for the allocation of funds for the Primary Schools 
for the 21st Century. Funding to the education authorities was arranged across three funding rounds with 20 
percent of eligible schools to apply for funding in round one, 40 percent of eligible schools to apply for 
funding in round two, and 40 percent of eligible schools to apply for funding in round three, as depicted in 
table 5-2. Under round one, construction must commence no later than June 2009, no later than July 2009 
for round two, and no later than September for round three. Also, all projects must be completed no later 
than March 2011. Milestone payments were 25 percent on commencement; 25 percent on milestone one; 
25 percent on milestone two; and 25 percent on completion. For projects less than $0.85 million, payments 
were 50 percent on commencement and 50 percent on completion.  
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Furthermore, as depicted in table 5-2, there were established timeframes for the commencement and 
completion of the BER Primary Schools for the 21st Century projects. Particularly, smaller schools were to 
complete projects within seven months and projects undertaken by larger schools were to be completed 
within 18 months.  
Table 5-2: Project Funding for BER Primary Schools for the 21st Century 
Source: Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 4). 
With the BER Sciences and Language Centres for 21st century secondary schools, education authorities 
were to submit project proposals to the PO by May 2009, and demonstrate their readiness and capacity to 
build facilities by 30 June 2010, as depicted in table 5-3. Treasury allocated AUD $1 billion in funds for 
around 500 buildings with similar Primary Schools for the 21st Century element funding conditions being 
applied. 
 
Round One: 20 per cent of Eligible Schools 
Month/Year Action 
February-March 2009 Education authorities assess proposals 
By 10 April 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
May-June 2009 Commencement of projects 
20 December 2010 Projects completed 
Round Two: 40 per cent of Eligible Schools 
Month/Year Action 
April 2009 Education authorities assess proposals 
By 15 May 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
June-July 2009 Commencement of projects 
31 January 2011 Projects completed 
Round Three: 40 per cent of Eligible Schools 
Month/Year Action 
June 2009 Education authorities assess proposals 
By 10 July 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
August-September 2009 Commencement of projects 
31 March 2011 Projects completed 
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With the National School Pride program, funding was provided across two funding rounds with 60 percent 
of eligible schools to have access to funding in 2008-09 (round one), and 40 percent of eligible schools to 
have access to funding in 2009-10 (round two), as depicted in table 5-4. Treasury allocated 60 percent of 
school funding for the 2008-09 financial year, and the remainder based on two milestone payments: 50 
percent upon commencement and the remaining 50 percent payable upon completion. Similar Primary 
Schools for the 21st Century element funding conditions were applied.  
Table 5-3: Project Funding for BER Science and Language Centres for the 21st Century 
Source: Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 8). 
According to the Building the Education Revolution (2009a) the main objective for the strict timeframes 
was to ensure that the program had the greatest impact on job support, therefore it was critical that 
construction commenced rapidly. The Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 3) also states that 
‘projects which are unable to demonstrate their ability to be completed within the specified timeframe will 
not be funded.’  
Table 5-4: Project Funding for BER National School Pride Program for the 21st Century 
Round One: 60 per cent of Eligible Schools 
Month/Year Action 
February-March 2009 Education authorities assess proposals 
24 March 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
April-May 2009 Commencement of projects 
20 December 2010 Projects completed 
Round Two: 40 per cent of Eligible Schools 
Month/Year Action 
March-April 2009 Education authorities assess proposals 
Month/Year Action 
March-May 2009 Education authorities assess proposals and create 
short-list of projects 
By 31 May 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
July 2009 Commencement of projects 
30 June 2010 Projects completed 
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Month/Year Action 
8 May 2009 Education authorities submit project lists to 
Commonwealth for approval 
July 2009 Commencement of projects 
31 February 2010 Projects completed 
Source: Building the Education Revolution (2009a, p. 10). 
 The National Partnership Agreement 
The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Premier of every State and Territory, 
hereinafter called the states, signed the National Partnership Agreement on the Nation Building and Jobs 
Plan: Building Prosperity for the Future and Supporting Jobs Now, hereinafter called the national 
partnership agreement, to facilitate coordination, monitoring and delivery of timely economic stimulus 
through building prosperity for the future and supporting jobs now (Council of Australian Governments 
2009b). The national partnership agreement involved: 
a) Support for implementation and monitoring of the nominated commitments through new National 
Coordination arrangements, reporting to the Council of Australia Governments (COAG). 
b) A process overseen by Heads of Treasury and reporting to COAG through the Ministerial Council 
for Federal Financial Relations to ensure the maximum additional benefit is derived from new 
infrastructure and stimulus measures. 
c) The commitment by all jurisdiction, within a best value approach, to give priority in contracting 
and tendering arrangements to businesses that have a demonstrated commitment to adding or 
retaining trainees and apprentices. 
d) Facilitation payments by the Commonwealth for Social Housing and Building the Education 
Revolution. 
All parties executed the national partnership agreement on the same day, being 5 February 2009, which 
recognised that the Commonwealth and the states had mutual interest in the timely delivery of additional 
economic stimulus to address the current global financial crisis. The expiration date of the national 
partnership agreement was 31 December 2012, or earlier by agreement. In addition to boosting demand and 
supporting employment over two years, and adding to the productive capacity of the economy in the longer 
term (outcomes), the parties agreed with the following outputs: 
a) Governance arrangements for overseeing, monitoring and implementing the nominated 
commitments through National Coordination arrangements, and Heads of Treasuries arrangements 
for reporting expenditure. 
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b) Around 20,000 new housing units and repairs and maintenance to around 2,500 existing public 
housing dwellings, providing stimulus to the building and construction industry, and growth the 
not-for-profit sector. 
c) New, upgrading, and refurbishment of education facilities. 
d) Additional Black Spot safety projects; additional regional road maintenance; and other similar 
road projects. 
e) Other commitments agreed by the parties. 
 Roles and Responsibilities 
To realise the objectives and commitments of the national partnership agreement, the role of the 
Commonwealth was to provide financial contributions to the states. The role of the states was to implement 
the national partnership agreement, maintain expenditure and provide financial contributions as identified 
within the respective bilateral agreements or implementation plans. Furthermore, the Commonwealth 
agreed to work in partnership with the states, including:  
• Establishing monitoring mechanisms to facilitate problem solving for swift implementation of the 
stimulus package. 
• Participate in consultations. 
• Plan and implement implementation plans. 
• Reach prior agreement on the nature of any events or other publicity relating to activity under the 
agreement. 
• Identify and share best practice (i.e., knowledge sharing) across all parties to the national 
partnership agreement. 
• Provide sufficient data to enable effective planning and a thorough evaluation of outcomes.  
In relation to responsibilities, the then Prime Minister of Australia was delegated responsibility for the 
coordination mechanism (i.e., oversight of the delivery of significant infrastructure and stimulus 
commitments). The then Treasurer was delegated responsibility for the monitoring mechanism (i.e., 
coordination and monitoring principles for additional funding to the states). The then Minister for 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations was delegated responsibility for the approved bilateral 
agreements or other implementation plans (i.e., the Building the Education Revolution program). Within 
the states, Premiers and Chief Ministers had the same responsibilities as the Prime Minister. State treasurers 
had the same responsibilities as the Treasurer, and ministers for the state education portfolio had the same 
responsibilities as the Minister for Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. See figure 5-1 for 
responsibilities under the BER program. 
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Figure 5-1: Responsibilities under the BER Program. Figure by the Australian National Audit Office 
(2010, p. 55). 
 Performance Benchmarks and Indicators 
The Commonwealth and the states agreed to follow coordination and implementation arrangements i.e., 
oversight and monitoring, for example, project slippage, cost overruns and project delivery that may impact 
key infrastructure and stimulus measures. Report on expenditure and output benchmarks i.e., states to report 
every three months and sanctions for non-compliance, for example, making assessment public, return 
shortfall in expenditure or halt further funding. Lastly, meet key milestones as set out in bilateral agreements 
or implementation plans for the program i.e., construction of major and minor infrastructure in schools 
within the prescribed funding and timeframes, creation of jobs through the construction, refurbishment of 
minor and major infrastructure, complete projects on time and within allocated funds. 
 Governance 
Considering the unprecedented complexity and the web of interconnected relations needed to implement 
and achieve the objectives of the plan, COAG, the PO and the PORs implemented robust governance 
arrangements (see figure 5-2). 
 
According to Building the Education Revolution (2009b) the role of the coordinators-general, appointed 
by the Commonwealth and by each state, is to undertake an analysis of economic indicators relating to the 
impact of the plan in stimulating the economy by supporting employment and growth. They will meet 
fortnightly to support and monitor implementation of the key infrastructure and stimulus measures across 
all elements of the plan, and then report to Council of Australian Governments quarterly on implementation 
of the plan. Coordinators of each state and territory will ensure co-ordinated project management and 
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delivery of that element. The Heads of Treasuries’ and Ministerial Council for Federal Financial Relations 
responsibilities are expanded to include monitoring state expenditure in all areas of the plan. This is critical 
to ensure that the plan provided additional stimulus to the economy. 
 
With the BER governance arrangements, the BER National Coordinator, eight state and territory and 14 
BGA Coordinators represented the BER Coordinators Group (the group). The group met frequently to 
report on the progress, share ideas and experiences, and resolved issues and logistics. Each state and 
territory Coordinator also reported to the Coordinator-General in their jurisdiction for monitoring purposes. 
The National Coordinator is a Group Manager within the Commonwealth, responsible for strategic policy 
Figure 5-2: The Nation Building and Jobs Plan Governance Arrangements. Figure from the Building 
the Education Revolution (2009b, p. 2). 
decisions, issue resolution, strategic risk management, stakeholder management and quality control. The 
National Coordinator also reported to the Deputy Secretary of the Schools Cluster and to the Minister for 
Education, and communicated with the Commonwealth internal audit committee and implementation 
subcommittee, convened the BER Coordinators Group and provided briefings to the Commonwealth 
Coordinator-General’s Office. The relationship between the Commonwealth, the education authorities, and 
the schools for the program implementation is depicted in figure 5-3. As mentioned previously, the 
Commonwealth was responsible for managing the program at a national level, and the education authorities 
were responsible for delivery of the BER projects in schools i.e., state level. This included liaising with 
schools and school communities about BER projects and oversee delivery of BER funding and projects.  
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 Program Management 
The program was delivered in line with the Australian National Audit Office’s best practice program 
management principles, and approved project management implementation plans that were submitted by 
the education authorities. The Commonwealth also had extensive experience in the delivery of large 
funding programs and utilised that expertise in developing the program management policies, which 
included the roles and responsibilities and governance arrangements, as described in the previous section. 
The program management policies covered reporting obligations, risk and issues management, program 
assurance, communications and ICT support. With the reporting obligations, the BER National Coordinator 
 
Figure 5-3: BER Program Implementation Relationships. Figure from Building the Education 
Revolution (2009b, p. 7). 
reported on status, outcomes and progress of the BER implementation to stakeholders within the 
governance model, see figure 5-3. According to the Building the Education Revolution (2009b, p. 9), the 
education authorities provided monthly reports to the BER National Coordinator covering the following:  
• The status of each BER project, identified by name and DEEWR school number – ranging from 
‘not yet commenced’ to ‘commenced,’ then ‘progressing’ and ‘completed’. 
• Expected timing of project milestones. 
• Actual expenditure and contracted commitment for each project. 
• On commencement of a project, or at the time of contracting, average daily numbers of on-site 
workers for the duration of the project, broken down by Indigenous and non-Indigenous apprentices 
and trainees and Indigenous and non-Indigenous other works. 
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• On completion of a project, the sustainability aspects incorporated in the building and community 
access details for the P21 element of the BER program. 
With risk management, the Commonwealth developed a risk management plan identifying risks, 
assessments of their likelihood and the consequence on the program. The risk management plan was 
captured in the PO’s RisKMan system and overseen by the Business Management Committee. There was 
also a complaints process which was controlled by the National Coordinator, a corporate support system to 
assist with communications (i.e., implementation of a communications strategy to support the effective 
delivery of the program, for example, websites, e-bulletin, ministerial announcements, funded projects via 
an interactive map, monitor media articles), and an information and communications technology system 
ICT (i.e., dedicated ICT team to develop, test and deploy monthly progress reports; distribute user manuals 
and update education authorities to use a share point system, assist with assurance assessments). The 
Commonwealth also developed a monitoring and performance information framework and plan for quality 
assurance. Its purpose was to monitor implementation of the program by education authorities and assess 
the extent to which they meet their identified priorities and achieved their objectives. Assessments included:  
• Analysis of monthly reports from education authorities to monitor and assess BER 
implementation, including project progress and expenditure. 
• Desktop monitoring of a sample of documents from education authorities, such as project 
contracts, invoices and payments to schools. 
• Analysis of information provided by education authorities annually via statements of income and 
expenditure and annual audits. 
• On-site monitoring visits with education authorities to check that obligations under funding 
agreements are being met, such as management of funding and payments, recordkeeping, 
branding and recognition requirements. 
• On-site visits to a random sample of schools to monitor project progress (Building the Education 
Revolution 2009b, p. 11). 
 Implementation Plans 
In line with the national partnership agreement, the education authorities were required to develop and 
submit implementation plans to the Commonwealth for the program by March 2009. According to Building 
the Education Revolution (2009b, p. 38), the implementation plans explained how each education authority 
intended to: 
• Call for, assess, priorities and select school infrastructure projects under NSP, P21, SLC for 
submission to the PO. 
• Fast track application and assessment outcomes. 
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• Manage applications from schools marked for closure or merger. 
• Manage each project. 
• Ensure every school could maximise its opportunities under the BER, and assist smaller or less 
resourced schools to participate. 
• Use design templates. 
• Incorporate sustainable building principles into construction, refurbishments and maintenance; 
• Achieve broad community consultation. 
• Ensure new refurbished buildings in primary schools would be available for community use at no 
or low cost. 
In addition, they had to develop a governance structure to implement the program in their state or territory. 
This usually involves the establishment of a BER project office or project team or enlarging an existing 
team, which was headed by a senior executive or senior executive group of the organisation. Table 5-5 
provides a summary of information based on pre-determined categories provided to the Commonwealth on 
the implementation of the program by participating agencies in this research study.  
 BER Constituent Project 
The BER program also initiated a state government infrastructure constituent taskforce project, otherwise 
known as a temporary ‘action team’ (Engwall and Svensson 2001, Hollenbeck et al. 2012, Jacobsson and 
Hällgren 2016), that was of high political importance and intangible complexity. The approximate value of 
the project was AUD $1 billion and about AUD $500,000 in project scope. It was initiated in April 2010 
and ceased in October 2012 with a change in state government leadership. The action team, which included 
highly experienced, knowledgeable and powerful stakeholders (i.e., ministers, executives, senior 
government project managers, senior external project managers from a large international consultancy firm, 
and a dedicated team of solicitors) had to rapidly deliver the project by the end of October 2012, just prior 
to the state government elections: a deadline of seven months. 
 
The rationale behind the initiation of the infrastructure constituent project taskforce was seen as 
opportunistic i.e., state government officials saw they could potentially generate significant funding from 
the project for other government project priorities, including but not limited to, significant cost overruns 
associated with the program. If the state government could generate these funds prior to the November 
2010 state government elections, and generate social and economic spillover effects, it could potentially 
enhance and legitimise the state government’s image, and thus lead to greater political stability, support, 
and their survival prospects. However, it led to their demise. Subsequent to the demise of the government, 
the project continues today [at the time of writing] under a new government with the underlying principle 
to generate significant funding to strengthen the state finances. This includes the  
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
134 
Table 5-5: State Government BER Implementation Plans 
BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
Commencing Projects   
Outline how you will call for, assess, 
prioritise and select projects to meet the 
requirements of each of the three 
elements of the BER? 
a. Primary schools for the 21st 
century. 
b. Science and language centres for 
21st century secondary schools. 
c. National school pride program. 
With the ‘Primary schools for the 21st century’ 
component: Principal briefing sessions to outline process, 
timeline and standard designs; distribution of the chief 
executive’s advice on process; preparation of fact sheets 
on programs; preparation and distribution of electronic 
application proformas including instructions; schools 
required to identify their priorities; Infra-GA to review 
school submissions; Infra-GA to identify Round 1 project 
proposals and contact Principals and obtain their 
agreement to the proposal. Confirm use of standard design 
as suitable for their state; and, Commonwealth 
government priorities to be applied in the planning of 
projects. 
For ‘Science and language centres for 21st century 
secondary schools’: Schools with secondary enrolment to 
apply using similar process as per Primary Schools for the 
21st Century above. 
For ‘National school pride program’: As per Primary 
Schools for the 21st Century; site will be provided with 
With the ‘Primary schools for the 21st century’ 
component: Projects for immediate implementation: the 
state government has a well-developed process to work 
with schools and communities to plan and fund school 
infrastructure, it will leverage off existing building 
processes (i.e., projects that are already well advanced in 
relation to planning and approval processes will proceed 
in the first round of each element of the BER), and it 
will manage proposals against a set of assessment 
criteria, including state of project readiness, consistency 
with the program guidelines and extent that capital 
investments are driven by education needs and improved 
strategies. 
Selecting future projects: Infra-GC’s regional network 
leaders (RNL) have responsibility for implementing the 
school improvement agenda by leading and managing a 
network of schools to improve the educational offering 
and performance of all students within the network, 
which will inform the projects to be delivered under the 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
life cycle data on key infrastructure elements for 
consideration and inclusion in their priorities; and, sites 
requested to be reviewed against Commonwealth program 
guidelines and Infra-GA’s policies and program 
guidelines. 
program. Each region has also commenced consultation 
with primary and special schools to establish local 
priorities and filter for the size and scope of proposals.  
For ‘Science and language centres for 21st century 
secondary schools’: The state is well positioned to 
provide quality applications for accessing funds under 
the science and language centres for the 21st century 
secondary schools program. In line with the Primary 
Schools for the 21st Century process, each region will 
undertake a short period of intensive consultations with 
secondary schools to establish local priorities and 
provide a filter for the focus and scope of proposals. 
Infra-GC’s project-based unit will also assess regional 
priorities to develop a statewide proposal for 
Commonwealth government assessment and approval.  
For ‘National school pride program’: Implementation of 
the National school pride program will leverage off an 
existing school asset maintenance system to assist in 
confirming where funding will be allocated. Round 1 
includes fast tracking stimulus for immediate priorities, 
where each school will submit a list of works to be 
undertaken, with implementation being monitored using 
the asset maintenance system as well as the 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
Commonwealth government system. Round 2 includes 
addressing important maintenance works.  
What strategies will be used to fast 
track application and assessment 
outcomes? 
Electronic forms and instructions have been developed 
and circulated to Principals; fact sheets have been 
developed and made available via the asset services web 
site; advice is provided via Principal Association Chat 
Rooms; assessment checks will be limited to key strategic 
direction/requirements for each site; guidelines have been 
provided to Principals to make application process easy; 
and, Round 1 projects have been identified corporately 
based on the ability to utilise and build standard designs. 
RNL will be critical in delivering the BER, particularly 
assessing and fast tracking proposals. The will undertake 
consultation with schools to establish local priorities and 
will feed data into an established Program Management 
Office (PMO), which will priorities proposals into 
appropriate funding rounds. Additional staff will be 
employed to assist this process. 
To meet the tight timeframes, the education authority, in 
partnership with schools and regional offices, will 
modify its traditional design and procurement processes. 
Infra-GC will draw heavily on its established series of 
design footprints which has guided recent government 
infrastructure projects. 
Infra-GC is developing a number of standard school 
templates. 
Schools will select from these footprints and consultants 
will finalise the design in consultation with the school. 
Outline how you will manage 
applications from schools marked for 
closure or for merger? 
Amalgamation, merger and closure of schools in the state 
is a voluntary process; known closures/mergers (next 2-3 
years); sites will be supported with the purchase of 
The government’s parameter is that no government 
school will be forced to close, hence there are no 
schools marked for closure. However, schools can 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
equipment/resources that add to existing teaching and 
learning programs prior to closure. The 
equipment/resources will transfer to the new site 
Sites considering voluntary closure/merger; and, Infra-GA 
is liaising with Principals/Governing Councils to 
strategically plan facilities requirements for the long term. 
The outcome of these discussions will be incorporated 
into site submissions. 
choose to merge or consolidate if their school 
communities agree.  
In relation to the BER, RNL will work with those 
schools that are listed as being part of a future 
regeneration project to determine if their capital needs 
can be met through the BER. 
Project Management   
What ongoing project management of 
each project will be offered? 
National School Pride: projects will be managed locally 
by the Principal. They are able to access the state’s 
facilities management contract; and Primary 
Schools/Science Labs/Language Centres: Infra-GB to co-
ordinate project delivery via specially designed contracts, 
Infra-GA to monitor contractor performance/project 
delivery, Infra-GA to monitor program delivery, Principal 
to monitor local project delivery. 
To oversee the implementation of the BER, Infra-GC 
has developed a new project board and associated 
governance arrangements. This project board will 
provide high level oversight of the BER implementation 
and will feed into the PO Oversight Group structure.  
To implement the three programs Infra-GC will employ 
new program managers, design consultants, project 
managers, finance and communication officers as 
required. In particular, individual teams will be 
established to implement all three programs. Each team 
will have a dedicated program manager, program 
administrators, project management and design service 
providers and delivery service providers. These teams 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
will provide comprehensive project management, 
support for implementation for the BER. Private sector 
project delivery and program management will be 
sourced to ensure Infra-GC has access to sufficient 
commercial, procurement and project management 
services.  
A detailed program administration plan that outlines the 
necessary program resource structure has been 
developed for project board approval. 
To ensure timely delivery of the BER, interim program 
managers will be appointed whilst the broader 
recruitment process is undertaken.  
What project management approach 
will be adopted? 
Primary Schools/Science Labs/Language Centres: State 
government structure has been established to oversight all 
programs and projects; Infra-GB plan to utilise a head 
contractor arrangement with Design and Construct 
contracts for a group of geographically located projects; 
Infra-GB has a pool of experienced project managers to 
be assigned to the contracts; and, Infra-GA has a pool of 
major project coordinators to liaise and support sites with 
the process. 
Infra-GC has a well-established and successful approach 
to asset project management. Most the management of 
Infra-GC’s capital works program is managed by a 
private provider. 
The program management approach for the primary 
schools and science and language centre elements will 
be based on the existing implementation of the 
Managing Successful programmes methodology from 
the UK. Under this structure, the program managers will 
need to: 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
• Apply Managing Successful programmes 
• Liaise with senior Infra-GC’s management 
• Manage program stakeholders 
• Lead the program team 
• Supervise the program team and consultants 
• Ensure excellent program communications 
• Prepare and present key program documents 
• Source and recommend selection for program 
service providers 
• Work collaboratively with Infra-GC’s staff and staff 
of other service providers 
Program management for all rounds will be delivered 
within a central PMO covering both capital works and 
maintenance and minor works. Detailed project 
management for significant projects will take place, with 
three to five organisations to be engaged and project 
management services being provided on a regional 
basis. Project management would include detailed 
planning and scheduling of works. Infra-GC has 
confidence that the proposed approach, which builds on 
Infra-GC’s existing successful project management 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
approach, will ensure Commonwealth’s timelines are 
met. 
How will you ensure every school can 
maximise opportunities under the 
BER? How will you assist smaller or 
less resourced schools/communities to 
participate? 
Infra-GA has implemented the following: Premiers 
Conference held for all Principals and Governing Council 
Chairpersons, all Principals have been invited to attend 
information sessions, information has been distributed to 
sites and published on the asset services web site, planned 
use of electronic forms with detailed instructions, 
expansion of Infra-GA’s asset support centre to respond 
to enquiries, and local choice to access the state 
government’s facilities management contract. 
The state government has a well-developed process to 
support best practice capital development in all school 
communities, with the aim of maximising opportunities 
and outcomes. As such, BER implementation will 
leverage existing structures. 
All state government schools will be made aware of the 
state government implementation of the BER through 
central office electronic circulars and direct 
communication with regional level staff. 
Building   
List design templates to be used (and 
attached copies for the 
Commonwealth), or if design templates 
are not being used why this is 
reasonable and appropriate. 
(Infra-GA provided a list of five design templates used 
previously, new design template, and two design 
templates under development) 
(Infra-GC provided the Commonwealth with its standard 
design templates that it will utilise for BER projects) 
How will sustainable building 
principles be incorporated into 
construction, refurbishments and 
maintenance, wherever possible? 
Sustainable building principles are incorporated into 
standard designs; and in addition, it is proposed that solar 
panels will be incorporated where practical. 
Infra-GC has existing standards for incorporating 
sustainable building principles including ecologically 
sustainable development program guidelines. 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
The Community   
Outline the steps to be taken to achieve 
broad community consultation, 
including incorporating the views of 
relevant Principals, Parents and 
Citizens or Parents and Friends groups, 
on work to be undertaken. 
Briefing sessions on the project have commenced as per 
the following: Premier’s Conference of Principals and 
Governing Council representatives, Regional 
Principal/Leaders seminars, construction industry briefing 
undertaken by Infra-GB, Principals consult with the 
Governing Council in the selection of projects to be 
identified in their proforma response, and Principal 
Associations are able to contract senior education 
authority officers for clarification of any emerging issues. 
The state government will take full responsibility for 
liaising on funding allocations and projects under its 
share of the BER. The state government commits to 
working in partnership with parents and communities. 
As such, community consultation is already a 
fundamental principle that underpins any capital 
investment.  
Outline how you will ensure new and 
refurbished facilities in primary schools 
will be available for broad community 
use at no cost or low cost. 
The state government already has a policy position of 
allowing after-hours access to facilities, and local schools 
sets hire charge rates to recover at least direct costs 
(utilities). These can be waived by the Government 
Council in special circumstances. 
Infra-GC is committed to promoting schools as 
community hubs, which includes sharing school 
facilities with the broader community. Processes are 
already in place that help facilitate partnerships ranging 
from basic hire agreements to formal joint use 
arrangements.  
Data Entry   
Will you undertake entry on your 
school projects? 
a. If yes, how will this be achieved? 
Or 
From the proposed implementation plan, Infra-GA 
partnered with Infra-GB to deliver the program, who will 
be discussed next.  
A dedicated PMO was established to implement a 
previous school-based infrastructure plan. The PMO 
will be expanded to manage all the data requirements for 
the BER. The PMO will: 
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BER Implementation Plan 
Categories 
Infra-GA BER Implementation Plan Infra-GC BER Implementation Plan 
b. If no, how will you ensure your 
schools meet all data entry 
requirements as required? 
• Maintain data to monitor, analyse and advise on the 
delivery of the BER 
• Provide data on individual projects 
• Develop data scorecards and progress reporting for 
Infra-GC’s project board and State Coordinator 
• Undertake high level data costing and analysis 
• Manage capital budget and reporting 
• Develop records to demonstrate compliance with 
obligations under the bilateral agreements. 
School will be required to: 
• Provide timely and accurate data on the delivery of 
projects 
• Update the school maintenance system, and 
• Advise of any potential issues that may arise 
Source: Infra-GA and Infra-GC Private Correspondence. 
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reinvestment of the funds into building new educational facilities, hospitals and other services. The next 
section describes the organisations that were selected as organisational case studies including a general 
background of each organisation i.e., its roles and responsibilities, and governance framework for the 
program. 
5.3 Agencies and Actors 
As mentioned previously, the researcher engaged in purposeful sampling, which according to Tracy (2013, 
p. 134) means that a researcher ‘purposefully choose data that fit the parameters of the project’s research 
questions, goals, and purposes.’ This enables the researcher to capture cases that are ‘information-rich’ for 
in-depth study (Patton 2002), especially for implementation of public policies (see Palinkas et al. 2015). 
Information-rich cases are those from which one provides a great deal about issues of central importance 
to the purpose of the research. However, this is constrained by what is practicable, including gaining access 
to organisations and organisational actors, availability and willingness to participate, knowledge and 
experience, resources to support the study, and the ability to clearly communicate experiences and opinions 
(Palinkas et al. 2015, Patton 2002, Saunders 2012). Taken together, and as suggested by Patton (2002), all 
the participants were chosen according to predetermined common criteria, which is as follows:  
• Possess knowledge and experience on the implementation of the BER program including 
constituent projects of the program. 
• Actively involved with program implementation, including organisational strategic decision-
making which was potentially influenced by external and internal environmental factors. 
• Able to provide information that is both detailed (depth) and generalizable (breadth) i.e., 
‘information-rich’ cases (Patton 2002). 
• Able to potentially recommend other information-rich key informants or critical cases i.e., 
snowballing (Patton 2002). 
• Potentially willing to participate as subject-matter experts (SME’s) in modified Delphi technique 
to validate findings. 
These criteria insured that all cases were consistent with this research questions, goals and purpose. There 
were no exclusion criteria. Based on the hereinbefore criteria, all agencies and actors, besides one 
participant whose information was not taken forward in the research, fulfilled the predetermined common 
criteria. However, prior to providing a background on the participating agencies (or organisations), it is 
well worth delving into the different organisational archetypes or temporary organisational forms. 
According to Lundin et al. (2015) the three most common organisational archetypes are:  
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• Project-based organisations: business is primarily carried out in projects, such as, infrastructure 
and construction.  
• Project-supported organisations: projects are tied to the internal parts of the organisation, such as, 
research and development organisations as producers of complex products and services.  
• Project networks: projects are embedded in networks of relationships, such as, government 
agencies that are part of a larger project ecology or system i.e., inter-organisational or interpersonal 
projects. 
Although each organisational archetype has its ‘own distinct set of characteristics, in some cases, there is 
no absolute border between the three’ (Lundin et al. 2015, p. 25). For example, project-based organisations 
may be part of a project network in which project-based organising dominates. Furthermore, although the 
focus on such organisational forms is on ‘actors establishing, maintaining, and discontinuing temporary 
structures, typically, the outcome of such efforts are hybrids containing a mix of temporary and permanent 
structures,’ which includes the three most common organisational archetypes, and where temporariness is 
centre stage along with the unique dynamics of the change (Bakker et al. 2016, p. 1705, emphasis in 
original). The summary of organisational archetypes provides a good foundation for the remainder of the 
research study – that is, background of each agency, their relationships on the program, and the data analysis 
and interpretation.  
 Background of Infra-GA 
Infra-GA is an education authority that was responsible for implementing the BER program in its state 
(otherwise known as a hybrid project network organisation). It’s core purpose is to provide educational 
services. It had a dedicated project-based organisation (or unit) with the main purpose to provide school-
based infrastructure and financial services. This included the development and implementation of 
infrastructure and finance strategies, policies and procedures. It also provided services to the organisation’s 
central and regional offices, government schools in the areas of finance and resourcing, procurement, 
project management, information and technology, environmental and infrastructure support. In hindsight, 
it had a high level of (inter)actions with other government agencies, schools and school based communities.  
 Background of Infra-GB 
Infra-GB is a state government agency that partnered with Infra-GA to deliver the program (otherwise 
known as a hybrid project network organisation). It was responsible for managing procurement and 
construction of major projects for the program. As it was not an education authority, it was not responsible 
for implementing the program in its state. It’s core purpose was to provide infrastructure, transport and 
planning works to the people of the state. Specifically, with the program, Infra-GB provided an integration 
of services associated with the procurement of the program including: 
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• Development and implementation of the procurement model 
• Development and implementation of the engagement strategy with the industry 
• Development of standard and site specific designs 
• Development of contracting strategy and contract documentation 
• Managing tendering and contracting processes 
• Monitoring and reporting on progress of projects including recordkeeping 
• Payment of contractors and invoicing of Infra-GA 
Infra-GB’s role was led by an executive director with two project managers, one from Infra-GB and one 
from the private sector, leading the management of the various streams of activities. A program 
management office, with a mix of in-house and contract resources was established specifically to support 
the program. Infra-GB also identified key stakeholders for the program, being five other government 
organisations within its state, a private building industry, schools and their communities. There was a high 
level of community integration. Therefore, it had an established and deeply imbedded relationship with 
Infra-GA on the implementation and management of school-based infrastructure projects. 
 
With governance arrangements, Infra-GB and Infra-GA jointly established and developed a specific 
governance model for the program, see figure 5-4.  
 
This included an executive steering committee to ensure consistency in approach across the program and 
included the chief executive from each organisation, a program director of Infra-GA, an executive director 
of Infra-GB and the deputy chief executive of Infra-GA. The executive steering committee provided a high-
level oversight of policy and strategic matters relating to the program. It also monitored the progress of the 
program and was responsible for escalating strategic matters to the State Coordinator-General for the 
national partnership agreement.  
 
To achieve the strict program timeframes, Cabinet introduced regulations that empowered the Coordinator-
General to rapidly approve development applications. The usual local council consultation process was 
waived for the program, which at times, can take years to approve. Consultations with key external 
stakeholders were held to contribute to the determination of industry capacity, procurement methodologies 
and development of pricing and program benchmarks. Briefing sessions were also held with all school 
Principals to advise them of the program including the standard designs and budgets to assist in determining 
each project’s scope. 
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Figure 5-4: Infra-GA and Infra-GB BER Program Governance Framework. Figure adapted from Infra-
GB Private Correspondence. 
 Background of Infra-GC 
Infra-GC is a similar education authority as Infra-GA that was responsible for implementing the program 
in its state (otherwise known as a hybrid project network organisation). It’s core purpose is also similar to 
Infra-GA to provide educational services. It also had a dedicated project-based organisation (or unit) as 
Infra-GA with the main purpose to provide school-based infrastructure and financial services. This included 
the development and implementation of infrastructure and finance strategies, policies and procedures. It 
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also provided services to the organisation’s central and regional offices, government schools in the areas 
of finance and resourcing, procurement, project management, information and technology, environmental 
and infrastructure support. Therefore, it had a high level of (inter)actions with other government agencies, 
schools and school based communities. 
 
It also agreed to implement the program within its state in accordance with the conditions and rapid 
timeframes prescribed by the Commonwealth. The project-based unit was responsible for delivering the 
program. The acting executive director of Infra-GC’s was the delegated BER State Coordinator, and the 
assistant general manager of the project-based unit was an alternative contact. As an education authority 
under the program, its roles and responsibilities included working with schools and school communities to 
develop and submit proposals for BER projects to the PO, to manage the construction and refurbishment 
projects that were funded, and monitor and report project progress to the PO.  
 Background of Infra-PA 
Infra-PA is a private organisation that partnered with Infra-GC to deliver the program (otherwise known as 
a project-based organisation). It is a global organisation of designers, planners, engineers, consultants and 
technical specialists offering a broad range of professional services. It also has a long-established 
partnership with Infra-GC on the delivery of education-based infrastructure projects. The procurement of 
Infra-PA enabled Infra-GC to swiftly meet the Commonwealth government’s expectations. This included 
immediate mobilisation of an experienced program management team, active program management 
strategies, and the ability to commence working with project management firms within two weeks of 
engagement. With the program, Infra-PA was responsible for the management of almost three-thousand 
school construction projects to the value of about AUD $2.5 billion, which included about 1,200 primary 
school projects ranging from AUD $100,000 to more than AUD $3 million, 70 secondary science and 
language centres and about 1,500 school maintenance projects.  
 
Infra-PA also developed a co-ordinated procurement strategy comprising standardised tender and contract 
documentation, which enabled construction work to be spread across the state. Considering the high-level 
consultation process for the program, Infra-PA worked closely with Infra-GC in large briefing presentations 
to contractors and construction material manufacturers and suppliers. A major responsibility of Infra-PA 
was to gather accurate data and monitor the financial and construction status of more than 2,000 projects, 
and provide the Commonwealth with monthly reporting data. Infra-PA also designed and implemented a 
SharePoint system to monitor the status of all the school construction projects in real time. The system also 
enabled the monitoring of sub-programs, detailed status reporting, expectations and risk analysis. From 
program design to the application of PMO concepts, Infra-PA implemented Managing Successful Projects 
(MSP) principles, governance and transformational flow processes. MSP is a UK Office of Government 
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Commerce methodology. The governance model for the program between Infra-GC and Infra-PA is 
depicted in figure 5-5. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Infra-GC and Infra-PA BER Program Governance Framework. Figure adapted from Infra-
GC Private Correspondence. 
 Background of Infra-PB 
Infra-PB is a private organisation that partnered with Infra-GC and Infra-PA to deliver the program 
(otherwise known as a project-based organisation), see figure 5-5. It is a firm of project, program and 
portfolio managers offering a broad range of professional project management services to government and 
non-government organisations across Australia. It’s areas of expertise includes strategic advice, risk and 
audit, business analysis, change and communication, project management, and organisational agility. As 
well as being a pre-qualified state government supplier of services, it has a well-advanced partnership with 
Infra-GC, providing years of project and program management services.  
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 Background of Infra-PC 
Infra-PC is a professional services firm responsible for providing legal services for the constituent BER 
taskforce project. It is a commercial law firm providing specialist legal expertise, supported by in-depth 
industry knowledge to government and non-government organisations across Australia. It’s areas of 
expertise includes commercial and corporate advisory, commercial litigation, commercial real estate, 
construction and projects, employment law and workplace relations, financing, intellectual property, 
planning and environment, taxation, wills and estates. As well as being a pre-qualified state government 
supplier of legal services, it has a well-established partnership with Infra-GC, providing years of legal 
advisory expertise. In addition, it was part of the infrastructure project taskforce team and steering 
committee providing strategic legal advice on project matters. It continued to provide legal services until 
the partial dissolution and redefinition of the constituent BER taskforce project, being October 2012. 
 Background of Infra-PD 
Infra-PD is a professional services firm responsible for providing project management services for the 
constituent BER taskforce project. It is an international advisory firm providing specialist services to 
government and non-government organisations. It’s areas of advisory expertise includes strategy 
formulation and execution i.e., opportunities and risks involved with the implementation of strategies to 
achieve client strategies and benefits. As well as being a pre-qualified state government supplier of such 
services, it has a well-established partnership with Infra-GC providing years of advisory expertise. In 
addition, it was also part of the infrastructure project taskforce team and steering committee providing 
project management services and strategic advice. It also continued to provide strategic advisory services 
until the partial dissolution and redefinition of the constituent BER project, being October 2012. The 
governance framework for the constituent BER taskforce project is depicted in figure 5-6. 
5.4 Agency and Actor Relationships 
Similar to organisational social network analysis, which focuses on the relationships between agencies and 
actors, the embeddedness of social (inter)actions, structural patterning, and the utility of network 
connections (see Kilduff and Brass 2010 for a deeper understanding of organisational social network 
research and analysis), the researcher developed a framework to explain in graphical and narrative form the 
BER program agency and actor relationships, see figure 5-7. Although the research questions look deeply 
into the phenomena under investigation i.e., human behaviour and (inter)actions, the framework provides 
a peripheral impetus explanation of the agency and actor structural relationships. For example, the first 
research question aims to understand external factors that influence organisational strategic decision-
making on the implementation of mega public sector program of projects. From the figure, we can see that 
each agency or actor has a different program governance structure i.e., levels of (inter)actions that 
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influences, or is interdependence on, its partnership(s) with other actors, and making strategic decisions, in 
implementing the BER program. Such a multi-organisational governance structure or network also 
influences the internal organisational environment and thus performance outcomes (Provan and Kenis 
2008). Having an understanding of governance networks, ‘irrespective of whether it is from bottom-up or  
 
Figure 5-6: Constituent BER Program Taskforce Project Governance Framework. Figure adapted from 
Infra-GC Private Correspondence. 
a product of strategic decision-making made by network participants or government actors’ is important so 
as we can better understand how networks function to produce certain outcomes (Provan and Kenis 2008, 
p. 229). This is also advocated by Van Popering-Verkerk and Van Buuren (2016) who stress that 
understanding of multilevel decision-making i.e., organisational interactions, in a governance structure is 
imperative for a better decision-making environment. Thus, such an agency and actor relational framework 
is an impetus for the research aim, objectives and questions.
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Figure 5-7: BER Program Agency and Actor Relational Framework 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the Building the Education (BER) program and a constituent 
taskforce project under the program. This included funding allocations of the program, the national 
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partnership agreement, roles and responsibilities of the Commonwealth and the education authorities, 
performance benchmarks and indicators for the program, governance and program management principles. 
Additionally, it provided a description of the implementation plans submitted by participating agencies in 
the case study, a detailed description of the agencies and actors background including their relationships in 
governing program implementation.  
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DATA ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Six Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
Discussed and described the case study and the organisations selected as case studies. This included the 
background of the Building the Education Revolution (BER) program, agencies and actors and their 
relationships in implementing and delivering the program. 
What this chapter does: 
Provides the data analysis and interpretation of the case study. This includes grounded theory as the 
analytic strategy, an inductive top-down approach to theorising, and entering a dialogue for the 
refinement of extant theory.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Seven will provide the validation of the case study research through a few mechanisms.  
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of a mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable project 
managers to implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to eradicate 
potential ‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process.  
 
This chapter presents the key findings obtained from the 17 in-depth interviews and research instruments, 
as well as from the modified Delphi technique were six SMEs provided validation on seven propositions 
that emerged and were articulated from the findings. The major finding that emerged from the case study 
is that strategically shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary 
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uniqueness of the organisational change initiative is determined by four principal factors: collective 
institutional leadership, informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project work, project reality, and 
rational agent. The following discusses the analytic strategy adopted for this study, and then a detailed 
discussion of the findings based on ‘thick description’ (Denzin 2001, Patton 2002) and a ‘creative story’ 
(Shepherd and Suddaby 2017), which includes quotations taken from interview transcripts to capture real 
life experiences or meanings present in the sequence of experiences.  
6.2 Data Analysis 
The analytic strategy adopted for this research is grounded theory (Charmaz 2005, Corbin and Strauss 2008, 
Corbin and Strauss 1990, Glaser and Strauss 1967), which is fundamental to case study research (Bazeley 
2013, Yin 2014). This strategy is a systematic inductive method for conducting qualitative research aimed 
toward theory development (Charmaz 2004). See figure 6-1 for a simple model for developing grounded 
theory.  
 
Figure 6-1: Simple Model for Developing Grounded Theory. Figure by Saldana (2013, p. 53). 
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In this context, induction means moving up from the detailed descriptive to the more abstract, conceptual 
level i.e., moving from the particular to the general (Bryant and Charmaz 2007b). Furthermore, according 
to Charmaz (2004, p. 441) grounded theory has considerable significance because it: 
a) Provides explicit, sequential program guidelines for conducting qualitative research. 
b) Offers specific strategies for handling the analytic phases of inquiry. 
c) Streamlines and integrates data collection and analysis. 
d) Advances conceptual analysis of qualitative data. 
e) Legitimises qualitative research as scientific inquiry. 
The analytic process is recursive, going through a number of interactive stages, forwards and backwards, 
with the aim to gain insightful understanding of the case and topic of investigation (Bazeley 2013). Bazeley 
(2013) defines the analytic process as ‘working with the data,’ as the researcher reads and reflects, explores 
and plays, codes and connects, reviews and refines, working back and forth through the various data 
sources. This includes all the interview transcripts and documents. This is further professed by Corbin and 
Strauss (2008, p. 57) who state that analysis is: 
A dynamic process of generating, developing and verifying concepts – a process that builds over 
time and with the acquisition of data. One derives concepts from the first pieces of data. These same 
concepts are compared for similarities and differences against the next set of data – either expanding 
concepts by adding new properties and dimensions, or, if there are new ideas in the data, adding new 
concepts to the lists of concepts. Or, there is still a third option of revising previous concepts if after 
looking at the new data if appears that another term would be more suitable.  
Here an analyst has to brainstorm and interact with the data (i.e., asking questions about the data, making 
comparisons between data, try out different ideas, eliminate some, expand on others before arriving at 
conclusions), and be immersed in the data to find the ‘essence’ of what participants are trying to convey. 
According to Bryant and Charmaz (2007a, p. 272) grounded theory ‘is not about the accuracy of descriptive 
units, nor is it an act of interpreting meaning as ascribed by participants in a study; rather, it is an act of 
conceptual abstraction.’ It requires theoretical sensitivity of the researcher: analytic temperament (i.e., 
analytic distance from the data, trust in preconscious processing for conceptual emergence) and competence 
(i.e., develop theoretical insights and abstract conceptual ideas from various data sources) (Bryant and 
Charmaz 2007a). This is also professed by Kelle (2007b) on the emergence of empirical data. Here a 
researcher does not approach the research tabula rasa but on previous knowledge, including the integration 
of extant theoretical knowledge (Kelle 2007a, 2007b, Wrona and Gunnesch 2015). According to Wrona 
and Gunnesch (2015) this ‘encourages abductive reasoning which is inextricably linked with creativity.’ 
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Furthermore, grounded theory explains what is happening in a social setting including underlying 
behaviour, which usually commences after the first interview or observation.  
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) state, as emphasised by Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), Charmaz (2004), that the 
analytic process begins with microanalysis (i.e., detailed form of open coding), which complements and 
supplements a more general analysis (i.e., broader perspective of the data). Here an analyst breaks into the 
data to make sense of the materials. I did this with all the data sources including interview transcripts, 
documents and memos. Or in other words, the process ‘proceeds from the initial open coding of data to the 
emergence of a core category, followed by a delimiting of data collection and analysis for selective coding 
to theoretically saturate the core category and related categories’ (Bryant and Charmaz 2007a, p. 275). 
Although there are many analytic tools to facilitate the coding process (e.g., dimensional analysis, focusing, 
various meanings of a word or phrase, drawing upon personal experience, looking at language, thinking in 
terms of metaphors and similes), the two analytic tools used by most qualitative researchers are: asking 
questions and making comparisons (Bryant and Charmaz 2007a, Corbin and Strauss 2008).  
 
The asking questions tool is useful at every stage of the analysis, and enables researchers to ‘get off the 
ground’ and to probe, develop provisional answers, think outside the box, and become acquainted with the 
data (Corbin and Strauss 2008). For example, the who, what, where, how, and even the duration, rate, and 
frequency questions. A researcher may also focus on sensitising questions e.g., What is going on here? 
Theoretical questions e.g., What is the relationship between the concepts? and questions of a practical 
nature e.g., Which concepts are well developed and which are not? It also enables researchers to think about 
possible answers to better understand a problem from the participant’s perspective. The making 
comparisons tool is usually seen from two perspectives, constant comparisons and theoretical 
comparisons/sampling (Bryant and Charmaz 2007a, Corbin and Strauss 2008). With constant comparisons, 
a researcher is comparing each incident in the data with other incidents, for example, one category/theme 
with another to differentiate and identify properties and dimensions specific to that category/theme. With 
theoretical comparisons/sampling, the researcher is confused about the meaning of an incident in the data 
or wants to think about an event or object in different ways (i.e. a range of possible meanings), which can 
be derived from the literature and experience. 
 
After taking a microanalysis or a more general analysis of the data, a researcher begins strategic analysis 
of the data for context, process, and theoretical integration (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Context identifies 
the sets of conditions in which problems or situations arise and to which persons respond through some 
form of (inter)action, which is similar to analysing data for concepts and categories. But how and where 
does an analyst look for context? According to Corbin and Strauss (2008) this involves the use of the 
paradigm and conditional/consequential matrix. With the paradigm, an analyst applies a set of questions to 
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the data to draw out the contextual factors and identify relationships between context and process. The basic 
components of the paradigm are: conditions (i.e., a conceptual way of grouping answers to the questions 
about why, where, how and what happens), (inter)actions and emotions (e.g., responses made by people to 
situations, problems, events), and consequences (e.g., outcomes of (inter)actions or of emotional responses 
to events). See table 6-1 for an example of using the conditional/consequential matrix with this data.  
Table 6-1: Conditional/Consequential Matrix 
 
(Transcribed interview excerpt) 
Expert knowledge was crucial in terms of program delivery where we met our timelines because of the 
speed in which it was put together, and expert knowledge was crucial in terms of trying to unlock some 
of the difficulties where we did get into some delays. A project of this size you're going to have delays, 
that’s just one of the givens, the question is how long is the delay and what can you do to try and actually 
speed things up. I was very confident of the processes that we had in place because the regular meetings 
that we were having with [the other government agency] and because this was such a high-profile project 
we were able to get people and unlock things as we needed them. 
 
In my memo I write: 
Reinforces the point of having strong a relational framework including trust in the partner to deliver the 
program of projects. Perhaps this is because it is a state-to-state government agency i.e., relations, they 
knew each other, each other’s processes, worked together on previous projects, etc. Trust is almost ‘a 
given.’ But without it they may have gone through their business as usual project delivery models which 
would have most probably caused delays in the projects and effected program performance and 
outcomes. It is almost like pace of implementation ‘forced’ the state government agencies to relay on 
informal project steering or shaping mechanisms i.e., trust, and not so much on formal contractual 
relations. It almost forces you into informal program management and relational control mechanisms. 
This also somewhat implies that if they delivered the program their traditional way agency actors would 
have potentially relied on the formal way to manage the program of projects. 
 
Conditional/Consequential Matrix Summary  
The above provides an example of the conditional/consequential matrix. The rapid implementation of 
the BER program which was predominately based on formal governance mechanisms (condition), 
basically, ‘forced’ the two state government agencies to rely predominately on informal governance 
mechanisms i.e., competency based trust (interaction), which as an outcome enabled them to stay of the 
path to achieve the program strategies and benefits (consequence).  
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The conditional/consequential matrix enriches the data analysis by assisting the analyst sort through the 
range of conditions/consequences in which events are located. The ideas contained within the matrix are:  
• Conditions/consequences do not exist in a vacuum (e.g., conditions are always connected through 
(inter)action and emotional responses). 
• The distinction between micro and macro is an artificial one (e.g., most situations are a combination 
of micro and macro conditions and the nature of (inter)actions influence each other). 
• The full range of possible interrelationships between micro/macro are not always visible to 
individual research participants, conditions and consequences usually exist in clusters and can 
associate or co-vary in many different ways. 
• (Inter)action and emotional responses to events are not confined to individuals (e.g., (inter)action 
can be carried out by other organisational actors). 
Furthermore, the coding process is an ongoing interaction and emotion taken in response to situations or 
problems with the aim to reach a goal (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Processes can be simple, complex or 
chaotic. For example, the process involved with implementing a mega public sector infrastructure program 
of projects, which demonstrates an individual’s, groups and organisation’s ability to give meaning to and 
respond to or shape the implementation process through a series of (inter)actions. It can also be analysed at 
the macro or micro level and broken down into sub-processes. Whatever the process or level of analysis, 
its main goal is to understand the interactions within a context over time. Considering context and process 
for data analysis, how does a researcher achieve theoretical integration or ‘gel’ the data? According to 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) this involves a number of steps. Firstly, an analyst needs to decide upon a central 
or core category (i.e., main research theme), for this research it was ‘strategically shaping institutional 
project reality,’ which happens as the researcher proceeds with constant comparison. Here a researcher can 
also use a number of aids for integration including writing a story line, moving from the descriptive story 
to the theoretical explanation i.e., proposition, use integrative diagrams, reviewing and sorting through 
memos. Once a researcher has an overarching theoretical scheme i.e., proposition, the next step is to refine 
the theory. This consists of:  
• Reviewing the scheme for internal consistency and gaps (i.e., strong story line). 
• Filling in poorly developed categories (i.e., ensure that salient properties and dimensions of 
categories have been identified and filled, or theoretical saturation).  
• Trimming excess (i.e., under developed concepts that do not fit the theory). 
• Validating the scheme (i.e., compare the raw data with the scheme or tell the story to respondents).  
With the first analytic session i.e., interview or observation, a researcher should begin reading the materials 
from beginning to end (i.e., to feel what the participants are experiencing and telling), then writing memos 
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and drawing diagrams, and continue this throughout the analytic process, for example, asking questions of 
the data: What is happening here? To what extent? (Bazeley 2013, Bryant and Charmaz 2007b, Corbin and 
Strauss 2008, Saldana 2013). This enables a researcher to clarify processes, gain analytical distance, 
distinguish between major and minor codes and categories, facilitate the generation of theory, and identify 
patterns and their properties (Bazeley 2013, Lempert 2007). I adopted this rather tedious but fulfilling 
approach to this research including reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and documents, deep 
reflective thinking, memo writing (i.e., asking questions, making comparisons, brainstorming, creating and 
changing diagrams or sketches, etc.), and used the literature extensively, for example, see figure 6-2 and 
figure 6-3. According to Lempert (2007) the use of the literature during the memo process enable 
researchers to participate in the current theoretical conversation, and alerts them to gaps in theorising. This 
is essential to grounded theory methodology, as this enables the researcher to think analytically and 
transform the data into theory. Here the researcher explores, explicates and theorises emergent patterns – 
conceptualises the data in narrative form (Bazeley 2013, Bryant and Charmaz 2007a, Lempert 2007). This 
process continues (i.e., data gathering, followed by analysis, followed by more data gathering) until a 
category or concept reaches the point of saturation i.e., a coherent explanatory story (Corbin and Strauss 
2008).  
 
 
Informal Trust and Risk Relations (Subcategory), Informal Mechanisms of Institutional Project 
Work (Category), Institutional Project Work (Sensemaking) (Theme), Rational Agent (Theme) 
(Transcribed interview excerpt) 
I think down to a deputy secretary who was highly pragmatic and engaged in program delivery but then 
supported by two at the time general managers; one who had a leadership role, and the other who 
had the operational responsibility. I think tactical level and a small power and political level, that mix 
never quite worked, there was never a level of trust and transparency within the organisation for it 
to be a well-run program. (Interview with Participant-1C) 
In my memo I write: 
Lack of trust and transparency affecting program environment relations especially from a hierarchical 
or power perspective. ‘Trust,’ ‘cultural fit’, a ‘strong sense of values or identity’ and ‘norms’ etc., which 
can be seen as lower level concepts or sub-concepts for a higher level concept of ‘informal mechanisms 
of institutional project work’ from the business as usual framework to say a project alliance framework, 
would have potentially delivered the program better including ‘sharing of information and knowledge 
i.e. ‘informal knowledge diffusion’, a sensemaking process, which can be seen as a higher level concept, 
subsequently and potentially led to better ‘rationalising of decisions,’ and thus a ‘rational agent,’ higher 
level concept. Also, the participant states the ‘conflict’ with hierarchical power relations, the literature 
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Figure 6-2: Field Note Excerpts and Memos 
sees this a ‘power-over,’ subsequently, this can be seen as a lower level concept or sub-concept of 
‘formal power-over’ within the program environment, which can be seen as a higher-level concept of 
‘formal mechanisms of institutional project work.’ I will keep an eye on these… (i.e., refine the 
concepts if and when needed for better conceptualisation of the data). It will also be interesting to see 
how ‘formal mechanisms of institutional project work’ influences or shapes organisational strategic 
decision making especially at different hierarchical levels and their dimensions. A review of the 
literature may also assist with these concepts.  
 
Creating Institutional Project Relations (Subcategory), Collective Institutional Leadership 
(Category), Informal Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work (Category), Informal Trust and 
Risk Relations (Subcategory) 
(Transcribed interview excerpt) 
The procurement model for these were a little bit different in that the partner organisation would come 
up with a project, we’d work out what would be an agreed price based on their assessments and then 
that was basically then offered to builders and builders could agree to build it for that price, it was 
pretty much like that … so it wasn’t the traditional tendering style because there wasn’t time. (Interview 
with Participant-1A) 
In my memo I write: 
Interesting and wow! It is clearly evident that they had to go away from their business as usual 
framework to a more tailored project alliance framework aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change to deliver the program, which can be seen as a ‘creating institutional project 
relations’ category, which also required collective and innovative procurement thinking (perhaps a 
form of sensebreaking) to deliver projects within the strict timeframes – this can be seen as a higher 
level concept of ‘collective institutional leadership’ – I will need more information here i.e., literature 
review on the concept of collective institutional leadership, sensemaking, sensebreaking, and identity. 
This is one of the advantages of project alliancing or integration, particularly the strengthening of 
relations through informal governance mechanisms a category of ‘informal mechanisms of institutional 
project work.’ High level of ‘trust,’ which can be seen as a lower level concept of ‘informal trust and 
risk relations’ within the higher-level concept of ‘informal mechanisms of institutional project work’ 
and ‘power-to,’ which can be seen as an ‘informal power-to’ concept, was evident. So basically from 
here, the program entered a more informal phase of delivery. This requires further exploration with the 
data and literature. 
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Figure 6-3: Preliminary Diagram 
Data is analysed through coding, moving through an initial stage of identification and labelling or open 
coding, and then a second stage of refining to develop categories or focused coding (Bazeley 2013, Saldana 
2013). Open coding, or as other publications refer to as initial coding (Saldana 2013), enables ‘breaking 
down qualitative data into discrete parts, closely examining them, and comparing them for similarities and 
differences’ (Corbin and Strauss 2008, p. 102). This also provides a researcher with analytic leads for 
further exploration. Initial coding can also employ in vivo coding (i.e., word or short phrase from the actual 
language found in the data) or process coding (i.e., also named ‘action coding,’ uses gerunds ‘-ing words’ 
to connote action in the data). This is particularly useful for a wide variety of data forms e.g., interview 
transcripts, field notes, journals, documents, diaries, artifacts, correspondence (Saldana 2013). Although 
during open coding, some scholars recommend line-by-line coding or micro-analysis (Corbin and Strauss 
2008, Saldana 2013), I believed that this was not warranted during the whole data analysis process, and on 
times, employed sentence-by-sentence and even paragraph-by-paragraph coding, which enabled generating 
codes with emergent fit to the research study (Bazeley 2013, Bryant and Charmaz 2007a, Miles and 
Huberman 1994). See table 6-2 for a structured account of the five-step analytical approach adopted for 
this research. 
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Table 6-2: Data Analysis Approach 
No. Steps Data analysis approach 
1 Familiarising with the data Reading, re-reading, identification of initial ideas, 
transcription of interviews and documents, writing memos 
and drawing diagrams – capture participants’ view. 
2 Generating initial codes and 
categories (open coding) 
Codes and categories abductively generated (Kelle 2007a) 
based on grounded theory approach using NVivo. 
3 Naming and making connections 
between categories (axial coding) 
or mechanisms 
Based on codes, enriching and making connections between 
developed categories or mechanisms. 
4 Refining categories and themes, or 
mechanisms and activities 
On-going critical analysis to refine the specifics of each 
category and theme or mechanisms and activities – make 
sense and understand the ‘true’ meaning of the data for 
theory development i.e., inductive top-down theorising 
(Shepherd and Sutcliffe 2011). 
5 Producing the report Refining analysis, selection of compelling extract examples, 
final analysis of selected extracts, relating analysis back to 
the research question and literature, and presenting a 
compelling story. 
Source: Partially adapted from Walker and Jacobsson (2014, p. 656). 
Once a first round of coding (i.e., open and axial) and categorising (or conceptualising data), I revised the 
data and undertook a second and third round of some recoding and recategorising – building on concepts 
and looking for further concepts and scrutinising concepts against further data (Bazeley 2013, Corbin and 
Strauss 2008). Some categories (or mechanisms) where changed, scrapped, and inadequately developed 
which prompted me to seek further data. During the process, I also set aside time to think about the data, 
the participants, and understand its ‘true’ meaning – the ‘quality’ behind qualitative research. This enabled 
the research to become more refined, more conceptual and abstract, as suggested by Saldana (2013).  
 
During the coding, I went from coding, with some sub-codes, to categorising with some subcategories, and 
then to higher-level and more abstract constructs – themes (Bazeley 2013, Saldana 2013). This process is 
otherwise referred to conceptualising i.e., from lower-level concepts to higher-level concepts until 
sufficient data is acquired to describe each category/theme in terms of its properties and dimensions (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008) using abductive reasoning (Reichertz 2007). This also enables researchers to 
systematically interrelate the themes and concepts (or mechanisms and activities), and thus lead to the 
Chapter Six: Data Analysis and Interpretation 
163 
 
development of theory (Corbin and Strauss 2008, Saldana 2013). See figure 6-4 for the interrelation of 
themes and concepts undertaken for this research. 
 
(Transcribed interview excerpt) 
Well, local MPs obviously had their buy-in, but the real problem from my point of view is you had a 
Federal government who had an agenda and there was State government that had an agenda. And 
remember, the MPs cross over, so the Federal government clearly saw it as their program, and 
particularly after the first year we changed government in this state, and suddenly we had a Liberal state 
government and a Federal Labor government, to be fair, the Liberal government here used BER program 
as a lever and basically said: now, I don’t know if politics had anything to do with it, or whether it was 
a legitimate issue they raised, they said BER wasn’t good. It didn’t stop them opening the odd school 
here and there, but I think when the state government came in, they transferred the management approach 
to principals and schools. (Interview with Participant-2C) 
Mechanism/Theme 
Front-End Institutional Project Work (Sensemaking): Legitimately creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutional project relations aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change initiative to achieve a sense of collective institutional leadership in the relational actor space 
through sensemaking. Such a process can be either enabling or constraining on relations through the 
activities of power, trust and control to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised project 
reality. 
Activity/Category 
Disrupting Institutional Project Relations Description: Legitimately or illegitimately disrupting 
(sensebreaking) institutional project relations, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of 
the organisational change initiative, which can be either formal or informal e.g. prescribed or social ways. 
Also, seen as disrupting project reality through the process of sensebreaking. 
Activity/Subcategory 
Legitimate Disruption Description: Legitimately disrupting (sensebreaking) institutional project 
relations aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, 
which can be either formal e.g., in line with prescribed ways – directions from a minister or a delegate, 
or expert ways – engineer with expert knowledge; or informal e.g., in line with social ways - changing 
cultural norms, values, ethics etc. Also, seen as legitimately disrupting project reality. 
Codes 
Formal political change in government, formal change in political agendas. 
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Interview notes 
‘…after the first year we changed government in this state, and suddenly we had a Liberal state 
government and a Federal Labor government … I don’t know if politics had anything to do with it, or 
whether it was a legitimate issue they raised, they said BER wasn’t good...’  
Figure 6-4: Interrelation of Themes and Concepts 
I also adopted the software NVivo to assist with the data analysis. NVivo, an electronic coding software, 
efficiently stores, organises, manages, and reconfigures the data to enable analytic reflection (Bazeley 
2007). Essentially, the software helps researchers to code and categorise large amounts of data, which is 
commonly used in grounded theory strategies (Yin 2014). During this process for each item, as suggested 
by Bernard and Ryan (2010, p. 99) in Saldana (2013), I specified, when possible, the following: 
• Short description – the name of the code itself 
• Detailed description – a 1-3 sentence description of the coded datum’s qualities or properties 
• Inclusion criteria – conditions of the datum or phenomenon that merit the code 
• Exclusion criteria – exceptions or particular instances of the datum or phenomenon that do not 
merit the code 
• Typical exemplars – a few examples of data that best represent the code 
• Atypical exemplars – extreme or special examples of data that still represent the code 
• “Close, but no” – data examples that could mistakably be assigned this particular code 
There are some noted problems associated with using computer software for coding. For example, there is 
a risk of creating and recording too many data in too much detail, relying on coding without taking 
advantage of the linking or memoing, and becoming obsessed with the task of coding which may impact 
reflective thinking (Bazeley 2013). I found the computer software, NVivo, highly beneficial due to it 
providing: 
• An audit trail of the case study project 
• Easy navigation of a wide variety of data sources 
• An ability to link codes and categories 
• An ability to add comments with emerging concepts in annotations and memos  
• Visual representation of the data 
This is also advocated by Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012) on using NVivo to facilitate trustworthiness in the 
qualitative research process. However, the software did provide some limitations, for example, limited to 
word count in descriptive fields. For a detailed understanding of how researchers are using NVivo for 
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empirical studies see Woods et al. (2015). Figure 6-5 illustrates how this enabled a better understanding of 
the nodal relationships and an alternative understanding of reality that cannot be translated to words 
(Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 2010). In addition, see Appendix E for the NVivo nodes tree used 
for this research.  
 
This relational analysis of the data i.e., mapping and understanding the relationships between key concepts, 
or interpreting the meaning of the data through pattern matching, a narrative form of explanation building 
which includes propositions, enables researchers to ‘explain’ a phenomenon, or ‘how’ or ‘why’ something 
happened (Yin 2014). Furthermore, these relationships enable the development of theory (Anderson et al. 
2006, Bazeley 2013, Kelle 2007a, 2007b, Ridder et al. 2014, Stake 2005).  
Figure 6-5: Partial Visual Representation of the Data using NVivo 
Instead of adopting the traditional mechanisms of theorising i.e., deductive, inductive or abductive, which 
have limitations for generating ‘new’ organisational theories, for example, theories are sometimes sterile, 
lack scope or generalisability (see Eisenhardt 1991, Glaser 2001, Weick 1996), this research adopted an 
inductive top-down approach to theorising, as suggested by Shepherd and Sutcliffe (2011). Here theorising 
builds on coherence theory to integrate the three traditional approaches to theorising. This is ‘informed by 
the literature, but it is inductive in that it begins with the data from which theory is built … [in addition] … 
it relies on the data themselves to speak to the theorist (through the formation of gists) to focus attention so 
as to detect tensions, conflicts, or contradictions’ (Shepherd and Sutcliffe 2011, p. 362). See figure 6-6 for 
a model of inductive top-down theorising adopted for this research.  
 
As with other types of theorising, inductive top-down has some limitations and challenges. For example, 
scholars trained in certain disciplines may find it difficult to put aside preconceived notions of theory and 
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method in order to approach the literature with openness to generate gists. Secondly, scholars may face 
challenges in their contextual environments, such as university policies and accepted practices by 
reviewers, that may limit sources for new theories. Finally, inductive top-down is a dynamic process with 
an underlying principle that recognises that all theories are fallible (Shepherd and Sutcliffe 2011).  
 
In addition and still focusing on theorising, according to Ridder et al. (2014) theory is the outcome of 
research which includes extending, refining and generating theory, especially from a case study perspective. 
Figure 6-6: Model of Inductive Top-Down Theorising. Figure by Shepherd and Sutcliffe (2011, p. 366). 
He further argues that theory extension entails expanding pre-existing theoretical or conceptual 
formulations. Theory refinement is the modification or even negation of existing and emerging theoretical 
domains. Theory generation is a means of detecting new concepts or theoretical constructs. In addition, the 
dialogue between ‘case study findings and existing theory strives for seeking either complementarities from 
the study’s initial theory domain, or rather seeking dissimilarities by drawing upon theories, which go 
beyond the study’s initial theory domain’ (Wrona and Gunnesch 2015). This is further professed by Ridder 
et al. (2014). Basically, theory emerges through the constant comparison between emerging constructs and 
relationships and extant theory (Shepherd and Sutcliffe 2011). See figure 6-7 for the different ways of 
positioning research findings i.e., entering a pluralistic dialogue or positioning towards the generation of 
new theory, or alternatively seen as pragmatic empirical theorizing (see Shepherd and Suddaby 2017), 
which was adopted for this research. Being in such a pluralistic position, that is the generation of new theory 
through abductive reasoning, not only advanced the management of knowledge, but enabled the 
development of more interesting and influential theories through problemization as a methodology 
(Alvesson and Karreman 2007, Alvesson and Sandberg 2011, Davis 1971).  
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Figure 6-7: Entering a Dialogue with Theory to Demonstrate Contribution. Figure by Ridder et al. (2014, p. 381). 
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Despite the widespread recognition and the importance of theorising, it is well worth delving deeper into 
‘how to build theories’ (Shepherd and Suddaby 2017, p. 60, emphasis in original). Although the process 
has been viewed from many angles i.e., engaged scholarship, metaphor, balance between novelty and 
continuity, a distinct importance stands – that is, ‘compelling theories are at their core compelling stories,’ 
which involves the main characters, a narrative setting, an event sequence, and a plot/theme (Shepherd and 
Suddaby 2017, p. 60). With the main characters in conceiving and constructing theories, the focus is on 
identifying and naming core constructs, as they are a source of agency or causality. That is, ‘greater clarity 
in describing constructs and their relationships to the phenomenon of interest helps to clarify the 
motivations or causal relationships in the theoretical argument’ (Shepherd and Suddaby 2017, p. 68). This 
is also professed by Donaldson et al. (2013) for rigour in the development of sound theory i.e., clearly 
defining a construct and ensuring that variable X affects Y through Z. With a narrative setting, the focus is 
on choosing a perspective for theorizing, such as, moving back and forth between the empirical evidence 
and the literature i.e., the researcher constructs theory by moving between the thick description and the 
extant literature (Dyer et al. 1991). Another way includes crossing levels of analysis with the generalisation 
of theory i.e., cross-level and within-level analysis and the relationships among the theoretical constructs 
(Klein et al. 1994). With the story’s event sequence, the focus is on setting time to establish boundary 
conditions. For example, the ‘duration of periods categorised as periods of stability and change; the 
interplay between constructs over time reflected in mutual causation and change intensity; constructing a 
detailed story anchored through time (narrative strategy); or constantly comparing sets of data to gradually 
build a system of categories that can be linked to explain the process (grounded theory strategy)’ (Shepherd 
and Suddaby 2017, p. 71). And finally, the plot which holds the story together (Jameson 2001) and provides 
the disciplined imagination of the story. For example with anthropomorphizing (see Shepherd and Sutcliffe 
2015), which provides a rich understanding of ‘humans (i.e., self and others) to (1) take a leap of faith to 
make a guess at an explanation of an anomaly, (2) provide insights into the mechanisms underlying the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ of key relationships and insights into organizing, and (3) facilitate sensemaking as well 
as tap into the audiences’ knowledge of themselves and others as a communication strategy for sensegiving 
to tell robust stories’ (Shepherd and Suddaby 2017, p. 74). Another way is through typologies, such as, 
combining constructs and explaining multiple causal relationships (Fiss 2011). Taken together, in assessing 
theory, or theoretical contribution, Shepherd and Suddaby (2017, p. 77), drawing on Shepherd and Sutcliffe 
(2011), offer the following principles: 
1) A broader theory is a better theory. A broader theory is one that explains more facts and, in doing 
so, provides a more coherent explanation than one that explains fewer facts. 
2) A simple theory is a better theory. A simpler theory is one that requires the fewest assumptions and 
is more parsimonious. A theory is less parsimonious when factors can be deleted because they add 
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little additional value to our understanding. A good theory finds a balance between being overly 
exhaustive and overly exclusive. 
3) A theory with explicit mechanisms is a better theory. Mechanisms offer an explanation for proposed 
relationships (Davis and Marquis 2005). Anderson et al. (2006, p. 102) define social mechanisms 
as ‘theoretical cogs and wheels that explain how and why one thing leads to another, which can run 
from the macro to micro (e.g., explaining the effects of organisational socialisation practices), 
micro to micro (e.g., social comparison processes), or micro to macro (e.g., how cognitively limited 
persons can be aggregated into a smart bureaucracy).’  
4) A theory with fewer acceptable alternative explanations is a better theory. The evaluation of a 
theory is partly comparative in that a judge is partially influenced by the availability of alternative 
explanations and how good they are. A better theory is one that loosens ‘the normal science 
straightjacket’ to offer something new that challenges and extends existing knowledge (Davis 1971, 
Whetten 1989). 
Furthermore, although the definition of ‘theoretical contribution’ is heavily debated within the scholarly 
community (for example see Alvesson and Karreman 2007, Corley and Gioia 2011, Flyvbjerg 2006, Wrona 
and Gunnesch 2015), a fundamental aspect still stands: the notion of contribution, which includes 
originality (i.e., challenge and extend existing knowledge) and utility. The insight must be seen as useful 
to either informed scholars or practitioners with an orientation toward prescience (Corley and Gioia 2011). 
This is especially applicable with case study research as findings can provide a theoretical contribution by 
challenging, changing or fundamentally advancing our understanding of a phenomenon or initiate new 
theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, Flyvbjerg 2006, Ridder et al. 2014, Siggelkow 2007).  
 
All in all, creative theory building is ‘not the exclusive domain of elite or experienced management scholars 
but rather a technical craft that can be learned and applied’ (Shepherd and Suddaby 2017, p. 80), of which, 
is the ‘most appropriate vehicle for representing actions and events in organisations’ (Baron and Hershey 
1988, p. 35). This is succinctly reinforced by Weick (1995, p. 60): 
If accuracy is nice but not necessary is sensemaking, then what is necessary? The answer is, 
something that preserves plausibility and coherence, something that is reasonable and memorable, 
something that embodies past experience and expectations, something that resonates with other 
people, something that can be constructed retrospectively but also can be used prospectively, 
something that captures both feeling and thought, something that allows for embellishment to fit 
current oddities, something that is fun to construct. In short, what is necessary in sensemaking is a 
good story. 
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Such a view for theoretical contribution was adopted for this research – that is, the set of activities in 
conceiving and constructing theory, including developing the main characters (or constructs), constructing 
the context, and actively engaging the audience’s imagination through plots and themes towards presenting 
a compelling story, of which, will be discussed next. 
 
Figure 6-8 conceptualises the ‘creative story’ that emerged from the data analysis for the successful 
implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Additionally, the following are 
the conceptual mechanisms (or categories) and their project action-based activities (or descriptors) of the 
framework that capture the research questions: 
Collective Institutional Leadership (Mechanism/Category). Achieving a sense of collective institutional 
leadership i.e., where organisational actors comprehend, act collectively and see the project world through 
the one lens – an emergent lens towards a common theme – through the (inter)actions of legitimately 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project relations aligned at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. This also includes the action-meaning cycles 
(or project action-based activities) of sensemaking, including prospective sensemaking through powerful 
narratives, for example, an inspirational, sustainable and clearly articulated strategic intent: vision and 
mission statement a strategy for achieving that vision i.e., capturing the ‘power’ of key and influential 
stakeholders; making the right decisions within the right structure and culture i.e., temporary high 
performing ‘action team’; and, understanding the relational behaviour of actors to achieve desired strategies 
and benefits. 
Front-End Institutional Project Work (Sensemaking) (Activity/Theme). Legitimately creating, maintaining 
and disrupting institutional project relations i.e., aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of 
the organisational change initiative, such as, an organisational response to a crisis or an unexpected event, 
through the action-meaning cycles (or project action-based activities) of sensemaking (i.e., sensemaking, 
sensebreaking and sensegiving). Such a social process can be either enabling or constraining on relations 
through the ‘shaping mechanisms’ of power, trust and control to achieve an unique temporary organising 
institutionalised project reality – that is, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change initiative. Taken from another perspective, from the temporarily aligned 
intrasubjective project reality (‘I’ am implementing the project), where such ‘shaping mechanisms’ can 
either enable or constrain the relational actor space towards a temporarily aligned intersubjective project 
reality (‘We’ are implementing the project), where such ‘shaping mechanisms’ can then either enable or 
constrain the relational actor space towards a temporarily aligned institutional project reality (‘the project’) 
– thus, achieving a state as an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality.  
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Figure 6-8: Conceptual Framework 
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Creating Institutional Project Relations (Activity/Category). Legitimately creating institutional project 
relations, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, 
with regulative or formal mechanisms (e.g., rules, program guidelines, regulations, contracts, memos, etc.) 
and normative or informal mechanisms (e.g., cultural, norms, values, morals, etc.). For example, contracts 
for PPPs or norms embedded within temporary organisations i.e., project action-based organisations, or 
government agencies providing goods and services i.e., hybrid project networks (otherwise known as inter-
organisational projects).  
Maintaining Institutional Project Relations (Activity/Category). Legitimately maintaining institutional 
project relations, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change 
initiative, with regulative or formal mechanisms (e.g., meetings, reporting, auditing, rules, program 
guidelines, regulations, memos, etc.) and normative or informal mechanisms (e.g. meetings, cultural, 
norms, values, morals, etc.). For example, contracts for PPPs or norms embedded within temporary 
organisations i.e., project action-based organisations, or government agencies providing goods and services 
i.e., hybrid project networks (otherwise known as inter-organisational projects). 
Disrupting Institutional Project Relations (Activity/Category). Legitimately (conformity to socially 
constructed systems of rules, norms, values, beliefs, etc.) or illegitimately (i.e., non-conformity to socially 
constructed systems of rules, norms, values, beliefs, etc.) disrupting (sensebreaking) institutional project 
relations, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. 
For example, an illegitimate action that leads to crime or political corruption, or a legitimate action that 
leads to creative thinking amongst and between organisational actors.  
Formal (or Regulative) Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work (Mechanism/Category). Formally 
governing actor or agency (inter)actions, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change initiative, per prescribed ways (i.e., contracts, legislation, regulations, policy, 
procedures, program guidelines, etc.) towards achieving project policy strategies and benefits. This also 
includes the project action-based activities or behaviours of formal power-over, formal power-to, and 
formal trust and risk relations.  
Informal (or Normative) Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work (Mechanism/Category). Informally 
governing actor or agency (inter)actions, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change initiative, per social ways (i.e., norms, values, culture, morals, etc.) towards 
achieving project policy strategies and benefits. This also includes the project based-activities or behaviours 
of informal power-over, informal power-to, and informal trust and risk relations. 
Rational Agent (Mechanism/Category): Minimising cognitive biases (i.e., systematic errors) in the 
decision-making process, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change initiative, based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, including reasons based explanations 
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(motiving) and reason-based justifications (normative): achieving a state as a rational agent. This also 
includes the project action-based activities or behaviours of cognitive biases.  
6.3 Interpretation 
Figure 6-8 illustrates the researcher’s understanding of the mechanisms that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. 
The case study findings show that the key mechanisms to alleviate the risk of cognitive biases in 
rationalising decisions – a rational agent in achieving program strategies and benefits – is situated-based 
institutional project governance mechanisms. Achieving such a state is critical at the front-end of project 
policy implementation where the ‘trigger’ for sensemaking occurs i.e., discrepancies between expectations 
and reality, aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. Here 
organisational actors are constantly operating in a state of complexity, which at times can be chaotic, or 
‘bounded instability’ (Kay et al. 2006), and action-meaning cycles of sensemaking – that is, ‘interpreting 
their environment in and through interactions with others, constructing accounts that allow them to 
comprehend the world and act collectively’ (Maitlis 2005, p. 21). Such ‘sensemaking moves’ are 
encapsulated within the processes of noticing or perceiving cues, creating interpretations, and taking action 
(Maitlis and Christianson 2014, Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, Weick et al. 2005); a truly formed high 
performing temporary action-based project team. This enables organisational actors to comprehend the 
emergent project ‘terrain’ and coordinate the expectations and (inter)actions between actors in rationalising 
decisions. I call this phenomenon strategically governing relational actor space (inter)actions aligned at the 
front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. This is also seen as 
strategically shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of 
the organisational change initiative in achieving project strategies and benefits. During this change process, 
organisational actors are able to tame the Machiavellianism and tribalism i.e., immoral practices, factional 
interests and power structures of the project world – that is, a state as a rational agent. Although this is an 
effortful and time consuming process for organisational actors, it is a necessity, for successful project policy 
implementation.  
 
This contributes far more insight and utility than traditional governance mechanisms to co-ordinate 
expectations and (inter)actions between and amongst actors for project policy implementation (see Ahola 
et al. 2014, Biesenthal and Wilden 2014, Müller 2009, Müller 2012, National Audit Office 2008, 
Productivity Commission 2014, Victorian Auditor-General's Office 2012a). Where such a system is highly 
integrated within the principles of Machiavellianism (see Adams 1997, Bass and Bass 2008, Johnson and 
Duberley 2011, O'Connor 1999), or the ‘iron-cage’ of project management – that is, a low degree of 
actioning the uniqueness of temporary organising, or action-based entrepreneurialism (Lundin and 
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Söderholm 1995). The traditional decision to achieve project strategies and benefits based on temporary 
organising dominated by the ‘iron cage’ of project management, that is, powerful organisational decision 
makers (i.e., hierarchical and top-down control), and regulative governance mechanisms, corrodes the 
project environment and significantly increases the risk of cognitive biases in rationalising decisions. This 
tends to strengthen existing isomorphic institutional logics, significantly constraining the necessary 
temporary uniqueness needed to achieve project strategies and benefits, and thus strengthens 
Machiavellianism and tribalism in the project world – spreading the project plague or mal-governance to 
the point where governing antidotes are useless. This also leads to significant cost escalations and time 
overruns, impacts organisational performances and stakeholder morale, and eventually leads to the demise 
of government agents and agencies. 
 
The principal mechanisms: collective institutional leadership, informal and formal mechanisms of 
institutional project work, project reality, and rational agent led to the conclusion that strategically shaping 
institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change initiative is essential for the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program 
of projects. These are now explained more fully. 
 
Collective Institutional Leadership 
The literature on strategic intent emphasises the importance collective leadership (Friedrich et al. 2009), 
including capturing the views of powerful stakeholders through the actions of creating, maintaining and 
disrupting institutional relations (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) aligned with organisational change 
initiatives (Balogun and Johnson 2005, Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Strategic intent also includes 
developing an inspirational and sustainable vision and mission statement i.e., prospective sensemaking 
(Mantere 2013, Mantere and Sillince 2007, Patvardhan 2015), and a strategy for achieving that vision 
through a necessary leadership style (Delisle 2007, Smith 1994, Thoms and Kerwin 2007, Watkins 2009, 
Wensley 2003). For example, through being influenced by an institutional entrepreneur (Marti and Mair 
2009, Tracey et al. 2011), especially for the achievement of project strategies and benefits (Christenson 
and Walker 2008, Walker et al. 2008b). Following the work by Bakker et al. (2016), Burke and Morley 
(2016), Carter et al. (2015), Drescher et al. (2014), Friedrich et al. (2009), Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), 
Uhl-Bien (2006), I define collective institutional leadership as an emergent phenomenon constructed 
through the purposive (inter)actions of organisational actors in creating, maintaining, and disrupting 
institutional project relations aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change initiative – that is, when there are discrepancies between expectations and reality, such as, an 
organisational response to a crisis or an unexpected event, which ‘triggers’ the need for sensemaking. As 
leadership is not a ‘thing,’ but a strategic, relational and co-evolving effect institutionally constructed in 
individual and organisational (inter)actions. Here there are multiple realities of leadership moving through 
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space and time (Uhl-Bien 2006). Capturing this emergence, that is, a shared sense of group identity 
(Drescher et al. 2014, Haslam and Reicher 2007) or institutional logic (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) towards 
the uniqueness of temporary organising (Bakker et al. 2016, Burke and Morley 2016) aligned with an 
institutional reality (Ashforth et al. 2011, Weick et al. 2005) at the front-end of projects (or programs) is 
critical to achieve a relatively stable state of (inter)actions for project policy success: the means-end 
relationship. Such a phenomenon in the relational actor space is seen as front-end institutional project work 
which includes the action-meaning cycles of sensemaking i.e., sensemaking, sensebreaking and 
sensegiving (Ashforth et al. 2008, Maitlis and Christianson 2014) among and between organisational actors 
that enables interpretations and (inter)actions to comprehend the ‘changed’ project world, see Figure 6-9. 
This finding is contrary to existing literature on leadership that views traditional leadership as static 
phenomenon with formal and individualistic actions of behaviour i.e., individual agency (Lichtenstein et 
al. 2006, Uhl-Bien 2006), which rather still dominates the project strategy literature. This study begins to 
address this gap in the literature.  
 
Figure 6-9: Front-End Institutional Project Work (Sensemaking) 
What emerged from the data was a pattern of collective institutional leadership relations and its effect on 
achieving a relatively stable state of (inter)actions aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness 
of the organisational change initiative – in this case study, a hybrid project network temporarily ‘changing’ 
from their ‘permanent’ structures to an ‘action team’ to respond to an unfolding economic emergency in 
Australia. This is expressed by Participant-5C, Project Manager from Infra-GC: ‘…culture was excellent, 
team was very good. It made it all the more worthwhile. When your team is good, that’s the most important, 
when you have a good team who you can ride with and run with, it makes a big difference. Your motivation 
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factors are very high…’ This led me to induct the constructs of creating institutional project relations, 
maintaining institutional project relations, and disrupting institutional project relations aligned at the 
front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative through legitimate or 
illegitimate means. I define these constructs as creating/maintaining/disrupting institutional project 
relations through front-end institutional project work and the coevolution of distant and situated 
mechanisms of institutional project work to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
project reality. This is also seen as strategically shaping institutional project reality, the relational actor 
space, in alignment at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change through 
action-meaning cycles of sensemaking.  
 
The results indicate that collective institutional leadership is in part determined by the actions of 
organisational actors in creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutional project relations aligned at the 
front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, which significantly effects 
achieving mega infrastructure program of projects strategies and benefits. 
 
Creating Institutional Project Relations. The actions of creating institutions involves defining rule systems, 
conferring property rights, constructing normative networks of actors, collaborative co-creation and 
competitive convergence, and developing support for those rule systems through advocacy, theorising and 
educating (Zietsma and Pedersen 2009). It also needs legitimacy within the project environment to survive 
and thrive. Legitimacy is defined as actions within an institutional framework that are considered desirable, 
proper or appropriate within a socially constructed system (Scott 2014). Although it can take a number of 
forms or logics, the one most appropriate for the implementation of project policies is work that focuses on 
changing the norms or belief systems, which is embedded in communities of practice and associated with 
practices that parallel or complements existing institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Here individuals 
transcend from the intrasubjective (‘I think’) to the intersubjective (‘we think’) to an institutionalised reality 
(‘it is’) (Ashforth et al. 2011). This type of work, although effortful and time consuming, which the data 
shows, is also the most co-operative. This is illustrated with the initial implementation of the program (or 
at the front-end of the program) which ‘triggered’ the need for sensemaking and unique temporary 
organising. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG), seen as an adversarial decision-making body 
operating under an ‘unanimity rule’ with insufficient policy presumptive reasoning (Painter 1996), which 
includes the Prime Minister, State and Territory Premiers and Chief Ministers and the President of the 
Australian Local Government Association, announced – in necessitarian and consequentialist rhetoric – on 
5 February 2009 a funding of AUD $14.7 billion for the rapid implementation of the program. It was 
delivered through ‘cooperation’ among federal, state and territory governments and the non-government 
education sector: 
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The Prime Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government 
Association, together with Commonwealth, State and Territory Treasurers, held a special meeting of the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in Canberra … to ensure rapid delivery of economic 
stimulus measures to support employment and growth and to foster a more resilient Australia (Council of 
Australian Governments 2009a, p. 1).  
The Prime Minister, State Premiers, and Territory Chief Ministers also co-signed a national partnership 
agreement, which was labelled and untested as a new federal financial relations framework, to confirm their 
commitment to the implementation of the program. However, it must be stressed that the national 
partnership agreement was not a legally binding nor enforceable agreement, but rather a memorandum of 
understanding, a ‘formal handshake,’ or more accurately an ‘agreement’ based on political morals between 
ministers and governments. Such disjointed ‘agreements,’ with multiple, competing and deeply politicised 
morals or identities, especially in the Australian intergovernmental context for policy implementation (i.e., 
different jurisdictional responsibilities, political pressures and views of the ‘world’) are breeding grounds 
for post-Machiavellianism i.e., multiple players and sources of advice operating in contestable 
environments and competing to influence final decisions, and ‘irrationality’ in the decision-making process 
(Jones 2010). However, rather than dictating how things should be done, the national partnership agreement 
focused on achieving mutually agreed strategies and benefits, high level governance arrangements to 
stimulate the economy, and provided the states flexibility in the way they delivered the program (Council 
of Australian Governments 2009b). Basically, it was a devolved approach to program delivery (Australian 
Public Service Commission 2013).  
 
Simultaneously, and following consultation with the education authorities, the Commonwealth released the 
program guidelines. This implies there was a coordinated, but an illusory level of sensemaking and 
sensegiving between the Commonwealth and states on the rules or practices for rapid program 
implementation. Illusory in the sense that government agencies did not have enough time to form reasoned 
and just arguments for or against policy implementation. Program sensemaking was restricted, as the 
Commonwealth promoted overarching accounts of the Australian economic issues i.e., global financial 
crisis in need of rapid stimulus measures i.e., the program, which the state government ministers accepted 
with relatively few attempts to provide alternative interpretations and courses of action. This is a typical 
Machiavelli trait: as ‘speakers who invoke rhetoric of necessity [necessita] generally want to push policies 
through against the resistance of those who demand more time to evaluate the situation, consider different 
courses of action, and weigh foreseeable consequences’ (Benner 2009, p. 138). Demonstrating insufficient 
presumptive reasoning (Blair 2012), the Commonwealth entered a state of prima facie program 
implementation – this could be seen as the start of program failure. These two documents were the ‘bible’ 
of the program. Although it was a rather effortful and time consuming process with a strong necessita 
partnership narrative, it enabled the swift creation of institutional program relations – a high degree of 
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unique temporary organising in the hybrid project network – through legitimate informal i.e., government 
values, norms and culture, and formal i.e., national partnership agreement and the program guidelines, 
relational mechanisms. This constituted the emergence of collective institutional leadership in the relational 
actor space. In this initial phase of the program all parties saw its implementation through the one lens: a 
temporary alliance lens. This action of creating institutional program relations with a rather strong esprit 
de corps is further advanced at the state government level by Participant-1A from Infra-GA, an Executive 
Director: 
The structures and the hierarchy from a vertical level can cause major grief in projects like this and a lot 
of it just boils down to simple confidence from the minister down in terms of delivering a project, and 
you don’t want to go through enormous layers of bureaucracy to be able to get a decision made. […] 
when the program was announced the director of capital programs rang me and spoke to me and asked 
me […] to come and work on the BER […] There was a governance structure put in place and at that 
stage the structure for governance included Infra-GB and Infra-GA. We had the executive director 
meeting at another governance level with the director from Infra-GB and there were some moves to ensure 
that sign offs and delegations could be managed between the executive director of Infra-GA and the 
director of Infra-GB. There was information flow to the minister, there were regular meetings so that the 
minister and chief executive were kept aware so that everybody was in the know but the delegations and 
the decision-making was very easily had from our governance group in terms of program delivery. There 
was only one layer up to actually get sign off (Participant-1A).  
In addition, Participant-1B from Infra-GB, a Senior Project Manager, quote reinforces this team collegiality 
within the concept of creating institutional program relations: 
Infra-GA created their own workforce or their work team, which they were predominantly all government 
employees; we created the work team here, which were predominantly private sector. But, for all intents 
and purposes it was one team […] (Participant-1B). Similarly, Participant-1D from Infra-PA, a Principal 
Consultant, states that: ‘exemplary behaviour… clear strategies, good teams, tough negotiations, there 
was a strong sense of leadership to create different cultures across the whole program … we adopted a 
different culture, a fast-paced culture and environment for the program.’  
The data shows that initially the program participants achieved a relatively stable state of (inter)actions 
through the action-meaning cycles of sensemaking i.e., creating institutional program relations aligned with 
the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change. For example, senior organisational actors at the 
state level instigated and lead change in their organisations by sensemaking i.e., questioning who are the 
right people or what is the right temporary ‘action team’ to deliver the program, then sensebreaking i.e., 
breaking-down traditional hierarchical program structures for a relatively high degree of temporary agency, 
and finally sensegiving i.e., creating the right institutional ‘action team’ aligned with the temporary 
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uniqueness of the organisational change to achieve the program strategies and benefits. Furthermore, 
organisational actors engaged in actions of advocacy through the mobilisation of political support at 
Commonwealth and state government levels, through direct and indirect techniques of social persuasion of 
necessity to rapidly but in a rather restricted manner implement the program. Rules for the program were 
defined with the creation of the national partnership agreement and program guidelines. This provided 
decision-making flexibility to the education authorities but also constrained institutional program relations 
and (inter)actions to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality: revealing a 
organising weakness in the temporary uniqueness of the hybrid project networks. According to the 
Commonwealth, such a relational constraint is warranted to achieve the stimulatory nature of the program 
(Australian National Audit Office 2010). However, such a view proved to be a major program fallacy. For 
example, the transition from an aligned intrasubjective (‘Commonwealth implementing the program’) to 
the intersubjective (‘governments implementing the program’) and to a unique temporary organising 
institionalised program reality (‘the stimulus program’) was illusory. Program rules were vested from the 
Commonwealth to the states with the reallocation of property rights, providing the states with flexibility in 
the way they delivered the program (a degree of ‘intersubjective program reality’). However, this still 
required the prior approval of the Commonwealth (overarching degree of ‘intrasubjective program reality’), 
with each state having to submit an implementation plan outlining their delivery approaches.  
 
Organisational and agency actors also created new temporary institutions, which paralleled or 
complemented existing ‘permanent’ institutions, with the aim to change institutional logics to capture the 
temporary uniqueness of the program. Although organisational and agency actors were used to 
implementing school-based infrastructure, such traditional program management approaches were highly 
impracticable to the stimulatory nature of the program i.e., from ‘permanent’ organising structures to 
temporary organising as an unique ‘action team,’ as this was not business as usual, as the then Prime 
Minister related, ‘…for nation building to work, it’s got to be translated into real projects on the ground 
and translated onto the ground quick smart … we were in uncharted, unprecedented times … It won’t be 
business as usual for our bureaucracies…’ (Rudd 2009). To address the complex task and swiftly coordinate 
(inter)actions, organisational and agency actors created new institutions through mimicry of pre-existing 
program management practices: a failure in alignment with the temporary uniqueness of the program. This 
was more evident with the state government agencies, where they tended to mimic or juxtaposition pre-
existing program management practices for rapid program implementation. For example, education 
authorities submitted implementation plans to the Commonwealth which tended to reference pre-existing 
project and program policies, standards and practices i.e., instrumental technocratic processes – revealing 
their isomorphic or ‘iron cage’ project management practices. Additionally, the education authorities 
institutionalised new rules to adopt to the stimulatory nature of the program such as flexibility in timeframes 
for the commencement and completion of projects, project variation approval processes, and reporting 
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structure. However, the data shows that such a change in temporary institutional logics –  that is, creating 
institutional program relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the program was insufficient to 
achieve the program strategies and benefits: there was an overall collapse in the facilitation of 
organisational sensemaking i.e., restricted with a single and dominate interpretation of the issues, 
sensebreaking i.e., breaking-down traditional hierarchical program structures for a relatively high degree 
of temporary agency, and sensegiving i.e., juxtaposition pre-existing program management practices in 
endeavour to achieve the program strategies and benefits.  
 
The data also shows that the Commonwealth and the education authorities did not sufficiently change the 
‘temporariness’ of their normative associations and project networks, relying on pre-existing or 
‘permanent’ normative practices, where such a change in temporary institutional logics i.e., aligned with 
the temporary stimulatory nature of the program, is essential for creating institutionally aligned program 
relationships – the ’glue’ that connects organisational and agency actors to form a collective identity, a high 
performing temporary ‘action team,’ or a truly aligned institutional program reality through front-end 
institutional project work. Instead the Commonwealth saw the implementation of the program through their 
lens, their social reality – where most social processes of (inter)action were situated – with a focus on 
legitimising their identity. It also showed an absence, almost non-existent practice, of theorising – 
sensegiving – that is a strong communicative narrative, and educating actors in the skills and knowledge 
necessary to support the temporary uniqueness of the program i.e., an institutional entrepreneur, which is 
essential for the normative paradigm in changing institutions and institutional logics aligned at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change. This may have been due to the rapid 
implementation of the program to simulate the economy, but considering its scale and impact on community 
values and norms, it is surely no excuse. More so than not, it indicates a potential threat to organisational 
identity which is a precursor for powerful sensemaking (Weick 1995). The Commonwealth government’s 
identity, as a sovereign governing entity, could have potentially fallen if it did not ‘make-sense’ of the 
economic issues and rapidly implement the program through the rhetoric of necessity – more on this later.    
 
The three forms of creating institutional work, that is, mimicry, theorising and educating focuses primarily 
on the cognitive side of institutions, that is the ‘beliefs, assumptions and frames that inform action by 
providing meaningful and understandable interaction patterns’ (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, p. 228), thus, 
deeply facilitating the sensemaking process. In addition, according to Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 
228), ‘mimicry draws on existing patterns of action in order to articulate and legitimate new practices and 
structures; theorising develops concepts and beliefs that can support new institutions; and educating 
provides actors with the knowledge necessary to engage in new practices or interact with new structures.’ 
These theoretical constructs in conjunction with the data suggest that the implementation of the program 
had a significant normative and cognitive deficit, a poorly articulated program narrative, where most of the 
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rules reflected overt political or bureaucratic work: reinforcing the collapse in the facilitation of 
organisational sensemaking aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change at the 
front-end. This is where actors reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access to 
material resources (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Furthermore, there was no clear articulation of a strategic 
intent for the program – an inspirational and sustainable vision and mission statement – which is essential 
in creating and maintaining strong institutional program relations. There was no ‘statesman,’ an institutional 
leader or entrepreneur to embed the necessary temporary institutional changes including values and a 
mission of the program into everyday program reality i.e., high performing temporary ‘action team’ to 
achieve the program strategies and benefits. Although it can be argued that the ‘vision’ of the program was 
a desire for the Commonwealth government to provide economic stimulus and reduce the effect of the 
global recession – a consequentialist lens – on Australia by long term investment to improve school-based 
infrastructure. The rules of the program supported this unprecedented and utilitarian intent; however, it did 
not have enough substance to form an inspirational and sustainable strategic intent i.e., powerful strategic 
discourse, embedded with strong normative and cultural-cognitive mechanisms for actors to work 
collectively as a high performing temporary ‘action team’ towards achieving the program strategies and 
benefits: a significant deficit in actioning the uniqueness of temporary organising i.e., towards an ‘action 
team,’ or action-based entrepreneurialism. Though the general direction given was: charge! The explicit 
end was rather open. This is a typical Machiavellian trait: send troops into battle ‘blind’ to avoid 
responsibility for policy failures (Benner 2009).  
 
Maintaining Institutional Project Relations. Similar to creating institutional project relations, with the main 
difference being maintaining legitimate and institutional project relations aligned at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, and thus, project policy survival. This requires 
three things: manage internal consistency of the organisation, develop external support mechanisms to 
maintain survival and obtain legitimacy of an organisation, and engage in actions to overcome external 
enemies (Washington et al. 2008). Here the focus is on maintaining relations which underpin an institution 
or institutional logic aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change 
initiative. This is achieved by adherence to rule systems i.e., enabling, policing and deterring, and 
reproducing norms and beliefs i.e., valorising/demonising, mythologising, embedding and routinizing 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). The data shows that managing internal consistency of the program was 
constraining the emergence of a collective identity and an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality: significantly undermining the core principles of sensemaking i.e., noticing cues, creating 
interpretations, and taking action to align with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change. As 
aforementioned, the program lacked an institutional entrepreneur to articulate and enact a vision, mission 
and values through powerful narratives – to cope with the program’s complexities. According to Hill and 
Levenhagen (1995, p. 1057) an ‘entrepreneur must develop a vision or metal model of how the environment 
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works (sensemaking) and then be able to communicate it to other actors or partners and gain their support 
(sensegiving),’ which is imperative in maintaining strongly aligned institutional relations in times of such 
complex change. This lacklustre in maintaining institutional program relations aligned with the program’s 
temporary uniqueness is related by Participant-1C, a Senior Manager from Infra-GC: 
[…] there wasn't a close working relationship amongst some of the senior people within the organisation, 
the governance models were fairly adversarial. There really wasn't much of a sense of shared ownership, 
I think there was a group of individual, parts of the organisation working alongside each other rather than 
working in a genuinely shared way (Participant-1C). 
Similarity, Participant-1E, Senior Manager from Infra-PC, also illustrates the impact on a project mission 
with a weak identity in maintaining aligned program relations in the relational actor space: 
It was beset by politics at every level […] there was such a conservative culture […] a culture of 
uncertainty and bureaucracy and process which really outweighed the way mission become embedded 
(Participant-1E). 
Although this view tended to be rather consistent from participants – that is, a failure in sensemaking and 
sensegiving, and thus temporary organising, which led to failings in the organisational change initiative 
[this will be explained later in further detail], what emerged from the data was a pattern of adherence to 
rule systems through the process of enabling, policing and deterring institutional program work. These 
enabled actors to achieve a relatively stable state of (inter)actions i.e., instrumental technocratic processes, 
which significantly constrained the formation of an unique temporary organising institutionalised program 
reality. For example, new national coordination arrangements were created i.e., oversight group, 
coordinator-general and national coordinators to support program implementation. This suggests, as shown 
by the data, that maintaining institutional program relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change was predominately achieved through policing. Such a program narrative spells 
disaster in creating and maintaining strongly aligned institutional program relations. In this case, one must 
seriously question the feasibility of top-down control, or hierarchical interactions, of change programs, as 
those lower down in organisations i.e., project managers, are active shapers of the way initiatives develop 
(Balogun and Johnson 2005, Rouleau and Balogun 2011). This is illustrated in the national partnership 
agreement and program guidelines, and to an extent the implementation plans, which adopted robust 
regimes of performance monitoring, reporting and auditing. This suggests that the Commonwealth adopted 
a rather authoritative stance or narrative for temporary organising over the states and the education 
authorities. This included sanctions of public humiliation and halting funds if states failed to meet agreed 
funding benchmarks. The Commonwealth also demanded ongoing disclosure of project information, for 
example, whether projects were meeting delivery timeframes and objectives, cost overruns, advice on 
possible strategies and interventions to prevent any slippages. Essentially, there was a significant amount 
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of overseeing of work from the Commonwealth on state government agencies for implementing the 
program and achieving stimulus measures: a low degree of temporary agency. The role of the 
Commonwealth was a regulator and inspector. This tended to form coercive and constraining barriers in 
maintaining institutional program relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change or a collective program identity, which is an essential requirement of sensemaking for such a 
temporary organisational change i.e., comprehend the world and act collectively. Such coercive 
mechanisms tend to stem from external pressures, as aforementioned, to conform and gain legitimacy i.e., 
threat to organisational identity, which may actually deinstitutionalise acts, thus questioning the validity of 
the legitimation of an institution (Mollering 2006). Such constraining work is more visible and apparent 
than cognitive or normative work. However, at the state level, organisational and agency actors infused 
normative practices into participants, on a daily, weekly and even monthly basis, thus facilitating recipient 
sensemaking processes to achieve an alignment of interpretation in their own realities (showing signs of 
macro-deinstitutionalisation), or more so ‘lateral’ interpretations of program reality for collective action. 
These stabilising normative practices in maintaining institutional program relations aligned with the 
temporary uniqueness of the organisational change is related by Participant 1-A, a Senior Manager from 
Infra-GA:  
[…] Infra-GB and Infra-GA worked really well and from program delivery point of view we utilised their 
services, we were having monthly meetings with them … but be that as it may there needed to be regular 
reporting frameworks, regular activity, regular targets, regular information flow to ensure that the 
confidence was maintained (Participant-1A).  
Participant-5C, a Senior Program Manager from Infra-GC, also provided some insights into the normative 
practices of managing project risks that maintained institutional program relations:  
We had risk registers meeting every week. We would come around and share the issues and risk and learn 
from each other and the team was working out very well. So, I would listen to Participant-11C, from 
Infra-GC, for example, he has got the issue with the principle and other guys would learn issue about the 
[school] problem that I'm having with the external cladding and so we were constantly learning from each 
other (Participant-5C). 
Thus, the alignment of institutional program relations were maintained and reproduced through stabilising 
influences of embedded routines, repetitive practices and action-meaning cycles of sensemaking i.e., shared 
frameworks of information flow and knowledge diffusion. Although these are powerful mechanisms that 
‘glue’ institutional program relations i.e., lateral processes of communication (informal verbal exchanges) 
that infuse temporary ‘action teams,’ especially in a context of rapid temporary organising, one impetus of 
such influences is someone with the ability to make fast and painful decisions. This is related by Participant-
2C, a Senior Manager from Infra-GC: 
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We used to have a weekly meeting with Infra-PA, they had a program manager. We would have a monthly 
meeting with Infra-PA and the project managers. But I know Infra-PA were having more regular meetings 
outside of that with the project managers. In-house, we would have a monthly steering committee meeting 
with Participant-9C, and a few other people would sit in… [like the] …state service co-ordinator… 
Anyway, there were lots of discussions but sometimes on the ground I was vested with a lot of authority, 
so I would make decisions about things. Sometimes that would be, ‘You need to do this. I am going to 
take that project off you and give it to that person.’ That really got a few people steamed. There were 
contractual issues there, but for me it was just taking noise out of the system. But, yeah, there was a formal 
governance, but there was a lot of informal governance going on as well (Participant-2C). 
These theoretical constructs in conjunction with the data suggests that maintaining institutional program 
relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change had a significant (as with the 
creating institutional project relations construct) normative and cognitive deficit: insufficient change in the 
temporary uniqueness of their normative associations and hybrid project networks. Effort was more focused 
on adherence to hierarchical and formal rule systems (written and spoken): traditional instrumental 
technocratic processes and isomorphic pressures associated with their ‘permanent’ structures, rather than 
on the reproduction of norms and beliefs in maintaining institutional program relations aligned with the 
temporary uniqueness of the organisational change.  Such systems are coercive and tended to significantly 
constrain the relational actor space (inter)actions to achieve a sense of collective institutional leadership 
towards a high performing temporary ‘action team.’ Here organisational and agency actors tend to focus 
more on adhering to rule systems (formal verbal communications), rather than enacting institutional norms 
needed to align with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change, which enables a complex 
system to influence and shape organisational behaviour (i.e., enabling system of influence) towards 
achieving the program strategies and benefits. 
 
Disrupting Institutional Project Relations. Although creating and maintaining institutional project relations 
aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative is essential 
to achieve a relatively stable state of (inter)actions, organisational and agency actors also need to be aware 
of project relations being disrupted by individual or collective actors. This form of disruption, which is also 
seen as sensebreaking i.e. reconsideration of senses, questioning underlying assumptions, and re-examining 
the course of action (Maitlis and Christianson 2014) in the relational actor space, can either be achieved 
through legitimate or illegitimate means. Additionally, it is seen as conformity or non-conformity to 
existing socially constructed systems of rules, norms, values and beliefs (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). 
Here the focus is on attacking, undermining or challenging the mechanisms that lead members to comply 
with institutions (Giuliani 2016, Lawrence 2008, Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). This involves mechanisms 
such as disconnecting sanctions, disassociating moral foundations, questioning or undermining 
assumptions and beliefs. In essence, it is the ‘destruction or breaking down of meaning’ (Pratt 2000, p. 
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464). The data shows that these types of disruptions, which were minor throughout the program, were 
particularly evident when the Commonwealth amended the program guidelines. However, these disruptive 
changes, although legitimate, reduced certainty and constrained flexibility for the education authorities. For 
example, difficulties with the Commonwealth program rules arose from measures introduced to ensure 
progress (i.e., silent on construction commencement, more realistic timeframes to procure work), guidance 
on the use of allowable funding (i.e., inconsistent funding terms and agreements which required legal advice 
and subsequent ministerial approval), rules governing project variations (i.e., authorisation process for 
variations), and changes in payment schedules (i.e., smaller and more regular funding instalments). In 
addition, the Commonwealth did not consult, nor entered sufficient action-meaning cycles of sensemaking, 
with the education authorities on some of the amendments – they practically dictated the relational actor 
space: again reinforcing the collapse in the facilitation of sensemaking aligned with the temporary 
uniqueness of the organisational change, and the predominance of an instrumental technocratic process to 
program implementation. This tended to constrain relationships and detract from the emergence of an 
unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality. Such constraints arose around rules 
establishing more realistic timeframes was illustrated by Participant-2C:   
They were impossible… no, I won’t say impossible, nothing is impossible. Their deadlines were, from 
my point of view, very aspirational and, given the circumstances we had here in [this state] … and, as it 
played out, for the rest of the country – it would have been very difficult for us to have met those timelines 
(Participant-2C). 
Participant-1F, a Senior Program Manager from Infra-PB, illustrates when institutions are disrupted based 
on normative foundations, that is institutional practices:  
[… the senior program manager…] was trying to co-ordinate, she was trying to co-ordinate the Infra-PA 
groups, and with [the other manager’s] groups, and then we brought them all in under my group, briefly 
as their own teams … we moved out of that internal structure and had our own world, we reported directly 
to Participant-2C … (Participant-1F). 
Here traditional institutional program management practices or logics were legitimately disrupted and 
aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change i.e., a high performing temporary 
‘action team,’ which introduced more streamlined practices with the aim to achieve the program strategies 
and benefits. Although this tended to undermine existing beliefs or institutional logics, it actually facilitated 
new ways of (inter)acting which was unopposed, and actually favoured, by existing actors. Such a process 
can be seen as a licence to critique where an ‘empty space’ is explored via dissensus for creative solutions 
(Christensen et al. 2015). Participants also expressed this to be non-compliance (or non-conformity) with 
existing rule systems for program implementation. Such a process underpins the essence of ‘breaking down 
meaning’ i.e., questioning current institutional logics, and then realigning institutional logics (new course 
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of action) to the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change to achieve the program strategies and 
benefits. Participant-2C relates another example with the disruption of management practices or 
institutional logics: 
To be fair [the senior manager] is a very shy man … [and]… socially he was very introvert, whereas me, 
I mean, I'll go and talk to anyone. For me, I initially sent Infra-PA an email, I sent them a coffee invitation, 
which they all came to, and I said, ‘Look, I don’t know how this works, but this is what I'd like to do.’ 
They said, ‘We love this, we've been dying to talk to you guys.’ They said, ‘Infra-PA has been keeping 
us away’ and I think [the senior manager] was blaming Infra-PA, and Infra-PA were blaming [the senior 
manager]. So I just went around there. They're my program managers, that doesn’t stop me having a chat 
to them … even Infra-PA came changed their project director or program director and said their project 
director, or program manager head, wanted to start working with me. Now, Participant-1D is the guy who 
was running it, I get on well with Participant-1D, and he was the right person to set that up. But once we 
then got to a point where we were at delivery, we needed someone with a lot more people engagement. 
Participant-1D was not good at people engagement; very technical, very good. Then that's why they've 
replaced him with [another senior program director], and [he is] much more people-oriented (Participant-
2C).  
Basically, Participant-2C instigated and led change with the enactment of a ‘fresh’ cycle of sensemaking 
(or otherwise sensebreaking) i.e., less about directing and controlling and more about facilitating recipient 
sensemaking processes (informal communication) to achieve an alignment of interpretation towards an 
unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality. The participant was a ‘statesman,’ truly 
transforming the relational actor space towards an aligned, or ‘managed,’ taken-for-granted 
institutionalised program reality. Although legitimately disrupting institutional project relations through 
sensebreaking was considered the ‘norm,’ especially for such a large and complex program, which tended 
to favour the program environment as an enabling influence, program relations were also illegitimately 
disrupted. This was destructive and significantly constraining on the formation of an unique temporary 
organising institutionalised program reality. This is seen as the emergence of program anomie, the 
Machiavellianism, in the relational actor space. For example, the program’s implementation was fiercely 
debated in state and federal elections during program delivery, organisational and political actors were 
‘breaking down’ the program for political means, and eventually, the program’s normative institutional 
framework was severely disrupted with a change in leadership and government. Actors adopted dissociative 
narratives and techniques to disrupt institutional practices. This is related by Participant-1C: 
… [the state’s] change in government in 2010 when we were still at the very height of delivering the BER 
we had an incoming coalition government that were very critical of the BER program in its entirety, not 
just the way it was delivered but the fact that it should never have occurred in the first place. So there was 
probably not a strong political interest in seeing it through to be a success; they really were just trying to 
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minimise the fallout rather than actually make it a success. So that presented particular challenges where 
the opposition which became the government had been highly critical of both the BER program and the 
way it was delivered in opposition and they continued that rhetoric when they became government which 
made it very hard for the [education authority] to actually win the credibility back from communities and 
schools when they had their own government criticising the program. Many of the individual projects 
from the program got affected by local politics (Participant-1C). 
Another example of illegitimate program disruption, and Machiavellianism, is illustrated by Participant-
11C, a Project Manager from Infra-GC:  
[…] But if a school principal said, you know, ‘We're not getting what we want, the school community 
with all the money that you're providing which is a one in a life time sort of injection, we're not getting 
what we want.’ Then you get a lot of feedback through the ministerial members who would be saying, 
you know, ‘We've given you $3 million what are we getting for it? Are we getting value for money? Why 
can't they get what they want,’ […] the local members … interfered so much that … there’s a level of 
frustration that the interference isn’t warranted, it’s effectively chewing up time, distorting the outcome 
and just annoying (Participant-11C). 
A substantive insight taken from the data on disrupting institutional program relations aligned with the 
temporary uniqueness of the organisational change concerns the influence of institutional pressures on 
different agency actors. Such institutional pressures can be characterised as the institutionalisation of self-
interest in the guise of utilitarianism (Johnson and Duberley 2011), or ‘totalising’ the relational actor space 
that hold some actors ‘captive’ to relentless coercive, normative and cognitive pressures for conformity 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). The data shows that this was associated with political elites who operated 
with heightened awareness of, or politically ‘militarised,’ their social environment to undermine or redefine 
program rules or logics to reconstitute actors or reconfigure institutional logics or the relational actor space: 
pursuing a divergent program identity and reality. These actors had a sophisticated understanding of the 
normative boundaries of the program and meanings of institutions including political, and mobilised the 
necessary powers to shape the relational actor space to achieve their desired ends with a sense of immunity. 
This type of institutional work can also be seen as ‘boundary work,’ or politicisation, relocation and 
institutionalisation of boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Here organisational and agency actors 
disrupted institutional program relations that were aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change through manipulating social and symbolic boundaries, which is a powerful medium 
through which people acquire status and monopolise resources (Lamont and Molnar 2002). As according 
to Machiavelli: ‘War is just to whom it is necessary’ (Benner 2009, p. 147, quoting Machiavelli). The war, 
in this case the program, was seen as unjust to those actors who opposed its necessity, which motivated 
them to take action. Such disruption to the relational actor space tends to be seen with large-scale changes, 
such as revolutionary change, war and imminent economic failure (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), and 
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dynamically fragmented systems (i.e., loosely coupled inter-organisational networks) where actors pursue 
different interests (Sydow 2006). Following on from the construct or mechanism of collective institutional 
leadership, and contextually intertwined, is informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project work, 
which influences and shapes relational actor space (inter)actions to achieve an unique temporary organising 
institionalised program reality.  
 
Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work 
The data revealed that front-end institutional project work (sensemaking) is influenced by four distinct, but 
intertwined, mechanisms: (a) distant associational institutionalisation, (b) situated associational 
institutionalisation, (c) distant instrumental institutionalisation, and (d) situated instrumental 
institutionalisation. Although distinct and despite their one-dimensional sense of influence, in reality they 
are cross-cutting in nature and continuously shaping relational actor space (inter)actions and hybrid project 
networks in achieving program strategies and benefits. With these influential mechanisms, distant means 
that power is exercised at a distance i.e., far spatial reach, and situated means that power is exercised in the 
present i.e., face-to-face communication and interaction. Additionally, the major differentiating factor is 
the quality of communication. Acting at a distance is less tangible than face-to-face interactions which 
involve body language and gestural symbols (Allen 2003). In these constructs power is also exercised by 
different means: associational and instrumental. With associational as a medium, power is seen as ‘power-
to’ or integrative action, which acts like a collective medium i.e., exercised with others, whereas 
instrumental power as a medium, is seen as ‘power-over’ or dominative action, which acts like an 
authoritative medium i.e., exercised over others (Allen 2003). The relational characteristics and outcomes 
of these influential mechanisms are highlighted in figure 6-10. These influential mechanisms in the 
relational actor space will be now explained in further detail under the constructs of informal and formal 
mechanisms of institutional project work. 
 
Informal Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work. The literature on informal or normative governance 
mechanisms tends to focus on the institutionalisation of normative i.e., values, norms, morals and even 
cultural mechanisms to develop a collective consciousness (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, 
Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, Eisenhardt 1985, Surel 2000). These normative mechanisms are able to 
influence organisational relations – for the better or worse (Delmas and Toffel 2004, Dyer and Singh 1998) 
in rationalising decisions on the implementation of mega infrastructure program of projects. Although the 
literature discusses the importance of normative governance mechanisms, including the theory on trust and 
control (Bachmann 2001, Das and Bing-Sheng 1998, Das and Teng 2001, Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, 
Luhmann 1979, Puranam and Vanneste 2009, Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003) in strengthening 
organisational and agency relations, it is particularly distant on the literature of power and its influence on  
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Figure 6-10: Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work. Figure partially adapted from Allen (2003). 
governing relations in rationalising decisions for project policy implementation. This study begins to 
address this gap in the literature.  
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What emerged from the data was a pattern of informal power relations and its influence on co-ordinating 
the expectations and (inter)actions between organisational actors in rationalising decisions for the 
implementation of mega infrastructure program of projects. This led me to induct the constructs of situated 
associational institutionalisation and situated instrumental institutionalisation. I define these constructs as 
shaping relational actor space (inter)actions based on social power, trust and risk relations. These are now 
discussed in more detail. Although in a formal sense informal power-over, or situated instrumental 
institutionalisation, is conceived as a vertical relationship which tends to produce negative results (see 
Gohler 2009), more precisely, it is about identifying the medium i.e., people, political, cultural, 
informational, knowledge and norms, through which power is exercised and diffused, which gives it 
effectiveness as an influential factor in rationalising decisions to achieve project policy strategies and 
benefits. This is illustrated by Participant-1F from Infra-PB, who was a Senior Program Manager: 
[…] so in terms of us managing […] we needed to be clear on what the rules of engagement were, so 
there was a framework that we had to work to and we needed to be clear on what that meant and how we 
would engage you know, day to day in terms of management […] that allowed us to communicate with 
the stakeholders as to what … [and]… how they could then engage with it. So if their engagement was 
through us, we needed to be clear on what we did and we could inform them what we did or what we 
needed to do and so if they had […] if they wanted to influence the outcomes or make change or drive 
change, we could clearly communicate with them the best way to do it.  Sometimes it was directed through 
us, sometimes our advice would be another avenue. ‘We’re happy to support you but under the rules of 
engagement we can’t, and if you need to go and have a conversation with someone else from a different 
aspect, usually political, then we would understand when it comes back to us, we would understand where 
it’s coming from (Participant-1F). 
This influential factor is further related by Participant-1A, a Senior Manager from Infra-GA: 
The structures and the hierarchy from a vertical level can cause major grief in projects like this and a lot 
of it just boils down to simple confidence from the minister down in terms of delivering a project, and 
you don’t want to go through enormous layers of bureaucracy to be able to get a decision made 
(Participant-1A). 
What the emerging pattern in the data shows is that even though the participants did not exercise, nor in 
some cases even were delegated with, formal power to make decisions, they could influence the relational 
actor space based on situated instrumental institutionalisation. Thus, achieving a sense of a collective 
identity or an temporary organising institutionalised program reality. This was exercised and diffused 
through people and other normative mechanisms such as culture, trust, information and knowledge. 
Although seen as asymmetrical, power in this sense was practically symmetrical, embedded within social 
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relations, which enabled the emergence of collective action in rationalising decisions to achieve the project 
policy strategies and benefits. This now brings us to the next construct of informal power-to, or situated 
associational institutionalisation, in rationalising decisions.  
 
The data also revealed that situated associational institutionalisation was a significant influential 
mechanism through which power was exercised and diffused in rationalising program decisions. This is 
related by Participant-1B, a Senior Project Manager, from Infra-GB: 
We did a procurement and implementation plan, which was signed off. So, after that really the only bind 
was when there was an issue on site, you know, school was upset at what they were getting or progress 
or whatever and that didn't happen very often either, that they decided to escalate the issue up through 
government or through MPs, but we had very few of those. And again, that was because we had 
information sessions for schools, we got all the principals coming to a session across their area and they 
could bring along a member of their school council. So, again it was that early communication 
consultation explaining the framework I think went along way to helping get a relatively smooth delivery 
of the program (Participant-1B). 
This is further related by Participant-4C, a Senior Project Manager, from Infra-GC: 
[…] it wasn't exactly like a war but there was a job to be done and everybody knew it had to be done and 
I think there was a lot of cooperation at a horizontal level right through. I don't think there was any power 
playing. […] there was this learning experience that everyone was participating in and there was good 
fundamental knowledge and good thinking around. There was a lot of sharing […] of knowledge and 
opinions. […] it was really informal (Participant-4C). 
Although politics, or political power, could have significantly constrained the relational actor space in 
rationalising decisions i.e., escalating issues with the education authorities, ministers or a member of 
parliament, which is seen as the bureaucratisation of relations (Gohler 2009), such hierarchical and 
bureaucratic decision-making was relatively tamed due to the allocation of informational resources that 
made program relations more integrative, effective and collective. This enabled the emergence of a 
collective program identity i.e., strong identification in the relational actor space and a strong esprit de 
corps of a temporary ‘action team.’ Actors were able to see and make program decisions through the one 
lens – a collective means to an end – which besides developing a high level of stakeholder trust in governing 
relations (Dietz et al. 2010), which is a ‘lubricant’ to high performing temporary ‘action teams’ (Wildman 
et al. 2012), were also able to show commitment (Mintzberg and Westley 2010) to program policy strategies 
and benefits.  
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Although situated associational and instrumental institutionalisations are essential to governing the 
relational actor space, the data also shows that it is highly dependent on informal trust and risk relations 
between organisational and agency actors. For example, if an organisational actor trusts another actor i.e., 
a strong sense of empathy, integrity and identification in the relational actor space, it enables the emergence 
of an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality, which significantly decreases 
relational risks and increases program performance. This tends to be due to the fact that as experience grows 
between actors in a relationship, communication patterns will develop i.e., high relational cues, and norms 
will emerge and embed over time thus reflecting the level of trust and performance of a relationship (Dowell 
et al. 2015), which is a typical representation of a high performing temporary ‘action team’ (Mckinney et 
al. 2005). What this suggests is that the way actors see informal trust and risk relations, especially in the 
early phase of a relationship, is not only imperative in creating and maintaining positive relationship 
outcomes, but a powerful influential factor in the means-end relationship in rationalising decisions. This is 
particularly related by Participant-1B: 
[…] we were able to work with Infra-GA because of our, I guess years of experience in delivering their 
projects. We're able to very quickly provide some very sound information on the buildings that had 
worked well. […] So, it was very much a governance structure by trust […] I think probably the main 
reason for its success was the fact that the two departments worked together as one unit of work 
(Participant-1B). 
However, such positive relations were not always created nor maintained in the program, which is related 
by Participant-7C, a Senior Project Manager from Infra-GC:  
The culture of it there is no trust, because everybody doesn't want to take the chance if something goes 
wrong. […] it's become such a thing within the culture that everyone is so busy watching their back and 
their position that it's created inefficiencies of great scale (Participant-7C). This was similarly related by 
Participant-4C: I think then down to an [executive level] who was highly pragmatic and engaged in 
program delivery but then supported by two at the time [senior managers]; one who had a leadership role 
[…] and operational responsibility. I think tactical level and a small power and political level, that mix 
never quite worked, there was never a level of trust and transparency within the organisation for it to be 
a well-run program (Participant-4C). 
A substantive insight taken from the data shows that horizontally, or laterally, intertwined decision-making 
had a significant positive effect on the level of trust and risks in governing program relations. Here actors 
tended to rely on the past actions in program relations, maturity of individual program actors and the fast 
pace of implementation which effected relationship performance: signifying a truly formed high performing 
temporary ‘action team’ (Hollenbeck et al. 2012, Jacobsson and Hällgren 2016, Katzenbach and Smith 
1994). Integrity trust i.e., norms, values and morals was the main enabling factor that strengthened the 
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relational actor space in rationalising program decisions. This also tends to be see in rich cultures with a 
deep net of interactions (Langley et al. 1995). This was particularly evident at the front-end phase of the 
program. However, when decision behaviour is vertically intertwined, it is an impetus for politics 
(Eisenhardt and Iii 1988, Pfeffer 1992b), which the data reveals, had a negative effect on program 
performance relations and in rationalising program policy decisions. Here the positive relational 
characteristics of situated associational and instrumental institutionalisation were practically non-existent 
i.e., high relational trust and identification in the relational actor space. Actually, the negative characteristics 
of the mechanisms i.e., lack of trust and weak identification, appeared to be concealed and surfaced in the 
latter phases of program relations. This absence of commitment to strengthening relations significantly 
constrained and corroded relational actor space (inter)actions, representing relational spaces as ‘cold,’ and 
led to ‘boundary work’ or disrupting institutional program relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness 
of the organisational change through acts of manipulation and deception: a significant deficit in actioning 
the uniqueness of temporary organising i.e., towards a high performing temporary ‘action team,’ or action-
based entrepreneurialism. Without such a ‘powerful’ relational actor space, ‘the necessary confidence in a 
partner to meet obligations would not be met, ensuring the relationship does not continue’ (Dowell et al. 
2015, p. 126). With such low-quality connection between actors, there is death in every interaction (Dutton 
and Heaphy 2003).  
 
Formal Mechanisms of Institutional Project Work. The literature on formal or regulative governance 
mechanisms tends to focus on organisations as a mechanical, long-driven and engineered system of 
interactions (Baligh 2006, Lorange 1998). As with informal mechanisms of institutional project work, these 
formal mechanisms influence and reflect organisational and agency relations – its identity for the better or 
worse (Ashkanasy et al. 2014, Pratt and Rafaeli 2001) in rationalising decisions on the implementation of 
mega infrastructure program of projects. Although the literature discusses the importance of regulative 
governance mechanisms in strengthening organisational relations (Bijlsma-Frankema and Woolthuis 2005, 
Edelenbos and Eshuis 2009, 2012, Inkpen and Currall 2004, Klijn et al. 2008, Klijn and Snellen 2009, 
Teisman et al. 2009b, Vlaar et al. 2006, Woolthuis et al. 2005) it is particularly distant, as with the previous 
construct, on the literature of power and its influence on governing relations in rationalising decisions for 
project policy implementation. This study begins to address this gap in the literature.  
 
Similar patterns emerged from the data as with informal power relations with the difference being in the 
spatial nature of power. Here power is exercised at a distance and less tangible. This led me to induct the 
constructs of distant associational institutionalisation and distant instrumental institutionalisation. I define 
these constructs as shaping relational actor space (inter)actions based on prescribed power, trust and risk 
relations. These are now discussed in more detail.  
 
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
194 
The data shows that distant instrumental institutionalisation was particularly evident during the front-end 
and execution phases of program implementation. The Commonwealth used contracts, program guidelines 
and administrative decisions to govern the relational actor space with the education authorities in the 
execution phase, but with minimal facilitation of sensemaking aligned with the temporary uniqueness of 
the organisational change at the front-end phase of the program. Additionally, education authorities used 
standard industry contracts to establish rules for projects with contractors. Such formal mechanisms of 
institutional work serve a number of principal functions in a partnership. This includes binding parties to 
carry out actions, specifying rules, providing evidence of the nature of the agreement and its enforcement 
(Blomqvist et al. 2005), and the facilitation of sensemaking in organisational relationships (Vlaar et al. 
2006). The data also shows that these formal arrangements were the dominate and least abstract 
mechanisms governing program-based relations, particularly during program execution. Thus, signalling a 
relatively weak temporary organising institutional environment. It was seen as the ‘third’ actor, an 
authoritative and hierarchical actor, acting as a communicative and governance (i.e., transmission of 
information for sensemaking and sensegiving) tool amongst and between actors. Such formal mechanisms 
are seen as transactional contracts, an illusion or misrepresentation of organisational reality (Wierdsma 
2004), which tend to focus more on outputs or outcomes (Das and Teng 2001) and little on ‘personal’ 
activities or relational contracting (Camen et al. 2011) to form strong relational or social bonds. Where 
such bonding is an absolute necessity for the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change i.e., high 
performing temporary ‘action team.’ Additionally, these mechanisms signal and communicate hierarchical 
or ‘top-down’ relationships (Pratt and Rafaeli 2001), and predominately incorporate structural bonding to 
reduce uncertainties in relationship outcomes (Camen et al. 2011, Gounaris 2005). Such formal 
mechanisms of institutional work also tend to threaten the well-being and stabilisation of relationships, as 
organisational actors do not strive to equalise the distribution of power in relations (Ling et al. 2014), which 
tends to deplete social bonding as an important trait in fostering trust in partner relationships (Gounaris 
2005). Such governance mechanisms, are also a basis for partner asymmetries, opportunistic behaviour, 
and Machiavellianism (Heath 2009).  
 
In an effort to drive the rapid delivery of the program, the Commonwealth assumed a greater authority than 
was envisaged under the national partnership agreement i.e., taking an authoritative stance on program 
relations. This is illustrated by Participant-1C:  
The [education authority] made a number of decisions to ensure that we could meet the Commonwealth’s 
requirements which were primarily about expenditure and shortness of time. There were decisions made 
around much less consultation, so communities were not engaged, they were basically told: ‘You’ve got 
this amount of money, this will get you this project we’re putting in this spot and you don't need to worry 
about the budget and the engagement, we’ll just take care of that for you. […] a lot of communities didn't 
feel a great sense of ownership of what they were getting and felt it was imposed on them meant that no 
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matter how good a design or how timely or how well the budget was managed, they were never going to 
feel a sense of connection to what was delivered. So I think the fact that the organisation made a conscious 
decision not to consult, and that was done for a legitimate reason around time limit. I think it actually cost 
more time in the end through wrangling with local governments, communities and local members and the 
Commonwealth throughout all the iterations […] than if the consultation had just been done right the first 
time (Participant-1C). 
This resulted in rapid tensions between the Commonwealth and the education authorities i.e., 
disidentification in the relational actor space. Participants also expressed that the program was delivered on 
a more traditional or relationship model i.e., the ‘permanent’ structures of the hybrid project networks, 
rather than on a partnership or relationship model as envisaged in the national partnership agreement i.e., 
temporary alliance. This resulted in weak social bonds and increased transaction costs, which is a sign of 
relatively weak institutional logics in partnership arrangements (Adobor 2011). Additionally, the 
Commonwealth adopted structural bonding i.e., financial sanctions to closely monitor the relational 
behaviour of the education authorities. Such mechanisms foreshadow the emergence of a collective identity 
or institutionalised reality through interactions (Ashforth et al. 2011) which affects rationalising decisions.  
 
What the emerging pattern in the data shows is that distant instrumental institutionalisation significantly 
influenced the relational actor space in rationalising decisions. It tended to constrain the emergence of 
strong relationships and a collective identity to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality. Such emergence of strong relations is an impetus for making rational decisions, especially 
at the front-end phase of program implementation.  
 
The data also revealed that distant associational institutionalisation significantly influenced institutional 
project work. With the program, the Commonwealth and the education authorities delegated organisational 
actors with certain responsibilities in delivering the program. Such arrangements, that is delegating some 
decision-making authority to inter- and intra-governmental agents is beneficial to the principal as he or she 
is bound rationally and unable to engage in all activities or tasks in a timely and effective way (Barney and 
Hesterly 2006). Additionally, this facilitates an enabling program environment, for example, empowering 
actors to make faster decisions, more social interactions, sensemaking and sensegiving, information flows 
and knowledge diffusion, which enables the emergence of a collective program identity. However, such a 
formal governance mechanism adopted for the program does also have a number of problems, which can 
and tends to constrain the emergence of an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality. 
This centres around the notion of behavioural rationality with policy implementation processes, in 
particular, information asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazard in rationalising decisions (Jones 
et al. 2006).  
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The Commonwealth has a well-grounded history with the education authorities in implementing programs 
aimed at improving school-based infrastructure. This suggests that there is a relatively high level of inter-
organisational antecedent trust in relations for program policy implementation. However, the 
Commonwealth has never implemented such a rapid temporary program with the education authorities, 
even though there are partner similarities and common understandings (i.e., government agencies, similar 
portfolios and institutional arrangements). This is related, once again, by the Prime Minister: ‘…we were 
in uncharted, unprecedented times … It won’t be just business as usual for our bureaucracies’ (Rudd 2009). 
Subsequently, the Commonwealth did not know a priori the exact qualifications or competencies of the 
education authorities to deliver such a fast pace program. Being in such a position, agents may exaggerate 
their ability to attain contracts (Jones et al. 2006).  
 
The data shows that such adverse selection was present in the program. The national partnership agreement 
set out arrangements, agreed by governments, including project implementation plans submitted by the 
education authorities outlining their rapid delivery approaches. Although the education authorities 
provided, to a limited extent, explicit strategies used to fast track processes, they also provided little 
assurance on their competencies to deliver such a rapid program – as aforementioned, adopting 
predominately a ‘business as usual’ approach i.e., instrumental technocratic processes. This tends to be 
seen in highly institutionalised organisational routines or logics (i.e., government agencies), that is, 
regularly and habitually performed programs of action (Mollering 2006, Nooteboom 2007). In other words 
the Commonwealth was unknowingly in a ‘competency trap’ (see Patzelt and Shepherd 2008), persisting 
with partnerships in an underperforming program. Being in such a position (i.e., Commonwealth’s 
reputation or identity on the line), may motive managers to lower performance aspirations and persist with 
a partnership despite underperformance (Patzelt and Shepherd 2008). The data shows that such a situation 
transpired in the program.  
 
The Commonwealth lowered the program performance aspirations, changed unachievable project 
milestones and increased funding resources, and persisted with the ‘business as usual’ partnership approach 
with the education authorities in an underperforming program. The sunk and reputational costs for 
terminating the program would have been too great for the Commonwealth, thus it continued with the 
underperforming program. Secondly, the Commonwealth lacked the necessary resources and ability to 
constantly monitor the education authorities. This shows an absence of competence-based trust and 
complexity in integrity-based trust (Connelly et al. 2015) with the education authorities to fulfil their 
agreement obligations. To resolve such problems including continuing with the underperforming program, 
the Commonwealth developed a monitoring and performance information plan, or more accurately labelled 
as a monitoring regime, to assess the extent to which the program was implemented successfully, met its 
identified priorities and effectively achieved its strategies and benefits. Although it tends to be seen in a 
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negative light, such program formalisation does have an advantage, being in that is facilitates sensemaking 
among participants in inter-organisational relationships (Vlaar et al. 2006). However, an absolute impetus 
here is that organisational actors make sense of equivocal inputs and enact this sense back into their world 
to make it more orderly (Vlaar et al. 2006, Weick et al. 2005). But the data shows that such sensemaking 
for program ‘orderliness’ to transcend into an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality 
was farfetched, practically non-existent, and significantly plagued with Machiavellianism and tribalism. 
This includes data integrity issues and an absence of reliable program performance information to make 
rational decisions i.e., program outcomes of economic stimulus and job creation in local communities, and 
modern teaching and learning environments for school and community use. Sensemaking continually 
dominated the intrasubjective or individual cognitions about identity (‘Commonwealth implementing the 
program’) with minimal transcendence to the intersubjective or shared cognitions (‘governments 
implementing the program’) and into the temporary uniqueness of an institutionalised program reality (‘the 
stimulus program’). There was minimal discourse reciprocity within the discursive resources adopted for 
the program (i.e., program information flow and knowledge diffusion) between the actors, or the ‘relational 
actor space for enabling action’ orientated towards program strategies and benefits, to achieve a collective 
identity or an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality. As Mckinney et al. (2005, p. 
216) state that ‘to successfully accomplish an interaction, the sender must correctly signal and the 
respondent much appropriately reciprocate.’ There was a lot of action, but minimal interaction in the 
relational actor space.  
 
The decision to focus predominately on competence-based trust and authoritative control (i.e., output, 
outcome and behavioural) with the education authorities, ‘forced’ the Commonwealth to persist with an 
underperforming program. The Commonwealth was in a highly intractable position: continue with the 
underperforming program and believe that ‘favourable’ adjustments will be made in the future to achieve 
the desired program strategies and benefits; or terminate the program and ‘absorb’ sunk and reputational 
costs. However, this would also require decision consensus with the education authorities and COAG – a 
highly unlikely scenario especially considering the overriding strategic objective of the program was to 
stimulate the Australian economy. Thus, the Commonwealth decided with the former, continue with the 
underperforming program. In addition, the implementation of such a monitoring regime increased program 
transaction costs (i.e., costs in monitoring) and timeframes (i.e., time spent drafting and renegotiating 
commitments, and resolving conflicts), and thus negatively impacted program performance. For example, 
the monitoring regime showed inconsistences or misrepresentations with the national partnership 
agreement, conflicts with interpretation, and minimal consultation with key program stakeholders including 
the education authorities on the implementation of the plan, particularly at the front-end. Such arrangements 
tend to diminish the benefits of ‘noncalculative’ trust, that is the values and norms in a relationship 
(Nooteboom 2002), including knowledge sharing and learning outcomes (Fulmer and Gelfand 2012) that 
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are essential to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality and make rational 
program decisions. This could be seen as the ‘achilles heel’ in the program, a disjointed means to achieve 
the desired end, and being in such a non-transcending state is practically impossible to conceive a strong 
collective identity (Ashforth et al. 2011), which was required for the temporary uniqueness of the program. 
This is where most of the action and enabling action was orientated towards – the survival of the 
Commonwealth as an entity. This phenomenon can be seen as ‘structural program manipulation’ within a 
dysfunctional persisting program.   
 
However, such agency problems were not so prevalent with the education authorities. For example, Infra-
GA and Infra-GB (both state government agencies) have a well-grounded history on infrastructure program 
delivery, or hybrid project networks, thus demonstrating relatively high individual, team and organisational 
institutional-based trust antecedents and identity i.e., high level of institutionalisation for the delivery of 
school-based infrastructure. In addition, their program tasks are reciprocally interdependent, which enables 
the generation of constructive or enabling feedback loops (i.e., sensemaking and sensegiving), learning and 
knowledge diffusion, and the increased need for relational coordination in rationalising decisions to achieve 
program strategies and benefits. This is illustrated by Participant-1B:  
‘…we were able to work with Infra-GA because of our … years of experience in delivering their projects. 
We're able to very quickly provide some very sound information…’. And reciprocated by Participant-1A: 
‘…Infra-GB and Infra-GA worked really well and from program delivery point of view we utilised their 
services…’. 
Being embedded in such strong partner relations each partner ‘begins to use the mind of the other as it were 
an extension of his own’ (Patzelt and Shepherd 2008, p. 1221). These cross-level or institutional ripple 
effects were also experienced with some schools. However, such cross-level institutionalisation ripple 
effects were distant with Infra-GA and its program manager and other project management firms. It had 
similar contagion effects i.e., authoritative decision-making, minimal facilitation of sensemaking and 
sensegiving in the relational actor space, as the Commonwealth had with the education authorities. In 
addition, such institutionalisational effects cascaded from Infra-GA to the program manager and to project 
management firms. The more the micro-institutional effects cascaded the more the program become weaker 
and volatile to disruptions. It entered a state of perpetual deinstitutionalisation. 
 
Such enabling relational co-ordination is imperative in fast paced environments (Gittell 2012). For example, 
the rapid implementation of the program, where organisational actors needed to make decisions ‘on the fly’ 
and ‘adjust their actions rapidly in response to each other and newly emergent information, without wasting 
additional time referring problems upward for resolution’ (Gittell 2012, p. 402). Such relations were highly 
beneficial for achieving program performance outcomes. Additionally, organisational, or program-based, 
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actors operating under such strong institutional environments tend to choose trust and other normative traits 
as the dominate governance mechanism for co-ordinating expectations and (inter)actions between 
individuals and organisations. Thus it can be argued that the organisational environment of some state 
government agencies created a credible program identity i.e., became institutionalised, self-referential for 
and aligned with the collective (see Ashforth et al. 2011) to achieve the program strategies and benefits, 
and validating its existence as an entity.  
 
However, such a micro-institutional program identity, or the intersubjective identity within a state, had 
minimal affect in influencing the actual program (macro-institutional program identity). The data shows 
that this is due to the absence of social interaction for sensemaking, sensegiving, knowledge diffusion, a 
constraining policy environment, bureaucratic and weakness in temporary organising the uniqueness of the 
program including the construction of other state collectives of the program. It was in a continuous state of 
dysfunctional temporary organising institutional program reality. The necessary level, and the fundamental 
traits, of the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change was never achieved. This can also be seen 
as ‘identity foil’ (Ashforth et al. 2011), where the Commonwealth partly disidentified itself from the states. 
Under the national partnership agreement, the states were ultimately responsible and accountable for the 
way they delivered the program. However, each state’s program delivery decisions were predominately 
constrained by the Commonwealth, thus causing a level of institutional program dissensus amongst the 
education authorities. Showing signs of ‘two-faced politics,’ or more accurately structural program 
manipulation, which is a sign of Machiavellianism i.e., the lion and the fox (Benner 2009). Here the 
education authorities found it challenging to form an allegiance, or a temporary alliance with the 
Commonwealth. They also believed that the Commonwealth boundaries were rather impermeable and 
insecure, and thus began to identify and build a consensus with fellow state government program actors 
i.e., forming an allegiance to and embedding an unique temporary organising micro-institutionalised 
program reality. Such allegiance identification also transcended, or rippled, across to other state education 
authorities, as related by Participant-1A:  
The Commonwealth government has always been an issue in terms of what they want and they would say 
that it's prescribed. But then states have a way of manipulating the prescription and then states …[are]… 
talking to one another to find out how the other states are going to deliver in case someone else has got a 
better idea. So there is collaboration going on at a national level and sometimes depending on what's 
happening with the Commonwealth the states may meet outside of that Commonwealth meeting just to 
hear what's going on as well. Or the states will individually ring up one another, …[so]… there's behind 
the scenes stuff going on (Participant-1A). 
This need for collective action and transcendence of allegiance to other state government authorities 
enabled the emergence of a stronger temporary organising micro-institutionalised program reality, 
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increasing program performance and their collective power as an unique temporary organising micro-
institutionalised program. Such micro-institutional forces were felt by the Commonwealth. This also gave 
the education authorities a stronger sense of agency and program control, but such ‘dynamics’ also 
threatened the integrity of the program and the Commonwealth as a legitimate actor. Participants saw that 
the centralisation and bureaucracy of decision-making was hindering program performance – its integrity 
and viability – and decision-making decentralisation emerged amongst the education authorities. In the 
process the education authorities were also validating and maintaining their existence as a legitimate entity. 
Such a phenomenon can be seen as cognitive-behavioural restructuring, where ‘mutual social influence and 
the achievement of normative consensus are grounded in shared social identity’ (Haslam and Reicher 2007, 
p. 145) to form a collective identity. However, in order to reassure program integrity and alliance to program 
strategies i.e., deliver projects to stimulate the Australian economy, the Commonwealth implemented a 
monitoring regime, which was seen as ever-more onerous on the education authorities, and as a 
consequence, began to create deinstitutionalisation and insurmountable problems for the Commonwealth 
and its monitoring regime. The Commonwealth utopian for program policy implementation was turning 
into a dystopian nightmare.   
 
From a rather inflated realist perspective, if the Commonwealth and the education authorities focused more 
on trust based relations (i.e., integrity-based trust and competence-based trust) to achieve an unique 
temporary organising institutionalised program reality, then the Commonwealth could have potentially 
saved Australian taxpayers AUD $4.6 million in program management fees for ex post transaction costs 
per education authority (22 separate education authorities delivered the program, thus a cumulative figure 
of AUD $101 million), and each education authority could have potentially saved taxpayers AUD $42.9 
million (cumulative figure of AUD $943 million) in program management and other embedded services 
fees. This equals to an approximate potential taxpayer saving of 42 percent on program and project 
management fees. Overall the potential program savings to taxpayers would have been AUD $1.0 billion 
or 6 percent of the program cost (based on calculating the actual impact that an increase in trust has on 
transaction costs as described by Connelly et al. 2015). Even though this may seem like a rather arbitrary 
figure, it does show that trust, or more so distant associational institutionalisation is an essential mechanism 
for project policy implementation.   
 
What the emerging pattern in the data shows is that distant associational institutionalisation can 
significantly influence the relational actor space in rationalising decisions. It enables project- and program-
based actors to make rapid program decisions through delegation and decentralisation of decision-making 
authority. This is an impetus for an enabling program environment, including social interaction, 
sensemaking and sensegiving, information flows and knowledge diffusion to make rational program 
decisions. This is especially true for innovative project policy solutions, seen as socio-epistemological 
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technology (Peschl and Fundneider 2014). Here meanings materialise which enables transcending to a 
collective, and at times innovative, program identity or an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality. However, such a mechanism does have a dark side, a ‘double-edged sword,’ which can 
generate undesirable and unanticipated benefits and constrain the emergence of an unique temporary 
organising institionalised program reality. A program owner that fails to achieve a ‘balanced’ (i.e., trust 
and control) environment can enter an intractable and ill-fated position. An allocation of too much power 
with minimal sense back into a program can lead to an underperforming program and the formation of 
micro-institutions. Here program actors tend to continue with a dysfunctional program while distancing 
themselves from the program owner, but not necessarily the program, to survive as an entity. 
 
Although distant associational and instrumental institutionalisations are essential to governing the relational 
actor space, the data also shows that it is highly dependent on formal trust and risk relations between 
organisational and agency actors. In implementing the program, the Commonwealth incorporated overly 
prescriptive outputs, outcomes and behavioural control clauses in the national partnership agreement and 
program guidelines. Although such prescriptive controlling mechanisms make the outcome of relationships 
more predictable (Patzelt and Shepherd 2008), and enable the facilitation of sensemaking between 
organisational actors (Vlaar et al. 2006) to form a collective identity (Ashforth et al. 2011), it can also 
corrode relationships with its rigidity, loss of flexibility, and diminish trust (Vlaar et al. 2006). The data 
shows that these traits were evident in the program which significantly constrained the relational actor space 
to form a collective identity. The national partnership agreement was overly prescriptive and not done in 
partnership with the education authorities. It used authoritative program rules to influence the delivery 
activities. Education authorities expressed concern on the level of prescription imposed by the 
Commonwealth in its management of the program. However, through the devolvement of the program, 
flexibility was given to the education authorities with a reduction of prescriptive rules, and the ability to 
determine the most appropriate delivery approaches to achieve strategies and benefits i.e., procurement 
approach. Such an authoritative and prescriptive approach corroded macro-institutional and strengthened 
micro-institutional program relations. This is particularly related by Participant-1C: 
To really be able to manage a major project you’ve got to understand the relations and manage them 
carefully and also throw your weight around when you need to, but I think there was a sense from the 
Commonwealth that they didn't trust us, they didn't trust the information we were giving them and I think 
that meant that when things got difficult everything was that bit harder because there wasn't the basis of 
trust (Participant-1C). 
The participant saw that the Commonwealth did not trust their ability to deliver the program with the 
imposition of authoritative control. Such authoritative control is also illustrated by Participant-2C and then 
similarly afterwards by Participant-1A:  
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[…] Yeah. Commonwealth putting unreasonable deadlines around things; that's just a fact of life, we have 
to live with that, but at the same time we don’t want to compromise our standards to get what we need 
(Participant-2C). This was similarly related by Participant-1A: ‘… the Commonwealth government has 
always been an issue in terms of what they want and they would say that it's prescribed.’  
In addition, such authoritative control which significantly constrained the development of relations was 
related by Participant-9C: 
[…] the Commonwealth and State were in opposition; it became a football game […] there was a lot of 
political pressure […] there was ‘one-voice’ [being the Commonwealth]’ (Participant-9C).  
What emerged from the data was a pattern of authoritative control and its effect on trust to achieve an 
unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality. When an organisational actor, such as the 
Commonwealth, uses highly prescriptive outputs, outcomes and behavioural control clauses it tends to 
constrain the development of trust and social interactions (or social bonds) needed to achieve an unique 
temporary organising institionalised program reality. Such control mechanisms tend to decrease trust i.e., 
integrity-based trust in partner relations, and impair knowledge sharing and learning outcomes (Fulmer and 
Gelfand 2012), which is an essential basis for action to form a collective identity (Ashforth et al. 2011). All 
in all, the Commonwealth saw the relational risk too high (i.e., uncertainty in partner’s willingness to co-
operate or achieve program strategies and benefits, potential reputational or identity loss etc.) in the 
partnership, and opted for highly prescriptive control mechanisms thinking that it is an impetus to achieve 
program strategies and benefits. However, this is far from the ‘truth.’ It was actually an impetus for tribalism 
and Machiavellianism: organisational actors forming micro-institutions to achieve program strategies and 
benefits and survive as an entity, while questioning the legitimacy of the Commonwealth as a viable 
program actor.  
 
Figure 6-11 provides an institutional project governance framework based on the four mechanisms of 
institutional project work. As shown in the data, the relational actor space between the Commonwealth and 
state government agencies was associated more with distant-based institutional project governance 
mechanisms i.e., authoritative decision-making, representations of space as ‘cold,’ asymmetrical and low 
trusting relations. This leads to constraining influences in the relational actor space with other outcomes 
such as high transactions costs, low stability, weak identification and sense of morality, disidentification, 
and exacerbates Machiavellianism. However, the data shows that the relational actor space between state 
government agencies and their program managers was associated more towards situated-based institutional 
project governance mechanisms i.e., transverse decision-making, representational spaces as ‘lived,’ 
symmetrical, and high trusting relations. This leads to enabling influences in the relational actor space with 
other outcomes such as low transaction costs, high stability, strong identification and sense of morality, and 
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tames Machiavellianism. The institutional governance framework also shows that to achieve an unique 
temporary organising institutionalised program reality, the Commonwealth’s institutional program work 
should have focused more towards situated institutionalisation. 
Figure 6-11: Institutional Project Governance Framework 
 
Rational Agent 
The literature on rationalising decisions tend to focus on decision-making as a process (Langley et al. 1995, 
Mintzberg and Westley 2010, Parkin 1996), or as strategic and characterised by plurality (Buijs et al. 2009, 
Jean-Louis et al. 2007, Klijn and Snellen 2009, Kriger and Barnes 1992, Little 2015, Pettigrew 2003). This 
also includes organisational and political strategic decision-making (Child et al. 2010, Eisenhardt and Iii 
1988), strategic decision-making in professional and public organisations (Morris et al. 2010, Rainey et al. 
2010), and the importance of quality decision-making in project environments (Cooke-Davies 2009, Miller 
and Hobbs 2009, Mullay 2015, Parliament of Victoria 2012, Productivity Commission 2014, Victorian 
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Auditor-General's Office 2012b, Williams et al. 2009). Following the work by Almendares and Landa 
(2016), Ansar et al. (Forthcoming), Bakker et al. (2016), Burke and Morley (2016), Connelly et al. (2015), 
Dietrich and List (2013), Fast et al. (2012), Flyvbjerg (2008a, 2009a), Flyvbjerg et al. (2009), Klossek et 
al. (2015), Patzelt and Shepherd (2008), Weick (2009), Yarritu et al. (2014), I define a rational agent as 
minimising cognitive biases (i.e., systematic errors) in the decision-making process, aligned at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, based on strategic equilibrium-
based reasoning, including reason-based explanations (motivating) and reason-based justifications 
(normative). As motivations and justifications structure practical reasoning may change, a critical factor 
here is the way actors process information (i.e., sensemaking, sensebreaking, sensegiving, information 
flows, governance mechanisms, knowledge diffusion etc.) towards a joint intention. This is based on 
strategic equilibrium-based reasoning i.e., in the reasoning of decisions or committing to courses of action. 
When actors achieve a ‘level of social reality,’ or a sense of jointness (Almendares and Landa 2016), 
transcendence to an institutionalised reality or collective identity (Ashforth et al. 2011, Weick 1995, Weick 
et al. 2005) they identify the best courses of action and optimise choices (Landa 2006), thus, achieving a 
state as a rational agent. Being in such a state, agency actors can successfully achieve program strategies 
and benefits. 
 
Cognitive biases in rationalising decisions was beleaguered with mal-governance from program initiation, 
or the front-end of the program. On 5 February 2009, COAG announced the rapid delivery of the program: 
this commenced a ‘plague’ of Machiavellianism and tribal program behaviours. The Prime Minister, State 
Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers decided and agreed to implement the national partnership 
agreement, and rapid arrangements thereof, in a rather authoritative way. Education authorities had 18 
months, from date of approval, to design, procure, construct and complete projects. This contrasts with 
traditional timeframes applied to education authorities’ capital programs, where it can take up to 12 months 
to execute a construction contract, and an average timeframe between 38 to 45 months to complete projects. 
No program exemplar exists. Additionally, COAG provided minimal opportunities for the Commonwealth 
and state government agencies to provide input in drafting the national partnership agreement. Here COAG 
entered a state known as ‘discursive closure,’ when ‘a particular view of reality is maintained at the expense 
of equally plausible ones’ (Deetz 1992, p. 188) and precluded a licence to critique which could have 
‘stimulated sensitivity, quick adaption, and innovative solutions’ (Christensen et al. 2015, p. 135). This 
significantly constrained the relational actor space, especially the process of sensemaking, sensebreaking, 
sensegiving, and knowledge diffusion required to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality, and identify the best courses of action in achieving program strategies and benefits. 
Leaders being in such a powerful and salient structural or relational position tend to pay more attention to 
positive and rewarding information (for example, with the program, stimulate the economy by supporting 
employment and growth, and foster a more resilient Australia), rather than the process to make reasoned 
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decisions, which shape institutions towards an unique temporary organising institutionalised program 
reality. This leads to an overestimation of one’s accuracy in decision-making (Fast et al. 2012), and ‘blind 
rule following’ by agency actors (Christensen et al. 2015, Deetz 1992, Landa 2006). What is more, making 
such essential decisions in the ‘absence of adequate information hinders not only one’s own performance 
and ability to maintain power, but often hurts stakeholder communities’ (Fast et al. 2012, p. 249). Being in 
such a position, agency actors fall into a state of ‘irrationality’ (Landa 2006), and being unable to identify 
the best courses of action and optimise program choices. 
 
Such overconfidence in decision-making with corroding effects was a contagion in the program until its 
‘completion.’ For example, the national partnership agreement clearly states that the Commonwealth will 
develop the program guidelines in consultation with the states. However, such a partnership arrangement 
i.e., temporary alliance, especially consultation and knowledge diffusion, was practically non-existent. 
With the program guidelines, the Commonwealth imposed a powerful position, or sense of power, (i.e., 
greater control over how the program will be delivered) with overly prescriptive rules, or input controls, on 
the education authorities for governing the delivery of the program. This was not in spirit with previous 
arrangements nor initiatives. Additionally, the Commonwealth did not consult with other 
intergovernmental agencies (i.e., finance or treasury) on the content of the program guidelines. The data 
shows that such a constraining narrative was evident throughout the program. All in all, the education 
authorities and other intergovernmental agencies i.e., hybrid project network, where given minimal input, 
such as, sensemaking into the design of the program (i.e., capitalising on existing practices and knowledge), 
which significantly constrained relations and led to an underperforming program, and a deinstitutionalised 
temporary organising program reality. The Commonwealth’s rationale for such authoritative decision-
making with minimal consultation was the tight program timeframes and diverse stakeholder interests, 
which precluded the ‘normal’ consultation processes associated with such a large and complex initiative. 
However, no government agency including the Senate Committee saw this as a reasoned nor rational 
decision.  
 
Organisational actors in such powerful positions tend to make overconfident or ill-informed decisions, 
engage in less advice taking, exhibit less willingness to revise their decisions in the direction of an advisor, 
and have significantly less accurate final judgements than lower power participants (See et al. 2011). Such 
cognitive bias traits were evident in the case study. This is also applicable to COAG and the decision to 
implement the program, as people who associate themselves with powerful individuals tend to exacerbate 
their confidence in decision-making and performance outcomes (Fast et al. 2012, See et al. 2011). Besides 
overconfidence in decision-making, another cognitive bias that effected program performance was the 
illusion of control. Such illusory control, or a perceived control over outcomes, tends to be seen in powerful 
leaders and in environments of power asymmetries (Fast et al. 2009, Vlaar et al. 2006), which, therefore, 
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significantly effects performances and the formation of an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality, and thus, the rationalising of decisions. In addition, this tends to be seen in powerful actors 
who have a personal involvement in obtaining an outcome, and their self-esteem is at risk (Yarritu et al. 
2014). The data shows that this was the most dominate cognitive bias in the program, which made it 
practically impossible to form a collective program identity, and thus, the best courses of action for program 
implementation. A significant program implementation fallacy. For example, the education authorities 
submitted implementation plans outlining their rapid delivery approaches. However, the implementation 
plans provided little assurances on the education authorities competencies to deliver such a temporary rapid 
program – adopting predominately on a ‘business as usual’ approach or program narrative: an old mind set 
approach to program delivery. The Commonwealth was under the illusion that the education authorities 
could competently deliver the rapid program. However, this was far from the truth. Education authorities 
apparently had the relevant expertise and knowledge to deliver the program, where the Commonwealth 
rightfully devolved such roles and responsibilities to the states, but it was the process of forming a 
temporary institutionalised program reality aligned with the rapidity of the program – making reason-based 
justifications towards joint intentions – that led to the illusion of control, and other cognitive biases in the 
program.  
 
Being in such a state of illusion, the program experienced delays in meeting construction commencement 
and completion milestones, including revised milestones, and cost overruns which required the 
Commonwealth to reallocate funds from other programs. This illusion also led to a phenomenon known as 
escalation of commitment (Staw 1976). Here the Commonwealth had to decide to either invest more (i.e., 
14 percent or $1.7 billion) and continue with the underperforming program, or terminate the program. The 
Commonwealth was in ‘no-man’s land’ (see Brockner 1992). The Commonwealth decided the latter, as 
quitting here would have been prohibitively expensive and there would have been formidable political exit 
barriers (Drummond 2014). Also, the Commonwealth was time constrained to explore other viable 
investment options, especially considering Australia was about to fall into recession. This is also the most 
vulnerable time for erroneous project abandonment, and is most likely to be murky, as costs have been 
incurred, but other benefits are distant (Drummond 2014), and social identities, especially political, are at 
risk (Dietz-Uhler 1996). In addition, through a constructive dialogue process of sensemaking, 
sensebreaking and sensegiving with the education authorities, the Commonwealth revised the program 
guidelines and targets twice within about six months of program commencement: one-sixth of a way into 
the program. Such a program fallacy could have been prevented if the Commonwealth engaged with the 
education authorities at the front-end of the program (i.e., facilitation of organisational sensemaking, 
sensebreaking and sensegiving), prior to public announcement, to identify the best courses of action and 
optimise choices, and thus, potentially achieving a state as a rational agent. Such a myopic and unscrupulous 
vision can be traced back to COAG – an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality 
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aligned with the rapidity of the program never came to realisation. Although such program revisions looked 
extremely favourably on ‘paper,’ it was too little too late. The program ‘plane’ had already taken-off, with 
landing now being compulsory. At this stage of the program, both the Commonwealth and the education 
authorities were continuing with a underperforming program, nowhere near the temporary uniqueness i.e., 
a high performing temporary ‘action team,’ needed to achieve the program strategies and benefits. All 
parties to the program intentionally continued with the underperforming program. This reinforces the theory 
that individuals who identify strongly with a group or project (i.e., ‘program binding’) will remain 
committed to a failing course of action (Dietz-Uhler 1996). 
 
Additionally, the program costs were strategically misrepresented by the Commonwealth from program 
initiation. The data shows that the original costing of the program, hastily, unilaterally and ‘irrationally’ 
made within one week, was based on an assumed 90 percent utilisation rate of total potential funding by 
schools, but the utilisation rate was close to 100 percent, even though a number of agencies raised concerns 
with the Commonwealth on the viability of such program funding (Australian National Audit Office 2010). 
Such a situation significantly enhances the escalation of commitment (Drummond 2003). In addition, such 
illusions, strategic misrepresentations and an absence of constructive consultations i.e., lack of action from 
a wider, multilateral or non-partisan standpoint, to form an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
program reality, and thus, reasonings as a rational agent were also felt on the project front-lines. For 
example, schools were not given the right or appropriate infrastructure, projects continually being 
descoped, failure to receive value for money, schools dissuaded from having a voice, and even at times, 
funds being used for corrupt purposes. Such failure to achieve value for money on school based 
infrastructure was systemic in nature. Giving the appropriate information or learning, individual agents 
could have made optimal decisions and avoided significant sunk costs (see Navarro 2007). This 
significantly reinforces the value of achieving a ‘relational actor space for enabling action,’ where actors 
make sense of situations for the best courses of action orientated towards program strategies and benefits – 
achieving a state as a rational agent, a rational program agent. Besides being strategically misrepresented – 
fallen into ‘irrationality’ – and in a state of illusory control, the Commonwealth lowered performance 
targets and persisted with the partnership based on the belief that with competence and goodwill the 
‘partnership’ will ‘ride out’ the current storm. Such a phenomenon can been seen as cognitive dissonance 
(Patzelt and Shepherd 2008), or even optimism bias (Meyer 2014). Both the Commonwealth and the 
education authorities were powerful actors leading the program. They were personally involved in 
obtaining the desired outcomes in their jurisdictions, as opposed to forming an unique temporary organising 
institutionalised program reality aligned with the organisational change and achieving a state as a rational 
program agent. If either partner discontinued the program it would have significantly affected their self-
esteem, their reputations as a legitimate organisational entity, and the social costs of admitting failure would 
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have been too high (a phoenomeon known as self-presentation theory, see Drummond 2014), which all in 
all, would have eventually led to their demise.  
 
However, the Commonwealth decided to ‘soldier on,’ strategically avoiding the ‘sunk cost fallacy’ 
(McAfee et al. 2010, emphasis added), even with an underperforming program, sunk costs and wider 
economic benefits: a delusional rational agent. In addition, program funding was conditional on the states 
agreeing to be fully responsible for all ongoing recurrent costs and maintenance of the new and refurbished 
infrastructure. Therefore, future sunk costs matter on the rationality of the program (see McAfee et al. 
2010). For example, program funding was conditional on the education authorities, wherever possible, 
incorporating sustainable building principles to help reduce environmental impacts. These requirements are 
important as it minimises energy consumption and reduces ongoing infrastructure maintenance (i.e., 
electricity and water). However, the Commonwealth exempted projects from adhering to traditionally 
adopted ‘global area standard’ requirements. Even though states agreed to incorporate sustainable building 
principles, and the education authorities submitted implementation plans outlining how they would 
incorporate such principles, it was rarely implemented nor controlled by the Commonwealth – thus 
reinforcing the illusion of control. Such a limited focus on sustainable building design is going to 
significantly increase annual operating costs in the millions for the education authorities, not to mention 
the direct and indirect increase in environmental pollutants. Thus it was rather irrational for the 
Commonwealth and the education authorities to ignore future sunk costs i.e., long-term management 
approach in implementing the program (see McAfee et al. 2010). This places another question mark on the 
program’s value for money outcomes or benefits. However, as Drummond (2014, p. 437) puts it ‘in 
practice, a project really fails only when people will no longer support it.’ The data shows that the program, 
always, maintained enough support to be deemed a success, even though there is no evidence that the 
program strategies and benefits were nor ever will be achieved. Although the program can be deemed a 
success, the people of Australia were under the illusion that the program was a success, that is, achieving 
its strategies and benefits: a delusion of program success. Thus, conceptualising another cognitive bias: 
delusional program success.  
 
A significant insight taken from the data is the absolute necessity to focus predominately on creating a 
collective identity or a legitimate and an unique temporary organising institutionalised program reality 
aligned at the front-end with the organisational change initiative based on strategic equilibrium-based 
reasoning – a rational program agent – prior to the commitment of significant resources or prior to the 
program plan taking off. Figure 6-12 illustrates the emergence of program (or project) 
(de)institutionalisation. Had COAG, the Commonwealth and the education authorities achieved a deeper 
movement from the intrasubjective (‘the Commonwealth implementing the program’) to an intersubjective 
(‘governments implementing the program’) and then into an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
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program reality (‘the stimulus program’), especially at the front-end phase, they would have most likely 
have then made reasoned and more optimal decisions. They would have entered the state as a rational 
program agent. Decisions would have been made earlier, options explored and justified, especially on the 
viability of the program to achieve its strategies and benefits. However, another essential point taken here 
is the need for someone to make fast and painful program decisions. Such decision-making was absent in 
the program; when it was made, it was highly questionable. In the case of the program, COAG seen as the 
program initiator or sponsor, should have made an earlier decision to either persist with the program or 
discontinue with the program: either decision is going to be painful and costly. However, such a program 
framework (i.e., multiple actors), or overvaluing the existing ‘dysfunctional partnership’ which is rooted in 
cognitive biases emerging from multiple institutional levels (Klossek et al. 2015), made making rational 
program decisions practically impossible – a state as a rational program agent – and eventually led to 
program deinstitutionalisation and failure: major program or megaproject fallacy. 
 
Figure 6-12: Emergence of Temporary Program (De)institutionalisation. Figure partially adapted from 
Lawrence et al. (2001). 
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6.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the key findings that emerged from this study. Findings were organised into 
mechanisms and project action-based activities (or categories and themes) towards conceptual abstraction 
i.e., conceptual model, which then enabled the generation of new theory i.e., newly generated theoretical 
constructs, relationships, conceptual framework and proposition. Data from individual interviews, 
documents and the modified Delphi technique revealed participants’ perceptions of external and internal 
environmental factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. As is common in qualitative research, quotations 
were taken from interview transcripts to support researcher aims, illustrate ideas, illuminate experience, 
evoke emotion and provoke response (Sandelowski 1994). The primary finding of this study is that 
strategically shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of 
the organisational change initiative is essential for the successful implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. Additionally, the findings show that although the decision to implement 
a strategic governance framework is based on a combination of trust, power and control mechanisms, the 
key mechanisms to alleviate the risk of cognitive biases in rationalising decisions is a strategic governance 
framework predominately associated on situated-based institutional project governance mechanisms. This 
is particularly relevant and highly influential at the front-end of project policy implementation, or temporary 
organising, where the ‘trigger’ for sensemaking transpires. This finding emerged from the descriptions of 
almost all the participants. 
 
The findings also revealed that strategically shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end 
with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative is determined by four principal 
mechanisms: collective institutional leadership, informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project 
work, project reality, and rational agent. With collective institutional leadership, all the participants 
expressed that such a phenomenon involves creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project 
relations aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. 
Here the focus is on achieving a relatively stable state of (inter)actions. The participants also articulated 
that informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project work influenced the relational actor space 
(inter)actions to form an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality. This includes four 
distinct mechanisms of distant associational institutionalisation, distant instrumental institutionalisation, 
situated associational institutionalisation, and situated instrumental institutionalisation. Most the 
participants expressed an opinion that a program environment dominated by distant-based institutional 
project governance mechanisms led to ‘cold,’ asymmetrical and low trusting relations. While a program 
environment dominated by situated-based institutional project governance mechanisms led to ‘lived,’ 
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symmetrical and high trusting relations. This significantly influenced the level of cognitive biases in 
rationalising decisions – a rational agent –  particularly at the front-end of program policy implementation.  
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VALIDATION OF FINDINGS 
BY QUALITATIVE RIGOUR 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Seven Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
Provided the data analysis and interpretation of the case study including grounded theory as the analytic 
strategy, an inductive top-down approach to theorising, and entering a dialogue for the generation of new 
theory. 
What this chapter does: 
Provides the validation of the case study research through ‘qualitative rigour,’ which includes four rigour 
dimensions of construct validity, internal validity, external validity (or generalizability), and reliability. 
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Eight will provide evidence and reflections of the research process. 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable project 
managers to implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to eradicate 
potential ‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process.  
 
This chapter discusses the most critical aspect of qualitative research: the validation of research findings. 
Firstly, it discusses the dimensions of ‘qualitative rigour’ including reliability, validity and generalizability 
to enhance qualitative rigour which is researcher centered. At the other end of the spectrum, it also discusses 
trustworthiness as a mode of validation which includes credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. As this is a case study approach, the ‘natural science model’ is discussed as the most 
appropriate and influential model used to ensure rigour. This model includes construct validity, internal 
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validity, external validity and reliability as rigour dimensions. Additionally, to ensure high quality rigour, 
the research as adopted ‘talk the walk’ as a strategy which focuses on the priority ordering of validity types.  
7.2 Strategies for Qualitative Rigour 
The most critical aspect of qualitative research, ‘qualitative rigour’ (or formerly referred to as trustworthy), 
is heavily debated among the community of qualitative researchers (see Barusch et al. 2011, Bloomberg 
and Volpe 2008, Morse 2002, Morse 2015, Thomas and Magilvy 2011). For example, Morse (2015) 
recommends qualitative strategies of reliability, validity (or internal validity), and generalizability to 
enhance qualitative rigour. In her opinion, strategies for ensuring reliability, which have some caveats, are 
the development of a coding system and inter-coder agreement (i.e., only for semi-structured interviews), 
member checks, peer review debriefing (i.e., not usually a reliability issue, except for team research), 
triangulation, and external audits (i.e., do not ensure reliability). For validity, which all have caveats and 
limits their application, are prolonged engagement, persistent observation, think and rich description; 
negative case analysis; peer review or debriefing; clarifying researcher bias; member checking (which is 
not recommended); external audits; and triangulation. She provides a detailed rationale for the strategies, 
for example, with external audits she states that ‘external audits may reveal internal linkages as the theory 
develops, but it is not a routine strategy, and it is of limited use as a tool to achieve validity, not reliability’ 
(2015, p. 1219). All in all, she states that rigour is achieved through the process of data collection and 
analysis, which is researcher centered.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Thomas and Magilvy (2011) focus on the mode of trustworthiness as 
proposed by Guba and Lincoln (1989), Lincoln and Guba (1985). This includes the criteria of truth-value 
(credibility), applicability (transferability), consistency (dependability), and neutrality (confirmability). 
With credibility, a researcher aims to capture an accurate description or interpretation of participants’ 
experiences. Strategies include reflexivity, member checking, clarifying bias that a research brings to a 
study, peer debriefing or peer examination. Transferability focuses on the applicability of research findings 
or methods in other contexts or with other subjects. Strategies include the richness of the descriptions i.e., 
thick description, and the amount of detailed information provided by the researcher regarding context. 
Dependability, which parallels reliability, focuses on the processes and procedures used to collect and 
interpret the data. Strategies include an audit trail (e.g., discussing how and why the participants were 
selected for the research study), inter-rater reliability, and confirmability which occurs when credibility, 
transferability, and dependability have been established. The main strategy here is reflexivity, where a 
research maintains a sense of awareness and openness to the study. Their rationale is that researchers and 
their audiences need to have confidence and trust in the research findings, where such criteria facilitates 
the judging of the quality of a research. Taken together, what all the literature has in common is that 
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qualitative rigour, or the credibility of ‘scientific research,’ depends on reliability and validity, and the 
application of the ‘best’ strategies depends, as emphasised by Seale (2002, p. 108), on craftsmanship and 
‘methodological awareness,’ that is, the ‘thoughtful application of relevant criteria throughout the research 
project’ (Barusch et al. 2011). Morse (2015) comes to a similar conclusion with the statement that the ‘best’ 
strategies are the ones that ‘fit qualitative inquiry while also remaining consistent with concepts used by 
the larger social science community’ (2015, p. 1220). 
 
As the researcher has undertaken a case study approach, the most appropriate and influential model used to 
ensure rigour is the ‘natural science model’ (see Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, 
Gibbert et al. 2008, Piekkari et al. 2009). Although the model takes a positivist worldview, researchers tend 
to use the model as it focuses on concrete research actions, being construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability, rather than abstract criteria to ensure rigour in case study research (Gibbert 
and Ruigrok 2010), such a view is also adopted from interpretivist scholars (Silverman 2011, 2016, Yin 
2014). For example, Yin (2014) argues that researchers should follow systematic procedures, rather than 
‘subjective’ judgments, to ensure rigour in case study research. Patton (2002, p. 571) takes a similar view, 
in that, although there are ‘no clear-cut rules about how to do a credible, high-quality analysis,’ to ensure 
rigour, researchers should engage in systematic analysis. This includes engaging in systematic search for 
alternative themes, divergent patterns, and rival explanations, which is similarly advocated by Silverman 
(2011). Subsequently, this research adopts the four rigour dimensions of construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity (or generalizability), and reliability to ensure qualitative rigour, or more commonly called 
the ‘natural science model’ (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, Yin 2014). These dimensions have also served as 
a framework for assessing rigour in case studies in the field of strategic management (see Gibbert et al. 
2008), which is highly applicable to this research topic. Table 7-1 provides an outline of the strategies and 
dimensions adopted for this research.  
 
In addition, other strategies that are imperative for ensuring rigour in case study research are: (a) talk the 
walk: report concrete research actions rather than abstract criteria; (b) priority ordering of validity types: 
internal and construct validity over external validity; and, (c) necessity is the mother of rigour: creatively 
use setbacks and make best use of existing resources (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010). The authors recommend 
that with the ‘talk the walk’ strategy, researchers should focus on ‘concrete research actions taken, carefully 
relaying them to the reader so that he or she may appreciate the logic and purpose of these actions in the 
context of the specific case study’ (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, p. 727). With the ‘priority ordering of 
validity types’ strategy, researchers should focus on getting the priorities right and demonstrating the 
relationship among the four validity and reliability criteria. For example, prioritising internal validity and 
construct validity over external validity and demonstrating relationships among them. The third strategy, 
‘necessity is the mother of rigour,’ researchers should focus not only on the ‘talk the walk’ and ‘priority 
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ordering of validity types,’ but also describing some of the challenges and problems that emerged during 
the research process. For example, unexpected findings or the way researchers ‘problematized trade-offs 
and compromises in ensuring rigour in an often disarmingly honest and open way’ (Gibbert and Ruigrok 
2010, p. 730). Such qualitative rigour for each dimension will be discussed next. 
Table 7-1: Strategies for Qualitative Rigour adopted for this Research 
 Construct Validity 
With this dimension, I used the strategies of triangulation, thick description, transcripts and drafts of the 
evolving case study being reviewed by peers, audit trail or a clear chain of evidence, and reflexivity. 
 
Strategies Dimensions Comments 
Triangulation (i.e., different data 
sources including modified Delphi 
technique), thick description, 
transcripts and drafts of the evolving 
case study reviewed by peers (i.e., 
supervisors), audit trail or clear chain of 
evidence, and reflexivity. 
Construct 
validity 
Procedure leads to an accurate observation of 
reality (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, Patton 2002, 
Yin 2014), aided by reflexivity to check 
‘constructions’ of meaning (Schwartz-Shea 2014). 
Negative case analysis (i.e., rival 
explanations, falsification or refutation, 
examining competing views or voices), 
and reflexivity. 
Internal 
validity 
Presence of casual relationships between variables 
and results, avoid anecdotalism (Gibbert and 
Ruigrok 2010, Patton 2002, Yin 2014), aided by 
reflexivity by evolving understandings of purpose 
and theory (Schwartz-Shea 2014), that are 
powerful and compelling to defend the research 
conclusions (Gibbert et al. 2008). 
Use of theory to generalize (i.e., 
analytic generalization, case-to-case 
transfer), and rationale for case study 
selection. 
External 
validity 
Generalizability, theories must be show to 
account for phenomena in other settings (Gibbert 
and Ruigrok 2010, Patton 2002, Yin 2014), which 
can also be case-to-case transfer (Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech 2010, Patton 2002). 
Case study database (i.e., interview 
transcripts, electronic documentation, 
etc.), and case study protocol. 
Reliability Absence of random error, transparency and 
replication (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010, Patton 
2002, Yin 2014). 
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Triangulation. Triangulation helped me to identify different realities in order to obtain a ‘true’ picture and 
thus reduce bias and improve convergence of the data. This included a combination of qualitative (i.e., 
semi-structured interviews) and quantitative research (i.e., modified Delphi technique) designs, or 
methodological triangulation, to strengthen the research findings and enrich the interpretations. Such a 
strategy best matched the research questions. For example, the semi-structured interviews enabled me to 
control but not lead the interviews for in-depth interviewing (i.e., probing to keep discussions, obtain in-
depth information, and clarifications) and develop stronger trustful relationships with participants. 
Additionally, I gave participants an opportunity to continue the discussion, including adding any other 
insightful data, by sending participants a copy of the transcribed interview. For example, I asked the 
following question: ‘Would you like me to send you a copy of the transcribed interview, so you can see if 
I got it straight or if there is anything you would like to add?’ Participants were also happy for me to 
continue the interview, if needed, at another convenient time. This was a constructive experience for both 
the researcher and participants as it enabled both parties to reflect on the research questions asked, and if 
needed, obtain additional information. From the 17 candidates that decided to participate in the research, 
three pursued this avenue and provided additional information.  
 
In addition, most participants were known to me either from working together on previous projects or 
programs, or close colleagues. This included participants at executive level, middle management, and front-
line project management ‘troops,’ which provided diversity in the data. Being in such a position was also 
highly beneficial for data enrichment. For example, participants opened-up more as there was already a 
high level of antecedent trust, and participants provided or directed me to primary data documents. This 
saved me significant time searching or requesting for primary data documents under government 
legislation. For example, access to documents under the freedom of information act in the relevant 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, I used snowball sampling, via informants, to locate other research participants. 
This was more troublesome, as participants’ unknown to me through this process were unwilling to 
participant in the research, especially in a sensitive environment such as government portfolios. I overcame 
this hurdle through a number of mechanisms. Firstly, some unwilling participants had written memoirs and 
other similar publications which were rich in data and were seen as a primary data source. Secondly, 
participants were given the opportunity to contact the primary supervisor if he or she had any questions. 
One participant decided to exercise this right, and subsequent to reassurance of confidentiality by the 
primary supervisor, decided too participant in the research. I also encountered times when senior 
management used time demands as a convenient excuse for not participating. When this happened, I 
minimised participant’s time demands, made it clear why their investment of time is worthwhile, and gave 
the option to continue the interview at a later date, if needed. Participants were happy with this flexibility. 
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I also used archival records as evidence. The rationale being that the case study focused on the past, and 
that such analysis of evidence, in this case, provided valuable information. For example, considering the 
significance of the case study there were a number of auditor general reports, independent taskforce reports, 
and other parliamentary inquiries on the case study. All of these were seen as high quality data sources, as 
they are open and transparent (i.e., open to public scrutiny). However, such a process does have limitations. 
For example, some records requested under the relevant freedom of information legislation were not 
accurately stored. To overcome this, I was persistent and keep referencing the relevant legislation to gain 
access to the documents. However, upon retrieval of the documents it came with caveats. For example, a 
government agency imposed a search fee. Such a fee was outside the scope of the research funding, and 
consequently, I had to get an independent agency to review the imposed search fee. After arguing the 
significance of the research findings to the wider project management community and references to 
precedent legal cases, the government agency revised their decision, removing the search fees – almost one 
year after the initial request. In addition, other limitations are that some aspects of reality reflected in the 
archived records differed from the reality experienced by the participants that lived it. Government reports 
were also limited to scope including purpose, time and funding, which also tends to have an element of bias 
towards the government agency that procured the report. However, these archival records were used 
together with independent information to shed light on the case study. This is where thick description was 
beneficial to the research process, which will be discussed later. In addition to archival records, I also 
obtained other primary data documents including drawn maps and diagrams of organisational facilities, and 
other secondary data documents including organisational records and program information readily 
available on the internet.  
 
In addition, to validate the research findings, I also used a modified Delphi technique (which is similar to 
focus group interviews), as described in section 4.6 Collection of Evidence. Using the modified Delphi 
technique for this case study had significant advantages. Although conducting the number of rounds is 
variable and dependent upon the purpose of the research (Skulmoski et al. 2007), in line with the 
technique’s fundamental rationale, achieving consensus measurement, including group stability and rigour, 
are key components of the Delphi technique (Von der Gracht 2012). For this research study, the modified 
Delphi technique included the following: round one, 11 participants or SMEs were handpicked by me, as 
opposed to random sampling, due to my knowledge about the population based on predetermined criteria. 
A cover letter was then provided inviting them to participant in the Delphi outlining the rationale for the 
Delphi, their requirements including timeframe for completion, and benefits associated with participation. 
Seven participants or SMEs accepted (55 percent response rate) to participate, were then provided with a 
briefing paper outlining the main research findings with a conceptual framework, definitions, and 
articulated propositions. SMEs were encouraged to provide written feedback, as suggested by Loo (2002), 
this reduces intentional and unintentional noise, for example, irrelevant and non-productive communication 
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(Strauss and Zeigler 1975). They were then directed to an online questionnaire (i.e., SurveyMonkey). Both 
quantitative (i.e., distribution statistics) and qualitative data (i.e., extraction of themes) were then analysed 
and returned to participants via a feedback report. To enhance rigour, I defined group stability and 
consensus prior to conducting the modified Delphi technique. These criteria were as follows: mean rating 
of ≥ 3.5, a coefficient of variation of ≤ 30%, and with ≥ 75% agreement (percentage of panel members 
scoring ‘4’ = Agree or ‘5’ = Strongly Agree on a 5 point Likert scale. Termination of the Delphi from 
further rounds, or stopping criterion, was determined when another round would not significantly add to 
the results, based on the predefined criteria. Consensus was achieved over round one and thus no further 
rounds were necessary. Participants were provided with the following propositions that emerged and were 
articulated from the research findings: 
Proposition 1. Creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project relations requires collective 
institutional leadership. 
Proposition 2. Creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project relations requires a 
relatively stabilised and strategic governance framework of formal or regulative (e.g., contracts, 
agreements, program guidelines, formal meetings, etc.) governance mechanisms, and informal or 
normative (e.g., norms, values, beliefs, morals, casual meetings, etc.) governance mechanisms.  
Proposition 3. The decision to implement a strategic governance framework is based on a 
combination of trust, power and control mechanisms. In a project environment with a relatively weak 
institutional governance framework, power and regulative (or formal) control tend to be the dominate 
governance mechanisms to co-ordinate expectations and (inter)actions between individuals and 
organisations.  
Proposition 4. The decision to implement a strategic governance framework is based on a 
combination of trust, power and control mechanisms. In a project environment with a relatively 
strong and stabilised institutional governance framework, trust and informal (or normative) control 
tend to be the dominate and coevolving governance mechanisms to co-ordinate expectations and 
(inter)actions between individuals and organisations.  
Proposition 5. When a relatively strong and stabilised institutional governance framework is 
legitimately (e.g., change in human resources, change in project scope, etc.) or illegitimately (e.g., 
self-serving interests, hidden agendas, opportunistic behaviour, etc.) disrupted, collective 
institutional leadership and informal (or normative) control with collaborative co-creation tend to be 
the dominate mechanisms to co-ordinate expectations and (inter)actions between individuals and 
organisations. 
Proposition 6. A project environment with a strategic governance framework which is dominated 
by power i.e., powerful decision makers and regulative (or formal) control tends to increase the risk 
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of cognitive biases (e.g., overconfidence, illusory control, strategic misrepresentation or 
manipulation, outcome etc.) in rationalising decisions.  
Proposition 7. A project environment with a relatively strong and stabilised institutional governance 
framework tends to alleviate the risk of cognitive biases (e.g., overconfidence, illusory control, 
strategic misrepresentation or manipulation, outcome etc.) in rationalising decisions. 
Consensus was achieved over round one and thus no further rounds were necessary, as illustrated in table 
7-2. Following the final round, I prepared a comprehensive report (i.e., debrief) and distributed it to all 
group participants with the Delphi findings, and thanked them for their contribution to the research (see 
Appendix C). 
Table 7-2: Modified Delphi Results 
Proposition 
no. 
Comments 
(aggregated, if and when needed) 
Round 1 Score (mean, (𝝈𝝈), 
median, coefficient of 
variation) 
P1 Project relations usually involves a team of people. 
Leadership at the corporate level feeds down to CEO's, senior 
managers and project managers. If all are aligned relations 
can flourish, if not, a small number of people are not aligned, 
can disrupt projects and lead to delays, cost overruns, damage 
to corporate branding and failure. 
4.33, (0.52), 4.0, 0.12 
P2 Projects need the right mix of hard and soft project controls to 
be successful. The tendency to try to manage projects and 
control risks through contracts is flawed. Similarly, a 
complete reliance on informal relationships creates a lack of 
accountability and reduces ability to affect great outcomes. 
4.67, (0.52), 5.0, 0.10 
P3 Organisations look to contracts, hard policies and processes to 
manage where trust and relationships are weak. However in 
situations where there is too much trust (and not enough 
formality), accountability is diminished. 
The development of governance frameworks need to be 
inclusion of key stakeholders or else it will not be embraced 
by the numbers. 
4.00, (0.63), 4.0, 0.16 
P4 I don't necessarily think this is the norm as organisations seek 
to maintain accountability across project participants, even 
when there is a degree of trust. 
4.00, (0.63), 4.0, 0.16 
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Proposition 
no. 
Comments 
(aggregated, if and when needed) 
Round 1 Score (mean, (𝝈𝝈), 
median, coefficient of 
variation) 
Roles and expectations are defined. This enables the project to 
be reviewed against defined milestones and individuals to be 
accountable. 
P5 People turn to relationships when they lose faith in the 
governance mechanisms. 
The aim is to create a work environment for all to flourish. 
4.0, (0.63), 4.0, 0.16 
P6 Some projects need strong leadership and people who can 
make hard decisions. There is a balance as to how this is 
communicated to ensure people are aligned. 
3.8, (1.17), 4.0, 0.29 
P7 Well established and accepted governance mechanisms 
should act as quality assurance mechanisms to test and 
reframe cognitive biases and rationalising behaviour. 
This provides clear corporate direction, an environment for 
individual to flourish and their work to be valued. It is still up 
to the leaders to ensure those values are respected and 
implemented. If not commence a review cycle of the 
governance framework. 
4.0, (0.00), 4.0, 0.00 
 
Following the final round, I prepared a comprehensive report (i.e., debrief) and distributed it to all group 
participants with the Delphi findings, and thanking them for their contribution to the research. However, 
this strategy also had limitations. For example, I had to extend the first round by a further two weeks as a 
number of expert panellists were unable to complete the first round by the deadline. Reasons included work 
commitments or on leave. In addition, I sent reminder emails to participants that had not completed the 
survey prior to the end date. All in all, I had to be on ‘top of my game,’ thinking proactively with the 
establishment of predefined criteria and sending reminder emails to participants. 
 
Thick description. With this strategy, I focused on thick description-as-inscription including micro thick 
description, macrohistorical thick description, relational, and interactional (Denzin 2001), as described in 
section 6.3 Interpretation. This was achieved through the triangulation of data to capture real-life 
experiences or meanings present in the sequence of experiences. With micro thick description, I described 
small slices of (inter)action, for example, with the program announcement by the Prime Minister. With 
respect to macrohistorical thick description, I brought earlier parts of the case study alive and in realistic 
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detail, for example, the description of the national partnership agreement. I also brought relationships alive 
in the case study by describing partner (inter)actions from a macro- and micro-institutional level. Finally, 
with interactional thick description, I focused on the interactions between multiple individuals and 
organisations. All in all, I aimed to capture and describe the ‘true’ meanings, as a real narrative, of 
individual and organisational (inter)actions. Such a narrative for this case study was achieved from 
describing the initiation of program implementation, the macro- and micro-institutional (inter)actions, 
mechanisms and activities thereof, of individuals and organisations, through to program ‘completion.’ 
However, as with other strategies, limitations were evident. Such limitations were in the data gathering 
process, which is highlighted in the triangulation strategy. For example, I could have potentially gained 
richer information if certain actors were willing to participant in this research. However, to overcome this 
I deployed other tactics, as described in the triangulation strategy.  
 
Transcripts and drafts of the evolving case study reviewed by peers. With this strategy, I undertook a ‘peer 
review’ process by having my supervisors review transcripts and the evolving cases study. For example, 
during the data gathering and interpretation process, I would email my supervisors a description of the 
‘real-time’ findings of the case study. Such a process, seen as reflexivity, also enabled me to check 
‘constructions’ of meaning (i.e., true reflections of reality). Even though my supervisors may have been 
passive, at times, and proactive at other times by reviewing the ‘real-time’ findings, they provided 
constructive feedback and recommend a strategy or tactic to enrich the data gathering process. Having such 
expertise and leadership, ‘constructive behaviour,’ offering alternative points of view was invaluable to the 
research process. However, such a strategy does have a limitation. Supervisors and other ‘peer reviewers,’ 
are not closest to the data nor responsible for the analysis, thus they cannot offer nor gain the true meaning 
of reality or the participants experience – the thick description, and the ‘best’ they can do is offer alternative 
points of view. The final responsibility for the results rests with the researcher.  
 
Audit trail or clear chain of evidence. This strategy was implemented right from the start of the research 
process. I complied with the university’s ethics process including the retention and storage of data i.e., an 
audit trail or clear chain of evidence, on the university’s secure systems where access is limited i.e., to me 
and my supervisors. I embraced the mindset that such a clear chain of evidence should be able to be 
presented in ‘court,’ should the need arise. In addition, as I have experience in managing major projects 
and programs in the government sector, my project files were randomly audited by the auditor-general’s 
office, thus I have a deep appreciation of this process.   
 Internal Validity 
With this dimension, I used the strategies of negative case analysis, sometimes referred to as deviant case 
analysis, (i.e., rival explanations, falsification or refutation, examining competing views or voices), and 
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reflexivity. I developed a theoretical proposition and achieved good-quality analysis when a pattern of 
independent variables became mutually exclusive. This also included achieving objectivity. For example, 
I looked for differences, looking for deeper processes, searching for similarities and differences, comparing 
data fragments, and writing in a reflective journal, see section 8.2 Research Reflections. In addition, this is 
where grounded theory provided significant value, as a constant comparative method of data analysis. With 
this process, I went through a number of interactive stages, forwards and backwards, with the aim to gain 
insightful understanding of the case study and topic under investigation. I read and reflected, explored and 
played, coded and connected, reviewed and refined, worked backwards and forwards through various data 
sources. This was aided by a reflective journal where I wrote notes, generated ideas and insights, asked 
questions of relationships, and draw models. Theoretical ideas or propositions where revised and redesigned 
and compared with the data. I continued this until I achieved theoretical saturation i.e., a coherent and 
compelling explanatory story. This enabled me to avoid anecdotalism, and unable to falsify or refute the 
relationship between the variables or mechanisms. This analysis, although exhaustive at times, provided 
richness in understanding the phenomenon and the related constructs and the opportunity for wider 
theoretical resonance or the transferability of the research findings.  
 External Validity 
With this dimension, I used the strategies of use of theory to generalize (i.e., analytic generalization, case-
to-case transfer), and the rationale for case study selection. I achieved analytic generalization through 
refining and advancing the theoretical concept or mechanisms i.e., inferences derived from the typical case 
study. This means that generalization is ‘limited to those cases that are identified as similar: qualitatively 
identical’ (Rohlfing 2012). The objective of this case study is to investigate factors that influence 
organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure 
program of projects. The population of interest involves, hereinbefore, three boundary dimensions: an 
institutional dimension (project institutionalisation), a temporal dimension (implementation), and elements 
of a substantive dimension (successful and mega public sector infrastructure program of projects). 
Subsequent the empirical analysis, the proposition was refined with a change in the scope conditions (see 
Rohlfing 2012). The case study showed that ‘collective institutional leadership,’ rather than a ‘project 
institute,’ and ‘informal and formal mechanisms of institutional project work,’ rather than ‘institutional-
based governance,’ leads to the successful implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects. While the other mechanisms of ‘project reality’ and ‘rational agent’ remain. Consequently, the 
scope condition ‘project institutionalisation’ is relaxed and extends to relational embeddedness as a 
‘collective’ leading the relational actor space through ‘front-end institutional project work,’ and the four 
distinct mechanisms of institutionalisation in rationalising decisions. For example, relational embeddedness 
that is predominately associated with an emergent and situated institutional phenomenon will increase the 
strength and project performances, whereas, relational embeddedness that is predominately associated with 
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a bureaucratic and distant institutional phenomenon will decrease the strength and project performances. 
While the temporal boundary and substantive conditions remain. Table 7-3 provides case-to-case 
transferability or extrapolation for a selection of cases of the population that support the causal inferences. 
Table 7-3: Case-to-Case Transferability or Extrapolation 
Case Institutional Dimension Temporal Dimension Substantive 
Dimension 
Australia 
Australian 
National 
Broadband 
Network 
(NBN) Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Parliament of Australia 
2016), suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Commonwealth 
government in 2009, 
planned to be delivered 
over an eight-year 
construction period 
(Commonwealth of 
Australia 2011). 
Budgeted at AUD $43 
billion, affecting 
Australia’s national 
population of about 23 
million people 
including businesses 
(The Treasury 2009), 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (Wilson 
2014).  
New Royal 
Adelaide 
Hospital PPP 
Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Auditor-General's 
Department of South Australia 
2015), suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the South 
Australian government 
in 2007, planned to be 
delivered over nine 
years (Auditor-General's 
Department of South 
Australia 2015). 
AUD $2.3 billion, 
affecting South 
Australia’s population 
of about 1.6 million 
people, failing to 
achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits 
(Auditor-General's 
Department of South 
Australia 2015). 
Western 
Sydney 
Infrastructure 
Plan 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Roads & Maritime 
Authorised by the New 
South Wales 
government in 2014, 
planned to be delivered 
over ten years (Roads & 
Budgeted at AUD $3.6 
billion, affecting New 
South Wales 
population of about 
seven million people 
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Case Institutional Dimension Temporal Dimension Substantive 
Dimension 
Services 2014), suggesting weak 
project institutionalisation i.e., 
insufficient alignment at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness 
of the project, and behaviour that is 
less than optimally rational. 
Maritime Services 2014, 
The Hon Warren Truss 
MP 2014). 
(Roads & Maritime 
Services 2014), failing 
to achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits.  
Australian 
Future 
Submarine 
Program 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Roos 2015, Spong 
2015), suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the 
program, and behaviour that is less 
than optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Commonwealth 
government in 2015 
(Commonwealth of 
Australia 2015), planned 
to be delivered late 
2040s to 2050 
(Department of Defence 
2016a, 2016b). 
Budgeted at AUD $50 
billion, affecting 
Australia’s national 
population at about 23 
million people 
(Department of 
Defence 2016b), 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits. 
Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Government of South 
Australia 2016), suggesting weak 
project institutionalisation i.e., 
insufficient alignment at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness 
of the project, and behaviour that is 
less than optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Governor of South 
Australia in 2015 
(Governor of South 
Australia 2015), planned 
to be delivered between 
2035 to 2045 
(Government of South 
Australia 2016). 
AUD $41 billion, 
affecting South 
Australia’s population 
of about 1.6 million 
people (Government 
of South Australia 
2016), failing to 
achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits. 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong-
Shenzehn-
Guangzhou 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in the late 1990s, 
planned to be delivered 
Budgeted at HKD $65 
billion, affecting a 
population of about 
seven million people, 
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Case Institutional Dimension Temporal Dimension Substantive 
Dimension 
Express Rail 
Link Project 
reasonings (Hong Kong 
Government 2014), suggesting 
weak project institutionalisation i.e., 
insufficient alignment at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness 
of the project, and behaviour that is 
less than optimally rational. 
2015 (Hong Kong 
Government 2014).  
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (Hong Kong 
Government 2014).  
Hong Kong – 
Zhuhai – 
Macao Bridge 
Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Wikipedia 2016b), 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in 2002, planned 
to be delivered 2016 
(Wikipedia 2016b). 
Budgeted at HKD $83 
billion, affecting a 
population of hundreds 
of millions of people 
in Hong Kong, Macau 
and Zhuhai, failing to 
achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits 
(Wikipedia 2016b). 
West Kowloon 
Cultural 
District 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Wikipedia 2016c), 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in 2001, first 
phase planned to be 
delivered 2015 and 
second phase 2026, 
respectively (Wikipedia 
2016c).  
Budgeted at HKD 
$21.6 billion, affecting 
population of about 
seven million people 
(Wikipedia 2016c), 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (Lee 2015). 
Cyberport Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (LegCo 2014b), 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in 1999, planned 
to be delivered in 2004 
(LegCo 2014b) 
Budgeted at HKD $13 
billion, affecting a 
population of about 
seven million people 
(Wikipedia 2016a), 
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Case Institutional Dimension Temporal Dimension Substantive 
Dimension 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (LegCo 
2014b). 
Kai Tak Cruise 
Terminal 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (LegCo 2008), 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in 2006, planned 
to be delivered in 2016 
(LegCo 2014a). 
Budgeted at HKD $2.4 
billion, affecting a 
population of about  
seven million people 
(LegCo 2006), failing 
to achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits 
(LegCo 2014a). 
Hong Kong 
International 
Airport Master 
Plan 2030 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (LegCo 2015), 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
Government of Hong 
Kong in 2012, planned 
to be delivered in 2023 
(LegCo 2015). 
Budgeted at HKD 
$86.2 billion, affecting 
a population of about 
seven million people 
(LegCo 2015), failing 
to achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits.  
Croatia 
Croatian 
Motorway 
Program 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
Authorised by the 
Croatian government in 
2000, planned to be 
Budgeted at HRK 
kn11.23 billion, 
affecting a population 
of about four million 
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Case Institutional Dimension Temporal Dimension Substantive 
Dimension 
reasonings (Legac et al. 2014), 
weak project institutionalisation i.e., 
insufficient alignment at the front-
end with the temporary uniqueness 
of the program, and behaviour that 
is less than optimally rational. 
delivered in 2003 
(Legac et al. 2014). 
people, failed to 
achieve most of its 
strategies and benefits 
(Legac et al. 2014). 
Germany 
Berlin-
Brandenburg 
Airport Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Fiedler and Wendler 
2016), suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the 
German government, 
subsequent German 
Reunification in 1990 
and planned to be 
delivered in 2011 
(Fiedler and Wendler 
2016). 
Budgeted at EUR €2.4 
billion, affecting a 
population of about 
80.6 million people, 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (Fiedler and 
Wendler 2016). 
Qatar 
Hamad 
International 
Airport Project 
Predominately associated with 
bureaucratic, distant-based 
institutional project governance 
mechanisms and consequentialist 
reasonings (Senouci et al. 2016), 
suggesting weak project 
institutionalisation i.e., insufficient 
alignment at the front-end with the 
temporary uniqueness of the project, 
and behaviour that is less than 
optimally rational. 
Authorised by the ruling 
Emir of Qatar in 2003, 
planned to be delivered 
in 2009 (Doha News 
Team 2013). 
Budgeted at QAR ﷼ 
5.5 billion, affecting a 
population of about 
four million people, 
failing to achieve most 
of its strategies and 
benefits (Doha News 
Team 2013). 
 
Although the selection of cases is limited, which can be expanded globally, they are highly generalizable 
to the population of cases. What the selected cases show is that they are experiencing the contagious effects 
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of malpractice in project policy implementation i.e., tribalism and Machiavellianism, and in the process, 
failing (or failed) to achieve most of their strategies and benefits. This is predominately due to a project 
environment being associated with bureaucratic, distant-based institutional project governance mechanisms 
i.e., insufficient alignment at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change 
initiative, and consequentialist reasonings – thus signalling a low performing temporary project 
environment – which leads to unsuccessful implementation. Such processes are typical of project 
management seen as an instrumental technocratic process – ‘iron-cage’ of project management, rather than 
project management as an institutional emergent process. With the consideration of the theoretical 
constructs, such project policy contagious effects can be significantly minimised, as individuals and agency 
actors would be ‘seeing’ the emergent reality through one lens i.e., a temporary alliance or an unique 
temporary organising institutionalised project reality rationalising decisions, instead of multiple lenses 
where the project world is opaque and at times ‘murky,’ and thus, a breeding ground for the project plague.  
 
The selection of case study selection, which focused on cross-case characteristics and adopted the typical 
case method, was thoroughly presented in section 4.4 Research Methodology.  
 Reliability 
With this dimension, I used the strategies of case study database (i.e., interview transcripts, electronic 
documentation, etc.), and case study protocol. My aim here was to achieve transparency and ‘replication’ 
(i.e., that a later investigator could, as reasonably as possible, arrive at the same findings and conclusions). 
During this process, I asked myself: ‘Could I repeat my own work?’ This is where a case study database 
and protocol were invaluable. Throughout the whole research process, I created and maintained a database 
with all the research data (e.g., field notes, case study documentation, memos, narrative compilations) – 
which is also in-line with the university’s ethics approval. Although a time-consuming process, it was 
invaluable, for example, for the retrievable of documents including ‘lost’ documents. With the case study 
protocol strategy, I presented to the university’s panel at my confirmation of candidature the following: 
purpose and objectives of the research, research questions, relevant readings on the topic, theoretical 
framework and methodological approach for the research, potential participant organisations, timetable of 
expected research tasks, and ethics approval to conduct the research – this also includes procedures for 
protecting human subjects. This strategy continually co-evolved during the research process i.e., asking 
supervisors questions. 
7.3 Summary 
This chapter discussed the most critical aspect of qualitative research being the validation of research 
findings. This included an overview of ‘qualitative rigour,’ trustworthiness, and the ‘natural science model’ 
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as strategies for validation. I adopted the ‘natural science model’ as this is the most appropriate strategy for 
case study research. This included a discussion on the four dimensions of validity: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Construct validity leads to an accurate observation of 
reality which was achieved through triangulation, thick description, transcripts and drafts of the evolving 
case study reviewed by peers, audit trial and reflexivity. Internal validity leads to the presence of casual 
relationships between variables and results, and avoids anecdotalism which was achieved through negative 
case analysis and reflexivity. External validity leads to generalizability which was achieved through use of 
theory to generalize, and rationale for case study selection. Reliability leads to an absence of random error, 
transparency and replication which was achieve through the case study database and case study protocol. 
Additionally, a deeper sense of rigour this was achieved through ‘talk the walk’: priority ordering of validity 
types: internal and construct validity over external validity.  
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RESEARCH REFLECTIONS (INTELLECTUAL RIGOUR) 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter Eight Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
Provided the validation of the case study research through ‘qualitative rigour’ which included four rigour 
dimensions of construct validity, internal validity, external validity (or generalizability), and reliability. 
What this chapter does: 
Provides evidence and reflections of the research process (‘intellectual rigour’) this includes linking 
theory to practice and documenting my development as a researcher.  
What the remaining chapters do: 
• Chapter Nine will provide the findings, insights and recommendation for practice and future 
research. 
 
This aim of this research is to investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on 
the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. Particularly, with a focus on 
the muddled and strategic context i.e., complex, dynamic, plural and emergent properties of organisational 
strategic decision-making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor 
(inter)actions. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would enable project 
managers to implement an effective governance mechanism at the front-end of project policies to eradicate 
potential ‘hijacking’ of the project shaping process.  
 
This chapter provides evidence and reflection of the research process, taken from an ‘intellectual rigour’ 
perspective. This includes the research supervision, critical thinking, relationships with participants, 
gaining access to freedom of information data, journal publication, linking theory to practice, post-PhD, 
and documenting my development as a researcher. I begin a discussion on research reflection and then 
deeply discuss the process of emerging as a researcher. I adopt the reflective approach of ‘intellectual 
rigour,’ which is an essential part of methodological rigour i.e., trustworthiness, and the research process 
(Diefenbach 2008, Ortlipp 2008, Pyett 2003, Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012).  
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8.2 Research Reflections (Engaged Scholarship) 
No research journey can start without a researcher asking: Why am I undertaking this research project? 
Generally, from a PhD perspective, there are a number of reasons or motivations. For example, acquiring 
a research credential for academia or industry, a drive to find a solution to a long-held question or a need 
to prove oneself (Petre and Rugg 2010). Whatever motivates a researcher to undertake a research journey, 
a number of factors are clear. Firstly, every journey is different, and secondly, it is a transitional journey to 
becoming a researcher (Brydon and Fleming 2011), or engaged scholarship (Van De Ven 2007). In 
particular as part of the qualitative research process (Ortlipp 2008). Although there is plethora of literature 
on the research ‘journey,’ for example, books written by experts on conducting the research process with 
pre-determined steps and phases, although helpful, it is an abstract of PhD research reality. For it fails to 
fathom and hides the truth, and the craftsmanship needed, of becoming a researcher. Brydon and Fleming 
(2011, p. 996) succinctly describe it as ‘a journey fraught with twists and turns, with few defined signposts 
and the need to constantly adapt to unexpected events.’ And as aptly described by Richards (2009, p. 133) 
the ‘ultimate terror of a research project is that you can’t know at the start where it will end.’ For this 
implies, as stressed by Etherington (2004), that the means to achieving the end, the ‘becoming,’ is 
fundamental to a PhD research project. This is especially true for research quality and reflexivity (Schwartz-
Shea 2014). Here a researcher keeps a reflective journal, a ‘kind of diary in which the investigator on a 
daily basis, or as needed, records a variety of information about self (hence the term ‘reflective’) and 
method’ (Lincoln and Guba 1985, p. 327, emphasis in original). Subsequently, the reflective approach 
adopted for this research is ‘intellectual rigour’ (Diefenbach 2008). According to Diefenbach (2008, p. 877) 
in qualitative research ‘one can only draw analytical but not practical lines between research and researcher, 
‘reality’ and making sense of it, data and their interpretation, social science and social practice.’ This 
enables a researcher to make implicit assumptions (i.e., issues that are close to a researcher’s own 
experiences and daily life), interests, and objectives concerning the research process as explicit as possible, 
thus, adding another way to see ‘things’ and increasing the validation of the research process and findings 
(Diefenbach 2008, Ortlipp 2008, Pyett 2003, Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012). 
 Emerging as a Researcher 
Why start a research journey which according to Wright and Cochrane (2000) calls for a high degree of 
emotional and financial investment? Where you will spend hours, days or even weeks isolated from the 
‘real’ world. Such a journey can be seen from a number of perspectives: (a) research as the gathering of 
information; (b) research about the discovery of the truth; (c) research as an insightful process; (d) research 
viewed as re-search; and (e) research as finding solutions to problems (Meyer et al. 2005). From my 
perspective, the research journey is seen as an ‘insightful process’ and ‘finding solutions to problems,’ as 
my research journal illustrates. 
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When I think about the research journey including the emotional investment and spending hours, days 
and even years isolated from the ‘real’ world, let alone the most important people in my life, my family, 
I ask myself: Why? Why do you really want to undertake a PhD research project? Surely there are other 
ways? Are you insane? This is an easy question to answer. Perhaps I can break it down which may make 
it clearer. Firstly, my passion for PM and finding solutions to problems, which I gained some experience 
in while working on major projects and programs within the government sector. I want to master the art 
of finding solutions to problems in PM including deeply understanding the concept of ‘influential factors 
on strategic decision-making for the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects.’ This will create new PM insights, knowledge and advance the profession. Secondly, although I 
will be spending a significant portion of my time away from the ‘real’ world and my family, in the medium 
to long term, such an investment will be worth it! As I am following my passion. Lastly, because of the 
professionalism, expertise and influence of my primary supervisor, which I was fortunate to see during 
my MPM at RMIT University. (Research Journal 01/10/2012) 
The single most important factor in doctoral students’ candidature is their relationship with their supervisor 
(Halbert 2015). According to Franke and Arvidsson (2011, p. 8) research supervision ‘can be regarded as 
a knowledge and relational process which takes place in the encounter between doctoral student and 
supervisor.’ Such research supervision can be described as research practice-oriented supervision and 
research relational-oriented supervision (Franke and Arvidsson 2011). With research practice-oriented 
supervision the supervisor and student participate in common research practice i.e., student learns by 
participating in a research practice with his/her supervisor, and with research relational-oriented supervision 
the supervisor and student lack a common research practice i.e., student often works alone on a research 
project under the supervision of a more experienced researcher. My research supervision was 
predominately seen as research relational-oriented supervision with some elements of research practice-
oriented supervision as a reflection in my research journal illustrates. 
Considering that I am studying externally i.e., interstate, I expect that the supervisory relationship to be 
less practice-oriented. However, my primary supervisor does get me involved in some practice-oriented 
supervision, such as peer reviewing articles. Although I am not ‘really’ participating in the research 
process, for example, a research project initiated by the school, it does provide me with the opportunity 
to explore the research/academic field. Additionally, it gives me an opportunity to see the world from an 
academic or senior researcher perspective. However, I do reflect now and then about how good it would 
be to actually work on a research project with my supervisors and apply some of the lessons learnt to my 
research project. For example, the chapters on research design and analysis. I would also get to see how 
the ‘masters of the research field’ apply their knowledge and skills. But then again, reality hits. Where 
would I get time to commit to another research project? I am already bombarded with all the work of 
writing my research project including conference papers and journal articles. A way around this would 
be to read the latest papers published by my supervisors and learn – breaking down the article into 
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sections. However, achieving a better balance between research practice-oriented and research relation-
oriented supervision would have been the pinnacle of my PhD research journey. (Research Journal 
04/07/2016) 
Critical reflection of my research journey began to have an effect on my research process i.e., questioning 
how I could improve my research design and analysis process. Such a process goes beyond achieving 
methodological rigour (Ortlipp 2008). This was the beginning of ‘writing as a method of inquiry’ 
(Richardson and Pierre 2005) with the linking of theory to practice. I was beginning to learn more about 
myself and my research topic. Such a reflective process was particularly evident in my literature review 
and case study selection. Ultimately, the intention of the literature review is to ‘demonstrate a professional 
grasp of the background theory’ (Bruce 1994, p. 218) which continues throughout the thesis. Examiners 
expect candidates to demonstrate coherent and substantive use (Holbrook et al. 2007). With coherent use, 
examiners focus on a candidate’s (in)ability to select literature and position it to advance an argument, and 
the use of references to support an argument. While with substantive use, examiners focus on substantial 
familiarity with and systematic treatment of the literature. This also includes ‘critical engagement and 
sustained depth of immersion throughout the thesis’ (Holbrook et al. 2007, p. 346). Additionally, as part of 
the research development process doctoral students are expected to do this independently (Franke and 
Arvidsson 2011). Such scholarly work and disciplined inquiry is illustrated in my research journal. 
As I began my research journey, I read a number of books on writing a thesis. An emerging theme that 
surfaced from the books is that conducting and writing a literature review requires ‘mastership.’ The art 
of critical thinking and analysis. But, how do I master the literature review process? I begin by reading 
more books and papers on the literature review process including argumentation theory. I also enrol into 
the university’s online module ‘critical and creative thinking,’ which aims to improve students’ 
understanding of the role and nature of critical and creative thinking within their research practice. This 
should be enough for now and I continue the writing process. However, during this process I pause and 
tell myself: You do not need to master it straight away, it is a learning process, and expect to make a 
number of amendments as you proceed with the literature review. As with perhaps other doctoral students 
it is a ‘vehicle for learning’ (Bruce 1994). (Research Journal 02/08/2013) 
What the books, papers and module on ‘critical and creating thinking’ taught me was the essentiality of 
‘critical thinking and making inferences.’ Such a process can be seen as ‘acquiring, developing, and 
exercising the ability to grasp inferential connections holding between statements’ (Mulnix 2012, p. 464). 
However, prior to grasping inferential connections, a researcher should decide on the research approach 
(Creswell 2014). According to Creswell (2014, p. 4) qualitative research focuses on ‘exploring and 
understanding the meaning of individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem, and quantitative 
research focuses on testing objective theories by examining the relationship among variables.’ 
Consequently, and taking-into-account the research objectives, the most appropriate research approach is a 
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qualitative case study, as it will shed light on a population of cases (Gerring 2007), which is illustrated in 
my research journal. 
Prior to submitting my research proposal, I need to think deeply on the research approach. Which 
approach is the most appropriate for this project? After reading a number of books on ‘developing 
research proposals,’ and considering my background, research objectives, rationale and questions, and 
resource constraints, I believe that a qualitative case study approach is the best methodology. 
Additionally, as gaining access to data is essential for this research project, or any other qualitative 
research, I believe the most ‘fit’ case study that encapsulates the dimensions and is an excellent 
‘qualitative’ representation for the population of cases is the BER program. (Research Journal 2/12/2012) 
Continuing the critical thinking paradigm, from another perspective, Klein (2011, p. 210) paraphrasing 
Sternberg (1996) states that critical thinking involves ‘analytical thinking, such as analysing, critiquing, 
judging, evaluating, comparing and contrasting, and is different from creative thinking and practical 
thinking.’ Although there are competing definitions of critical thinking, what the authors stress is that the 
fundamental trait of critical thinking is the ability to analyse and make accurate and informed inferences. 
Such critical thinking is illustrated in my research journal. 
After thinking deeply and analysing a number of papers, I believe that I have finally come to an answer 
about project reality which is based on the doctrines of power, rationality and control: power defines 
reality but not what reality ‘really’ is. People create the reality they want. Also, actors that reveal 
rationality as rationalisations come to grief and must use persuasion (rhetoric) or illusions to continue to 
possess power. As they say, ‘truth is the first casualty of war.’ Propagating the rationalisation of rationality 
defines reality and hence is an essential feature of the rationality of power. As a number of scholars say 
‘up front rationality dominates, frequently as rationalisation presented by rationality. Backstage hidden 
from public view, power and rationalisation dominate.’ This is especially potent with the implementation 
of project policies: when reality starts or the beginning of the hidden plague of project reality. And the 
only way that the power of rationality can be maintained is through governing stable power relations. And 
I must also add that rationalisation is necessary to survival. Although different degrees of rationalisation 
exist and which can be challenged, this seldom occurs as they are difficult to identity and penetrate. As 
in doing so may lead to confrontations and destabilisation – causing an institution to be incapable of 
functioning and surviving – of the decision-making process. However, I must add a further twist in this 
argument and that is ‘the greater the power, the less the rationality.’ As he who possess strength divests 
himself of mind.’ Nietzsche identified this in the German Reich, which he accurately predicted and as we 
know it as the fall of the Reich, which we see and have seen in political leaders and organisational 
executives.  
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And supposedly, it is ‘uncovering and governing’ the rationalisation of rationality (factors that influence 
organisational strategic decision-making to optimise project success) that is at the heart of my research 
project and future doctrines of project power, rationality and control. (Research Journal 28/08/2015) 
I continue this with another journal entry. 
It was an emotional and time consuming process: searching, reading, highlighting, note taking, critical 
thinking and analysis until I reached the point of saturation. I was mentally exhausted after every process. 
However, such motivation and dedication to the literature review process proved to be worthy with the 
following comment from my supervisor in an email: ‘Wow Duro! I’m plodding through your lit review 
very slowly. That is because it is the best I’ve seen as a supervisor or examiner. Not only do you seem to 
have covered all the bases comprehensively but also there are very good references cited that I did not 
have or know about that is useful to me…’. I was not expecting such a comment from my supervisor but 
it made me feel really proud of the hard work I have put into the literature review. (Research Journal 
03/03/2016) 
Such constructive supervisor feedback is essential to a student’s well-being and the supervisor-student 
relationship (de Kleijn et al. 2014). Such a relationship is also reciprocal where students should be seen as 
‘active agents in the feedback process; that is, teachers can provide very constructive and possibly helpful 
feedback, but when students do not process it or act upon it, feedback is unlikely to lead to learning’ (de 
Kleijn et al. 2013, p. 1014). I perceived such constructive feedback as I was on the ‘right’ track with my 
PhD research project, and understood that it was not a one-way supervisor-student relationship as my 
research journal illustrates. 
Thanks and greatly appreciate the support! One thing (from many) that I really like about the supervision 
that I am receiving is that you (as supervisors) really challenge me to push my boundaries. Although it 
may feel (un)comfortable, such a ‘supervision pedagogy’ is a highly rewarding space to be in. (Research 
Journal 04/08/2016) 
Supposedly, I understand the value of constructive feedback in maintaining sound relations, as I am 
undertaking a research project which focuses on mechanisms to strengthen relations in a project and 
program environment. However, a lot of it comes to the values my parents ingrained into me as I was 
growing up. I also understand the significant value my supervisors are providing in the research relational-
oriented supervision, particularly their time, knowledge, experience, and mentoring which is shaping me 
as a researcher and ‘scholar.’ Such quality supervisory commitment is invaluable to doctoral student 
outcomes (Halbert 2015). 
 
Similarly aligned with the relational-oriented supervision is the relationship with participants, or the 
researched, on the research journey. Such a relationship can be seen as egalitarian, reciprocal and evolving 
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where the researcher and researched engage in the co-construction of knowledge (Karnieli-Miller et al. 
2009, Zajano and Edelsberg 1993). Although it can have a number of benefits and pitfalls, in particular, 
when doing research in familiar settings amongst peers (Hockey 1993), and change in the course of the 
different stages of the research process, in practice, there is ‘no correct or optimal relationship’ (Karnieli-
Miller et al. 2009, p. 280). I saw the researcher-researched relation as a partnership approach which had a 
number of benefits and pitfalls as my research journal illustrates. 
How am I supposed to involve participants in the research study? I am collecting data on a rather sensitive 
matter i.e., organisational strategic decision-making on Australia’s largest program in history. Will the 
potential participants, many of which are known to me as we have worked together, share the truth or will 
they bend the truth? I am going to have to work closely with my supervisors to gain a better understanding 
on the best way to approach potential candidates. (Research Journal 03/03/2014)  
I continue this with another journal entry. 
Subsequent university ethics approval, I send a letter to potential participants inviting them to participate 
in my research project. Supposedly, the aim is to persuade potential participants to participant in the 
research and share their experience and knowledge. In this initial participant recruitment stage, I am 
relying on their passion for the PM industry and our previous working relationship. Majority of the 
participants decide to participate, which is a huge relief. I am also excited with the prospect of developing 
a strong research partnership with these participants. These are the ones who met my pre-determined 
criteria i.e., PM passion and previous working relationship. The other potential participants, which would 
have provided a significant but different perspective, did not participate. I did not have a close working 
relationship with them. Upon reflection, these are the ones who potentially had the most to lose by 
participating – their reputations and future careers were most probably on the line. Although their 
identities would have been protected. Still, I am rather ‘lost’ why they did not want to participate. 
However, there are other research strategies that I can employ, for example, reading memoirs. (Research 
Journal 31/10/2013) 
The process of developing and maintaining a strong researcher-researched relation continued throughout 
the research process. This includes during the data collection process i.e., interviews to capture the 
participants’ wealth of knowledge; and with the validation of the research findings i.e., participants to 
review and comment on their transcripts (member checking), and participate in the Delphi technique. 
However, such a partnership was constraining when it came to gaining access to Commonwealth 
information under the freedom of information (FOI) legislation. Although governments are moving to more 
openness, FOI legislation does not guarantee free and unlimited access to information (Shepherd 2015). 
Information may be made ‘deliberately inaccessible or inadvertently hard to find due to poor record-
keeping’ (Shepherd 2015, p. 717). Other challenges associated with the process include reading and 
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comprehending legislation and regulations, unfamiliarity with an authority’s internal structures and 
processes, public authorities may charge a fee for dealing with requests, and exemptions may apply. 
Accessing FOI documents for this case study, in particular, cabinet-in-confidence information was not an 
easy process as my research journal illustrates. 
After thoroughly reading the FOI legislation, I submitted a request to the relevant agency to gain access 
to specific documents associated with my case study. A good thing with a request is that the responsible 
agency must reply within a statutory timeframe. I receive a reply on the last day, basically stating that 
they do not have the requested documents but it is with another agency. So I send a request to the other 
agency, and they reply stating they do not have the requested documents as it is with the initial submitting 
agency. The first thought that comes into my head is: What poor record management! How can a 
government agency ‘lose’ such important documents? Decisions made that affected millions of 
Australians. So after a couple of more months, the initial agency finds the documents. However, they 
attach a huge fee to gain access to the documents, which I believe is absolutely unjustifiable and 
unaffordable in my case. I argue the importance of the documents against the significance of my research 
findings without resolution with the governing agency. I then submit my argument to my local federal 
member of parliament to argue on my behalf without much success. I then request to have the matter 
internally reviewed – do not really believe this to be a just and fair system but it is part of the formal 
process. After a couple of more months, the internal review supports its initial decision. Surprise, surprise! 
I then submit a request with the Australian Information Commissioner arguing my case to gain access to 
the documents. A major drawback with this process is that there is no statutory response timeframe. After 
almost one year later, the Australian Information Commissioner rules in my favour and the government 
agency release the requested documents. However, a significant proportion of the documents have been 
blacked-out with the government agency using a legislative exemption, which in my opinion is invalid 
and illegitimate. I submit an argument with the Australian Information Commissioner once again arguing 
the validity and legitimacy of the exemption. (Research Journal 12/07/2016) 
Although such a process in the public sector can seem tedious and draining, I focused on establishing a 
strong relational partnership with the government agencies. At the end of the day, we were on the same 
team, kicking for the same goal. By doing this I accepted the paradox in public relations that managing 
relating makes more sense than managing relationships (Stoker 2014). Such a paradoxical view has been 
consistent throughout my PhD research journey. While the emerging as a researcher has been challenging 
throughout my research journey, I am entering perhaps an even more challenging phase which academia 
refers to as ‘publish or perish’ (McGrail et al. 2006, Wilkinson 2015). From the beginning of my research 
journey, my supervisors ingrained into me that publishing is an essential part of my candidature, in 
particular from the perspective when examiners assess my thesis with published work. Such a philosophical 
mindset is also echoed by Sharmini et al. (2015). The authors state that such a process can assist candidates 
to ‘foster certain attributes and skills that are essential in academia such as responding to constructive 
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feedback, communicating effectively, perseverance, confidence and a sense of independence’ (2015, p. 97) 
which can enrich the doctoral experience (Robins and Kanowski 2008). Although I agree with my 
supervisors and the literature on ‘publish or perish,’ I question the process of where to publish and the 
strategies of getting my thesis published in a high-ranking journal, particularly and subsequent the course 
of ‘writing for publication’ that I enrolled into at the university as my research journal illustrates. 
What do they mean by lower impact journal when publishing? Do I really want to publish my work in a 
lower impact journal? What do they mean by journal politics? Does this mean the quality of your research 
output? Criticism from journal examiners? So it appears I have to implement a strategy for journal 
publication, which has connections with the theory on strategic networking or alliancing. After finishing 
the course, I realise that there appears to be a lot of covert and overt strategic work when it comes to 
publishing. Where to publish? Who to publish with? It appeared I saw such strategic work at my last 
conference: well renowned academics quietly discussing their next ‘big’ research paper. However, the 
bigger question is: Why publish in journal articles? Is this the way of the future or is there another 
publication path that is more beneficial or valuable? Is this the best way to diffuse my research findings? 
How are candidates institutionalised within this scholarly community? Why do we write researcher-
journal-reader instead of researcher-reader? I am beginning to see a lot of research written from the 
researcher-reader perspective on social media. Cutting-out the journal ‘middle-man.’ However, upon deep 
reflection on the whole publication process, I decide to take my supervisors guidance and publish for 
conferences and in journals. I also believe this will provide a higher quality thesis, and enrich my doctoral 
experience in becoming a better researcher. (Research Journal 01/09/2015) 
As my research journal states, I had to think deeply about implementing a strategy for journal publication. 
So I begin to read papers on strategies for getting published in peer-reviewed journals. One paper that 
particularly caught my attention is ‘winning at the publication game’ by McDaniel and Childers (2011). In 
their article, the authors focus on the publication game and offer some ‘athletic advice’ to improve the 
chances of publication (2011, p. 171) which rather resonates with me: 
• To catch a fish, set the hook. Start with a short, strong and interesting title to catch the attention of 
the readers. 
• Start fast, finish strong. Focused introduction to set the direction of the article. 
• Drive for show, putt for dough. Focus on the details (the ‘putts’) that provide specificity to the 
thesis. 
• One of a kind beats a royal flush. Focus on a novel or unique manuscript. 
• Play the odds. Know the odds that your submission will be accepted. 
• Go for style points. Abided by established conventions of writing styles, and preview previous 
issues of the journal to see what seems to work. 
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• Practice makes perfect. Review manuscripts for any errors to make sure it is ready for publication. 
• There is no ‘I’ in ‘team.’ Writing is a team sport and involve co-authors and colleagues on your 
manuscript. Think of winning as collaboration. 
• Never up, never in. Make bold and accurate decisions in the publication game. 
• Listen to the coach. Pay close attention to the reviewers of your manuscript and learn from the 
process.  
Another important quality, besides originality, rigour and significance is: coherence (Badley 2009). 
According to the author, it is imperative to achieve a sense of ‘togetherness,’ including:  
• Displays coherence of structure when conclusions clearly follow from the data. 
• Skilfully organises a number of different angles. 
• Is cogently organised and expressed. 
• Possesses a definite agenda and an explicit structure. 
• Presents a sense of the researcher’s learning as a journey, as a structured incremental progress 
through a process of both argument and discovery (Badley 2009, p. 339). 
Although I am at the beginning of the ‘publication game’ i.e., learning the ‘tricks of the trade,’ I apply 
McDaniel and Childers (2011) and Badley (2009) ‘publishable athletic advice’ as my research journal 
illustrates. 
I am working on (or co-authoring) a conference paper and journal manuscript for publication. Supposedly, 
a significant advantage is that my primary supervisor is an editor of a PM journal. He would have a 
significant dyad understanding of ‘playing the publication game.’ Additionally, most of the academics on 
the editorial team, I have either referenced in my thesis or have a deep understanding of their area of 
expertise and latest publications. I understand the publication game is rather ‘tricky’ and strategically 
based i.e., write with a winning team. However, I want to know more about what happens behind the 
scenes. This is where I am relying on the experience of my supervisors. They can show me some of the 
‘tricks of the trade’ which I am unable to learn from published papers.  
I begin writing my abstract for a high impact journal which topic significantly aligns with my thesis. I do 
not want to mess this up! I write about five drafts of an extended abstract, until I submit a polished abstract 
as requested by the journal. I think critically in particular capturing the readers’ attention and reading 
pervious publications based on McDaniel and Childers (2011) paper on ‘winning at the publication game,’ 
and Badley (2009) suggestion on publishable coherence. Although I am excited about the opportunity to 
submit, which my supervisors fully support, the chances look rather slim i.e., first journal submission on 
a special edition on megaprojects. But the one thing that motivates me is knowing there is a great team 
behind this submission. (Research Journal 28/01/2016). 
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After about a few days, the editor replies with an email accepting our abstract and requesting a full 
manuscript for publication: We did it team! Well done! Through the process of emerging as a researcher, I 
have submitted two conference papers and one manuscript for a journal: all accepted for publication. In my 
opinion, gaining the winning edge for journal publication is not written on a paper but instead placing trust 
in my ability and trust in my supervisors. Such a view of trust is essential in the research relation-oriented 
supervision approach to the supervision of doctoral students (Franke and Arvidsson 2011).  
 
Now that I am close to submitting my thesis, where from here? How will my knowledge and skills be 
perceived in the Australian and global project management community? Do I go into academia or the 
private sector? After all, I am emerging as a researcher and about to be seen as a fellow ‘scholar.’ I 
remember the first face-to-face meeting I had with my primary supervisor, and he asked: Why do you want 
to undertake a PhD? This is a very important question which still resonates with me today and goes back 
to the initial part of this reflective journal, and I replied: I want to advance my career in research and 
advisory towards a leading global academic. He gave me his full backing and we were off. The research 
plane had taken-off and now we are about to land! As I begin to see the tarmac approaching in rather misty 
and foggy conditions, deeper questions are surfacing: Am I entering a world where my knowledge and 
skills will be appreciated? Have I distanced myself too far from the ‘real’ world? This requires further 
exploration. 
 
PhD researchers are entering a knowledge economy (Jackson and Michelson 2015, Neumann and Tan 
2011). According to Jackson and Michelson (2015) doctoral-qualified graduates and the quality of doctoral 
education are ‘key drivers in knowledge creation, innovation and national competitiveness.’ Although less 
than half of doctoral graduates move into academia (Neumann and Tan 2011), many are regularly utilising 
their research knowledge and skills in a range of careers following graduation (Barnacle and Dall’Alba 
2011). Additionally, many doctoral graduates attain full-time employment subsequent graduation (Jackson 
and Michelson 2015). Considering a significant proportion of doctoral candidates take up non-academic 
employment, particularly in developed economies (Neumann and Tan 2011), which rely on a highly skilled 
workforce for innovation and national competitiveness, another question surfaces: What factors influence 
the initial full-time employment of PhD graduates? Although there is no perfect answer, Jackson and 
Michelson (2015) study reveals the following factors that account for post-PhD employment outcomes: 
previous work experience; attendance at a research-intensive university; and access to a research culture 
and networking opportunities. My research journal illustrates such a transition, or ‘tarmac approach,’ into 
the post-PhD space. 
During the last year of my PhD candidature, I begin to apply for positions in academia and non-academia. 
I really want to enter the ‘research, scholarly and advisory space’ and know my knowledge and experience 
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will provide significant value to the Australian and global PM community. I believe that academia would 
be an excellent place to advance my career. I apply for a number of university lecturer positions in PM 
but I am ‘unsuccessful.’ I respectfully request for valuable feedback on my applications and the main 
themes are: ‘PhD completion’ and ‘academic teaching experience,’ which is fair and reasonable, and I 
am working on gaining these qualifications – keep at it, you will get there! It does not leave a rather sour 
taste in my mouth. I even respectfully request the assistance of my supervisors, which they were happy 
to abide-by. I then apply for a number of senior contract PM positions within the government sector on 
the implementation of major projects, as I need to survive financially and it can aid as a rather ‘buffer’ 
and advance my networking power until a suitable academic position arrives; however, and as with the 
academic positions, I am ‘unsuccessful.’ I also request for valuable feedback and the overwhelming 
responses are: ‘you are too qualified,’ ‘people fear your qualifications,’ and ‘employers will feel 
threatened by your presence.’ I am rather surprised by such comments. However, I discover that my 
situation is not uncommon with post-PhDs (Boulos 2016). Moving on a more positive note, through my 
networking and selling my skills, experience and knowledge that I gained during my PhD candidature, I 
met senior government and non-government officials working on mega infrastructure and defence sector 
projects. It is clearly evident that these people saw the benefits my skills, experience and knowledge could 
bring their agencies – we were in the early stages of creating a partnership. Consequently, it makes sense 
to me to continue this career path – advance myself as a global leading researcher, scholar and advisor in 
my field of expertise (Research Journal 12/08/2016) 
Supposedly, I was entering or entered the knowledge economy, networking to improve the interface 
between industry and research to solve problems and advance organisational goals (Bastalich 2010). Such 
a phenomenon can be seen as ‘networking in the knowledge economy,’ the promotion of economic growth 
and social well-being through university research (Kearney and Lincoln 2013, p. 313). The research 
relational-oriented supervision adopted for my research journey, my networking, skills, experience and 
knowledge, in particular the contribution of ‘new’ knowledge in my thesis, is preparing me to succeed 
within the PM industry and profession. I can confidently say that I am about to emerge as a researcher.  
8.3 Summary 
According to the Australian Qualifications Framework (2013), part of the expected PhD outcome is for the 
successful candidate to be a critical thinker. In light of this, and to better inform the reader, I included in 
this thesis this chapter. The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate critical thinking insights 
through my reflections to supplement my critical examination and use of literature in other chapters. It 
therefore forms a core and important part of the thesis – intellectual rigour – as it gave me the opportunity 
to explain to examiners and other readers how my own personal experience in my past role in the domain 
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under study and how that shaped, together with my study and critical consideration of the relevance and 
import of the literature, my perspective.  
 
This chapter discussed perhaps the most sensitive and exposed part of the research process: me emerging 
as a researcher. Evidence was provided through a reflective journal. Firstly, I discussed the motivations for 
undertaking a PhD and the reflective approach adopted for this research: intellectual rigour. Then I 
discussed me emerging as a researcher through main themes that emerged during my research journey 
which were grounded by my research reflections. My research journey revealed eight themes that were 
essential in emerging as a researcher. This included my perspective of the research journey, the relationship 
with my supervisors, the literature review, critical thinking, relationships with participants, gaining access 
to freedom of information documents, journal publication, and post-PhD. This significantly enhanced 
methodological rigour i.e., internal validity, and the research process i.e., changes were made to the 
literature review and data collection, which is at the ‘heart’ of qualitative research, that is, exploration.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter Nine Prologue 
What the previous chapter did: 
Provided evidence and reflections of the research process including reinterpreting ideas and concepts, 
linking theory to practice, and documenting my development as a researcher. 
What this chapter does: 
Provides the findings, insights and recommendations for practice and future research. 
The prince must be ready to imitate the behaviour of the fox, who can ‘recognise traps,’ and the lion, 
who can ‘frighten wolves.’ To obtain and maintain power, he needs a calculating attitude without 
any sense of guilt or shame. The prince should rely more on being feared than on being loved. If 
cruelty is required, it should be done all at once, not over an extended period. Although the prince 
does not need to have a moral character, he must seem to have one; he should appear to be merciful, 
faithful, humane, sincere, and religious, and avoid being despised. He has to uphold his dignity 
‘which must never be allowed to fail in anything whatever.’ He should not pay attention to advice 
unless he has asked for it. (Bass and Bass 2008, p. 135, quoting Machiavelli) 
In this research, I applied the leading themes from the literature on project strategy and the front-end, 
decision-making theory, ethics, external and internal environmental factors that influence organisational 
strategic decision-making, governance and policy implementation to analyse the empirical case of 
organisational strategic decision-making on the Building the Education Revolution (BER) program. In 
doing so, I aimed to advance current understanding to what extent and how do external and internal 
environmental factors influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega 
public sector infrastructure program of projects. The findings highlight that strategically shaping 
institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational 
change initiative is essential for the successful implementation of project policies i.e., achieving project 
strategies and benefits. Based on the findings, I formulate three theoretical contributions and three 
implications for practice including paradoxes. In addition, I suggest possible avenues for future research. 
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9.2 Research Conclusions 
The ideas leading to this research are partly built from my background as a steering committee member on 
an Australian state government mega infrastructure project taskforce fulfilling objectives of an overarching 
crisis program. Although the megaproject failed to achieve most of its strategies and benefits, which led 
me to question the reasoning behind mega infrastructure project policy ‘failure,’ it also led to the 
development and articulation of the following research aim:  
Investigate factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of projects including the exploration of coping 
mechanisms to optimise its success. Particularly with a focus on a muddled and strategic context i.e., 
complex, dynamic, intricate, plural and emergent properties of organisational strategic decision-
making, intertwined in often unforeseen ways between different agency and actor (inter)actions.  
The aforesaid research aim has been achieved and the respective findings make three specific contributions 
to the research on factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of projects. The first contribution is that collective institutional 
leadership, an emergent phenomenon, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change initiative, is critical in achieving a relatively stable state of (inter)actions for project 
policy success: the means-end relationship. Such a phenomenon in the relational actor space is seen as 
front-end institutional project work (sensemaking) which includes: (1) creating institutional project 
relations, (2) maintaining institutional project relations, and (3) disrupting institutional project relations, 
aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative, through the purposive action-
meaning cycles of sensemaking between organisational actors to achieve an unique temporary organising 
institutionalised project reality in rationalising decisions. This phenomenon is novel in the literature, being 
factors that influence organisational strategic decision-making on the implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. Moreover, despite the contextual embeddedness of the actions in the 
relational actor space, they highlight the significant value of the normative and cognitive frames in 
achieving a collective identity or an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality in 
rationalising decisions – that is, a hybrid project network temporarily changing their ‘permanent’ structures 
aligned with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change initiative. Although such a 
phenomenon is an effortful and time consuming process, particularly at the front-end of project policy 
implementation, once legitimised, it is a strong pillar to prevent illegitimate behaviour, enabling project 
institutions and hybrid project networks to co-ordinate complex, flexible behaviour and respond to changes 
(including innovative practices) in the project environment. Thus, I argue that achieving a strong sense of 
collective institutional leadership is essential for the successful implementation of project policies.  
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This takes us to the second contribution showing the important characteristics of informal and formal 
mechanisms of institutional project work that influences the relational actor space to achieve (or fail to 
achieve) an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality in rationalising decisions. I 
identified four distinct influential mechanisms based on the concepts of power and governance in the 
relational actor space: (1) distant associational institutionalisation, (2) situated associational 
institutionalisation, (3) distant instrumental institutionalisation, and (4) situated instrumental 
institutionalisation that are essential in rationalising project policy decisions. The constructs acted as either 
constraining or enabling mechanisms in the relational actor space to achieve (or fail to achieve) an unique 
temporary organising institionalised project reality. When the relational actor space is associated with more 
distant-based institutional project governance mechanisms, it leads to constraining influences in the 
relational actor space with outcomes such as high transaction costs, low stability, weak identification and 
disidentification, weak sense of morality, low project performances, and exacerbates Machiavellianism. 
This is seen as failure in temporary organising as a process and form i.e., inability to truly transform the 
relational actor space towards an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality. This also 
appears to initiate a ‘plague’ of project malgovernance. However, when the relational actor space is 
associated more towards situated-based institutional project governance mechanisms, it leads to enabling 
influences in the relational actor space with outcomes such as low transaction costs, high stability, strong 
identification, strong sense of morality, high project performances, and tames Machiavellianism.  
 
The third contribution of the research summarises the significance of creating a legitimate and an unique 
temporary organising institutionalised project reality prior to the commitment of significant resources in 
rationalising project policy decisions. It is imperative to achieve this at the front-end of project policy 
implementation to identify the best courses of action and optimise choices – thus minimising cognitive 
biases – in the decision-making process with a focus on motivations and justifications which structure 
practical reasoning. Being in such an institutionalised state of social reality, individuals and institutions can 
interact as rational agents and prevent project fallacies. The strength of rationalising project policy decisions 
is principally determined by the mechanisms of institutional project work. A relational actor space that is 
primarily associated with situated-based institutional project governance mechanisms and deontological 
reasonings is considered to achieve a relatively strong temporary institutional project environment and high 
project performance i.e., fast pace of temporary organising and high stability in the relational actor space. 
In addition, being in such a strong relational actor space, decisions are made earlier and options explored 
on the viability of a project policy to achieve strategies and benefits. On the other hand, a relational actor 
space that is primarily associated with distant-based institutional project governance mechanisms and 
consequentialist reasonings is considered to significantly increase the risk of cognitive biases in 
rationalising project policy decisions. In addition, organisational actors being in such a relatively weak 
temporary institutional project environment enter a state of low project performance i.e., 
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deinstitutionalisation of temporary organising and low stability in the relational actor space. Such a state of 
project fallacy is seen about one-sixth of the way into a project policy i.e., after sponsor authorisation. This 
adds significantly to the literature on the importance of ‘vision,’ for example the work by Christenson as 
reported in Christenson and Walker (2008), by explaining why and how a clear vision may act as an enabler 
for project delivery success.  
 
The contributions highlight the absolute imperative of achieving a temporary organising institutionalised 
project reality, aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the organisational change 
initiative, predominately associated with situated-based institutional project governance mechanisms. In 
doing so, organisational actors can significantly minimise cognitive biases in rationalising decisions – 
rational agent – in a high performing temporary project environment towards the successful achievement 
of project policy strategies and benefits.  
9.3 Insights and Recommendations for Practice and Further Research 
According to Morris (2010, p. 140), ‘when we go to the doctor we are more interested in being cured than 
knowing whether the doctor followed current best practices and procedures (though these are important).’ 
Such a metaphor is highly applicable to traditional project management schools of thought: an instrumental 
technocratic process (Walker and Lloyd-Walker 2016), particularly for the implementation of project 
policies. Politicians tend to adopt an utilitarian outcome view – consequentialism – where the means 
justifies the end taken from a Machiavellian perspective for the implementation of mega infrastructure 
program policies. Rightfully so, as such ‘high impacting’ policies can provide significant direct social and 
economic benefits (Dimitriou et al. 2015), and generate other ‘spillover’ effects, such as creating 
employment opportunities, and revitalising industries and precincts (Copeland et al. 2011, Van Der 
Westhuizen 2007). The positive impact of these spillover effects on the electability and career trajectory 
tends to be seen as irresistible to politicians and their advisors as any positive goodwill resulting from a 
program can enhance and legitimise their image (Steinberg 1987, Van Der Westhuizen 2007). In this sense, 
mega infrastructure projects can be seen as political symbols: symbolising political legacy (Flyvbjerg 
2014). For example, the pyramids with the Egyptians (Morris 1994). However, there is a dark side to 
sponsoring such programs. Political elites, politicians and their advisory and public relations groups, use 
language and symbols as instruments to manipulate social realities, especially through the implementation 
of policies to maintain their stature and relevance (Flyvbjerg 2014, Flyvbjerg and Molloy 2011). However, 
this research shows that the ‘dark side’ to sponsoring such programs can be significantly ‘enlightened’ by 
changing the project management paradigm to an institutional emergent process. Consequently, this 
research presents eight paradoxes, which have implications for the theory of project management and 
practice, as illustrated in table 9-1. Simply stated, the term paradox is a ‘thought construction, which leads 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations 
247 
 
to an unexpected contradiction’ (Łukowski 2011, p. 1). Such a view is highly relevant as ‘contradiction and 
paradox are the ‘new normal’ in this volatile, rapidly changing landscape of organisations’ (Putnam et al. 
2016, p. 66), particularly, in the field of temporary organising (Bakker et al. 2016). Much of this thesis 
dealt with the paradox of the means-end paradox of project success and the paradox of who may be 
considered the rightful beneficiary of a successful project outcome. 
Table 9-1: Means-End Project Paradoxes 
Paradox Description 
The project management paradox: Project 
management, seen as an instrumental technocratic 
process, is in fact an institutional emergent process 
which leads to the successful implementation of 
mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects. 
Project institutions identified primarily with 
bureaucratic, regulative and cognitive power 
relations and consequentialist reasonings is 
considered to lead to the unsuccessful 
implementation of project policies. However, as the 
findings show, institutions identified primarily with 
collective, normative and cognitive power relations 
and deontological reasonings leads to the successful 
implementation of project policies. 
The project partnership paradox: Project 
partnerships, seen primarily based on contractual 
relationships, are in fact primarily based on 
institutional relations.  
Project partnerships are primarily based on 
contractual relationships – oriented towards 
outcomes (Cruz and Marques 2013, Van Marrewijk 
et al. 2008). However, as the findings show, in 
reality they are primarily based on institutional 
relations – oriented towards the emergent 
phenomenon – through the process of front-end 
institutional project work (sensemaking). For 
example, rather than Public-Private Partnerships, 
which abstracts project relationships, a more 
accurate representation, which abstracts project 
relations is: Institutional Partnership Projects.  
The project front-end paradox: The front-end 
phase of megaprojects, which is considered to take 
years to conceptualise, can in fact take a few months 
to conceptualise.  
The front-end phase of megaprojects is based on the 
presumption that it typically takes 3-5 years (Samset 
and Volden 2016) and even on average 6-7 years 
(Miller and Lessard 2000) to conceptualise. 
However, as the findings show in reality the front-
end phase of megaprojects can take a few months to 
conceptualise.  
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Paradox Description 
The project performance paradox: Megaproject 
performance, embodied with low stability and slow 
pace, is in fact embodied with high stability and fast 
pace which leads to high megaproject performances.  
Megaproject performance is primarily based on the 
presumption that it is embodied with an environment 
of low stability i.e., structural complexity, and slow 
pace (delays in initiation and delivery), which leads 
to underperforming projects (Patanakul et al. 2016). 
However, as the findings show in reality 
megaprojects are embodied with an environment of 
high stability and fast pace which leads to 
phenomenal delivery on strategies and benefits.  
The project governance paradox: Project 
governance, which is associated with the ‘steering’ 
of individual and organisational actors, is in fact 
associated with the ‘shaping’ of individual and 
organisational actors.  
Project governance is primarily associated with the 
‘steering’ of individual and organisational actors 
(Bekker 2015). However, as the findings show in 
reality project governance is associated with the 
‘shaping’ of individual and organisational actors. 
The project uniqueness paradox: The temporary 
uniqueness of the task attribute in project 
organising, which is primarily associated with the 
‘permanent’ organisation, is in fact primarily 
associated with the temporary organisation.  
The temporary uniqueness of the task attribute in 
project organising is primarily associated with the 
‘permanent’ organisation’s repetitive or routine 
technical components i.e., repeatable and 
predictable patterns of project action-based 
activities (Engwall 2003). However, as the 
findings show in reality the temporary uniqueness 
of the task attribute in project organising, in 
particular on megaprojects, is primarily associated 
with the temporary organisation’s unique 
technical components i.e., unrepeatable and 
unpredictable patterns of project action-based 
activities.  
The rational decision-making project paradox: 
Project decision-making, which is considered either 
rational or irrational, is in fact illusionary and the 
degree of illusion or rationality ultimately 
determines the success in achieving project 
strategies and benefits.  
Individuals and organisational actors are considered 
to make either rational or irrational project decisions 
(Flyvbjerg 2008b). However, as the findings show, 
in reality individual and organisational actors are 
under the illusion they are making either rational or 
irrational project decisions. And it is the degree of 
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Paradox Description 
illusion or rationality that will ultimately determine 
achieving project success.  
The project success paradox: Project success, 
which is primarily considered outcome oriented, in 
in fact primarily process oriented which leads to the 
successful implementation of mega public sector 
infrastructure program of projects. 
Project success is primarily considered outcome 
oriented i.e., benefit realisation and 
consequentialism, where politicians and their 
advisors lead projects, which leads to 
underperforming projects. However, as the findings 
show in reality project success is primarily process 
oriented i.e., just, open and transparent processes 
(deontological ethics), where people lead projects, 
which leads to high performing projects. And thus, a 
rational agent implementing projects.  
 
All in all, the paradoxes suggest that the implementation of mega infrastructure program of projects are 
trapped in the ‘iron cage’ of project management. From Max Weber’s (1958) classic analysis of the 
rationalisation of modern society in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: ‘In modern society, 
we are trapped in a cycle in which accumulation and efficiency serve not as means but as self-justifying 
ends. We thus find ourselves in an iron cage of ever-increasing technical rationality and bureaucratisation’ 
(Britton 2003, p. 236). However, this need not be the case. According to Klagge (1997, p. 70) the iron cage 
can also be reconstructed as a ‘playground’ structure where:  
The bureaucratic structure is a neutral backdrop requiring the action of human beings before 
outcomes can emerge. If those actions are unethical, stifling, lazy, or inhumane, negative outcomes 
will result. If, on the other hand, those human actions are ethical, creative, energetic, and humane, 
positive outcomes will result. Activity will be productive and enjoyable, more like creative play than 
laborious toil. […] In sum, the iron cage of bureaucracy, being a neutral structure, calls for the 
creative, ethical, energetic play of adults that most of us know by the name of ‘work.’  
This reinforces the strategic importance of achieving an unique temporary organising institutionalised 
project reality, aligned at the front-end with the organisational change initiative, to successfully achieve 
project strategies and benefits. Managers need to work more towards the ‘management of projects’ ethos: 
managing the front-end of projects (Edkins et al. 2013), rather than the ‘project management’ ethos which 
tends to focus on project execution. In execution, the ethos is ‘typically about completion on time and 
budget to a given set of specifications and scope’ instead of the front-end where the ethos is on strategic 
project shaping (Edkins et al. 2013, p. 82). This critical phase is the most prone to experiencing the adverse 
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effects of the ‘iron law’ and the ‘iron cage’ through a Machiavellianism lens – constituting an iron cage of 
megaproject law – which not only causes tremendous cost and time overruns, but demoralises project 
environments, and brings us closer to a plague-like demise. Once in motion, it is practically impossible to 
terminate without prohibitive expenses and formidable political exit barriers i.e., foreseeable death to 
politicians. However, paradoxically it is also the phase that can significantly enhance project value. From 
a practical point of view, managers should focus on strategically shaping the relational actor space with the 
aim to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality, aligned at the front-end with 
the organisational change initiative, in rationalising decisions. Three empirical management actions were 
identified to achieve such a state of project reality. 
 
The first management action is achieving a strong sense of collective institutional leadership in the 
relational actor space. This is of fundamental importance at the front-end of project policy implementation, 
or temporary organising, prior to the significant commitment of resources, or project sponsor approval. 
Here a manager needs to be a ‘statesman,’ an agent of institutional project work, acting strategically and 
shaping institutional project reality – the emergent terrain – through critical and character-defining 
decisions. Such decisions include embedding strategic intent or recommending to a project sponsor to abort 
a project or explore other viable options. This role should be assigned to an institution or institutional leader 
i.e., institutional entrepreneur, able to capture the emergent actions of individuals and organisational actors 
in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutional project relations aligned with the temporary uniqueness 
of the organisational change initiative. This type of work, although effortful and time consuming, is the 
most valuable in constituting the emergence of collective institutional leadership in the relational actor 
space. Managers should also be constantly aware of legitimate and illegitimate disruptions which can be 
destructive and significantly constrain relations and detract from the emergence of an unique temporary 
organising institutionalised project reality; or it can be constructive and significantly enable relations and 
enact the emergence of an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality.  
 
The second management action further underlines the importance of institutional project work at the front-
end of project policies to achieve an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality in 
rationalising decisions. The results suggest that managers need to work more towards situated-based 
institutional project governance mechanisms in the relational actor space to achieve an unique temporary 
organising institutionalised project reality. Such relational characteristics include transverse power 
(exercising power with others), high relational cues, representational spaces as ‘lived,’ low relational risks, 
high relational trust, strong sense of morality, and face-to-face discourse. Being in such a situated space, 
organisational actors can achieve congruence, fast pace of institutionalisation and high stability in the 
relational actor space – a high performing temporary ‘action team’ – which significantly influences the 
strength of relations in rationalising project policy decisions.   
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The third management action emphasises the importance of minimising cognitive biases in the decision-
making process to achieve a state as a rational agent. Managers need to focus on the motivations and 
justifications which structure practical reasoning, including the diffusion of information and knowledge in 
the relational actor space, towards joint intentions. Being in such a rational state, agents are able to make 
reasoned decisions and commit to the best courses of action to achieve project strategies and benefits. Being 
in such an unique temporary organising institutionalised project reality or environment, also generates rich 
networks of constructive feedback loops where actors’ meanings materialise through sensemaking that 
inform and constrain identity and (inter)actions. It provides ‘clear questions and clear answers’ (Weick 
1993) and enables organisational actors to comprehend the project world and act collectively in 
rationalising decisions. It is of upmost importance for the project manager to create the right team i.e., high 
performing temporary ‘action team,’ with the right expertise that ‘gel’ together to deliver project policies. 
Without achieving such a state of utopian value, a project sponsor or manager should seriously consider 
proceeding with project policies.  
 
Taken together, as is professed by leading scholars (Dalcher 2016, Morris 2013, Turner et al. 2010, Turner 
et al. 2012, Walker and Lloyd-Walker 2016), projects are about people. People are the main drivers of 
project success or failures. The data shows that this is particularly prominent at the front-end of project 
policies i.e., the formation of a high performing temporary action-based project team. Today’s project 
managers should take seriously the human element in the management of projects. Although such 
competencies go beyond ‘traditional’ project management practices, learning the right actions to 
strategically shape institutional project reality can provide significant tangible and intangible value to the 
project sponsor and manager.  
 
This study also revealed areas of limitations and areas for further research including the implementation of 
megaprojects in other industry sectors such as the pharmaceutical or the financial sector, and developing 
countries such as Africa and Latin America. Areas for further research also include the exploration of other 
unknown cognitive biases, examining the interplay of virtual institutions, technological advances or 
disruptions, other forms of temporary organising, and geopolitics, and how they may influence serving the 
real needs of society including meeting the expected surge in the demand for food, water, and energy. The 
larger the world gets the more (or less) demand on resources, and thus the more fractious it gets. 
Infrastructure is a key driver of such growth, demanding more rational and transformational approaches to 
megaprojects.  
 
Although some researchers are heading down a similar path as this research, for example behavioural 
decision-making in projects (Stingl and Geraldi 2017), temporary organising processes and forms (Bakker 
Improving the Link between Project Management and Strategy to Optimise Project Success 
252 
et al. 2016), swift starting action teams (Wildman et al. 2012), and factional interests on megaprojects (Van 
Marrewijk et al. 2016), this research shows solutions to such challenges and recommendations for further 
research. 
9.4 Overall Thesis Conclusions 
City-builders should “mix and blend the various ways of life in the city” to produce “a human image 
[to andreikelon] based on what Homer too called ‘the divine form and image’ [theoeides te kai 
theoeokelon] when it occurred among human beings.” (Benner 2009, p. 493, quoting Socrates) 
This research began with the aim to understand ways to optimise the successful implementation of mega 
public sector infrastructure program of projects. And such a way to achieve this objective is by strategically 
shaping institutional project reality aligned at the front-end with the temporary uniqueness of the 
organisational change initiative. Like city-builders, or painters who’s ‘aim is to sketch a divine model… 
they would take the city and the characters of human beings … and, as they work, they would look often 
in each direction, towards that which by nature is just, fine, moderate, and the like, on the one hand, and 
towards that which they are trying to put into human beings, on the other … until they produced the divine 
form and image’ (Fraenkel 2012, p. 62). Such a process takes ‘work,’ physical and mental work, 
understanding and interpreting the project policy ‘terrain’ towards achieving strategies and benefits.  
 
Leading scholars tend to use the metaphor that organisational strategic decision-making is like being a 
chess master – a master decision-maker seeing emergent tensions (Nutt 2010b). However, this research has 
shown a more accurate representation would be a painter ‘mixing and blending various colours towards the 
divine form and image.’ Like the Creation of Adam by Michelangelo or the Mona Lisa by Leonardo da 
Vinci, they too stand as one of the greatest human achievements, similarly, as do the ancient Egyptian 
monuments and the Colosseum of the Roman Empire, but without the harsh means to justify the end. 
9.5 Summary 
This chapter provided the findings, insights and recommendations for practice and future research. Firstly, 
the achievement of the research objectives, including three contributions to project management research. 
Secondly, insights and recommendations for practice, including eight paradoxes and three management 
actions. And overall, it suggested that the implementation of mega public sector infrastructure program of 
projects is more like a city-builder or painter producing a divine form and image. 
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Participant Organisation Position Years of Public 
Sector Experience 
Type of 
Interview 
Length of 
Interview 
(Minutes) 
1A Infra-GA Director 30 years Face-to-Face 55 
1B Infra-GB Principal Project 
Manager 
40 years Face-to-Face 74 
1C Infra-GC Director 12 years Face-to-Face 33 
2C Infra-GC Director 5 years Face-to-Face 50 
3C Infra-GC Project Manager 40 years Face-to-Face 55 
4C Infra-GC Senior Project 
Officer 
11 years Face-to-Face 47 
5C Infra-GC Project Manager 4 years Face-to-Face 47 
6C Infra-GC Group Manager 12 years Face-to-Face 67 
7C Infra-GC Senior Project 
Officer 
3 years Telephone 59 
8C Infra-GC Senior Program 
Manager 
5 years Telephone 36 
9C Infra-GC Deputy Director 22 years Telephone 30 
10C Infra-PB Project Manager 1 year Face-to-Face  
11C Infra-PB Project Manager 2 years Face-to-Face 70 
1D Infra-PA Principal 
Consultant 
3 years Face-to-Face 45 
1E Infra-PC Partner 20 years Face-to-Face 34 
1F Infra-PB Senior Program 
Manager 
5 years Face-to-Face 40 
1G Infra-GG Project Manager 1 year Face-to-Face 50 
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RMIT University Ethics Approval 
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